In Rousseau and German Idealism: Freedom, Dependence and Necessity, author and assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Warsick, David James, sought to explain the concept of freedom and identify threats and impediments to its achievement in the philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Hegel. In doing so, James emphasized and repeated his view that the ideas and philosophies of these three prominent thinkers were influenced by Rousseau’s philosophy. James specifically focused his analysis on the role of the state, the concepts of perfection, freedom, dependence and necessity in the respective philosophies of Kant, Fichte and Hegel. As a result, he identified dependence on others and necessity as threats to freedom in the philosophies of these three prominent thinkers, prompting him to investigate how each of them attempted to address these particular threats.
The first chapter focuses on Rousseau’s concept of freedom, which regarded dependence as detrimental to its achievement in the context of a civil society. Rousseau recognized that civil society stimulated the achievement of perfection; however, he was also of the opinion that relying on other human beings in order to preserve one’s life, satisfy material needs, and obtain artificial and luxury commodities within spontaneously ordered societies endangers freedom, as well as the achievement of collective perfectibility. More precisely, he believed that the evil nature of human beings, combined with increasing dependence on one another within civil society, creates material inequality and prevents the achievement of collective perfectibility.
In Chapter Two, James explains that Kant, much like Rousseau, regarded dependence as a threat to the achievement of freedom. Kant argued that the egoistical nature of human beings in a civil society engenders a clash of interests, whereby detrimental outcomes are generated for both the individuals and society as a whole. Contrary to Rousseau, however, Kant did not regard material inequality as an obstacle to the achievement of freedom or perfection. In fact, Kant sought to achieve reconciliation between self-interest, which is attained spontaneously, and common will, which is related to human perfectibility. James, meanwhile, argued that self-interest and morality are incompatible because people’s interests are diverse and often clash, which essentially contradicts Kant’s defence of individualism and ethical community.
In the third chapter, James claims that Rousseau’s influence on Fichte’s philosophy was most apparent on the subject of the right to labour, as both of them aimed to achieve common will and equality. Fichte believed that human beings are evil by nature and he was not particularly confident that the spontaneous forces of society were capable of achieving the best possible outcome. As such, he attributed a significant role to the state in terms of achieving human perfectibility via property rights. James responds by pointing out that Fichte’s approach of protecting property rights by relying on deliberate state planning in order to achieve equality and freedom was in conflict with the version of property rights advocated by liberal theory. He further claims that, contrary to Rousseau, Fichte advocated that people with political power form the common will instead of having individual participation form the general will.
In Chapter Four, James explains that, similar to Rousseau, Hegel was conscious of the tension that existed between will and necessity. Like Kant, Hegel defended spontaneous order and believed that the pursuit of self-interest produces beneficial outcomes for society; however, he recognized this practice could also lead to unintended and detrimental outcomes for civil society. As a result, he promoted the laws and institutions of the state as a means for achieving the conditions of freedom and the common interest. Specifically, James states that “Hegel praises Rousseau for making the will into the principle of the state” (143). Thus, he was concerned that Hegel’s rejection of a democratic system would engender the imposition of social order.
Chapter Five shifts the focus back to Fichte, as James explains that Fichte regarded the development of needs as an important part of progress that is correlated with the improvement and expansion of different forms of leisure. In other words, Fichte associated the division of labour with increased leisure. This is important because he was of the view that leisure was essential for the achievement of human perfection, since it promotes the development of the capacity for moral freedom. Thus, Fichte regarded the idleness (that is favourable to laziness and reverie) in Rousseau’s philosophy as a radical evil that is incompatible with the development of human capacities and faculties.
James contends that Kant, Fichte and Hegel were all conscious of the fact that individuals in a spontaneously ordered society are dependent upon the arbitrary wills of others for the satisfaction of their needs, which engenders material, social and political inequality. Contrary to Rousseau, all three believed that it was possible for freedom to be compatible with both necessity and the interdependence of individuals. Although Kant, Fichte and Hegel were ultimately unable to resolve this issue of incompatibility between necessity and freedom, as identified by Rousseau, James claims that they did make significant contributions to advancing the discussion revolving around this problem.
Based on the title of the book, it is evident that the author’s primary objective was to analyze Rousseau’s ideas pertaining to freedom, dependence, and necessity, and compare and contrast them with those of Kant, Fichte and Hegel. However, despite James’ excellent explanation of these concepts, according to the views of Rousseau, Kant, Fichte and Hegel, the book turns out to be relatively one-dimensional, as the author chose to ignore the influences of Wolff, Leibniz, Cameralism and the philosophy of the Ancient Greeks in the development of German Idealism; it is generally well-understood that the roots of German Idealism can be traced back to the discovery of the Greek ideal of life. Additionally, some aspects of important concepts in German Idealism, including perfection, freedom, spontaneity, and the role of the state, can be traced back to the philosophies of Leibniz and Wolff. However, James essentially neglects to mention any contributions made by pre-18th century German philosophers in resolving the problems of necessity and freedom. The views and opinions of these thinkers are important if one is to gain a proper understanding of the concepts of freedom, spontaneity, and perfection in the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Hegel and Rousseau. Despite these shortcomings, this book makes significant contributions to the existing literature on German Idealism; it also provides some interesting critiques of certain defects of the modern market economy based on the views of Rousseau, Kant, Fichte and Hegel.
