The previous chapter demonstrated why the State has three fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property: ending homelessness, protecting public property’s role, and legitimizing coercion and punishment associated with laws that govern public property. It showed why these three duties flow from the State’s overarching fiduciary obligation to prevent and counteract domination.
This chapter demonstrates why the State’s fulfilment of its three fiduciary duties is preferable to other governmental and private mechanisms that address homelessness. The State may resort to ameliorative or coercive mechanisms to address homelessness, such as shelter space increases, zoning strategies, concentration tactics, and dispersal schemes. Yet each of these governmental mechanisms either exacerbates domination or fails to alleviate it. The State abdicates its three fiduciary obligations related to homelessness and public property – and its overarching fiduciary duty to redress domination – when it resorts to these alternatives.
This chapter then explores how unhoused persons have established tent encampments as a private self-help mechanism to protect themselves against domination and enjoy something that resembles a private property right. But as discussed further in Section 8.3, encampments cannot constitute a permanent and complete justification for appropriating public property.Footnote 1 Encampments are inconsistent with the core tenets of a property law regime. They undermine the potential of both private property and public property to neutralize domination. However, encampments can be temporarily and partially justifiable in certain contexts. Ultimately, the fact that individuals cannot justifiably establish permanent encampments as a self-help mechanism further underpins the State’s fiduciary duty to end homelessness.
8.1 Shelter Space Increases
First, one might claim that cities can simply provide more shelters spaces and washrooms to redress homelessness and treat unhoused persons with greater concern and respect. According to this argument, individuals would enjoy greater freedom to obey laws that govern public property if they had more access to resources that promote law-abidingness and that constitute reasonable alternatives to lawbreaking. Chapter 2 demonstrated how this argument underpins certain successful constitutional challenges to laws that govern public property. For instance, courts have struck down laws that prohibit urban camping or sleeping on public property when there were too few shelter spaces to accommodate the city’s unhoused population.Footnote 2 Conversely, courts have upheld these laws provided that sufficient shelter space was available.Footnote 3
There are four important limitations to this argument. First, the argument construes homelessness as a reductive condition where individuals’ needs are limited to survival and law-abidingness.Footnote 4 Purely quantitative assessments of available shelter space construe homelessness as a form of bare-life, which overlooks unhoused persons’ wider needs and interests related to self-actualization, human flourishing, and independence.Footnote 5 Shelters may ensure that individuals are protected against the elements and can obey the law. Yet many shelters cannot provide the requisite privacy and safety that are necessary for human flourishing.Footnote 6 Moreover, many cannot accommodate couples and families, which limits individuals’ intimacy and capacity to forge deeper relationships.Footnote 7 The claim that more shelter spaces and public washrooms can resolve homelessness tends to construe unhoused persons’ liberty in purely negative terms.
Second, quantitative assessments regarding shelter availability may ignore the quality of resources that the State provides to unhoused persons.Footnote 8 Chapter 4 demonstrated how shelters may be unsanitary, dangerous, or overcrowded.Footnote 9 Individuals may be reluctant to use public washrooms for similar reasons.Footnote 10 A strict emphasis on providing more shelter spaces and washrooms to unhoused persons may ignore the problem of nonegalitarian trade-offs that limit individual freedom.Footnote 11
Third, individuals who must stay in a shelter still experience domination without interference. Individuals who must use shelters continue to depend on others’ permission to access these spaces. They still lack a private power to exclude others and the authority to set the agenda over a private space in a manner that fosters autonomy. Individuals who have access to a shelter space may suffer less interference. But they continue to experience domination.
Fourth, the mere provision of more shelter spaces and public washrooms fails to secure unhoused persons’ egalitarian status. Unhoused persons may feel stigmatized because they lack access to housing and must stay in a shelter.Footnote 12 Conversely, individuals may harbor stereotypes and prejudices against shelter residents.Footnote 13 Community members may also oppose homeless shelters due to fears that they increase disorder or crime in the neighborhood.Footnote 14 Opposition to homeless shelters is typically associated with concepts such as NIMBY (not in my back yard) and LULU (local undesirable land use).Footnote 15 Although shelters may confer important benefits to unhoused persons and to society more generally, a community’s residents may oppose them because their costs are concentrated amongst few rightsholders.Footnote 16 Individuals may mobilize politically to block the construction or expansion of homeless shelters within the community.Footnote 17 Organizations may not receive zoning approval due to political and legal pressure from community groups.Footnote 18
These considerations demonstrate why individuals may view homeless shelters and their residents as problematic – a hallmark that unhoused persons lack the status of political equals. The simple provision of shelter spaces and public washrooms neither protects unhoused persons against domination nor treats them with equal concern and respect.
