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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 December 2003
Argument
This article attempts to show that the cultural-historical psychological theory of Aleksandr R. Luria (Luriya)When the spelling of Russian names diverges from the transliteration system used by Science in Context, the transliteration is given in parentheses on the first occurrence. See editors' note in the Summer 2002 issue. and his colleagues is based on the philosophical foundations of historical materialism. It argues in particular that Luria's psychology, neuropsychology, and brain theory are integrated in the same scientific research program and are based on the same philosophical premises, and that his theories must be interpreted in the Marxist context in which they are embedded. Luria's research program asserts that the development of higher mental functions depends on the appropriation of cultural means, particularly language, within social practice. Moreover, the brain structures underlying mental functions are also dependent on the appropriation of cultural means. Luria's clinical diagnosis and his program for rehabilitation of patients with brain lesions are based on his psychological theory and brain theory. The following analysis of Luria's comprehensive program will show that a socio-cultural non-reductive explanation of mental functions and their underlying brain structures may have implications for the philosophical discussion of the mind-brain problem.
A. R. Luria's neuropsychology has usually been considered from the perspective of its contribution to human brain research without adequate attention to the philosophical foundations of his scientific research program that transcends traditional disciplinary boundaries.2
The term “scientific research program” refers to a comprehensive scientific program that includes philosophical premises, theoretical propositions, empirical problems and research, interpretation of empirical data, and conclusions for practical implications (Lakatos 1970).
During the late 1920s and the 1930s Luria, together with Lev Vygotsky (Vygotskiy) and Aleksei Leont'ev (Aleksey Leont'yev), founded the socio-cultural school of psychology in the Soviet Union (Kozulin 1984; 1986; 1990; Van der Veer and Valsiner 1991). Luria writes that their aim was to develop “a comprehensive approach to human psychological processes” based on the philosophical premises of historical materialism (Luria 1979, 40, 43). Another school of Soviet psychology based on Marxist foundations was developed by Rubinstein (Rubinshteyn) ([1958] 1968; [1946] 1971; [1957] 1973; Payne 1968). Whereas Luria's declared commitment to Marxism was considered merely lip service to the political authorities in the Soviet Union, I claim that Luria and his colleagues were sincerely committed to historical materialism and that it shaped the foundations of their cultural-historical psychological theory. I argue that Luria's neuropsychology (and brain theory) was based on his psychological theory and in the last analysis on the philosophical premises of Marxism, and that Luria's anti-reductive approach also stemmed from his commitment to historical materialism. Moreover, the reconstruction of Luria's comprehensive research program within its philosophical framework has implications for the philosophical debate over the mind-body problem.
The claim that Luria and his colleagues developed a psychological school based on Marxist premises needs elaboration, since Marx did not develop a psychology or an explicitly formulated framework for a psychological theory. Although Luria and Vygotsky did not embellish their writings with quotations from Marx, Engels, Lenin, or other Marxist leaders as was commonly done at the time, Luria did express his commitment to Marxism in footnotes and introductions to his books. Beyond their declared commitment to Marxism, Luria and Vygotsky did not formulate in detail the philosophical premises of their psychology or of Luria's scientific research program, whereas Leont'ev and Rubinstein did. From this discussion it becomes apparent that the psychology developed by Vygotsky, Luria, and Leont'ev, as well as that developed by Rubinstein, explain mental functions on the basis of Marxist philosophy, i.e., on the definition of man as a working social animal, and on the assertion that the understanding of human forms of life including consciousness must be derived from research into the concrete social-historical forms of human labor.
The socio-cultural school of psychology accepts that mental functions depend on the biological evolution of the human organism and its brain, but asserts that they are not direct products of biological evolution. Rather the human brain and its functions develop and form during the history of human social life as a consequence of social (material and theoretical) practice. Since this practice changes historically, it is, in principle, impossible to base the explanation of specific mental functions on the structure and activity of the brain alone.3
Therefore, when Leont'ev discusses the explanation of mental functions, he claims that the problem is not the explanation of the directing role of consciousness within human activity, but the explanation of conscious phenomena as a subjective product that reflects social relations as manifested by human action in a world of objects (Leontjew 1982, 125).
This psychology is informed by the Marxian notion of man as a tool-making, tool-using animal. The modes of production and application of these tools are historically transmitted.4
The premises of historical materialism for defining the specific characteristics of man and human existence are formulated in Marx [1867] 1976a, vol. 1, chap. 5; [1845] 1976b; [1845] 1976c; [1859] 1980.
The following principles of Luria's psychology since 1930 are based on these philosophical premises.5
At the beginning of his scientific activity, Luria declared his aim to develop a psychology on Marxist foundations. Some of the questions and themes he formulated during the first years of his scientific activity appear in his later work in neuropsychology. However, his early work (1918–1927) relied on the empiricist approach and the reductive method of natural science (see Luria's attempt to integrate psychoanalysis with Marxism in Luria [1925] 1978a). In his early studies of the mechanisms underlying the organization of human behavior and its disorders in cases of conflict and emotional disturbances (1924–1927), Luria tried to develop a materialist non-reductive psychology, but he did not explicitly refer to human social practice as a central factor in his psychological explanations. Though he rejected reductive materialism for explaining mental functions, he did not offer an alternative materialist explanation (Luria [1932] 1976a, parts I, II). After 1928 (ibid., part III), and clearly after 1930 a drastic change occurred in Luria's philosophical premises. In fact his “mature” psychology, based on the philosophical premises of historical materialism, did not fully crystallize until 1930 (the third chapter in Vygotsky and Luria [1930] 1993, presumably written by Luria, dates before 1930).
Luria does not use the terms “means of production” or “means of representation,” nor does he stress the distinction between these two kinds of means. Most of his (and Vygotsky's) psychological research, concentrates on the role of representational means, especially language, in the development and structure of higher mental functions (Luria [1974] 1976b, 8–10). However, in his early psychological research, Luria studied the relations between the development of material activity with cultural means and cognitive development (Luria 1978b,c,d,e,f). Leont'ev discusses means of production in more detail and draws an analogy between the two kinds of means (Leontjew 1980, 1982; Leont'ev [1972] 1981).
