Introduction
In a recent essay entitled Faith and Reason,Footnote 1 Duncan Pritchard proposes a view of the Christian faith that he calls ‘quasi-fideism’. In this view, the fact that faith is grounded on a-rational commitments, i.e., commitments too deep for rational defence and unresponsive to rational criteria, is not conducive to fideism. It does not render faith extraneous to rational evaluation. In fact – so Pritchard argues – a-rational commitments constitute the ground for non-religious or ordinary belief as well. As a result, there is no reason for considering Christian belief ultimately as different from rational belief.
The proposal in question is worthy of consideration. It makes a significant contribution to the contemporary debate on the relationship between religious and ordinary belief. The former is usually considered a-rational, while the latter is ordinarily seen as rational or perfectly responsive to rational criteria. For Pritchard, instead, any belief relies on a-rational commitments. The author of FR backs up his thesis using the final notebooks of Ludwig Wittgenstein published as On Certainty, and also takes into account the masterwork of John Henry Newman – An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent. Both works, in fact, point out that the epistemic status of ordinary beliefs is different from what we ordinarily assume it to be, precisely because such beliefs seem often to be rationally groundless.
The a-rational commitments which are of interest to Pritchard are not even beliefs strictly speaking. As previously mentioned, for him they are not answerable to rational considerations, as would be the case when one continues to hold one's belief despite contrary evidence. Philosophically speaking, however, Wittgenstein's hinge commitments – which Pritchard considers a-rational – do not have anything to do with beliefs that are held although convincing evidence to the contrary seems to be provided. In their case, in fact, no convincing evidence to the contrary is available – on the one hand – while favourable evidence, though indirect, is provided – on the other.
In this essay, I intend to show that Pritchard's thesis, which he advances in the context of the philosophical debate, can be supported by the theological reflection on faith and reason contained in one of the most significant works of the Christian tradition: the Summa theologica by Thomas Aquinas. This work, in fact, supports the idea that both religious and rational belief are based on a-rational commitments. (It is easy to imagine that Thomas's thoughts on this matter can also be found elsewhere. For the sake of conciseness, however, I am going to mainly make reference to this masterpiece, which is usually regarded as the most clear and concise presentation of Aquinas's ideas. I will therefore quote from other works of his only when strictly necessary.)
In the first section of this essay, I show that Pritchard's conviction that religious belief retains a double dimension – a-rational and rational – can be found in Aquinas's reflection. While focusing on faith, Aquinas distinguishes between its object – which he finds that resists any rational explanation – and its signs – which instead can be attained by reason.
In the second section, I elaborate on rational belief, and show that Pritchard's stance on reason can be supported by Aquinas's theological reflection as well. On the basis of some Thomistic passages, which have often been neglected by scholars of Aquinas, I argue that for the medieval theologian a-rational factors play a significant role in the rational process that he calls ‘scientia’.
In the third section, I argue that Pritchard's thesis, while in one sense consistent with Aquinas's theological conception of faith and reason, taken in that sense would not be consistent with Wittgenstein's position on hinge propositions.
I therefore conclude that the parity argument between faith and reason proposed by Pritchard from a philosophical standpoint should be abandoned, although I do not exclude that it may be re-proposed on a new basis, namely, if Aquinas's theological stance were reinterpreted so as to point out unexpected connections between theology and philosophy. (This is – I believe – the reason why Pritchard's exploration of possible common grounds between religious and ordinary belief is especially worthy of consideration.)
1. On faith and its double dimension
Pritchard's argument focuses on rational beliefs, which he considers based on foundations that are not responsive to rational investigation. He does not explore faith, and takes for granted the assumption that faith is typically characterized by a-rational commitments. Although FR's objective is not to investigate faith and its nature, however, Pritchard's proposal needs to be presented in this section specifically devoted to religious belief, in order to show that his proposal can be supported by Aquinas's theological doctrine of faith.