8.2 Zoning, Concentration, and Dispersal Strategies
8.2.1 Zoning
Others claim that zoning strategies can protect public property’s communal worth – an approach that places greater emphasis on the regulation of public space rather than the alleviation of homelessness. Robert Ellickson has advanced a zoning scheme that attempts to confine low-level incivilities and nuisances to certain parts of the city.Footnote 19 He offers a thought experiment where cities could divide public property into three zones, each of which tolerate conduct that is prohibited by municipal ordinances to different degrees.Footnote 20 A small portion of the city’s public spaces – roughly 5 percent – would be designated as a Green Zone that prohibits incivilities such as noise, panhandling, or sleeping on a park bench.Footnote 21 Most of the city’s public property – approximately 90 percent – would be designated as Yellow Zones that allow periodic noise, public intoxication, or panhandling, but proscribe them in most contexts.Footnote 22 Lastly, a small portion of the city – roughly 5 percent – would be designated as a Red Zone that generally permits sleeping on a park bench, public intoxication, panhandling, and noise.Footnote 23
Scholars have critiqued Ellickson’s zoning strategy on various grounds. Jeremy Waldron notes that it would segregate unhoused persons to certain parts of the city and treat them as second-class citizens.Footnote 24 The dichotomy between Green Zones and Red Zones would reinforce rank-ordering between individuals.Footnote 25 Others, such as Stephen Munzer, posit that Ellickson’s proposed zoning strategy can increase risks of violence to unhoused persons because unruly conduct would be concentrated within certain parts of the city.Footnote 26 Furthermore, Ellickson’s proposed zoning scheme could be insulated against effective judicial review.Footnote 27 While municipal ordinances are frequently subject to constitutional review, formal and informal zoning schemes generally are not.Footnote 28 Lastly, Ellickson’s proposed strategy could also exacerbate discrimination and the overpolicing of unhoused persons.Footnote 29 Police officers could selectively enforce certain laws against marginalized persons who are condensed within a confined area that is known to police.Footnote 30 For these reasons, the implementation of Ellickson’s zoning proposal would increase various forms of domination that unhoused persons experience and fail to treat them with equal concern and respect.
8.2.2 Concentration Strategies
Consider concentration strategies next. Nicole Stelle Garnett observes that cities have employed concentration tactics and dispersal strategies to maximize public property’s communal worth.Footnote 31 Historically, certain cities condensed a significant portion of the homeless population within a particular area of the city, such as Skid Row in Los Angeles.Footnote 32 The city concentrated services for unhoused persons within Skid Row to promote the downtown district’s development.Footnote 33 Other cities have implemented homeless campuses that agglomerate various services within a small part of the city, such as shelter spaces, meals, showers, treatment facilities, and more.Footnote 34
Like zoning policies that segregate unhoused persons to certain parts of the city, concentration strategies are objectionable for several reasons. For one, these strategies can be sited disproportionately within racialized or lower-income communities, which disparately impacts their residents and worsens inequality.Footnote 35 Furthermore, tragedies of the commons can occur within areas that are subject to a concentration strategy.Footnote 36 Negative externalities – such as garbage, syringes, and human waste – can accumulate within areas that employ confinement tactics.Footnote 37 Concentration strategies impose significant costs on a limited number individuals who are within or near the concentration area: unhoused persons, business owners, and others.Footnote 38 Lastly, concentration strategies are problematic because they instrumentalize unhoused persons to safeguard others’ liberty and to maximize the value of public property. Unhoused persons are disproportionately burdened with the negative externalities within areas so that these costs are not imposed on others.Footnote 39 For these reasons, confinement tactics fail to express equal concern and respect for unhoused persons because they treat them as means to an end. These strategies ignore that unhoused persons have a shared interest to enjoy equal liberty on public property, and to enjoy public space on equal terms with others.