Higher mental functions cannot be innate since their development and the corresponding human behavior depend on active relations of the individual within his specific socio-cultural environment. Moreover, although mental functions belong to a specific individual, they are not “purely” subjective since they depend also on the objective physical and social environment and therefore reflect to some extent properties of this objective reality. The objective reality in which an individual lives and acts is not “purely natural” but includes products of former human social activity. The objects in the environment are endowed with socio-cultural meaning (Leont'ev 1969, 425–426; Leontjew 1980, 281; Luria [1974] 1976b, 8–9; Rubinstein [1957] 1973, 40). Hence mental functions are determined by the historical form of social practice, which depends on the biological and historical subject, on the cultural means, and on the objective reality within which it takes place (Leontjew 1982, 26–27). This socio-cultural approach emphasizes the differences not only in the content but also in the structure of mental functions within different cultural and historical environments.7
“Higher cognitive activities remain sociohistorical in nature, and … the structure of mental activity – not just the specific content but also the general forms basic to all cognitive processes – change in the course of historical development” (Luria [1974] 1976b, 8).
Even the concept of the individual as the owner of his own consciousness, as author of his own thoughts, as the personality responsible for his thoughts and feelings, is not a universal concept, but a purely socio-cultural phenomenon (see Voloshinov [1929] 1986, 34).
Luria's psychological research after 1930 can generally be divided into three groups, each focusing on a different aspect of his assertions on the development and structure of mental functions.9
Throughout this paper, the term ontogenesis will be used as it is used in the English translations of Luria's works to refer to the individual's postnatal development (not from the moment of conception).
For Luria's detailed description of this research, see Luria [1974] 1976b; 1979.
Luria and some colleagues carried out socio-cultural research in 1931 and 1932 to confirm the assertion that the development and structure of mental functions depended on appropriation of cultural means within social practice. Research was conducted in villages and rural regions of Uzbekistan and Kirghiszia in Central Asia where people had lived for generations in conditions of backward economy and illiteracy until drastic socioeconomic and cultural changes were introduced in the mid-1920s (Luria [1974] 1976b, 13–14). Schools were established to overcome illiteracy. Agriculture was collectivized and technological innovations were introduced. Short courses were offered for professional training of pre-school teachers and for teaching techniques of elementary agriculture.12
Luria claimed that if research had been carried out in other places of the Soviet Union that underwent similar cultural and economic changes at that time, such as remote areas of European Russia or northeast Siberia, they would have shown similar results (Luria [1974] 1976b, v-vi). The results of Luria's socio-cultural research were strongly criticized. The critics claimed that the research data were harmful for minority groups in the Soviet Union (ibid., xiv). At that time, the results were published only in a short abstract in the Journal of Genetic Psychology and in a short report in Science (Luria 1931). Another short report of this research was published in 1968 (Cole 1979, 215). A detailed publication of this research appeared only in 1974 (Luria [1974] 1976b).
The subjects belonged to an ethnically homogeneous population who differed in practical and social activities. Two groups included illiterate women or illiterate peasants who maintained traditional economic and cultural life in isolated mountain areas. Other groups included young people who after minimal professional training were actively involved in the socioeconomic and cultural change: a group of collective-farm activists trained to manage the collective farms, a group of women students in short preschool courses (barely literate), and a group of women students at teachers' schools who had previously received two to three years of schooling.13
The illiterate men and women who lived in distant isolated villages maintained an individualistic economy and were not involved in modern social activity or in the new socially organized labor. The women were interviewed by women researchers since men were not allowed into women's quarters.
To study visual perception, classification, and abstraction, an investigator joined a group of subjects, showed them drawings of geometric figures and asked them to name the figures. The non-literate village women named geometric figures as familiar objects. For example, when looking at a square, they named it a window frame; a trapezoid was also named a window frame. A dotted circle and a dotted square were called watches. A complete circle was called a plate, and an incomplete circle was called a bracelet or earring. When asked to say which figures were alike, they classified the geometric forms according to familiar concrete conditions where the object-form usually appeared.
Only the most advanced subjects, the students at teachers' schools, classified geometric figures according to their general configuration (abstracted from concrete conditions) such as a circle, a square, a triangle, etc., even when the figures were incomplete. Most of the other subjects used mainly object-oriented names rather than categorical names. When the subjects were shown pictures of a hammer, a saw, a log, and an ax and were asked to say which ones belonged together, illiterate traditional subjects said that all four things belonged together. When the investigator argued that according to some people only the hammer, saw, and ax belong together, these subjects agreed that a hammer, saw, and ax were tools but insisted that the log had to be there too since these tools are useless without it. Subjects who actively participated in the new socio-cultural and economic way of life immediately classified the working tools as belonging to one category (ibid., 31–47).
The research data showed that perception and classification of objects and of geometric forms by illiterate, traditional subjects was concrete and object-oriented, relying on practical experience. In other words, their forms of cognition and mental activity reflected their concrete and practical experience. For them, the function of words was to establish the practical interrelations among things. When subjects actively participated in new forms of social and economic relations, the structure of their mental functions and processes changed. Since they were now mediated by means of representation (language), their mental functions did not differ from those of educated people who use words for abstracting and generalizing (Luria 1979, 72–84; [1974] 1976b, 13, 17–18, 98–99). Similar results were obtained in tests for categorizing color, perception of visual illusions, logical thought processes (mainly syllogistic reasoning), imagination, and self-awareness.14
For further details, see Luria [1974] 1976b. For the historical setting of Luria's socio-historical research, see Métraux 1987, 7–13.
According to the data, cultural-economic changes, changes in social practice, and appropriation of cultural means resulted in the emergence of new mental functions and changes in the structure of each mental function. Mental functions that had depended directly on the individual's experience or on the functional-concrete conditions became abstract verbal (symbolic) and logical functions that depend on the representational system. For example, although the illiterate peasants were familiar with general concepts such as “tools,” or “working tools,” they categorized objects according to familiar concrete situations from their practical experience. The fact that the illiterate peasants knew the general concepts but refused to use them as criteria for classification confirms Luria's claim that acquiring the means and its application depends on social practice and social interrelations within practice. Accordingly, subjects who had acquired some education and were involved in the activities of the collective, categorized objects according to general concepts, abstracting from direct individual experience or concrete conditions, and relying on the categorization of sophisticated language.