I have already mentioned the parity argument applied in FR.Footnote 2 Pritchard points out that his view of a ‘quasi-fideism’ approaches this argument in a more radical way than Reformed epistemologists do. While Plantinga, Alston and others have used this argument to show that religious belief can be as rational as other kinds of belief ordinarily considered rational, ‘quasi-fideism takes a more radical line. According to the quasi-fideist, our everyday beliefs that we take to be through-and-through rational in fact presuppose fundamental a-rational commitments – i.e., commitments which are not rationally grounded’.Footnote 3 In other words, instead of insisting on the shared possession of rationality between faith and reason, it is the a-rational foundation of any belief that should be explored. For this reason Pritchard refers to Wittgenstein's metaphor of a hinge. For the author of On Certainty, ‘the questions that we raise and our doubts depend upon the fact that some propositions are exempt from doubt, are as it were like hinges on which those turn’.Footnote 4 Wittgenstein says that we cannot doubt every belief, because this would ‘drag everything with it and plunge it into chaos’.Footnote 5 A similar stance is held by Newman, whose view of the foundation of ordinary belief expressed in An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent may have influenced – so Pritchard hypothesizes – Wittgenstein's view of hinge commitments.Footnote 6 As a matter of fact, Wittgenstein's remarks mentioned above clearly echo Newman's claim about the possibility of universal doubt. The author of the Grammar firmly rejects the hypothesis that ‘we ought to begin with a universal doubt’. Ironically, so he argues, this ‘is of all assumptions the greatest’, because ‘doubt itself is a positive state, and implies a definite habit of mind, and thereby necessarily involves a system of principles and doctrines all its own.’Footnote 7 Newman's refusal of universal doubt was clearly due to his conviction that not only religious belief but also ordinary belief lacks the high epistemic support proposed by Locke in the fourth book of his Essay. Like Wittgenstein, the author of the Grammar was convinced that our beliefs seem often to be groundless and at the same time indubitable, which is precisely the conviction supported by Pritchard, who claims that ‘it is in the very nature of rational evaluations that they take place relative to hinge commitments which are both groundless and indubitable’.Footnote 8 As a result, if not only faith but also rational belief lies on a-rational commitments, then there is no reason to see faith as extraneous to normal epistemological considerations: ‘if the alleged epistemic defect in religious belief were shown to be found in non-religious belief, then this would not be grounds for scepticism about the epistemology of religious belief, specifically, but rather grounds for a general epistemological scepticism.’Footnote 9 (Whether this stance is really acceptable from a philosophical standpoint, as Pritchard assumes, is precisely what I intend to assess in the course of this essay.)
The idea that faith is not extraneous to rational criteria, yet at the same time is mainly based on a-rational commitments has consistently been developed in the Summa theologiae. For Aquinas, faith is ‘an act of the intellect assenting to the Divine Truth at the command of the will moved by the grace of God.’Footnote 10 Faith is formally an intellectual act, namely, a type of knowledge – adherence to Christ implies a kind of knowledge about him and his message. However, this kind of knowledge lacks a fundamental aspect of any knowledge, i.e., the evidence of the object. (‘Object’ is employed here as a synonym of ‘Christian beliefs’ as well as ‘revealed truths’ or ‘truths of faith’, namely, all of the statements that the faithful assume to be true and revealed by God.) But what exactly does Aquinas mean by ‘evidence’? Evidence is the quality due to which some objects, ‘of themselves, move the intellect or the senses to knowledge of them.’Footnote 11 Unlike the object of any rational belief, the object of faith is not evident, which is why the assent of faith is given only ‘at the command of the will moved by the grace of God.’ For Aquinas, ‘those things which are of faith surpass human reason. Hence, they do not come to man's knowledge, unless God reveals them’. In addition, ‘since man, by assenting to matters of faith, is raised above his nature, this must needs accrue to him from some supernatural principle moving him inwardly; and this is God.’Footnote 12 In conclusion, what moves the believer to assent to the revelation is ‘the inward instinct of the divine invitation.’Footnote 13 To put it otherwise, God is ‘the chief and proper cause of faith.’Footnote 14
By pointing out that the object of faith is not evident, and consequently the faithful accept the truths of faith only thanks to divine grace, Aquinas clearly emphasizes the a-rational foundation of religious belief. In addition, this acceptance must be totally firm, and the believers are expected to be sure that statements such as ‘Jesus is the Son of God’ or ‘He is risen from the dead’ are true. For Aquinas, this firmness is granted by divine grace, and this is why it surpasses the firmness given by intellectual virtues such as intellect, science, and wisdom. In fact, the former is due to God – who cannot fail – while the latter is due to human reason – which is fallible.Footnote 15 (Moreover, this persuasion itself – it is God who moves inwardly the believers – is supposed to be accepted by faith, and consequently taken by the faithful as more certain than any other statement.) As John Jenkins points out, in Aquinas's view ‘the faithful hold the articles of faith with even greater certainty than the principle of non-contradiction’.Footnote 16 It goes without saying that the firm assent that the believers are required to give to the truths of faith lacks rational foundations, because no evidence can justify such a high level of certainty. In conclusion, since the certainty in question is due to divine grace, it is a-rational: it is too deep for rational defense and unresponsive to rational considerations.