8.2.3 Dispersal Strategies
Some cities attempt to safeguard public property’s shared value through dispersal strategies. These strategies spread unhoused persons throughout the city rather than confine them to a particular area.Footnote 40 Dispersal strategies exist in various forms, such as trespass ordinances, exclusion orders, intensive ticketing practices, transjurisdictional transport, area restrictions (or Red Zones), and police sweeps.Footnote 41
Katherine Beckett and Steve Herbert observe that cities employ quasi-criminal trespass orders and exclusion orders to regulate homelessness.Footnote 42 For instance, Seattle has used trespass admonishments and park exclusion orders that forbid some individuals from using certain parts of the city.Footnote 43 A trespass admonishment is an agreement between an individual or entity and the police, which authorizes officers to exclude certain individuals from public property.Footnote 44 Once the agreement is concluded, officers can exclude a trespasser without having to secure permission from the property owner in a particular situation.Footnote 45 Trespass admonishments can prohibit individuals from accessing certain public spaces, such as transportation facilities, community centers, and commercial establishments.Footnote 46 Individuals who violate these admonishments can be convicted of criminal trespassing.Footnote 47
Park exclusion orders, for their part, proscribe certain individuals from entering one, several, or all parks within a city.Footnote 48 These exclusion orders can be imposed when individuals violated a municipal ordinance related to a park; for instance, because they camped or urinated in it.Footnote 49 Some cities’ park exclusion orders can last for up to one year.Footnote 50 Like the violation of a trespass admonishment, the violation of a park exclusion order is a criminal offense.Footnote 51
These types of quasi-criminal orders raise various concerns. First, these orders constitute a form of individualized criminal law that results in nonegalitarian coercion.Footnote 52 Notably, the State more heavily regulates and coerces individuals who are subject to these orders.Footnote 53 These orders prohibit only some individuals from engaging in conduct that is lawful for others.Footnote 54
Second, trespass admonishments and park exclusion orders are problematic because they can circumvent traditional criminal law and procedure safeguards.Footnote 55 Police officers require probable cause that someone engaged in unlawful conduct to lawfully arrest them.Footnote 56 And the prosecution must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant engaged in some type of unlawful conduct to secure a conviction.Footnote 57 Two-step orders, such as trespass admonishments and park exclusion orders, facilitate arrests and convictions and circumvent these safeguards. At the first step, these orders may be granted based on some type of unlawful conduct. But at the second step, an individual’s unlawful presence – irrespective of whether they engaged in illegal activity – suffices for an arrest and criminal conviction.Footnote 58 The police can more easily arrest persons – and the prosecution can more easily convict them – based on proof of unlawful presence compared to proof of other types of unlawful conduct that are more difficult to establish and that may incorporate a more demanding fault requirement.Footnote 59
Some cities employ intensive ticketing practices to disperse unhoused persons from public space.Footnote 60 For instance, in the city of Montreal, the number of municipal ordinance citations increased by 700 percent between 1994 and 2004.Footnote 61 Common offenses included public intoxication, consumption of alcohol on public property, loitering, and lying down on a bench or seat on transportation authority property.Footnote 62 The conduct underlying these offenses – being intoxicated, consuming alcohol, loitering, and lying down – are all lawful on private property. However, unhoused persons may violate these laws because they lack a private place to engage in such behavior lawfully.Footnote 63
Intensive ticketing practices are objectionable for several reasons. For one, they contribute to punitive entrenchment.Footnote 64 The fines, fees, surcharges, and collateral consequences associated with fines decrease access to housing and increase the likelihood that unhoused persons will continue to violate municipal ordinances.Footnote 65 Moreover, intensive ticketing practices are ineffective because they fail to address the underlying reasons why individuals violate certain municipal ordinances, for instance, because they lack of access to housing or suffer from substance use disorder.Footnote 66 Lastly, unhoused persons may move to more isolated locations to avoid being fined, which can result in various problems.Footnote 67 They may lack access to sanitation infrastructure, be unable to access resources that are designated for unhoused persons and become more vulnerable to physical or psychological harm.Footnote 68
In some contexts, police officers engage in transjurisdictional transport – also referred to as “dumping” or “starlight tours” – to disperse unhoused persons.Footnote 69 As part of this unlawful and informal practice, police officers transport an individual outside of the jurisdiction and leave them in that location.Footnote 70 Transjurisdictional transport has been used in various provinces, such as Quebec, British Columbia, and Saskatchewan.Footnote 71 In Canada, Indigenous persons have been subject to transjurisdictional transport in various contexts.Footnote 72