Luria's psychology contends that language is the most important cultural means that affects the development and structure of mental functions. Language does not depend on a particular individual; it is an objective tool, a historically transmitted and accumulated socio-cultural product. Appropriating spoken language is the main factor that affects the child's intellectual and cognitive development from the very first months of life. From the moment of birth, the child's relationship to the surrounding (natural and cultural) objects develops through the mediating help of adults. The child appropriates the language of his environment from adults by shared practice and speech. When adults name objects, they also define the relations between these objects according to the relations established earlier in human history within that language, thus creating in the child new forms for representing reality, for analyzing, generalizing and encoding his own experience (Luria [1974] 1976b, 9). Consequently, all the fundamental cognitive processes of the child are reorganized. In other words, language conditions the development of mental functions by changing the way reality is represented and creating new and complex forms of perception, attention, memory, imagination, thought and action (Luria and Yudovich [1956] 1959, 22–26).
Language is first applied as an external regulating factor when the child performs the verbal instructions of the adult. The child gradually acquires the system of instructions and uses them to regulate his own behavior. Speech, which is primarily a means for communication, becomes the main means for internal analysis and synthesis of reality. Speech also plays a central role in forming complex human behavior such as organized goal-directed activity: Speech is used for verbally formulating goals, for planning their realization and for objectively and critically comparing the outcome with the initial goals.
Luria further claims that the acquisition of speech effects changes in the nervous system by forming new neural connections. He shows that in cases of brain lesions or of abnormal development, the process of forming new connections in the nervous system may be impaired. Therefore, when brain lesions cause speech disturbances, the development of complex mediated mental functions is inhibited (ibid., 30–32).
For instance, when deaf children do not appropriate language and refer to objects by gesture, they are incapable of abstracting the action from the object or of creating abstract concepts, and are limited to categories of objects and conditions that rely on their direct visual and practical experience. Thus deaf children who do not appropriate language do not develop complex perceptual processes. This disturbance can be overcome by acquiring verbal speech. Environmental conditions may also cause retardation in the development of speech, when there is no objective need for active verbal communication within the social environment. Luria's research on twins illustrates such a case (ibid., 34).
Luria's research on twins was carried out in the Bio-Medical Institute in Moscow during the first half of the 1930s. However, most of the research reports from the Bio-Medical Institute were lost, and only a few of the remaining reports were published. Some research data were published in Russian in “Work of the Medical-Genetic Institute” in 1935–1936 (Luria 1979, 81; Cole 1978, xvi; 1979, 215–216). One of Luria's studies on twins was published in English in 1937 (Luria 1936/1937). His research on the development of constructive activity in children was published in Russian in 1948 (Luria [1948] 1978f). In 1956, a short book was published in Russian describing research on the relation between the development of speech and of cognitive processes in a pair of identical twins (Luria and Yudovich [1956] 1959). For a summary of some of Luria's studies on twins, see Luria 1979, chap. 5.
It can be assumed that diversity in the cognitive development of genetically identical twins is due to differences in their environmental conditions, whereas differences in the cognitive development of fraternal twins living in the same environment presumably reflect their genetic differences (Luria 1979, 81–82, 96). Research on twins was customary during the 1930s in order to study the influence of genetic-biological versus environmental factors. One example, focusing on language acquisition, was carried out by Luria on identical twin boys. The twins, who spent most of their time together until the age of five and a half, were retarded in their use and understanding of speech. They often used the same word to indicate an object, an action, or a quality. Their speech was only meaningful when it related to concrete practical situations, and they did not understand grammatically complicated speech or speech abstracted from the direct concrete situation, and did not use speech to regulate or plan their behavior. Unlike their peers, the twins did not engage in complex games that required preplanning, nor did they listen to stories told by the kindergarten teacher (Luria and Yudovich [1956] 1959, 43–57). Their “constructive play was somewhat retarded. … They played together most of the time. … When they did play with others, it was usually in simple chasing games. They never played with other children in creative activities such as drawing or modeling, or in role play” (Luria 1979, 98). Apart from these signs, the twins did not display any general signs of mental retardation, so Luria assumed that it was the “twin situation” that affected their retarded speech development, and in turn, their mental development. The boys were separated in order to evoke an objective need to communicate verbally with other children in their environment. At the same time, twin A, who was the weaker, more passive one, was given special speaking lessons for the correct use of grammar (Luria and Yudovich [1956] 1959, 58–61).
Three months after their separation, the twins' grammatical structure and their use and understanding of speech improved considerably. They began to develop narrative speech and their play activity developed as they started to use language for planning and orienting their behavior (ibid., 87). Luria maintained that the twins' mental development occurred within too short a period to be attributed to “purely natural maturation.” The role of speech in the twins' mental development was also confirmed by the difference in each boy's development. Three months after their separation, twin A, who had received special speaking lessons, showed more progress in the mastery of language, in narrative speech, and in speech comprehension than twin B. When the twins were allowed to play together for a short time in order to compare their development, twin A began to take the leading role in speech and in planned games. Twin B retained superiority in mobile games, running, etc. Ten months after their initial separation, further progress was observed in their use and understanding of speech and in their play activity (ibid., 61–107). The research results confirmed the assertion that the child does not appropriate the complex use of language by just being in the same environment with speaking people, but has to actively participate in social relations that require verbal communication.
Luria's first clinical research in neuropsychology was carried out during the years 1937–1941 with special emphasis on cases of aphasia, when he was professor of psychology and at an advanced stage in his medical studies. His most famous research in neuropsychology began in 1942, when he started treating and rehabilitating cases of brain injuries from World War II (Luria 1979, 56–57, 131, 137–140; Métraux 1994).
When Luria turned to the study of neuropsychology, he had already developed his cultural-historical psychological theory, which maintained that the development and structure of mental functions depend on appropriation of cultural means within social practice and are not a direct product of brain structures and mechanisms. Therefore, Luria did not need to assume the existence of special physiological mechanisms in the human brain in order to explain specific mental functions. Thus he could conclude that the physiological mechanisms underlying the diverse mental functions do not differ in principle from the physiological mechanisms underlying more general (or “simpler”) functions, such as the physiological mechanism of walking or running. Functions of that kind appear not only in humans but also in other animals.
Luria's psychology informs his neuropsychology by maintaining that the structure of specific mental functions depends on the appropriation of cultural means. He claimed that since cultural means differ in different historical periods and within different cultures, there could not be a fixed, innately determined localization of higher mental functions in brain structures. Luria also maintained that there were no essential differences between brains of people from different societies or different historical periods.
