Noam Gur’s monograph, Legal Directives and Practical Reasons, is an important contribution to the debate on the normativity of law and on reasons for action. It articulates an original and sophisticated answer to the following abstract question: how does the law bear on practical reasons? Equivalently: do legal directives provide reasons for action that exclude other reasons (the exclusionary hypothesis) or do the former simply compete in weight with the latter (the weighting hypothesis)?
Gur’s answer amounts to a third hypothesis, a dispositional model, which he considers to be ‘an optimal middle path’ between the exclusionary and the weighting hypotheses. (161) In Gur’s words, the dispositional model holds that “the fact of there being a legal system in place which meets certain competence and quality prerequisites … is a reason for its subjects to adopt an attitude which I will refer to as a law-abiding attitude.” (135) The law-abiding attitude that legal directives create is a persistent but nonetheless overridable disposition to obey the law. This model has, for Gur, the virtue of recognising the bindingness of law while leaving scope for case-specific assessment of legally required actions.
Gur’s position has Razian undertones in that it reaffirms the idea that there is something distinctive about legal (as opposed to non-legal) reasons for action. It also embodies rationalist assumptions in so far as it understands the bindingness of law in the light of agents’ motivating reasons. The articulation and defence of this dispositional model constitutes a novel and important contribution to the debate about the relationship between law and practical reasons.
The book has three parts. The first two are devoted to explaining why the exclusionary theory and the weighting theory are unconvincing, while the third answers, through the dispositional model, the main philosophical question that motivates the inquiry—namely how legal directives interact with practical reasons.
Gur’s discussion is abstract. This does not mean that Gur’s writing is imprecise. But it does mean, for example, that the book’s introduction says hardly anything meaningful about the thesis of the book. This makes it difficult to understand Gur’s key arguments and original contribution to the debate: the dispositional model. It also means that examples, when given, are often clearly fictional and perhaps are of limited or no immediate applicability to the real world.
Take the example of Caroline, “who, upon stopping her car at a red traffic light, is asked by another driver why she has just stopped” and whose reaction is “simply to point at the red light or to say that this is what the law requires without further attempt to justify her action by reference to the balance of ordinary reasons as applicable to the case.” (87) This example is meant to illustrate that compliance with legal directives is more than a mere habit. Readers are likely to want more credible practical illustrations of Gur’s point. One such convincing illustration is borrowed from Sartre and is designed to demonstrate the relative autonomy of first-order reasons for actions: a student who during World War II wants to join the Free French Forces to fight the Germans but does not want to leave his mother alone behind. (81) Unlike many works of the same sub-field of jurisprudence, however, Gur does away with pointless discussions about definitions, often defending positions using terms with which his opponents would agree.
The abstract tone of the book gives the impression that Gur is keen to do away with two fundamental concepts of social science: choice and action. This impression derives from the fact that the way Gur defines practical reasons (reasons that count in favour of a certain action) seems to do disregard action-as-result of choice.Footnote 1 (8-9, and n37) By contrast, in the rest of the book it appears that the notion of an agent and the agent’s choice is key to Gur’s account—and it is difficult to see how it would be otherwise in a book about reasons for action.
The critique of the exclusionary model
Part one of the book is dedicated to a critique of the Razian exclusionary model of legal reasons. Although readers of the monograph are likely to be well-acquainted with that approach, Gur summarizes it succinctly and helpfully. Gur refers to Raz’s pre-emption thesis: “[t]he fact that an authority requires performance of an action is a reason for its performance which is not to be added to all other relevant reasons when assessing what to do, but should exclude and take the place of some of them.”Footnote 2 (12) As an objection to the Razian proposition that legal reasons interact with other reasons by excluding some of them, Gur advances the well-known critique that it is plausible that legal and non-legal reasons are simply weighted differently by an agent. Here I will distinguish two claims made by Gur.
The first is the thesis that those meant to be exclusionary reasons, in fact, simply compete in weight with other reasons. This can be substantiated by showring that in at least one case of a conflict between reasons X (meant to be exclusionary reasons) and reasons Y (meant to be excluded by X), the latter defeat the former. In fact, even one such case would suffice. This, Gur says, is a ‘practical resolution’ which cannot be accounted for by the exclusionary model and would be readily explicable by a weighting model. (21) Here, concrete examples are needed to understand what ‘this practical resolution’ is. Gur presents rather abstract examples that are designed to show that disobedience of an unjust law, or disobedience of a just law in special circumstances, are instances of such ‘practical resolution’. (23-4) Despite the examples being somewhat removed from everyday life, the reasoning is convincing, as the situations surveyed by Gur make it clear that both reasons X and reasons Y obtain for the agent at the moment of choice.