Transjurisdictional transport raises an array of concerns. It may subject unhoused persons to trauma, injury, or death.Footnote 73 Individuals who are transported to remote locations – especially in a state of intoxication – are vulnerable to being harmed, kidnapped, or killed by others. Moreover, the unlawful nature of transjurisdictional transport constitutes a form of tortious conduct – such as false imprisonment – or a criminal act – such as unlawful confinement, kidnapping, or criminal negligence.Footnote 74 And police officers have notoriously subjected Indigenous persons to starlight tours, which combine the wrongfulness of forcible confinement, displacement, and discrimination.Footnote 75
Area restrictions (or Red Zones) raise other problems. These restrictions can be imposed as a bail condition pending trial for individuals who are charged with a crime.Footnote 76 Marie-Eve Sylvestre, Céline Bellot, and Nicholas Blomley have shown that unhoused defendants may be prohibited from entering a certain perimeter within a city – or can be excluded from an entire city – as a bail condition.Footnote 77 Like trespass admonishments and park exclusion orders, Red Zones result in nonegalitarian coercion because only some individuals cannot engage in conduct that is lawful for others. Area restriction orders also result in nonegalitarian sacrifices. People experiencing homelessness may not be able to access resources or services – such as safe injection sites, shelters, or treatment centers – that are within the prohibited perimeter.Footnote 78 Furthermore, the violation of these orders can exacerbate punitive entrenchment. Bail breaches may result in additional criminal charges, convictions, or punishment.Footnote 79
Lastly, cities may employ sweeps (or crackdowns) to safeguard public property’s value.Footnote 80 For instance, cities have dismantled homeless encampments, which disperses people experiencing homelessness to other parts of the city.Footnote 81 Encampment sweeps raise a host of concerns. Police officers may confiscate or destroy unhoused persons’ property during these sweeps, including government issued identification, sleeping bags, tents, and medication.Footnote 82 Individuals may have difficulty renting an apartment, opening a bank account, or securing employment without governmental identification.Footnote 83 They must also pay the costs to replace their lost, confiscated, or destroyed property, which detracts from their money to pay rent.
Furthermore, certain studies indicate that encampment sweeps are not an effective deterrent. Scholars conducted a survey study of homeless encampment residents in Honolulu that evaluated how police sweeps affected their decision to stay at a homeless shelter.Footnote 84 Roughly 21 percent of respondents reported that they were less inclined to stay at a shelter following a sweep, while 68 percent reported that the sweep did not impact their decision to sleep on public property.Footnote 85 Sweeps and the dismantling of encampments – especially when cities do not offer support to encampment residents – displace unhoused persons to a new location rather than alleviate homelessness.Footnote 86 Outreach workers may be unable to locate and assist unhoused persons who are displaced following a sweep.Footnote 87 Emotionally salient dispersal strategies may decrease individuals’ trust in the police and in local governments.Footnote 88 Yet unhoused persons’ trust in outreach workers and other personnel is an important factor that can help them secure access to housing.Footnote 89 Police sweeps worsen domination and fail to treat unhoused persons with concern and respect.
8.3 Encampments
Others contend that homeless encampments – or tent cities – are a viable temporary solution to homelessness while individuals lack access to housing.Footnote 90 To be clear, these scholars do not suggest that encampments are a permanent solution to homelessness or a substitute for housing. Instead, they posit that encampments confer various benefits to unhoused persons and acknowledge that encampments also result in various problems.Footnote 91
This section shows how encampments cannot constitute a complete justification for appropriating public property because they result in various problems and are inconsistent with the property law regime.Footnote 92 The term “justification” implies that acts which are normally wrong are morally acceptable in the circumstances.Footnote 93 A complete justification would connote that unhoused persons can appropriate property permanently when they lack other reasonable alternatives.Footnote 94
But encampments can operate as a partial justification in some circumstances. A partial justification denotes that unhoused persons can establish temporary encampments when no other reasonable options exist and the encampment’s benefits outweigh its burdens.Footnote 95 The partially justifiable nature of encampments – a concept acknowledged by judicial decisions – limits the State’s capacity to lawfully displace, coerce, or punish encampment residents who lack adequate alternatives in certain circumstances.Footnote 96
The partial justifiability of encampments also underpins the State’s fiduciary duty to end homelessness; a duty that must be fulfilled for the State to regulate public property and legitimize laws that govern public space. The State must end homelessness because individuals cannot justifiably establish permanent encampments as a self-help mechanism.
