The prevailing narrative that the foundations of Turkey's “Kemalist” foreign policy were established on the principles of peace and noninterventionism has been challenged in the last decade by a new wave of international relations scholars. Umut Uzer's Identity and Turkish Foreign Policy is a revisionist contribution to this debate, focusing on the influence of nationalism on Turkey's foreign affairs and, more specifically, the ways in which Turkey's outlook toward external Turks has impacted its foreign policy. Uzer questions whether Turkish foreign policy has lived up to the Kemalist motto “peace at home, peace abroad,” arguing that the Turkish Republic's traditional foreign policy discourse and narrative has been inconsistent with some of its actual policy positions.
According to Uzer, Turks living outside Turkey have always been a dormant consideration for Kemalist foreign policy, one that has motivated Turkey to intervene politically and through the use of force in foreign crises. The extent to which policymakers could pursue a policy of protection/involvement in relation to the status and political conditions of these “outside Turks” has been constrained by external factors, such as Turkey's alliance commitments (e.g., to NATO) and the military balance between Turkey and the host countries of outside Turks. Where such external factors have been minimal, the book argues, Turkey has followed an interventionist policy structured upon a dual political–military pressuring strategy. To develop this argument, the book focuses on three case studies: the annexation of Hatay province in 1939, the invasion of Cyprus in 1974, and the emergence of a new Turkic policy agenda following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991.
The book begins with a discussion of how best to situate Kemalist foreign policy within the literature on state identity, foreign policy, and the impact of nationalism on official decision making. The author's first major argument is that realism has always been the primary lens through which Kemalism viewed the international system, and that ideas and identity have served less to drive policy than to legitimize it. In other words, he asserts that Kemalism emerged as a calculating and rational ideology during the politically fragile reform period of 1925–38. The Kemalist state's emphasis on noninterventionism was less a matter of principle than a defensive stance that sought to eliminate any justification for outside powers to intervene in Turkey's affairs.
Uzer's second chapter looks at the development of different strands of Turkish nationalism and how each one influenced the making of foreign policy. The author identifies three distinct types of Turkish nationalism: the territorially defensive “Kemalist nationalism”; the ethnic-expansionist “Nihal Atsız nationalism”; and the Islamic-conservative “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” that emerged in the late 1970s. Uzer provides an account of how these different nationalisms shaped competing understandings of foreign policy, specifically in relation to Turks living outside Turkey. Kemalist nationalism has been “selectively involved” in the condition of outside Turks, “based on domestic and international variables”; Atsız's ethnonationalism pursued an expansionist and irredentist Pan-Turkism; and Islamist-conservative nationalism has been responsive to the protection of Turks in other countries as a foreign-policy issue only if it can be framed through the intersection of Turkish and Islamic identities (p. 53).
Chapter 3 is a broad exploration of how these different nationalist conceptions have affected the conduct of Turkish foreign affairs, offering an overview of key events, main actors, and policy priorities and providing a framework for understanding the conditions that drive Turkish involvement in foreign affairs. For example, the suppression of Turks abroad has typically triggered the involvement of Turkey only when the major powers were reluctant to intervene on behalf of the outside Turks and settle the dispute themselves and when the target state had little or no external support capable of countering Turkey's involvement (p. 86).
Turkey's first departure from a noninterventionist foreign policy occurred over the question of Hatay, the subject of Chapter 4. A region that came under French Mandate rule after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, Hatay (Alexandretta) was annexed by Turkey in 1939; according to Uzer, the annexation was driven by defensive Kemalist nationalism's dormant grudge over lost Ottoman territories. Chapter 5 looks at the case of Cyprus and at how strategic or realpolitik considerations weighed as heavily as identity concerns on the minds of Turkish foreign policy officials. Tracing the parallel development of Greek Enosis and Turkish nationalist ideologies in Cyprus, this chapter explores Turkey's “discovery” of the Turkish Cypriots from the 1950s onward, sometimes referring to it as the “second Hatay question” (p. 117). Illustrating the point made in Chapter 3, the military balance in relation to Cyprus (similar to Hatay) was a main reason that Turkish policymakers were more enthusiastic about intervention on behalf of “outside Turks” than they were in Russia or Iran.
The sixth chapter looks at the expansion of Turkey's ethnonational awareness in the post-Cold War period, with its “discovery” of the newly emerging Central Asian Turkic republics, focusing especially on the Nagorno–Karabakh conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia as a growing Turkish foreign policy priority. Particularly interesting are the author's astute comparisons in this chapter between Enver Paşa, who diverted a large contingency from the Ottoman army during World War I to unite all Turkic people of Central Asia into a single Turkish empire, and Turgut Özal, the Turkish president from 1989 to 1993 who extended Turkey's influence into the post-Soviet Turkic republics. While Enver had more grandiose plans to unite all Turks (along with a parallel aim of reaching British India during World War I so as to disrupt British access to its most prized colony), Özal's outreach to Central Asia is framed by Uzer as a more pragmatic policy (merged with elements of ethnic-expansionist nationalism, without incorporating militarist or racist elements), driven by Turkey's interest in the post-Soviet Eurasian energy domain, especially natural gas resources. Özal is not known as a follower of the traditional “Kemalist foreign policy”; his maximalist stance in post-Soviet Turkic republics is a very “Enverian” approach that may place him closer to Nihal Atsız's version of Turkish nationalism, but he has never been a Turkish supremacist. His view rather emphasizes Turkey's ethnolinguistic ties to Central Asia in establishing a political unity, a perspective that is shared by Enver Pasha and Nihal Atsız. Uzer also provides an interesting figure, titled “The Ladder of Involvement,” which diagrams the steps through which Turkey has sought to extend its influence, from “financial support” to “declaration of support” to “covert operations” and finally to military intervention and annexation in the cases of Hatay and Cyprus (p. 181).
Uzer's book is a well-written example of revisionist historiography on Turkish foreign policy. Although the case studies of Hatay, Cyprus, and Nagorno–Karabagh illustrate his argument well, one wonders whether these three examples are part of a long-term pattern or outliers to the general Kemalist approach. Uzer argues that nationalist ideology in Turkish foreign policy was limited by power dynamics, such as military balance and alliance patterns, but it is unclear whether this oscillation between realpolitik and ideology is unique to the case of Turkey and Kemalism in the period discussed. Although questioning the “peaceful” credentials of Kemalism in foreign policy is not new in the literature, the book offers three important case studies that give critical substance to an otherwise undercontextualized revisionist line. It is the first study of its kind to approach these three cases in a comparative fashion, providing an explanation of how different nationalist ideologies and the narrative of “external Turks” have influenced Turkish foreign policy.