One can argue that theories assuming fixed localization of mental functions in the brain are compatible with Luria's philosophical premises and with his psychological theory. After all, one can assume that innate and strictly defined brain areas underlie the different mental functions and that activation of these defined areas depends on certain stimuli from the external cultural environment. However, such localization theories are also compatible with the claim that cultural differences should be ascribed to differences in biological traits and thus do not specifically support explanations that argue from cultural differences. Since socio-cultural differences were at the core of Luria's interests it seems plausible that he therefore rejected the narrow and fixed localization of mental functions in the human brain.
Luria explicitly stated that his approach to neuropsychology stemmed from his psychological theory. He claimed that psychology and neuropsychology were closely interconnected, since neuropsychology was the science studying the brain systems underlying human mental processes (Luria 1973, 16, 42).16
“The attempt to determine the cerebral basis of a particular human mental process must be preceded by a careful study of the structure of that psychological process whose cerebral organization it is hoped to establish and by identification of those of its components which can be classed to some extent among definite systems of the brain” (Luria 1973, 34).
Luria defined consciousness as an ensemble of mental functions – such as conscious perception, voluntary attention, memory, voluntary action, and thought, performed by the brain, but not a direct product of the brain's structures and mechanisms.
According to Luria, the brain structures underlying mental functions are complex functional systems. Each functional system consists of a group of circumscribed brain areas, and each brain area has its specific elementary function. It is the integrated activity of an entire functional brain system that underlies the activity of a higher mental function (Luria [1948] 1963a, 51; 1966, 24–26; 1973, 30–31). These functional systems are formed in the brain according to the laws governing the formation of neural connections for conditioned reflexes and develop when the natural reflexes of the child, (sucking, grabbing etc.) are reorganized as a result of his actions with the objects in his environment. However, the child's actions with objects are determined not only by the physical properties of these objects but also by their socio-cultural meaning (Luria [1962] 1980, 30) since human “mental activity always takes place in a world of objects created during the development of society, is always directed towards them, and is frequently carried out with their aid. Consequently, both the objects and the mechanisms of human activity are greatly enriched, a fact which makes this activity different in principle from the more direct forms of animal behavior” (Luria [1948] 1963a, 39). Hence the socio-cultural environment conditions not only the child's mental processes but also his brain development from the first moments of life. Luria's definition of consciousness and his approach to brain research find expression in the way he defines three principal interconnected concepts in neuropsychology: function, localization, and syndrome.
The definition of the concept of function is crucial to Luria's brain theory. A function is usually defined as a specific role of a particular organ or tissue, such as bile secretion by gall-bladder tissue or insulin secretion by certain cells in the pancreas. This definition is also accepted by most brain researchers studying brain localization (Luria 1979, 123). However, if the emergence and development of mental functions depend on appropriation of cultural means then it is unreasonable to assume that the brain structures underlying mental functions are particular single cells or a specific tissue, with a fixed biologically-predetermined role to perform a higher mental function (ibid., 141). And yet, on the one hand, empirical data from a great deal of research, including Luria's, show specialization of brain areas for specific functions (Luria 1966, 11, 26–27; [1948] 1963a, 50–54). While on the other hand, Luria's clinical data show that disturbances in a certain higher mental function can be the outcome of damage to several different circumscribed cortical areas, and also that damage to a circumscribed area in the cortex may cause a series of disturbances in diverse complex mental functions (Luria 1966, 69).
Having taken these facts into consideration, Luria argued that instead of defining function as the role of a specific circumscribed brain area, function should be defined as a functional system. This definition is based on the characterization of mental functions according to Luria's psychological theory, as well as on Bernstein's (Bernshteyn) physiological theory of motion (Bernstein 1967, 34–35, 107; Luria 1987). In Bernstein's theory, a functional system is characterized by an invariant task performed by diverse means or mechanisms that lead to an invariant result. Accordingly, the complex structure of the functional system in the nervous system consists of a series of afferent and efferent impulses interconnected by a feedback mechanism that enables adjusting the way of performance to the tasks and conditions (Luria [1948] 1963a, 40–41; 1966, 17–18, 70; 1973, 27–29; 1979, 123–124).17
An example that Luria describes in detail is the development of writing (Luria 1973, 31–32; 1979, 126).
According to Luria, “functional systems” are not unique to the human brain. Other complex physiological processes such as digestion or breathing, and complex motor actions such as walking, are not based on a specific function of a particular tissue but depend on the cooperation of a whole system of tissues and organs, including a complex muscle–apparatus and a complex system of structures in the central nervous system. Thus, from a physiological aspect, the concept of a functional system does not introduce any new principle or activity, and could not, in itself, explain the specific characteristics of mental functions (Luria 1966, 20). Rather, it is the variability of the elements that constitute a functional system that serves to explain the dependence of mental development on the appropriation and internalization of cultural means, and speech in particular. Since he claims that speech is a component of several different functional systems, Luria can maintain that external speech and later internal speech are constituents of the structure of all higher mental functions. This can also explain the interrelations between the diverse mental functions. Moreover, it can explain Luria's claim that the relations between different mental functions may change during ontogenesis, when the child appropriates new cultural means. The redefinition of function as a functional system requires redefinition of the localization of mental functions in the brain (Luria 1973, 30; 1979, 126).
Luria points out two features that distinguish the activity of the human brain from the brains of other animals:
Luria's notion of functional brain systems, and the respective definition of localization require that we modify the way we define symptom and diagnose brain injury. Elementary functions may be located in particular tissues of the nervous system. For example, Luria claims that disturbance of general sensation, always indicates damage to the postcentral gyrus or to one of its efferent tracts, whereas loss of part of the visual field indicates a lesion in one of the following locations: the retina, the optic tract, or the visual cortex. Therefore diagnosing a disturbance in an elementary function and determining the exact localization of the brain lesion suffice to locate the function.
Higher mental functions, however, are based on a more complex functional system involving a group of brain areas working in concert. Therefore, a lesion of any one of these brain areas may cause the entire functional system to disintegrate. In such cases, the symptom, i.e. the “loss” of a certain mental function, does not indicate the narrow or fixed localization of that function. Luria maintains that a detailed psychological analysis of the structure of the disturbance is required in each case in order to elucidate the direct causes for its disintegration and determine which brain areas make up the structure of the functional system (ibid., 34–35, 38–39).