8.3.1 The Benefits of Encampments for Unhoused Persons
Encampments can be partially justifiable because they protect unhoused persons fundamental interests when the State abdicates its fiduciary duty to end homelessness. Tent encampments confer various benefits to people experiencing homelessness.Footnote 97 For one, in contrast to shelters or sleeping alone on public property, encampments may better protect unhoused persons’ safety and property.Footnote 98 Encampments provide “safety in numbers” that residents would not otherwise enjoy.Footnote 99 Encampments may also devise governing rules and regulations that aim to safeguard their inhabitants.Footnote 100 They may also use security guards – or impose security duties on residents – to maximize residents’ safety.Footnote 101 These security mechanisms allow encampment residents to store more property in a tent city compared to in other public spaces.Footnote 102
Second, encampments provide a degree of stability, predictability, and autonomy that unhoused persons may not otherwise enjoy.Footnote 103 Whereas some unhoused persons must find a new place to sleep each night, encampment residents may consistently stay in the same place surrounded by friends and acquaintances.Footnote 104 Furthermore, some cities provide sanitation infrastructure and other resources to assist encampment residents, such that they have free access to a place to alleviate their basic needs.Footnote 105 Whereas shelters may impose strict rules and regulations, reach capacity limits, or refuse entry to individuals, encampment residents may be subject to fewer regulations and may benefit from greater autonomy.Footnote 106
Third, encampments offer a sense of belonging and community.Footnote 107 Encampment residents may mutually assist one other and offer vital social and emotional support.Footnote 108 They may form strong friendship bonds because they are experiencing a similar situation.Footnote 109 Samir Junejo notes that certain self-governing aspects of encampments aim to promote a sense of community.Footnote 110 Notably, residents may be required to sign an agreement that they will abide by the encampments’ rules and regulations, which aim to foster mutual respect, cooperation, and cohesion.Footnote 111 Furthermore, some encampments mandate that residents perform various duties – security, maintenance, cleaning – as part of their individual and communal responsibilities.Footnote 112 And unlike shelters, encampments may allow individuals to stay with their partners and pets.Footnote 113
Fourth, compared to homeless shelters, individuals may enjoy more positive, negative, and republican liberty within encampments. Despite their informality and impermanent nature, encampments aim to provide many of the same benefits of housing.Footnote 114 As discussed earlier, individuals may benefit from more privacy, security, and stability within encampments, all of which promote positive liberty as self-actualization. In contrast to individuals who sleep alone on public property, encampment residents may suffer less interference from police officers and from others, which secures negative liberty. They can lawfully do certain things within their tent that are prohibited in public, such as engaging in intimate acts or consuming alcohol. And given the stable nature of encampments, residents may enjoy something akin to an informal power to exclude others from their tent, and to be safeguarded against others’ private power of exclusion.
8.3.2 Problems Associated with Encampments
Encampments also raise important concerns and result in various problems that militate against their justifiability. First, encampments can generate public health concerns.Footnote 115 Human waste, garbage, and syringes can accumulate within and around encampments.Footnote 116 For instance, sanitation and environment workers cleared an encampment in Echo Park, Los Angeles, that was comprised of roughly 160 tents.Footnote 117 The workers cleared approximately 35 tons of trash from the area.Footnote 118 This included roughly 700 lbs of biological waste, including 180 lbs of feces and 564 lbs of urine.Footnote 119 The workers also cleared 300 lbs of hazardous waste and 30 lbs of drug paraphernalia.Footnote 120 Volunteers have recovered thousands of syringes from areas that were used as an encampment in Everett, Washington.Footnote 121 Feces and garbage have also accumulated in other homeless encampments.Footnote 122 Infectious diseases may propagate within tent cities that lack adequate sanitation infrastructure and resources.Footnote 123 Diseases such as Hepatitis A, Typhus, and Shigella bacteria outbreaks have occurred within encampments.Footnote 124 Vermin infestations may also occur in tent cities.Footnote 125 Certain infectious diseases may spread to encampment residents through infected fleas who feed on rats.Footnote 126
