Estrella Trincado’s The Birth of Economic Rhetoric may be small, but it is dense. It is a successful attempt to bring together the corpus of work of two major thinkers through the analysis of their positions on language and communication. For the readers who expect to find the commonalities of two lifelong friends, this book will be a surprise. Trincado highlights the differences, at times radical differences, between David Hume and Adam Smith. Aside from both being Scottish and both being interested in the moral and material historical progress of humankind, Hume and Smith are portrayed as having little in common.
The account of the differences between Hume and Smith culminates in a Hume who justifies and supports nationalism “as a promotion of the identity of a nation” (p. 187) and defense of national character. For Hume, language determines our mind and thoughts, thus allowing and promoting common culture and history. Trincado explicitly links Hume with Johann Gottfried Herder’s Treatise on the Origin of Language (1772), where the word “nationalism” appears for the first time. Adam Smith, on the other hand, according to Trincado, sees language just as a means to express feelings, leaving no space for nationalism or any possible natural differences among “races.” As a matter of fact, Trincado reminds us that Smith, contra Hume, actually criticizes the pride of nations and the idea of innate differences among individuals.
This difference between Hume and Smith, for Trincado, is rooted in the difference between phenomenalism, which Hume embraces, and realism, which Smith defends instead, as well as in their different understanding of human motivations for action. The distance between appearance and reality is what Smith calls “self-deception,” against which the impartial spectator offers a remedy. For Smith, in contrast to Hume, our motivation for action is not utility but curiosity. Rather than sentiments based on pleasure and pain, as Hume describes, Smith sees sympathy, propriety, and gratitude as the base of our sentiments. The implications are notable. For Hume, economic behavior implies not only a desire to gratify desires but a desire to have and seek desires, without which men would fall into languor (p. 153). This places Hume in the category of thinkers, like mercantilists, who see utility in labor, so that, for example, an increased tax burden increases the industriousness of the workers. Hume, in this reading, opens the door to a sort of paternalism: short-sighted individuals need to follow rules set to maintain complex societies. And the survival of institutions becomes his evaluating criterion, so that Hume evaluates freedom for its utilitarian consequences (p. 59). For Smith, on the other hand, natural liberty is independent from utility, generating a distrust of political decision making.
The contrast between Hume and Smith on their understanding of utility shapes also their understanding of trade and value: “For Smith, people do not make judgments as a maximization of their subjectively defined ends; rather they try to better their condition or they reciprocate through the propensity to truck, barter and exchange one thing for another” (p. 158). And indeed, for Smith, “utility is not an exogenous pleasure that determines its value, but rather an endogenous one that depends on how it compares with other goods in the market” (p. 158).
Trincado insists that, for Smith, the approbation that people seek is not linked to either utility or pleasure but to gratitude. For Smith, the only “search for utility is therefore love of system, a love that creates temporal or fictitious illusion, but not pleasure” (p. 90).
That people do not seek the satisfaction of pleasure is testified also by the impulse to better our condition, which is what drives a person to try to become the center of attention by displaying his wealth. In Trincado’s account, for Smith, this natural impulse to better our own condition is what gives us the feeling of joy because it allows us to fully express ourselves and our creativity. It is not an accident, then, that a rich country is joyful: “since subsistence is assured for all its inhabitants, creative capacity is released, not being frightened by subsistence crisis” (p. 165).
The extent of the differences among the two thinkers ranges from suicide to money, according to Trincado, and, for the readers of this journal, I think it is particularly evident in their analysis of institutions. While Smith’s Wealth of Nations is presented as a study of growth under the assumption that there is a natural desire for freedom, Smith “campaign[ing] for freeing the maximum creative capacity of men,” Hume is described as trying to “morally justify ‘existing’ institutions from a certain fear of change” (p. 166).
Aside from an oversight and a typo, claiming that Smith delivered some lectures in 1948 to 1951 (p. 119), which made him so famous that, as a consequence, he was selected to be the tutor of the Duke of Bucchleuch (p. 120), giving no role to the fame of excellence in teaching that his years at the University of Glasgow developed or to the success of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, and aside from the attribution to Smith of an understanding of Central Banking more typical of the twentieth century than of the eighteenth one, this book is a remarkable concentrated account of the main fundamental differences between Hume and Smith.
This is not a book to bring to the beach. It is rather a book that reflects how its author describes Smith’s judgment of good writing: for Smith, the main point about language is veracity, so that a “writer does not want to express ‘anything’ that readers wants to hear, but rather his feelings and thoughts in the most accurate and exact way” (p. 136).
