A week before I wrote this review, a major earthquake struck Sichuan, China, causing massive damage and claiming tens of thousands of lives. Steve Chan's new book addresses an international question paralleling Sichuan's devastation: Will the rise of China disturb international power tectonics and cause catastrophic war with the United States? This is not an idle question, as the rise of past hegemons and contenders generated major wars that reshaped the international system.
Most academic treatments of China's rise focus exclusively on China. In contrast, Chan intertwines his analysis with a discussion of existing international relations theory, specifically power transition theory. But unlike other power transition analyses of China's rise (e.g., Ronald Tammen et al., Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21 stCentury, 2000), Chan uses his discussion of China's rise to critique power transition theory. He ultimately offers a clear (and optimistic) prediction about China—U.S. relations in the coming decades, and a spirited critique of the leading structural theory of international relations. The book thus admirably accomplishes two tasks.
Chan begins with a review of power transition theory's basic argument that global wars occur when a rising great power reaches parity with the existing dominant state in the international system. If that rising state has major revisionist goals (is dissatisfied with the status quo in power transition terms), war is likely, and is waged to determine whether the international system will retain existing organizing principles or will be revised to conform with the new great power's preferences. In this summary, Chan makes amply clear why power transition theory is the right structural theory for scholars interested in China's rise.
The next few chapters offer a persistent, strident critique of the logic of the theory and particularly of its ease of application to real-world cases. Chan identifies difficulties in anticipating which rising powers are likely to be the dominant state's challengers (in terms of whether they will reach parity with the dominant state, as well as whether rising states have revisionist goals sufficiently large to justify the costs of major war). He supplements these conceptual and measurement questions with detailed criticism of past efforts to address them in power transition analyses of the rise of historical challengers.
Moving back to the current case, Chan argues that China is unlikely to catch the United States in power anytime soon (although to do so, he introduces measures of power new to power transition theory), and further argues that there is more evidence of American than of Chinese dissatisfaction. If no transition, no need to fear war. And if China is not dissatisfied, then it will be unlikely to cause trouble. Chan clearly indicates that he believes the state most threatening to international stability is the United States, not China. He is at his provocative best in Chapter 9 where he speculates about possible U.S.-Chinese conflicts over Taiwan. The conventional power transition wisdom about this major disagreement suggests that the longer it remains unsettled, the riskier the situation becomes. In contrast, Chan suggests that China has clear incentives to wait until de facto reunification occurs through economic linkages, and that the United States has implicitly endorsed the eventual reunification of the two Chinas by pursuing a strategically ambiguous policy of defending Taiwan but forbidding it to declare official independence. Consequently, the United States will have no alternative but to acquiesce to eventual reunification.
I hope that Chan's optimistic forecast of China's long-term foreign policy behavior is correct. I regard many of his criticisms of power transition theory as valid (indeed, I suggest many of them in my own book about power transition theory, Regions of War and Peace, 2002; see especially pp. 27–35). But it is unclear in China, the U.S., and the Power-Transition Theory how the author's discussion of China's rise or his various criticisms of power transition theory combine to suggest how to reformulate the existing theory or to generate a new theory about the rise of great powers. Had he offered a new version of the theory or an entirely new theory, his predictions about U.S.-Chinese relations could have been evaluated as the future unfolds, and thus the future could have been used as evidence that either the old or the new theory is better.
To his credit, Chan admits the absence of theoretical closure. In his concluding chapter, he writes that he chose not to produce a new theory because power transition theory has such great resonance in both the United States and China, and because he finds more to admire in power transition theory than to reject. The implication is that his critiques are motivated by a desire to reformulate the theory rather than to replace it. And here the only shortcoming of the book arises. Specifically, the various critiques do not cumulate because they arise from very different perspectives. In some criticisms, rational choice bargaining theories provide the logical justification, while others are motivated by prospect theory, which suggests a different sort of utility maximization and thus is inconsistent with the bargaining perspective. Even more troublesome, Chan's criticisms about power transition theory and preventive war are justified by reference to offensive realism, a school of thought that is not clearly falsifiable and supported only by anecdotal evidence. Thus, if the criticisms raised here were combined to produce a new-and-improved power transition theory, the result would lack internal logical consistency.
In the 1950s, Ken Organski gave serious consideration to the implications of the Soviet Union's rise. His mental exertions produced power transition theory (for the record, Organski successfully predicted that the USSR would not overtake the United States but that China would; see his World Politics [1958], p. 446). Fifty years later, Steve Chan has thought carefully about the implications of China's rise. Any graduate seminar pairing his book with some standard power transition work will generate a lively discussion. Everyone interested in power transition theory owes thanks to the author for his contributions to the continuing development of this great theoretical tradition.