In contrast to the Razian position, therefore, Gur argues in this part of the book that legal reasons do not have the distinctive quality of excluding other relevant reasons for action. However, since his objection to the exclusionary theory revolves around the idea of ‘practical resolution’ it seems to me that Gur conflates two different issues: an abstract one, about the interactions between reasons for action (the alchemy between legal and non-legal reasons), and a more practical one that focuses on the result of such interactions.Footnote 3 (8)
The difference between the two is that looking at a ‘practical resolution’ in abstracto only allows us to draw weak inferences about the mechanisms that led to the decision, and therefore is not sufficient to wholly disprove the exclusionary theory. For example, legal reasons may well exclude some reasons (for example reasons of self-interest) but not others (say, altruistic motivations). A person may more easily choose to drive over the speed limit if he or she is carrying a wounded person to the hospital than if he or she is late for work. Moreover, the exclusionary theory may still prove to be correct, but the ‘practical resolution’ (the actual choice of the agent) may not involve compliance with the law due to other constraints (such as lack of opportunity). Finally, some practical reasons (be they legal or non-legal) may even belong to the “somewhat shadowy [category of] ‘quasi-belief’, held for their consumption value rather than as a premise for action.”Footnote 4 In other words the quasi-belief is held for its perceived utility, or because it is convenient for the agent to hold it, even though she does not act upon it (an example of quasi-belief is, for Elster, the belief in the afterlife.)Footnote 5 In short, Gur advances a persuasive critique of Raz’s exclusionary model, even though some counter-objections still remain to be addressed.
Gur makes a second claim stating that “the appearance of many cases, as far as the bottom-line practical resolution is concerned, is similar to that which an exclusionary model would produce, but what is really taking place in those cases is that reasons X are aligned with reasons Y or outweigh them.” (21) Since considering a ‘practical resolution’ does not always allow to draw valid conclusions on the interaction between the motivating factors for the choice, as I have tried to show, I think Gur fails to substantiate this claim.Footnote 6
Yet precisely because this second claim is made, it is appropriate to wonder whether the book should discuss something more than the abstract “factors that speak in favour of the action,” namely whether legal or non-legal directives have stronger motivational weight when an agent carries out an action, and whether there are discernible patterns for such interaction. In other words, instead of developing a relatively obvious point in two chapters (that a legitimate law prohibiting some action X does not exclude the possibility that people do X for other, non-legal, reasons),Footnote 7 perhaps it would have been more profitable to explore whether, when a person acts in compliance with the law, this is because of the reason given by the legal directive or because of the reason given by the non-legal directive (or both). That is to say, Gur would have been better off asking whether it is possible to imagine explanatory mechanisms for the interaction of beliefs when legal directives are involved.Footnote 8 Gur does not go into this sort of argument, and thus does not venture into issues related to rational choice theory. The critique of the exclusionary theory, in so far as it depends on the assessment of the actual actions of an agent, is hard to reconcile with this abstraction.
The critique of the weighting model
Part two of Legal Directives and Practical Reasons builds upon two objections made by Raz against the weighting model. Gur refers first to the Razian phenomenological objection. This objection makes the point that the way legal reasons are experienced is incompatible with legal and non-legal reasons being of similar ‘quality’. Legal reasons are experienced as not simply having a different weight than other reasons, but as coming with a distinctive strength, a ‘sense of bindingness’ (82) that non-legal reasons lack. The functional objection, on the other hand, “focuses on the function authorities are meant to fulfil in human affairs.” (97) It posits that authorities, to be functional, must operate as a source of reasons that “both require an action and exclude some opposing reasons from the range of factors that influence the decision how to act.” (97) According to Raz, the benefit of authorities lie in their ability to “overcoming problems of deficient or incomplete knowledge, helping to solve common difficulties of social coordination, and enabling people to share practices despite deeper disagreements between them.”Footnote 9 (102) This is, in itself, a fairly optimistic and by no means uncontentious position.
Gur is cautious about embracing the Razian critiques of the weighting model, using them instead as scaffolding from which to offer his own criticism of the model. Gur’s original contribution to the debate is to bring into the picture biases and epistemic deficiencies that would strongly militate against the weighting model. It is true that, as Gur argues, legal directives are structurally less biased than individual actors, and this is the advantage that makes directives fit to fulfil their function. However, “the crucial difficulty of the weighting model … is that when the weight of those structural advantages is assessed by the actor insituations of bias that made law necessary in the first place, this assessment itself is liable to be biased too.” (122) All the same, I am not sure it is worth taking the thought further: who said that what an agent assesses, when the agent weights a legal directive against other considerations, are the structural advantages of the law? I don’t think this is presupposed in the definition of legitimate authority, pursuant to which ‘subjects can benefit from practical guidance’. (110)
The dispositional model
In its essence, Gur’s model boils down to the following claim: “the fact of there being a legal system in place which meets certain competence and quality prerequisites—namely, a system whose substantive laws, procedures, and design generally exhibit a reasonable level of conformity with morality as well as with principles of legality (also known as the rule of law), and are in general reasonably apt to secure valuable goods—is a reason for its subjects to adopt an attitude which I will refer to as a law-abiding attitude … the conative (or behavioural) component of this attitude is a disposition, a standing inclination, to comply with legal requirements.” (135-36) In other words, valid or anyways functional legal directives generate an attitude in the agent a special disposition, which in turn results in a tendency to comply with such directives. The generation of this disposition is a distinctive characteristic of legal directives, but it does not imply compliance in every case a legal directive obtains. These two characteristics allow Gur’s model to provide a realistic account law’s impact on practical reasons: an impact that is subject to constraints depending on the content of the law.