Second, encampments can be dangerous.Footnote 127 Encampment residents may experience violence, threats, or harassment during their stay.Footnote 128 And other individuals may be subject to these same realities from encampment residents.Footnote 129 Some cities have experienced a rise of shootings in homeless encampments.Footnote 130 Encampments can also pose fire risks for their residents and for individuals in surrounding areas.Footnote 131 Some unhoused persons have died from fires that occurred within an encampment.Footnote 132 Others risk carbon monoxide poisoning when they heat their tents during winter months.Footnote 133 Police officers have also seized firearms and stolen property from encampments.Footnote 134
Third, encampments can generate negative economic repercussions for businesses, cities, and other individuals. Encampments in urban areas can adversely impact local business and tourism.Footnote 135 Customers may be less willing to frequent businesses that are difficult to access due to tents, tarps, and other objects that obstruct sidewalks.Footnote 136 Encampments residents may occupy the spaces in front of businesses and engage in conduct – such as drug use, loitering, or sidewalk sitting – that disincentivizes patrons from frequenting them.Footnote 137 Some business owners that are in proximity to encampments have experienced property damage, vandalism, threats, and harassment.Footnote 138
Cities bear financial costs related to encampments. The price to clean up encampment sites can be high.Footnote 139 St. Catharines, Ontario – a city of roughly 136,000 people – paid approximately $128,000 of cleaning fees related to encampments in 2021.Footnote 140 While the City of Chicago paid approximately $3.4 million to address encampments during the 2019 fiscal year, San Jose paid roughly $8.6 million to do so.Footnote 141
Fourth, encampments can limit others’ use of public property. Encampments in urban areas may block sidewalks, which can create dangers and difficulties for individuals with mobility issues.Footnote 142 Individuals may be unable to use public parks, squares, or other areas that are occupied by encampments.Footnote 143 Encampment residents who reside in public parks may also engage in conduct that undermines the park’s use as an inclusive space for all, such as public urination and defecation, indecent exposure, public intercourse, and so on.Footnote 144
Fifth, encampments can generate environmental risks and cause damage that necessitates remediation. An unhoused man who unlawfully camped in the Uncompahgre National Forest, Colorado, generated roughly 8,500 lbs of garbage.Footnote 145 The clean-up required a helicopter and forty-eight volunteers.Footnote 146 The individual was eventually sentenced to six months’ imprisonment.Footnote 147 Unlawful encampments in Chilliwack resulted in similar consequences. Twenty-five helicopter loads were required to remove the garbage that accumulated at the encampment.Footnote 148 The encampments created environmental threats. Garbage and waste risked polluting the river and traveling downstream.Footnote 149 Encampments in forests can create fire safety risks in environmentally sensitive areas.Footnote 150 Volunteers cleared over 6,000 lbs of garbage from an abandoned homeless encampment along the James Lake Forest Service Road in British Columbia.Footnote 151 Human waste from encampment residents can also contaminate adjacent waterways and creeks.Footnote 152
8.3.3 Encampments, Justification, and Necessity
Although encampments protect unhoused persons’ fundamental interests, they cannot operate as complete justification for appropriating property permanently.Footnote 153 Encampments operate much like the necessity defense in criminal justice contexts – a defense that is conceptualized as a justification in jurisdictions such as the United States and England and Wales.Footnote 154 Three general conditions must be satisfied for a defendant to invoke the necessity defense successfully.Footnote 155 First, the individual violated the law to avoid impending harm or death.Footnote 156 Second, the individual lacked a reasonable lawful alternative to violating the law.Footnote 157 Third, the harm inflicted through lawbreaking must be comparable or less serious than the harm that the individual averted if they would have obeyed the law.Footnote 158
There are two principal reasons why encampments cannot operate as a complete justificatory defense in contexts of extreme need. First, as Jeremy Waldron argues, the necessity defense applies in contexts where individuals challenge the overinclusiveness of legal rules rather than a distributive justice scheme.Footnote 159 For instance, the law prohibits individuals from breaking and entering into others’ private property.Footnote 160 Yet the necessity defense can succeed where a lost hiker breaks into another’s cabin so that they do not suffer hypothermia or die.Footnote 161 The necessity defense applies to mitigate the crime of breaking and entering’s overinclusiveness; namely, that it does not create an exception for individuals who break and enter into another’s private property to avoid serious harm during an emergency.