Luria's discussion of the necessary conditions for intact voluntary movements and their disintegration in cases of apraxia illustrates his approach to symptom analysis and higher (voluntary) human behavior. Apraxia is manifested by the patient's inability to manipulate objects in certain ways. However, there are several different possible symptoms of apraxia, that is, different disturbances in voluntary movement, each caused by a lesion in a different cortical or sub-cortical brain area. When voluntary movement is intact each one of these brain areas is usually part of the functional system. But in the case of apraxia a detailed analysis of the symptoms is necessary in order to determine the exact location of the lesion underlying the symptoms (ibid., 33–34, 37–38).18
One example illustrating the complex structure of higher mental functions and various types of disturbances is Luria's description of the complex functional system necessary for the intact performance of voluntary movements for manipulating objects (Luria 1973, 35–37). Another example is Luria's analysis of different brain lesions in the functional system of writing (Luria [1962] 1980, 80–81).
However, Luria argues that identifying the symptom is not enough. It is necessary to also specify the exact structure of the symptom. Often, after detailed investigations, symptoms that at first seemed identical turn out to be the consequence of completely different pathological factors. The data from detailed diagnostic procedures are crucial for understanding the brain mechanisms that underlie mental functions, for identifying the specific role of each brain focus, and especially for effectively planning treatment and rehabilitation. Luria claims that in cases of local brain pathology, the general characterization of a symptom is only a preliminary step in the neuropsychological investigation. Further analysis is required in order to fully characterize the symptom-complex or the syndrome, i.e. the whole group of functions that are disturbed when circumscribed brain damage occurs. A syndrome could consist of symptoms that prima facie seem heterogeneous, but in fact are connected by a brain area that is included in several different functional systems. Detailed clinical analysis is needed to determine which groups of processes are – and which groups are not – affected by a lesion in a specific brain focus. For example, local damage in the lower parieto-occipital region of the left hemisphere is manifested by disturbances in the spatial organization of perception and movement, and by some other symptoms. Patients suffering from such a lesion cannot interpret the position of the hands of a clock, they cannot find their bearing on a map, they lose their way in the hospital ward, they cannot solve relatively simple arithmetical problems, they get confused when they have to subtract a one-digit number from a two-digit number, i.e. to solve an arithmetic problem that requires carrying over from the tens. These patients also have difficulty understanding logico-grammatical relations, such as “the father's brother,” “the brother's father,” whereas other processes such as understanding simple grammatical relations, fluent speech and fluency of movement, and understanding or playing musical melodies are not affected. According to Luria, such cases indicate that certain different psychological processes, such as spatial orientation, arithmetic calculations and understanding of complex logico-grammatical structures, have an important connecting link, and therefore belong to the same group of psychological processes (ibid., 39–42).
Luria's definitions of function, localization, and symptom clearly illustrate that his approach to human brain research and clinical analysis of brain lesions stems from his psychological theory. He maintains that the psychological structure of mental functions should be the starting point for diagnosing the symptom-complex caused by a local brain lesion. He further claims that the results of the neuropsychological analysis are useful for analyzing the inner structure of psychological processes that cannot be examined by available psychological research methods.
Luria's theory of “the working brain” relies on his main psychological assertions; on the definitions of functional system, localization, and symptom; and on data from mainly his own research on brain lesions.19
For a comprehensive presentation of Luria's brain theory and some of his clinical work with patients with brain lesions, see Luria 1973. For further detailed research and a general outline of his brain theory, see Luria [1962] 1980.
According to Luria, the human brain consists of three principal functional units that are necessary for any type of normal mental activity:
The functional units are not homogeneous. Each unit consists of a group of brain areas that carry out different specific elementary functions, and accordingly differ in their anatomy and cytoarchitecture. Luria claims that human “conscious activity… always takes place with the participation of all three units, each of which has its role to play in mental processes and makes its contribution to their performance” (ibid., 43).
His analysis of the brain structures underlying mental functions into functional units, and his discussion of the central role of each functional unit are consistent with his psychological theory. However, most of the theory presents general and rather superficial outlines for normal brain activity and does not explain his objection to fixed localization of mental functions in the human brain, nor the variability in the structure of the functional brain systems underlying mental processes. The flexible and dynamic structure of the functional brain systems is illustrated only in Luria's discussion of ontogenesis.
Luria maintains that in the early stages of mental development, mental activity is based
mainly on elementary processes related to reflecting the concrete external environment. For example, young children think in terms of visual images and memory, namely, by recall. Therefore, when confronted with a task of memorizing organized material, young children usually try to memorize this material by vocal rehearsal. Elementary mental activity provides the foundation for developing mental processes of more complex structure, such as abstract thinking by means of abstract concepts. After the development of complex mental activity, even “elementary” mental functions such as perception and memory, are performed by the more complex processes of conceptual analysis and synthesis. Accordingly, an adolescent or adult usually applies logical methods for organizing any material that has to be memorized and recalled, even if the material to be memorized is not originally logically organized. The fact that similar tasks can be performed by different methods during different stages of mental development confirms that the structure of the functional system is dynamic and flexible.
Changes in the structure of mental functions and in the relationship between the fundamental psychological processes during ontogenesis lead to changes in the structure and organization of their underlying brain systems. The circumscribed brain areas that participate in the activity of a particular functional system change, especially in the hierarchical relations of activity between primary, secondary, and tertiary cortical zones and also in the participation of one and the same circumscribed brain area as a component in a wide variety of diverse functional systems.
Therefore, when brain lesions occur at an early age in brain areas that participate in establishing complex mental processes, retardation and anomaly in all the more complex aspects of intellectual functioning occur, and normal mental development is impaired. Generally development of the proper functioning of the secondary cortical zones in the young child depends on the intact structure and functioning of the primary zones. There is a similar dependence of the tertiary cortical zones on the primary and secondary zones. So a lesion in a cortical area responsible for relatively elementary forms of mental activity in the young child impairs the development of higher structures that are based on this activity, for example, a lesion in the secondary areas of the visual cortex impairs visual thought.
In the adult, however, this dependence is reversed. Because the higher cortical zones have already acquired a dominant role, the functioning of the tertiary zones can sometimes compensate for pathological damage to the secondary or primary zones. For example, a lesion to the secondary areas of the occipital (visual) cortex in the adult causes optic agnosia, but does not affect the more complex forms of thought that had already been formed. Adults suffering from such a lesion are not blind: they can still see the individual features of objects, though they cannot visually recognize the whole object or its pictorial representation. Such a lesion in the adult does not affect speech or intellectual functions, and in fact language can be used in order to compensate, to a certain degree, for the visual disturbances. Adult patients who suffer from optic agnosia may compensate for the visual disturbance by analysis and hypothesis based on the perception of individual features, and by comparing details and deducing the meaning of the perceived image. However, a lesion of “higher” areas in the adult leads to disintegration of the more elementary functions that have already developed a complex structure, and therefore now depend on the activity of a higher order of organization in the brain (Luria 1961; 1963b; 1966; 1973, 32–33, 74–75, 116–119, 232–233; 1979, 126–127; [1962] 1980).
