Theories on the manner in which leaders arrive at a given policy decision have been the focus of numerous works over the years. The newest entry into this category of scholarship by Alex Mintz and Carly Wayne challenges traditional decision-making frameworks through the consideration of a complex phenomenon, which they term “Polythink.” Polythink is defined by the authors as “a group dynamic whereby different members in a decision-making unit espouse a plurality of opinions and offer divergent policy prescriptions, and even dissent, which can result in intragroup conflict and a fragmented, disjointed decision-making process” (p. 3). Readers should be forgiven for confusing polythink with multiple advocacy, a similar concept that the authors account for as a structured decision-making technique within polythink. Despite the similarities of the concepts, the authors adequately differentiate the polythink framework and establish its independent theoretical utility. Polythink as a novel decision-making framework encompasses many challenges, and complex policy development realities present in modern bureaucracies and organizations. The authors extend and deepen the arguments of Graham Allison and others to form a robust theory that explains a set of decision outcomes.
At the core of the work is the concept of a policy continuum rooted in Irving Janis’ groupthink theory, wherein a decision group stifles dissent and achieves inefficient decision outcomes, and polythink, in which there are so many decisions and conflicts that it similarly constrains the decision set and also results in sub-optimal outcomes. In-between groupthink and polythink, the authors identify a range of balanced convergence and divergence (con-div) engagement of relevant actors yet constrained on both sides with neither too many options and too much dissent nor too few options and too little dissent. The optimal balance of the con-div group dynamics is case dependent and is best understood in the context of the situation being addressed, considering both the individuals and groups proposing policy options and the decision-maker.
Mintz and Wayne robustly establish the conceptual underpinnings of polythink in the first two chapters. This foundation is significant to the reader because it serves as a constant and often necessary reference point as the theory is applied to cases in subsequent chapters. Generally, the first and second cases on the events leading up to and following the 9/11 attacks, and the challenges faced by a young President Obama in deciding to surge troops in Afghanistan, stand out as the strongest examples of polythink both in analytic fit and in depth of analysis provided by the authors. The authors do note that the theory of polythink is an “ideal” type in much the same way as Janis’ groupthink, yet one comes away from these chapters wondering whether Allison’s bureaucratic, decision-making framework isn’t more compelling.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are well researched and offer a range of insights from diverse sources. Many of the controversies found in the decision-making processes of the Bush and Obama administrations are indicative of failed attempts at multiple advocacy to establish diverse viewpoints from which a President might derive a decision. The structural failings of multiple advocacy, and their subsequent result being polythink, strengthen the core argument of the work: that having unfettered policy options from a plurality of sources does not necessarily result in optimal outcomes. As the authors move away from the Iraq and Afghanistan cases, the multilevel complexities of the Iranian nuclear weapons crisis results in the authors providing insufficient support for the theory within the context of both American and Israeli decision-making processes. A similar problem plagues Chapter 7 on Syria and related issues. Whereas groupthink is readily identifiable, polythink requires more deliberate analysis of the structure of constituent groups and variety of policy options. This complexity challenges the authors and makes shortened case analysis less effective at drawing out the nuances of polythink.
Although the authors at times hint at the importance of polythink to other fields and domains of study, their investigation of its relevance is absent. The addition of reference to other applications and fields instead serves as a call to test and verify the applicability and utility of the theory. This call should be taken up and is likely to prove useful in environments where data are sufficient. The application of polythink to the domestic level within legislative bodies will likely foster novel insights into complex negotiation processes.
At the outset of receiving yet another book investigating non-cognitive approaches to decision-making, I was extremely skeptical. Chapters 3–5 changed my opinion on the value of polythink. The arguments developed by Mintz and Wayne sufficiently establish a new theory of decision-making that is likely to be taken up by future scholars; However, as with all decision-making theories, the insufficient examination conditions or the combining of levels of analysis is likely to prove challenging. In closing, the most valuable aspect of polythink is its ability to provide a logical and well-argued bookend to the decision-making spectrum established Janis.