From this, however, does not follow that religious belief lacks rational support of any kind. For Aquinas, there are many arguments for the divine revelation. They show that such revelation is not internally inconsistent, namely, its statements are coherently related to one another. The arguments at hand are not able to support the certainty that the believer is required to have, but they show that the Christian belief is not unresponsive to rational considerations. To make this point clearer, it is helpful to refer to Aquinas's distinction between believing and seeing, which correspond to the object and the signs of faith respectively. I have already shown that the object of faith consists of those statements that are taken as true although evidence in their support is missing. For Aquinas, the object of faith can only be believed. On the other hand, faith can to a certain extent be supported by signs, namely, arguments that are in themselves evident and point to the content of faith though are not able to show its truth. These signs can be seen, because they are evident, namely, are acquired by reason. Let us consider the following passage:
Those things which come under faith can be considered in two ways. First, in particular; and thus they cannot be seen and believed at the same time, as shown above. Secondly, in general, that is, under the common aspect of credibility; and in this way they are seen by the believer. For he would not believe unless, on the evidence of signs, or of something similar, he saw that they ought to be believed.Footnote 17
Any statement can either be seen, namely, attained by reason, or believed, namely, accepted by grace. Since the truths of faith cannot be seen – with the exception of the ones Aquinas notoriously calls preambles of faith Footnote 18 – it must be concluded that they can only be believed. The signs of faith are instead in themselves evident and show that the object of faith may be true. Aquinas says that the truths of faith can be known but ‘non quasi demonstrative’, namely, only in a limited sense. The faithful, in fact, ‘know them [the truths of faith] not as by demonstration’.Footnote 19 In other words, while the believer does not know that the statements of faith are true, he or she knows that they are not impossible: ‘The reasons employed by holy men to prove things that are of faith are not demonstrations’; they are ‘persuasive arguments showing that what is proposed to our faith is not impossible’.Footnote 20 This view is further confirmed in a well-known passage of his Comments on Boethius's De Trinitate, in which Aquinas wonders ‘whether in the science of faith, which is concerning God, it is permissible to use the rational arguments of the natural philosophers’. Thomas first points out a general principle according to which
the light of faith, which is gratuitously infused into our minds, does not destroy the natural light of cognition, which is in us by nature. For although the natural light of the human mind is insufficient to reveal those truths revealed by faith, yet it is impossible that those things which God has manifested to us by faith should be contrary to those which are evident to us by natural knowledge.Footnote 21
Then Aquinas argues that there are three ways to use reason in religious matters. Only one of them is of interest for the present purpose. (The others concern the preambles of faith, which I have already mentioned above, and the so-called ‘negative apologetics’.) It is the way we follow in order ‘to give a clearer notion, by certain similitudes, of the truths of faith, as Augustine in his book, De Trinitate, employed any comparisons taken from the teachings of the philosophers to aid understanding of the Trinity’.Footnote 22 Obviously, ‘similitudes’ and ‘comparisons’, while in themselves rational arguments, only partially support the revealed truth, because they can only show that such revelation is not impossible.