Permanent encampments, however, challenge the property law system’s distributive justice scheme rather than the overinclusiveness of a particular rule.Footnote 162 The complete justifiability of encampments would modify the property law system’s allocative scheme from market-based transactions to appropriation based on individual need.Footnote 163 This explains why the necessity defense is generally restricted to one-off emergencies that exemplify a rule’s overinclusiveness rather than chronic situations where necessity can be invoked repeatedly to counteract a distributive scheme’s unjustness.Footnote 164 Although a lost hiker can invoke the necessity defense successfully when they break into another’s cabin during an acute emergency, the defense will be rejected if they appropriate another’s cabin due to chronic poverty.Footnote 165
Second, encampments cannot constitute a complete justification for appropriating public property because they unilaterally limit others’ liberty without consent or authority.Footnote 166 If encampments operated as a complete justification, an individual could unilaterally confer themselves a private property right over public space replete with a private power to exclude others.Footnote 167 In doing so, they would attempt to exercise public powers that individuals lack. Notably, encampment residents would unliterally dictate which land does and does not constitute public property in a manner that binds all – a public power that the State exercises as part of its fiduciary duty to safeguard public property.Footnote 168 Furthermore, encampment residents would also attempt to exercise the equivalent of a public power to confer themselves a need-based private property right that binds all and that operates in parallel with a market-based property system.Footnote 169 In doing so, encampment residents would unilaterally limit others’ freedom to use public property without consent or authority. Yet as discussed in the previous chapter, the State has the public power to establish a mutually binding system of property rights that binds all and does not constitute domination.Footnote 170
These types of concerns explain why courts have rejected the necessity defense when individuals appropriated property due to extreme need. The English Court of Appeal decision Southwark London Borough Council v. Williams is the most notable example.Footnote 171 In Williams a group of unhoused individuals appropriated unused housing that belonged to the city’s borough council.Footnote 172 The individuals repaired some of the housing units.Footnote 173 Approximately 9,000 individuals were on a waiting list to access the borough’s housing.Footnote 174 The city sought possession of the housing units. In response, the defendants invoked the necessity defense.Footnote 175 The court rejected the claim for various reasons. Lord Denning noted that the necessity defense would result in a slippery slope that undermines the property law system’s allocative function.Footnote 176 He suggested that the expansion of the necessity defense could invite anarchy and disorder.Footnote 177 In his view, some individuals would argue that their needs were greater than those of others to appropriate their property.Footnote 178 He posited that others could create situations of need to acquire property through means other than market exchanges.Footnote 179 The court rejected the defendant’s claims for these reasons.
8.3.4 Homeless Encampments As a Partial Justification
Although encampments cannot constitute a complete justification for permanently appropriating public property, they may be temporarily and partially justifiable in certain circumstances.Footnote 180 A partial justification connotes that unhoused persons can establish temporary encampments in certain places when they lack adequate alternatives, provided the benefits of encampments outweigh their burdens.Footnote 181 Furthermore, certain judicial decisions acknowledge how encampments can be partially justifiable on a temporary basis when no other reasonable alternatives exist.Footnote 182
Several interrelated considerations explain why encampments may be partially justifiable in certain contexts.Footnote 183 First, they are partially justified in response to the State’s failure to accommodate unhoused persons within the property system and protect them against domination.Footnote 184 Unhoused persons are unilaterally vulnerable to others’ power of exclusion and to threats of interference by others, including risks of theft and violence.Footnote 185 Yet individuals who reside in encampments enjoy something like an informal power of exclusion and informal protection against others’ exclusionary power, both of which strive to protect their fundamental interests and counteract horizontal domination.Footnote 186 For instance, encampment residents may protect one another’s physical safety, guard each other’s property, and exclude individuals from the encampment because they violated its rules.Footnote 187
Similarly, encampments safeguard their residents against vertical forms of domination. Encampment residents may enjoy greater freedom to alleviate their basic needs in tent cities without having to rely on others’ permission to access private property. Individuals who reside in encampments may also be subject to fewer nonegalitarian trade-offs. In contrast to shelter residents, encampment residents may be able to alleviate their basic needs without having to risk their health, safety, or property.Footnote 188 They may enjoy more freedom because cities may not enforce certain laws that govern public property within encampments.Footnote 189
Encampments can be partially justifiable in certain circumstances because the State abdicates both its overarching duty to protect individuals against domination, and its specific fiduciary duty to end homelessness.Footnote 190 Encampments may help safeguard individuals against domination because the State does not fulfil its duty to do so.Footnote 191 Individuals establish encampments to redress the State’s failure to accommodate unhoused persons within two systems of mutual coercion that secure liberty: the private property system and the public property system.Footnote 192
Second and interrelatedly, encampments may be partially justifiable in certain circumstances because they informally redistribute some of the property law system’s benefits and burdens.Footnote 193 Previous chapters demonstrated how unhoused persons disproportionately bear the property law system’s burdens but enjoy few of its benefits.Footnote 194 Notably, they must constantly fulfil duties not to interfere with others’ private property and are constantly subject to others’ power of exclusion.Footnote 195 Yet others owe no reciprocal duty of noninterference to unhoused persons because they lack private property rights.Footnote 196 By conferring something like an informal power to exclude others and informal protection against others’ power, encampments may unofficially confer benefits and powers to unhoused persons that they would otherwise lack.Footnote 197 To be clear, this power and protection is both limited and informal. But it may be more than what unhoused persons enjoy when they do not stay in encampments.
