This invaluable analysis of al-Qaءida and its milieu, termed the “global Salafi jihad” (p. 61), claims the unique distinction of being an interdisciplinary study written by a retired Central Intelligence Agency case officer, a political sociologist, and a forensic psychiatrist, all of whom happen to be the same individual. On the strength of this research, Marc Sageman has already become a familiar presence at Washington, D.C., policy conferences. Even so, his work shows more commitment to the search for understanding than the marketing of ideas and, accordingly, has left little impression on public debate. The dense text lacks flair.
Sageman distinguishes Salafi jihad from “traditional” defensive jihad against outsiders. The Salafi version involves a violent struggle to replace a government within the Muslim world with a utopian Islamic regime. The global Salafi jihad in turn transfers this war to the “far enemy,” the ostensibly all-powerful non-Muslim ally and patron of the domestic “near enemy” (p. 44). This distinction bounds the work. Out of the biographies of individual mujahedin involved in terrorist attacks against Western powers such as the United States and France, Sageman builds up a pointillist portrait of the global Salafi jihad.
From these points and their connecting lines emerge novel and potent findings. Individuals rarely if ever join the jihad singly or in response to a recruiter's appeal but typically start by forming a clique of like-minded individuals who are not mujahedin. This “bunch of guys” usually comes together outside of its members' countries of origin and progressively develops into an alienated, “disembedded” microsociety with its own norms and values (pp. 101, 147). Frequenting a radical mosque (and, we gather, consuming Internet propaganda) helps to instill a new group identity based on a vicarious “common bond of victimhood based on Islam” (p. 116). Only then, if they happen to meet a well-connected person, may the members of the small group travel abroad to a training camp in hopes of joining the elite team. Should the group pass muster, its members pledge their loyalty and depart as a fully fledged terrorist cell.
The loss of Afghanistan's camps after 2001 left new cells to mobilize themselves and launch attacks within countries such as Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Indonesia, which had until then been sanctuaries. A mention of the Casablanca bombings of May 2003 as a sign of things to come appears prescient in light of subsequent multiple bomb attacks in Saudi Arabia, Spain, Egypt, and Britain. So, too, does a warning that Britain, long a terrorist sanctuary, is “at great risk of terrorist attacks now that access to other targets is denied” (p. 176).
Joining is, therefore, gradual and starts not with uncontained hatred but with dislocation, loneliness, disappointment, and the desire to belong. The insight goes a long way toward explaining how expatriates, university students, and members of France's excluded Muslim minority have come to be so heavily represented in the jihad. Sageman identifies a handful of earlier studies documenting analogous patterns of joining cult and terrorist groups. Another echo also comes to mind: Norman Cohn's classic 1957 study, The Pursuit of the Millennium, which describes multiple outbursts of messianic violence in late medieval Europe among groups of peasants displaced from their original social context in the countryside to the margins of cities.
Sageman's first chapter traces the ideological course of the Salafi jihad through the written works of Sayyid Qutb, Muhammad עAbd al-Salam al-Faraj, Osama bin Laden, and Ayman al-Zawahiri. Chapter 2 reconstructs the history of the movement in Egypt and its subsequent development into the global Salafi jihad while its leaders were exiled to Sudan and Afghanistan during the 1990s. Here, the author emphasizes the predominantly Egyptian leadership of the movement.
Chapter 3 profiles the 172 mujahedin of whom something could be known at the time of publication: their origins, socioeconomic standing, education, religiosity as youth, and marital status. These traits vary across the different regions of the network, which breaks down into four clusters, each almost entirely independent of the others and all originating in distinct places and times from the late 1980s through the 1990s. (War and exile are recurring circumstances.) We are also introduced to the above-described conditions of social isolation under which a large majority of the individuals under study joined the jihad. To Sageman's discomfort, much of this information arises from the pages of the New York Times, Le Monde, and Der Spiegel. Notwithstanding the author's disclaimer that reporters' fascination with leaders and unusual cases may have slanted the evidentiary base, the study stands as something of a monument to the value of investigative journalism.
Chapter 4 explores the three typical stages of joining the jihad through social clique, mosque, and training camp, and illustrates the process with two case studies, one of which is also described in the 9/11 Commission Report. The reader may nevertheless be surprised to rediscover as a group many figures already familiar as individuals. Chapter 5 offers a theoretical perspective on the topology of the jihad network, identifying some important differences between the relatively fragile Southeast Asian cluster and the other, stronger three clusters. Some conclusions follow on how intelligence and law enforcement can most effectively disrupt the system at its weak points, particularly the “human bridges” that connect incipient cells to the larger network (p. 178).
The volume is written straightforwardly and without excessive jargon. Advanced undergraduates should find it accessible. More aggressive editing might have proven beneficial in places, especially where Sageman dwells on correcting the record in matters related to his experiences in government or psychiatry.
A major shortcoming in the book as published is the absence of the data set that underpins its conclusions. An appendix provides the names, aliases, and dates and places of birth of the 172 terrorists, but not where and when each of the future mujahedin joined a clique, what mosques they attended, whom they knew, and where and when they went to join the jihad. A visual depiction of the network is printed too small to label the nodes (i.e., the individuals). This information ought to appear in any future edition, or at the publisher's Website.
