The sleeve notes on this impressive volume refer to the author as “forging a reputation as a leading historian of the British Empire and World War II” (since its initial publication earlier last year he has been appointed as professor of imperial and military history at King’s College London). Reading this collection of previously published chapters and articles augmented by revised or newly written material, it is not difficult to see why he is held in such growing acclaim or why this latest study has received such universally noteworthy reviews.

The book’s focus is on imperial defense and the argument that the British colonial empire was central to a system of collective security that permeated strategic planning emanating from Whitehall throughout the twentieth century. In order to examine this thesis, the author explores how “imperial networks were employed to connect imperial resources to Britain’s strategic needs” (x), and, in the process, he seeks to correct a significant omission from much of the established literature in which the former “white” Dominions and India receive the lion’s share of the attention. The British imperial system and how it responded to the challenges of a century marked by the zenith of expansion, global conflict, and, finally, a period of managed decolonization and decline is not a new area for study. Indeed, the author has already contributed a great deal to the debate, perhaps notably with his earlier The British Empire and the Second World War (London, 2006). The prism through which much of the examination is conducted has as its focus the first two great global conflicts of that century, the First and Second World Wars, while the environments that provide the context for much of the argument are generally located in Asia and Africa and the maritime intersection between the two, the Indian Ocean.

There are notable exceptions to these parameters. A particularly vivid and fascinating chapter about Ceylon, a “martial colony” whose close connection with Britain spans over two hundred years, confirms not only the author’s eye for detail but the often delightful prose he employs when constructing his narrative. Another stand-alone, and indeed in this instance standout, chapter succinctly describes how the wider network operated during what would prove to be its greatest challenge, the Second World War. This neatly details the complex interconnected relationship that prevailed; “an interactive system, one vast interconnected whole” (242) that was so successfully activated for one last great imperial stand. It offers a more general discussion of how the British Empire responded and includes some delightful vignettes of wartime incidents and grand wartime characters.

The study’s opening and closing chapters cover just over eighteen pages between them, but they provide an admirable summary of the writer’s key arguments. His colonial world is an “empire made up of fifty or so territories” and various other oddities, mandates, and “informal empire” such as Tanganyika and the Trucial states of the Persian Gulf (2–3), all administered from London by the Colonial Office. Early on he makes the very fair point that if Britain had lost either of the century’s world wars, these territories would have been most unlikely to secure “a nirvana of freedom, economic prosperity, and political significance on the world stage” but instead suffered further colonial rule by powers with “far less benign colonial intentions” than the previous landlord (3–4). This reality was not, however, the reason why their contribution to imperial defense was so great; rather, it was a response to the relationship that existed with Britain and a response to a common threat to security. In addition to providing much needed resources and a critical military infrastructure during the British empire’s wars, their populations supplied hundreds of thousands of volunteers who answered the call to arms and fought wherever they were required often many thousands of miles from their homes and with great uncertainty about terms of service and the welfare of their families. But this phenomenal mobilization has for some reason been “written out of the memory of how Britain fought wars” (4–5), a process that began with the failure to publish an official history. Yet after the war’s end the colonial empire quickly gained a new significance and importance in terms of planning for Cold War security and increasing an important new base as India and the Dominions loosened their long-standing ties (287–88). The final comments are a reminder that Britain still today retains colonial commitments that form a central element to its strategic planning and national defense considerations. While the debate rages currently in British defense circles about future capability and whether it would even be possible to send another task force to some far distant imperiled territory, there is no lack of intent to maintain the security of these diminished but still important imperial legacies.

It is difficult to fault the production of this volume. It benefits from the inclusion of some lovely illustrations drawn from, among other locations, the Sri Lanka National Archives in Colombo. A vast, wide-ranging bibliography merely confirms the many years that have been spent in researching this subject. A real strength, previously alluded to, is the manner in which this study has been written. The task of threading together his previously published material with the newly revised additions is accomplished with great skill to produce a highly informative and well-written monograph that flows extremely well and draws the reader along to great effect. It will appeal to a great many readers, whether they are students of the British Empire or military historians.