In conclusion, the view of faith that Pritchard calls ‘quasi-fideism’ can find support in Aquinas's doctrine, according to which faith is – on the one hand – due to God's grace, and is consequently a-rational, while – on the other hand – it can be investigated by reason, and is therefore responsive to rational criteria.
2. On reason and its double dimension
I can now move on to show, in addition, that Pritchard's view of rational belief can be supported by references to Aquinas's theological thought. Before I go on, however, I need to register a caveat. Unlike Aquinas's stance on faith, which I have discussed so far, the view I intend to expound now may not be equally convincing. As a matter of fact, the idea that Aquinas highlights a-rational elements in the context of what he calls ‘scientia’ is a controversial one. For some, Aquinas's epistemology was a form of foundationalism, and required that any statement must be either proved through demonstration or accepted as self-evident. Alvin Plantinga, for example, suggested that Aquinas was foundationalist in regard to both ordinary and religious belief,Footnote 23 and John Jenkins pointed out that this view of Aquinas's epistemology was held also by not a small number of Thomists.Footnote 24 However convincing the idea that Aquinas was a foundationalist may be, it is nevertheless contested by a number of passages from not only Summa theologiae but also other Aquinas's works – as we shall see in the course of this paper. (These passages have often been neglected, perhaps because they are part of Aquinas's reflection on the merit of faith as related to evidence and not on the epistemology of scientia.)
In one of these passages, Aquinas wonders whether or not arguments for Christian belief diminish the merit of faith. He distinguishes two kinds of arguments:
Human reason in support of what we believe, may stand in a twofold relation to the will of the believer. First, as preceding the act of the will; as, for instance, when a man either has not the will, or not a prompt will, to believe, unless he be moved by human reasons; and in this way human reason diminishes the merit of faith. … Secondly, human reasons may be consequent to the will of the believer. For when a man's will is ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes, he thinks out and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support thereof; and in this way human reason does not exclude the merit of faith but is a sign of greater merit.Footnote 25
Obviously, for the present purpose the relation between evidence and merit is of no interest. Instead, what I intend to focus on is Aquinas's idea that rational arguments are supposed to follow previous decisions. Among the two types of arguments he takes into account, Thomas prefers the ones that follow the will of the believer, who is expected to be ready to accept the divine revelation before finding proofs in its support.
One may object that, on closer inspection, the arguments at stake are not real demonstrations, because in Aquinas's view no demonstration can be offered in the realm of faith. In reply, it can be said that what I have just stated applies also when Aquinas reflects on completely evident subjects. This is the case of the revealed truths that can be attained by demonstration, the ‘preambles of faith’ which Aquinas considers part of scientia:
Demonstrative reasons in support of the preambles of faith, but not of the articles of faith, diminish the measure of faith, since they make the thing believed to be seen, yet they do not diminish the measure of charity, which makes the will ready to believe them, even if they were unseen.Footnote 26
As in the previous passages, Aquinas is focusing on merit and evidence. It clearly emerges, however, what is of interest for the present purpose, namely, the fact that the will of the believer is expected to be ready to accept certain truths regardless of the presence or absence of sound arguments in their support.
This view is perhaps even better explained in another passage, in which Aquinas focuses more generally on the merit of any demonstration – both related and unrelated to religious subjects. Aquinas confirms the content of the passages I have just mentioned by explaining how exactly the process of knowing and demonstrating is characterized by both rational and a-rational aspects. He says that evidence clearly requires assent on the part of the knower. He also says, however, that assent is not the only possible response of the knower once evidence is given, and distinguishes the concept of assent (assensus) from the concept of consideration (consideratio):
Two things may be considered in science: namely the scientist's assent to a scientific fact and his consideration of that fact. Now the assent of science is not subject to free will, because the scientist is obliged to assent by force of the demonstration, wherefore scientific assent is not meritorious. But the actual consideration of what a man knows scientifically is subject to his free will, for it is in his power to consider or not to consider. Hence scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good of our neighbor.Footnote 27
Aquinas claims that, if the assent is not a matter of free will (before the evidence, one cannot withhold assent), the same cannot be held with respect to consideration: this is a matter of free will, because one can decide whether or not to reflect on something that is already known.Footnote 28 This is why the reflection at stake ‘may be meritorious if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good of our neighbor’. (It could be objected that a contradiction arises here with that which Aquinas says in the same article; namely, that the believer ‘has not, however, sufficient reason for scientific knowledge, hence he does not lose the merit’. From this passage it seems to follow that in the case of demonstrative knowledge there cannot be merit. However, it is easy to realize that, saying so, Aquinas is not referring to demonstrative knowledge in general, but only to assent, which he conceives as not being susceptible to merit or demerit.)