Similar differences between children and adults are found in cases of hearing disability. Deafness in an adult does not cause drastic changes in mental functions that have already developed. However, even a relatively minor hearing disturbance at a young age hinders the child's intact acquisition of speech, and therefore delays further mental development and sometimes leads to slight retardation (Luria 1966, 58–59).
These and other examples clearly illustrate the importance Luria ascribes to the role of sensory and motor mechanisms, and to the role of speaking, reading, and writing for mental development. Sensory and motor mechanisms are essential, since Luria asserts that mental development depends on active interrelations with the socio-cultural environment, and that spoken and written language are the main cultural means that condition the development of all higher mental functions.
The close reciprocal interrelations between Luria's psychology and neuropsychology were manifested in his clinical-therapeutic program. He maintained that the “loss” of a higher mental function in a case of circumscribed brain lesion did not indicate the fixed brain localization of that function since the lesioned brain center might have been a component part in the structure of several different mental functions. Damage to any one of the brain centers comprising the structure of the functional system might have caused not only disintegration of the whole system, but also disturbances in other functional systems. Accordingly, the first aim of his diagnostic procedure was to identify the mental functions most severely disturbed by a circumscribed brain lesion. However, this first stage was always followed by tests for secondary disturbances in other mental functions that might have included the damaged brain center in their underlying functional brain system.20
The detailed diagnosis is necessary since “the behavioral changes observed with various circumscribed brain lesions are often very similar in character. In many cases, simple observation can only indicate some of the disturbances affecting the patient's general behavior and perceptual activity, but frequently it cannot establish the basic factors that are responsible for these disturbances or distinguish and evaluate symptoms that are due to various causes, and that differ in their internal structure” (Luria [1962] 1980, 387).
Luria deduced that since the brain mechanisms underlying mental functions were complex functional systems, damage to any one of the circumscribed brain areas could have had a different effect on the performance of the entire functional system. Therefore, diagnosis should focus not only on the tasks that the patient could or could not perform, but should attend also to the quality of the patient's activity, i.e. the patient's specific difficulties and mistakes in performing these tasks. In addition Luria's neuropsychological examination included a series of tests for the patient's state of auditory, optic, kinesthetic, and motor analyses and syntheses, assuming that disturbance in one or more of these sensory processes may have been a direct outcome of the damage to certain areas of the cortex. All these tests were carried out in order to reveal the exact causes for the disorder in a specific activity.
Luria's detailed diagnosis of the entire ensemble of primary and secondary symptoms always included tests for functions that were closely related to the language system: (reconstructive and spontaneous) speech, writing, reading, text comprehension, and problem solving. He tested for these functions even in cases that at first seemed unrelated to language. For example, he assumed that disorders in the motor system – especially disturbances of complex motor actions – often might have been the outcome of damage to some component of the speech system, even when the motor disorder was not directly related to the motor mechanism of the speech system itself. Therefore his diagnosis included tests for a wide variety of functions that did not seem directly related to the prominent disturbance, such as tests for disturbances in external and internal speech. He then also tested for disturbances in other functions related to the language system and to the appropriation and application of sign systems – such as writing, reading, and arithmetic operations (Luria 1966; [1962] 1980).
It is not self evident why Luria ascribes such importance to possible disturbances in the language system in cases of damage to any one of the mental functions. It stems from the assertion that the structure of higher mental functions always includes some components of the language system, since the emergence, development, and structure of higher mental functions depend on the appropriation of cultural means – mainly on language (Luria [1962] 1980, 93, 391–393). Luria's diagnostic procedure reflects his assumption that disturbances in the application of representational means (mainly, but not only, speech) are closely interconnected with other behavioral and mental disorders in cases of brain damage.
The results of the detailed diagnosis of a complex of symptoms are used to determine the specific elementary specialization of the damaged brain center, and to explain the complex structure of the entire group of mental functions connected with the damaged brain center and their interrelations. These results confirm that the brain mechanisms underlying mental functions are complex functional brain systems, and that the inter-functional connections between these brain systems exist because the same brain centers are part of the structure of several different functional systems.
The main purpose of the detailed diagnosis was to plan a rehabilitation program. However, Luria also used the data from detailed diagnoses in cases of circumscribed brain lesions in order to describe the complex structure of the functional brain systems during normal activity of the intact brain. These data were also used to determine the psychological structure of mental functions thus providing data that could not be obtained by psychological tests and research only. Meanwhile the consequences of rehabilitation provided further information on the normal activity of the brain and on the organization of mental functions (Luria 1979, 144).21
“There are several questions to ask and basic principles to apply in diagnosing and treating disruptions of complex psychological functioning by brain lesions. In making a diagnosis, we ask which link, or links, in the normal system of the working constellation of brain zones is disrupted in the patient. Once our analysis has indicated the area of disturbance, we can undertake treatment... In the course of trying to treat a particular disturbance we often modify our diagnosis. After determining which links of the activity are disturbed, we try to use the remaining links, which we supplement with external aids to reconstruct the activity on the basis of a new functional system. A considerable period of retraining may be necessary to build and maintain the new functional system, but at the end of the period it should be possible for the patient to engage in the activity without external assistance” (Luria 1979, 143–144).
Most of Luria's research concerns cases of lesions in circumscribed brain areas. In such cases, rehabilitation of higher mental or behavioral functions cannot be achieved by restoring the activity of the lesioned brain zones since there is no regeneration of destroyed nerve cells in the human brain (Luria [1948] 1963a, 32). Cases of partial spontaneous restoration (or restoration after long rehabilitation training) of mental functions after brain injury are often explained by transfer of the higher mental function to the corresponding area in the opposite hemisphere. Luria rejects this explanation, claiming that restoration of a mental function by such transfer is rare (Luria [1947] 1970, 457). He argues that in most cases, the rehabilitation of a disordered mental function due to local brain damage is possible by reconstructing or reorganizing a new structure for the damaged brain system (Luria [1948] 1963a, 55; [1947] 1970, 382–383).22
When brain damage causes inhibition of the entire activity of brain functioning, Luria recommends the use of medical treatment to cancel the inhibition. When such inhibition is a reaction to the injury by a mental protective state, he recommends combining the medical treatment with psychological therapy. For examples of treatment of speech inhibition in aphasics after brain injury, see Luria [1947] 1970, 375–380, 457.
