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Delegation and the Crisis-Induced Political Development of Bailout Institutions: The Case of Japan Between 1992 and 2003

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  28 October 2015

MIKLÓS SEBŐK*
Affiliation:
Research Fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences, Hungarian Academy of Science, Budapestsebok.miklos@tk.mta.hu
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Abstract

This paper argues for a reappraisal of extant scholarship on delegation in the domain of financial regulation. Through an examination of Japan's experience with financial regulation between 1992 and 2003, it is demonstrated that crisis-induced institutional development entails a shift toward a more flexible, trustee-type bureaucratic structure. While the logic presented in this paper is far from a universally applicable theory of institutional change, it calls into question the relevance of more conventional approaches to the origins of delegation of authority, notably the approach that uses unified and divided government as a key variable. A renewed emphasis on the role of extra-political sources of transfers of authority inside the executive, and also between the legislature and the executive, therefore, is in order.

Information

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2015 
Figure 0

Figure 1.The number and value of cases of financial assistanceNote: As of 31 March 2010. Figures are based on the date when financial assistance was implemented. Monetary grants include subsequent reductions. An asset purchase in FY1998 and monetary grant in FY1999 is counted as the case for FY1998 only. Data source: Deposit Insurance Corporation of Japan, http://www.dic.go.jp/english/e_katsudou/e_katsudou1–2.html.

Figure 1

Table 1.Elections and the type of government in Japan (1989–2010)

Figure 2

Table 1A.Bailout-related legislations and institutions (1990–2003)