Aquinas therefore reiterates his conviction that the believer should argue on the basis of a preceding decision. Unlike the passages previously mentioned, however, the one under consideration is concerned with a more general reflection on the epistemic nature of demonstrative knowledge. Aquinas claims that ‘scientific consideration may be meritorious if it be referred to the end of charity, i.e. to the honor of God or the good of our neighbor’ (my emphasis). This obviously amounts to saying that not only the believer, but also anyone else might decide to continue to hold one's belief in spite of the presence of what may seem to be contrary evidence. In conclusion, Aquinas sees the presence of rational motives (arguments) and at the same time of a-rational commitments (previous decisions) in the context of rational reflections – which is precisely what I wanted to show in support of Pritchard's view of ordinary rational belief.
3. On the ultimate difference between faith and reason – on the one hand – as well as theology and philosophy – on the other
So far I have argued that Pritchard's conviction that there is no ultimate epistemological difference between faith and reason can find support in Aquinas's theological reflections. Now I intend to show that, while the parity argument can be applied to theological views, the same cannot be said of the philosophical point of view taken by the author of FR. Philosophically speaking, in fact, there remains a fundamental distinction between faith and reason.
To determine this ultimate difference, it is helpful to reflect on a well-known passage in which Aquinas says that, if natural reason attains conclusions that contrast with the truths of faith, then the arguments that natural reason has used are certainly wrong:
If … anything is found in the teachings of the philosophers contrary to faith, this error does not properly belong to philosophy, but is due to an abuse of philosophy owing to the insufficiency of reason. Therefore also it is possible from the principles of philosophy to refute an error of this kind, either by showing it to be altogether impossible, or not to be necessary.Footnote 29
Aquinas claims that, even if it appears to be rationally convincing, any argument contrasting with the truth of the Christian revelation must be rejected as wrong.Footnote 30 This very position applies also to the distinction between assent and consideration. In that case, although evidence is expected to give rise to assent on the part of the knower, Aquinas claims that the knower may decide not to assent, and such decision would be meritorious if due ‘to the honor of God or the good of our neighbor’. One should therefore reject any evidence, however sound it may seem to be, if one believes that such evidence is in contrast with the honor of God or the good of neighbor.Footnote 31 Furthermore, one should continue to consider the object in question, in order to rationally find out why the evidence provided is either ‘altogether impossible’ or ‘not necessary’. Aquinas is sure that continuing to advance these considerations will show that the evidence rejected, however sound it might have seemed, was ‘due to an abuse of philosophy owing to the insufficiency of reason’. Consistent with this rejection, one should start again reasoning ‘from the principles of philosophy to refute an error of this kind’ and find new evidence in order to replace the previous one.