Sometimes partial or full spontaneous rehabilitation occurs in brain-damaged patients at an unconscious level. For example, lesions to part of the visual field (as an outcome of partial damage to the retina, to the optic nerve, or to the primary visual areas of the cortex) are sometimes spontaneously rehabilitated when quick eye movements are used to reorganize the visual system. Even in cases of brain lesions in parts of the motor cortex that cause paralysis of a certain organ, the damage can sometimes be compensated for in a relatively simple way by performing the movement using other intact parts of the motor system (Luria [1948] 1963a, 52, 55–58).
Rehabilitation of complex functions by compensation is also well known in cases of physical injuries where intact limbs take over the role of the injured or missing limb, and the motor function is unconsciously reorganized. Moreover, it is possible to partly restore the function of a physically injured limb within its own motor system by reorganizing the motor function on a conscious level (ibid., 44–47). The same approach can also be used for rehabilitation in cases of brain damage, when, as in most cases, the rehabilitation does not occur spontaneously. When rehabilitation is not spontaneous, Luria's methods focus on appropriating external cultural means as auxiliary aids for developing new functional brain systems. The damaged functional brain systems will reorganize by including the external auxiliary means in the newly formed functional systems.23
Luria compares two kinds of processes for reorganizing mental functions:
Luria describes the use of auxiliary means to rebuild a disrupted functional system after brain injury by analogy to the use of prostheses to compensate for the amputation of a limb. Suitable auxiliary external aids to compensate for damaged links in the functional system are selected and offered to the patient after diagnosing the complex of symptoms and identifying which brain centers were not damaged. Therefore, each case of rehabilitation requires not only an accurate and detailed diagnosis of the disturbance in the disordered function, but also an accurate diagnosis of the disturbance in the language system and in any other components related to the appropriation and application of cultural means.
The rehabilitation treatment is ultimately aimed at enabling patients to appropriate and internalize the auxiliary means so that they no longer need these aids and can automatically perform the activity that was impaired. However, a prolonged period of retraining may be needed in order to build and stabilize the new functional system. In fact, only in few cases are the external means fully internalized and newly structured internal functional systems formed. In most cases, reorganization of the complex functional system does not become fully automatic or unconscious, but requires constant conscious regulation of the mental function (Luria [1947] 1970, 382, 457–458; 1979, 143–144).24
On the relations between exact diagnosis of the symptom and rehabilitation of disturbed functions by replacing the damaged links with intact links, see Luria 1966, 66.
Rehabilitation after brain injury can be achieved by two different methods. One method can be used only when the brain areas of the more elementary function were not damaged. Repetitious training of some intact residual automatisms can then be used to reorganize the disturbed function on a more primitive and automatic level of activity. However, Luria maintains that this method limits the possibilities for maximum restoration of the mental function.
A better method is transferring the performance of the disturbed function to a higher, conscious level (Luria [1947] 1970, 385) by applying external auxiliary means, especially the language system – speech, writing, reading, and other sign systems – to compensate for the damaged parts of the functional system and reorganize it. Thus speech (or more generally language) is often included in the new structure of the functional system. This method depends on an accurate diagnosis and may require more effort, but according to Luria usually leads to better results, and is the method applied in most of the cases he describes. This is the method he chose in cases of damage to cortical centers that resulted in disturbance of a higher functional system as well as in cases of damage to sub-cortical brain structures. In fact this method is similar to the way mental functions develop in ontogenesis, by applying and internalizing language and other cultural means. During treatment, the patient first acquires the external application of the auxiliary means. At first, the restored activity requires much effort and is performed very slowly. However, after internalization of the auxiliary means, the disordered function reorganizes, and gradually becomes more automatic. In some cases, the patient internalizes this application after long practice; however, the signs of the reorganization rarely disappear completely. Nevertheless, Luria argues that this is the most effective method for the rehabilitation of mental functions after circumscribed brain damage (Luria [1948] 1963a, 62–65, 69, 72–77; [1947] 1970, 387–388). He gives examples of brain-injured patients who could say only a few spontaneous words, but not simple sentences even after several years of attempts to strengthen residual speech automatisms. Two or three months after changing the rehabilitation methods and directing them to conscious reorganization of the defective components, considerable improvement in speech was observed (Luria [1948] 1963a, 73–76).
Another case was a patient who suffered a parasagittal shrapnel wound in the pre-motor area of the cortex (Luria [1947] 1970, 386–387) and lost his ability to perform complex voluntary movement smoothly and skillfully. For instance, he could not voluntarily tap various rhythms with his finger. Attempts to train the patient to perform the action by repeated practice did not help. However, by learning to use external auxiliary means for reorganizing the function on a conscious level, the patient's ability to perform these coordinated movements was restored. When the patient was told to count out loud as he tapped, he immediately managed to master the rhythm. Visual representation of the rhythm as external signs achieved similar results, enabling the patient to tap the rhythm, thus again constructing the new functional system on a conscious level. At first the patient's activity had to be fully conscious, and relied entirely on the mediation of the external auxiliary means. However, after a short period of training he could count internally to himself or create an internal image of the representation, and thus rely on this image to tap the rhythm. On the surface, his activity was identical to the normal activity before brain injury; however, the newly organized function had to be totally conscious, and the patient was aware that the underlying mechanism was different. During treatment, the patient showed great skill in devising auxiliary means to tap the rhythm. Yet if forced to give up verbal mediators, his ability to tap rhythmically was immediately destroyed. Even after a prolonged period of practice, the patient did not develop automatism for this process (for more examples, see Luria, [1948] 1963a, 59–69).
