In this book, John Bailey mobilises his broad experience in Mexican security to create a model of how the interactions between crime and democracy result in a security trap. Here, tax evasion is widespread, society tolerates informal markets but these intermesh with common crime, organised crime has expanded beyond state control, police and the justice system are corrupt, and political elites and agents of the state enjoy impunity. Bailey explains that the roots of the security trap lie in the historical evolution of exclusionary and violent politics, where weak state institutions intermeshed with personalism, and powerful elites safeguarded their privileges while the masses remained poor and marginalised. Contemporary governments have still not dealt with inequality, while citizens have not bought into the neoliberal economic model, perceive government and the state as inefficient and corrupt, and tend to view compliance with the law as optional. That is, there is no social contract. To make matters worse, political competition under the constraints of no re-election and a mixed electoral system, including party list proportional representation, generates more incentives for politicians to engage in partisan struggles than to respond to citizen demands and cooperate on policy-making. The result? Mexico is in a process of competitive state making. Criminal actors rival political parties for control of territories and their populations, with the former fighting to protect their business interests and the latter for rule-of-law institutional reform.
The book is structured as a series of explanations of interrelated forms of alegality and illegality, their links to the state, and their impact on democracy. One chapter is dedicated to each of informality and tax evasion, common crime, organised crime and drug-trafficking organisations (DTOs), followed by a chapter on state responses and a conclusion dealing with future directions. Tax evasion and informality are advanced as ‘foundational crime’ – they are a widespread, integral part of society and the economy resulting from ineffective policy and poverty. Anyone involved in informal markets or regulatory evasion is usually also active in trading favours or bribes with state officials ostensibly responsible for applying the law. Low-level foundational crime thus generates a culture of street-level corruption whose benefits filter up the bureaucratic ranks, weakening professionalism and democratic transparency.
Bailey shows that homicides and ‘common crime’ – theft, burglary, robbery, kidnapping, assault and extortion perpetrated by three individuals or fewer – as well as more complex forms of organised crime existed in the past, but spiked after 2006. In the 1970s and 1980s, the centralised authoritarian regime regulated DTOs through the police. While crime and violence were already on the rise in other Latin American countries in the 1990s, Mexican rates were declining. But, as the authoritarian regime collapsed, so did the criminal equilibrium. Increasing party competition, political decentralisation, and state repression led to an increase in the number of gangs and the explosion of violence beginning in 2006 and levelling off after 2012.
Common crime appears to have had the highest impact on citizens, whose fear of insecurity far outstrips the actual incidence of crime. Here, too, Bailey argues, the impact on democracy is not negligible. While reliable data are scarce, Bailey constructs a logical analysis to explain that victimisation and fear make citizens less likely to vote, though sometimes more likely to participate in protests. He fears that participation may spill into contentious action, rather than remaining in the democratic arena. Beyond its immediate effect on democracy, common crime is a recruiting ground for organised crime.
Under the heading of organised crime, Bailey differentiates between territorial groups operating at the city or state level and transnational organisations with the resources to manage trans-border networks. Little is known of gang structure, operation and political penetration. Bailey thus uses strategic rationality, and its assumptions of incentives and constraints, to construct models. The first model focuses on interactions between criminal organisations and the state, which range from the most likely and stable scenario of evasion/tolerance, through corruption/collusion, to a transitional state of confrontation/repression – the Mexican dynamic since 2006. In the second model, Bailey hypothesises about DTOs organising in cells and subcontracting to territorial groups, as well as about drug production and distribution scenarios. He contends that the political aspirations of DTOs are limited to protecting their business interests.
The major challenge for the state, according to Bailey, is dealing with the immediate impact of insecurity, while also introducing long-term institutional reform. He analyses the Calderón government's strategy of using the army while the police and justice system were being reformed, and traces the problems undermining reform, including the lack of responsiveness of political representatives at all levels to demands made by civil society, the unwillingness of opposing parties to work together, the dearth of professionalism in the police and justice system, and – especially – poor implementation of policy because of distrust and competition among state agencies. Bailey points out that tangible outcomes of reform are uncertain due to the inadequacy of programme monitoring. Here, too, we lack evidence.
Finally, Bailey asserts that the future will depend on the evolution of criminal groups, civil society mobilisation, party-electoral reform, and police-justice reform. He advocates that reform efforts be driven by all levels of government, funding spread evenly across police and justice agencies, pilot projects established and monitored, and support provided by foreign organisations and governments. He also cautions against proposals for a wholesale copying of Colombia's reform efforts, basing his position on the differences between the two countries and the weaknesses of the Colombian model, especially in terms of human rights violations.
The book is strong in identifying the links among alegality, illegality and corruption; in its analysis of the institutional problems underlying policy failures; and in its evaluation of the relevance of the Colombian experience. However, the contribution on Mexican criminal organisations is slim. Bailey identifies the gaps in our knowledge about them, about their effects on politics, and about the effects of the state's counter-measures, basing the rest of his discussions on exercises in rational logic that use existing evidence (which, as the author indicates, is highly incomplete and often questionable) to generate theories of who might be doing what and why.