It is clear that this attitude can be accepted only from a theological point of view. Based on his previous religious commitment, Aquinas does not want to abandon his conviction. In addition, not only does he reject any evidence that is in contrast with previous religious beliefs; he also urges reason to start working again from the beginning because he seems to be certain by faith that reason is fully reliable. His wanting to start reasoning again ‘from the principles of philosophy’ and not by way of faith seems to imply that for him, if reason works appropriately and in accord with its own nature, it cannot be mistaken. Aquinas openly states that ‘the contrary of a truth can never be demonstrated … [and] the arguments brought against faith cannot be demonstrations, but are difficulties that can be answered’.Footnote 32 This is proposed by him as neither a demonstration nor an intuition. It must be therefore on faith that he grounds his trust in reason.Footnote 33 (Not surprisingly, at the beginning of Summa contra Gentiles, sometimes called his ‘summa philosophica’, Aquinas takes St. Hilary's words as orientation for his reflection: ‘I am aware that I owe this to God as the chief duty of my life, that my every word and sense may speak of him.’Footnote 34 For Aquinas this is a duty, as it is confirmed by the words he uses – officium and debere. Such a duty arises from Aquinas's desire to completely devote himself to reflect on God and his works.)
The attitude so far explored is manifestly unacceptable from a philosophical point of view. Nevertheless, it seems to coincide with the one maintained by Pritchard, whose thesis supports the philosophical employment of commitments ‘of a visceral nature’. As I said in the first section, for the author of FR such a-rational commitments are not even beliefs, because they lack two qualities that any belief should have, namely, truth-directedness and responsiveness to rational criteria. Pritchard gives the example of a parent who continues to hold that his/her child is innocent although the charges brought against him/her appear increasingly convincing. For the author of FR, this ‘applies to our hinge commitments. Once we recognize that they are completely unresponsive to rational considerations … then they cease to be plausible candidates for being beliefs’.Footnote 35
This, however, does not seem to match the examples Pritchard quotes from Wittgenstein's On Certainty. From Wittgenstein's claim that ‘my having two hands is, in normal circumstances, as certain as anything that I could produce in evidence for it’Footnote 36 , it does not follow that his having two hands lacks evidence. In addition, there is no evidence to deny his having two hands. If he denies that, he should also deny that his sight functions appropriately, and should in turn end up doubting any other possible belief. As I have already said in the first section, for both Wittgenstein and Newman universal doubt necessarily implies doubting itself, which is clearly conducive to self-referential contradiction. The author of On Certainty clearly states that ‘if you tried to doubt everything you would not get as far as doubting anything. The game of doubting itself presupposes certainty’.Footnote 37 The result of this reflection, therefore, is that indirect evidence is provided in support of the commitments in question, because, if doubting everything generate self-referential contradiction, this is clearly an indirect demonstration that denying hinge commitments is simply irrational.
In conclusion, Wittgenstein's hinge commitments do not seem to depend on a-rational commitments that are not even beliefs. A-rational commitments are subject to doubt because convincing evidence to the contrary seems to be provided and evidence in favour seems not, and this perfectly applies to both Pritchard's example of the parent who sticks to his/her belief that his/her child is innocent and Aquinas's claim that the will must be ready to believe despite contrary evidence. This does not apply, however, to Wittgenstein's hinge commitments, which appear to be undeniable because no convincing evidence to the contrary is provided, while evidence in their favour, though indirect, is available.
Conclusion
Pritchard argues that a-rational commitments can be considered the ultimate foundation of not only religious but also ordinary rational beliefs, and concludes that there is no fundamental epistemological distinction between faith and reason. I have argued that this thesis cannot be advanced from a philosophical point of view, while at the same time it impressively coincides with Aquinas's theological reflection. Unlike the philosophical standpoint, in fact, the theological one is analogous to Pritchard's stance, because the commitments that the theologian deals with are not simply intellectual contents but also affections and decisions, which the faithful consider due to divine grace.
I do not exclude that Pritchard's reflection may reveal unexpected potential and lend itself to new interpretation. If not only theology but also philosophy took into consideration a-rational motivations, then the parity argument could really apply to both faith and reason in the way Pritchard intends to. In this direction, Aquinas may already have offered significant suggestions, while focusing on the possibility of assenting before evidence if evidence goes against what had been previously believed. It requires further investigation, however, whether ‘the honor of God or the good of our neighbor’, namely, the a-rational motivations the Angelic doctor looks at as reasons for not assenting before evidence, may also play a role – even only partly – in the philosophical discussion. If so, the parity argument could really apply to faith and reason as Pritchard maintains.Footnote 38