Luria used similar methods of applying external auxiliary means consciously for rehabilitating active thinking. One of the patients, aged 34 years, suffered from a non-penetrating wound of the pre-motor region close to the upper part of the pre-motor area with a parasagittal depressed fracture of the skull. The patient lost automaticity of all the higher mental processes, and although he did not suffer from any motor or articulation problems, he could not perform a continuous series of movements smoothly, and could not produce fluent spontaneous speech. Though the patient had no difficulty in giving short replies to questions, he was incapable of fluent narrative speech. He complained of the loss of fluency of speech and thought. When asked to relate a short story after it was read to him, to write a composition, or to describe a picture, he used separate disjointed phrases, though he could relate the story and describe the picture perfectly in the form of answers to separate questions. During rehabilitation treatment, the patient was given a card with a series of words that could be used as “transition formulas” such as “once upon a time,” “once,” “then,” “however,” “whereas,” “after,” “since.” Using this card, the patient learned fluency in relating a story, describing a picture, or organizing his fragmented thoughts. Initially these formulas were applied as external supports between the separate parts of his description or thoughts. With practice they began to develop spontaneously and the patient started to actively seek the adequate formulas for orienting his thoughts and for developing fluency of thought and of narrative speech (Luria [1948] 1963a, 17–21, 215–220; [1947] 1970, 452–457).
Complete or even partial success of Luria's rehabilitation program demonstrates that by applying external auxiliary means, it is possible to reconstruct a functional brain system from brain components that differ from the original components in the intact brain. Such successful cases of rehabilitation emphasize the cultural-historical nature of higher human mental functions, and refute the assumption that higher mental functions are localized in fixed or innately determined circumscribed brain areas. The fact that it was possible to rehabilitate cases of circumscribed brain damage by applying (and in most successful cases internalizing) external auxiliary means shows that cultural means and their appropriation are crucial for the development and structure of mental functions. Successful rehabilitation by Luria's methods confirms the assumption that the development of mental functions and their structure are culturally dependent. In addition it confirms Luria's assertion that the development of mental functions during ontogenesis depends on the appropriation of cultural means. In fact, Luria's clinical work, i.e. his methods of diagnosis and rehabilitation confirm his main psychological and neuropsychological assertions.
Until now Luria's psychology, his brain research, and his clinical methods had each been considered separately according to the accepted standards of disciplinary boundaries.25
For examples illustrating the importance and relevance of Luria's scientific studies for contemporary psychology, neuropsychology, and rehabilitative treatment, see Aphasiology 1995; Christensen 1996; Goldberg 1990; Jantzen 1994.
Vocate's (1987) attempt to integrate Luria's different fields of research and publications by presenting the relations between spoken language and higher mental functions does not offer a unifying principle that links the variety of fields and subjects in Luria's scientific work. M. Cole states that Luria's account of his fifty-year career (Luria 1979) “explained many connections among the apparently separate lines of research he and his colleagues had pursued: cross cultural variation in thought, language and thought in mentally retarded children, the neuropsychology of brain damage, the development of memory and attention, comparison among identical and fraternal twins and so on” (Cole 1996, 107). However, beyond this statement, Cole does not explain the presumed connections between Luria's diverse research areas.
Luria changed his research fields during different periods of his life. Cole explains that this was a consequence of the changing socio-political conditions in the Soviet Union, and not necessarily Luria's personal choice. Cole also argues that Luria chose the suitable time for publishing his research work according to political and social conditions, and that he adjusted his writing style to the demands of the political authorities at the time of publication (Cole 1979, 217–221). However, Luria did not directly refer to the influence of political conditions on his scientific work in his autobiography (Luria 1979).
My reconstruction of Luria's scientific research program shows that though Luria probably adjusted his writing style to the demands of the socio-political conditions, he did not deviate from the guidelines of his research program, based on the philosophical premises of historical materialism, on the theoretical framework formulated by himself and by Vygotsky, and on a specific methodology adapted to each type of research. Each and every experiment in all his work was planned to fill an empty space within his comprehensive research program. Moreover, though Luria adopted some ideas from various psychological schools (such as Pavlov's reflex theory), he did not interweave in his studies any assertions that were contradictory to the framework of his comprehensive program. When his research is considered from the perspective of the philosophical and theoretical premises that formed the framework for formulating the research problems, a close connection can be drawn between all the subjects and fields of his research. Hence, he could present his scientific work as a process of interrelated stages without referring to the political and social pressures that forced him to change his research areas. From this perspective it can be argued that Luria's comprehensive research program did not depend on the transient social or political factors that created the conditions for one or the other specific research, or on the writing style of certain research at a particular time.
The reconstruction of Luria's comprehensive research program within the framework of its philosophical foundations does not imply that Luria was not influenced by various traditions and scientific ideas. However it indicates that he incorporated into his research program only those parts of other traditions that were either compatible with the philosophical premises of his research program, or were modified accordingly.
Since according to Luria mental functions are a product of development within a socio-cultural environment, any approach assuming that mental functions are ahistorical or universal is ruled out.29
For a short discussion of the socio-historically determined subject within the context of Vygotsky's research program, see Métraux 1996.
From Luria's claim that the structure of mental functions changes and develops during ontogenesis, it follows that their underlying brain structures are flexible and dynamic. His rehabilitation methods are based on the assumption that it is possible to perform an invariant task by variable means, and that it may be possible to reconstruct or reorganize functional brain systems after brain injury by a process similar to that of mental development in ontogenesis. Accordingly, these methods focus on restructuring or reorganizing neural connections in the flexibly and dynamically changing functional brain systems underlying mental functions by actively appropriating and internalizing auxiliary means.
Luria's research program offers a genetic-developmental explanation for mental functions that focuses attention on the cultural and social aspects of human life. I argue that his program presents a non-reductive approach to the scientific explanation of higher mental functions and their relations to the brain. Reductive approaches often start out by formulating a dichotomy between mental functions and innately determined and fixed brain structures and mechanisms. They then attempt to bridge this gap and explain even the end product – such as logical thinking – by reducing it to the most basic neurophysiological processes (e.g., Churchland 1986; Crick 1994; Searle 1992; Shear 1997). Moreover, by ignoring human activity (and its cultural and social context), such approaches create a dichotomy between thought and action. Whereas Luria's genetic-developmental explanation of mental functions does not eliminate the dichotomy between higher mental functions and the brain, it offers a social explanation for the development of this apparent dichotomy. His explanation starts from the fact that man is a laboring social animal, and maintains that mental functions, i.e. “human conscious activity” (Luria 1973, 31), develop in stages, depending on human action, specifically on physical actions with cultural means within social practice. The products of each developmental level form the substrate for activity in the next, higher, developmental level. Thus, higher mental functions are explained by gradually reconstructing the hierarchical levels of their development.30
Vygotsky's theory of concept formation during ontogenesis illustrates the method of genetic-developmental explanation (Vygotsky [1934] 1986).