In Gur’s framework, functional legal directives generate an ‘attitude’ that appears to share the characteristics of two mental states. The first is what can be termed a ‘formal preference’ for complying with the law. I use the word ‘formal’ in the sense that it is not substantial, that is, it is independent from beliefs on the merit or desirability of a specific legal directive (it is ‘content-independent’). (150) Yet, the framework here is open to criticism. It should be clear to begin with that it is difficult to isolate the attitude from its object. The will to obey the law is as difficult to distinguish from the content of the law, as it would be conceptually difficult to distinguish impatience from the object of the impatience or the attitude toward gambling from the bet at stake. Moreover, it would appear that in Gur’s voluntarist account, agents deliberately decide to adopt the compliance attitude. He states that “we have a reason to adopt a disposition to comply with the law.” (136 and 139, 153) It is not clear to me how agents choose their formal preferences. Does one choose to be impatient?Footnote 10
Considering these two difficulties, I would use slightly different terminology, and understand legal obligations in terms of an agent’s beliefs. Attitudes and beliefs are distinct, the difference being that the former are not chosen deliberately by an agent, while the latter might be. In my view, Gur’s insights about the distinctiveness of legal reasons could be expressed more perspicuously in terms of beliefs. If an agent chooses to obey the law, this choice ought to be understood as the belief that the law is binding in the circumstances in which the agent finds him or herself, since according to Gur’s dispositional model such a choice is not entirely independent of the agent’s view of the content of law itself.
The second mental state is a set of beliefs about the desirability the law. But how can such an ‘attitude’ consist of both beliefs and formal (independent) preferences? Gur addresses this objection: if the attitude-as-formal-preference in fact entails, among others, ‘legitimacy belief’, (150) is the model not inappropriately merging two different things? Gur’s defence of his model is, on this point, unconvincing. The analogy he makes with gambling shows precisely the difficulty I have with imputing the rational formation of dispositions. Gur wants to show, with the following example, how an attitude-as-formal independent preference is acquired. He writes “[s]uppose I have acquired, through a relatively prolonged assimilation of the view that ‘gambling generally tends to have destructive effects on one’s life’, a general and firmly embedded disposition against gambling.” (150) It may be just a question of terminology, but it would perhaps be more precise to say that what is acquired is at least in part a belief (that generally and firmly makes you regard gambling as undesirable). What is certainly not acquired through prolonged assimilation is the formal preference against gambling (if such a thing makes sense; more likely, it is a form of risk-aversion). If my analogy with the formal preference of impatience is correct, admitting that one can deliberately acquire (im)patience (or a disposition for/against gambling independent from bets) sounds counterintuitive (and in the case of patience it also runs into a conceptual problem: how can an impatient person decide to wait in order to acquire patience through prolonged assimilation?).
However, it is possible to assume, with Gur, that the law-abiding attitude can be adopted by the rational choice of the agent. It is notable that the mere existence of the legal system—albeit one with substantial preconditions of conformity with morality—is seen by Gur as providing the reasons to comply with it. An interesting question arises: what explains this attitude? This is one of the points about which the monograph stimulates further reflection. Gur sketches an answer that I would describe as involving a collective belief in the bindingness of law—yet that belief remains unexplained. (152ff) Finding a non-functional explanation for legal obligations remains one of the most fascinating and pressing questions for the philosophy of law, and Gur does not make significant progress on that important issue.
I have tried to present Gur’s argument in Legal Directives and Practical Reasons, contrast it with the exclusionary and weighting models, and indicate the novel and interesting aspects in Gur’s conceptualisation of a dispositional model. To be sure, Gur’s dispositional account has controversial aspects, but all the same it is a welcome addition to that field of legal theory concerned with the normativity of law, the reasons for action, and the fundamental question: what is law? Gur’s work, in providing a novel and carefully argued thesis, is bound to be an indispensable and deeply engaging reading for students and scholars working in jurisprudence, legal theory, and the philosophy of action.