Third, the primacy of human life over property may partially justify temporary encampments in certain contexts. Encampments may be the only way for individuals to protect their most fundamental needs – such as health, safety, and well-being – because they lack other reasonable alternatives. Like the defense of necessity, the partial justifiability of encampments acknowledges that the sanctity of human life is more important than property.Footnote 198 In some contexts, public property’s role and communal value must temporarily yield to the sanctity of human life where individuals lack access to alternatives that protect their most basic interests.
The partial justifiability of an encampment is conditional to various factors: the availability of adequate shelter space, the placement of the encampment, and a proportionality assessment regarding the benefits and burdens associated with the encampment for its residents and for others.Footnote 199 In other words, encampments can be more or less justifiable depending on the totality of the circumstances. The partial justifiability of encampments is conditional because it applies only in contexts where individuals lack access to alternatives, such as access to housing or to adequate shelter space.Footnote 200 This partial justifiability is temporary because encampments cannot constitute a complete and permanent justification for appropriating public property for the reasons discussed above.Footnote 201 And the right is circumstantial because encampments are more justifiable in some locations – such as in parks or lots – rather than others – on busy city streets or in locations that block access to essential services.Footnote 202
Two interrelated consequences flow from the partial justifiability of encampments in certain circumstances. First, partial justifications may limit the State’s capacity to displace, coerce, or punish unhoused persons who establish encampments because they lack adequate alternatives.Footnote 203 Second and interrelatedly, the partial justifiability of encampments may confer a conditional, temporal, and limited right to set up tents on public property when no other alternatives are available, provided the encampment’s benefits outweigh its burdens.Footnote 204
Courts have recognized that encampments can constitute a partial and temporary justification for occupying public property when unhoused persons lack other reasonable alternatives.Footnote 205 Certain examples illustrate this point. Some courts invalidate laws that comprehensively prohibited urban camping when there was insufficient shelter space for a city’s unhoused population.Footnote 206 In doing so, these courts recognized that individuals enjoy a conditional and limited right to establish encampments to protect their fundamental interests when no other reasonable options were available.Footnote 207 For instance, some judicial decisions permitted unhoused persons to erect tents during nighttime but required these tents to be dismantled during daytime.Footnote 208 More recently, certain courts have struck down an urban camping ban and decided that unhoused persons can maintain encampments during daytime when they lacked access to other alternatives.Footnote 209 Other courts have refused to grant an injunction to clear an encampment in contexts where individuals lacked access to other alternatives, and where the encampment’s benefits outweighed its detrimental effects.Footnote 210
These types of decisions exemplify the partial, temporary, and circumstantial justifiability of encampments in certain contexts. These decisions limit the State’s capacity to prohibit encampments when the State abdicates its fiduciary duty to end homelessness, such that there are too few shelter spaces for the city’s unhoused population. Conversely, these types of decisions recognize a conditional, temporal, and limited right to establish encampments when the State does not fulfil its fiduciary duty to end homelessness.
Ultimately, the partial justifiability of encampments further underpins the State’s duty to end homelessness. The State must fulfil this obligation because individuals cannot unconditionally establish permanent encampments to protect their interests and safeguard themselves against domination. The next chapter shows how the State fulfils this fiduciary duty when it addresses the risk factors associated with homelessness, improves access to housing, and provides emergency shelters and other interim resources until individuals become housed.
8.4 Conclusion
This chapter demonstrated why certain ameliorative and coercive mechanisms related to homelessness fail to alleviate domination. These mechanisms include shelter space increases, zoning proposals, concentration strategies, dispersal tactics, and encampments. It showed why the State fails to fulfil its fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property when it employs these mechanisms.
The concluding parts of this chapter showed why encampments are not a complete and permanent justification for appropriating public property due to extreme need. Although encampments safeguard unhoused persons’ fundamental interests, tent cities result in various problems and are inconsistent with the property system. Yet encampments can be partially and temporarily justifiable in certain circumstances when the State abdicates its fiduciary duty to end homelessness, such that individuals lack access to housing or to adequate shelter spaces.
Ultimately, the fact that individuals cannot justifiably establish permanent encampments as a self-help mechanism further supports the State’s fiduciary duty to end homelessness. Against this backdrop, the following chapter advances concrete proposals for how the State can better fulfil its three fiduciary duties related to homelessness and public property: the duties to end homelessness, safeguard public property’s role and value, and legitimize laws that govern the urban commons.
