The Islamist Terrorist Narrative

The Allied Democratic Forces were officially established after a September 1995 meeting – between Ugandan extremist Muslim leaders and the heads of NALU in eastern Congo – and launched their first attack in November 1996, on western Uganda. Ugandan newspapers immediately reported, ‘Ugandan dissidents who invaded the country at Mpondwe border post in Kasese last week were to install Jamil Mukulu as President of the Islamic State after ousting the Museveni government’ (Sserwanga & Nzinjah Reference Sserwanga and Nzinjah1996).Footnote ⁷ Those associated with the Ugandan regime appeared especially keen to highlight the ADF's Islamic terrorist tendencies. ‘ADF rebels are collaborating with Sudan to make Uganda an Islamic state’, said Uganda's Minister of Health, Dr Crispus Kiyonga (Karugaba Reference Karugaba1997). A former Security Adviser to President Museveni, Amama Mbabazi, claimed, ‘Khartoum's plan is to destabilise the region to prepare the ground for the spread of Islamic fundamentalism and Arabism’, and a local government official in western Uganda used the terms ‘fundamentalists’ and ‘jihadists’ to describe the group (Prunier Reference Prunier2004: 379; Local government official 2010a int.).

While this paper demonstrates that the ADF's constitution cannot be explained with sole reference to the influence of Islamic terrorist factors, it is of course necessary to recognise their role in ADF recruitment practices. An important component of the original ADF was a group of disaffected Muslims from Kampala, and a significant recruitment network in the years to follow was one centred around Islamic connections throughout the region. The roots of this Islamic angle to the ADF conflict stemmed from a perception on the part of Uganda's Muslims that they had historically been socially and economically marginalised (Kananura Reference Kananura and Mukwaya2005: 99). In the early 1980s this perception was translated into action when, partly inspired by militant Islam, the Tabliq Youth Movement was formed.Footnote ⁸ The Tabliqs became increasingly political throughout the 1980s, announcing their goal of transforming Uganda into an Islamic state after the Ugandan Supreme Court moved in favour of a rival and more mainstream Islamic faction (Nantulya Reference Nantulya2001: 89). Gérard Prunier notes, ‘By the 1990s the result of this initially rather mild faith renewal movement was the birth of a native Ugandan militant fundamentalism with strong connections to the Sudan’ (Prunier Reference Prunier2009: 87).

With support from the Sudanese embassy in Kampala, their numbers, militancy and radicalism grew (Romkema Reference Romkema2007: 64). In 1991 President Museveni imprisoned several members after a round of street clashes and violence in the capital. Upon their release two years later, the Tabliqs fled and set up camp in Buseruka in Hoima district, near Lake Albert. But for a variety of reasons – including a lack of support from the local populace, and a tradition in urban violence and thus unfamiliarity with rural terrain – Buseruka was not a strategic location to launch their struggle from (Humanitarian agency employee 2010 int.). Their principal military training camp there was overrun by the UPDF in 1995, and having still at that time been in training mode, they suffered extensive casualties. The survivors subsequently fled yet again, this time ending up in Bunia, eastern Congo. There they came into contact with a variety of forces, including the Sudanese Army Security Services, who were using the Bunia airfield to ferry supplies to the Ugandan West Nile Bank Front rebel group and Rwandan Interahamwe (Prunier Reference Prunier2004: 372).Footnote ⁹

The dominant understanding of the ADF, which sees the Islamic element as being representative of the group, ascribes the Sudanese angle a great deal of weight in terms of the ADF's origins. It credits Sudan with actually creating the ADF through strategically linking the Tabliqs to an ‘unlikely blend of former Hutu militiamen … and disaffected tribesmen’, so as to provide them with tangible links to the Rwenzori terrain (Prunier Reference Prunier1997: 19). With regards to what he calls the ‘Khartoum-sponsored’ origins of the ADF, Prunier argues, ‘the key element in that union was that the Sudanese operators soon realised that without a good peasant grounding in local realities, the guerrillas [the Tabliqs] would be defeated again. This is why they worked at incorporating the guerrilla force into the remnants of NALU, the old Bakonjo Rwenzururu movement of the Ruwenzori Mountains’ (Prunier Reference Prunier2009: 87).

There is no doubt that Sudan provided important support in the formative stages of the ADF, elevating the status of the Tabliq faction within the group, and thereby also the religious dimension. Numerous testimonies from former ADF combatants (both willing and forced recruits) described, for example, the religious indoctrination that took place in some of the camps during this time, and the forced conversion of those members who were not originally Muslim. One former ADF captive recounted, ‘They later took us to Congo for training. In Congo, they picked eight of us and we boarded a plane to another place. There we found many Moslems who taught us how to operate landmines and heavy guns' (Kabarole Research and Resource Centre 2002/2003: 21). Another ex-combatant, who had been recruited into the ADF with his brother, described how his sibling was killed when he refused to convert to Islam (Former ADF members May 2010a int.).

The ADF also worked on pursuing links with extremist mosques in western Uganda, and in fact chose the western Ugandan border town of Bwera as their first attack target, in November 1996, partly due to the considerable Muslim population there and consequent opportunities for acquiring recruits (NGO representative 2010a int.). Bwera's mosque represented a focal meeting point for Muslims of the region, and accordingly, recruitment pamphlets were regularly circulated there (as well as in Kasese mosques) (Nkuutu Reference Nkuutu2003: 22; Titeca Reference Titeca2009). Connections to mosques throughout the rest of the country were made as well, and recruits were drawn from Muslim-dominated pockets of Uganda such as Masaka, Mbarara, Iganga and Kampala (Namutebi Reference Namutebi2000; Muhangi Reference Muhangi2004: 4; Local government official 2010b. int.). This contributed to the multi-ethnic nature of the group, as it brought in personnel from, among others, the Baganda, Banyankole, Basoga and Batoro tribes (Mbalibulha Reference Mbalibulha2008: 113). Recruitment on a religious basis extended into the Congo as well, and was particularly focused on Eringeti, Beni and the villages between those two towns (Titeca & Vlassenroot Reference Titeca and Vlassenroot2012: 163). According to Kristof Titeca and Koen Vlassenroot, ‘In Eringeti, the local mosque was frequently visited by rebel forces and, from this mosque, local businesses generated some resources for the movement’ (Titeca & Vlassenroot Reference Titeca and Vlassenroot2012: 163).

It is interesting to note, however, that it appears ADF camps could differ in how ‘Islamicised’ they were. When asked how many fighters within his camp were Christians, a former major with the group answered, ‘all, except two Ugandans who were Muslims’ (Confidential document one). In assessing his file, the Demobilisation, Disarmament, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) unit of MONUSCO wrote, ‘the fact they were not forced to be converted to Muslim shows that ADF is not more a religious movement but just a rebel group with economic and political goals’ (Confidential document one). Additionally, even Prunier, who largely adopts the argument that the ADF were a proxy force for Sudan, states, ‘it was more a case of social and economic marginalisation leading people to convert to Islam in order to benefit from Khartoum's support than of Muslims revolting to promote a Sharia-based government’ (Prunier Reference Prunier2004: 382). Lucy Hovil and Eric Werker quote an ex-combatant as saying, ‘The religious aspect came later as a way to get support and recruits … the ADF adopted the grievances of Islam in order to appeal to these people … Islam was a ticket, so the leaders disguised their political motives in religion’ (Hovil & Werker Reference Hovil and Werker2005: 15). Reducing the Islamic element of the ADF to being merely a ‘ticket’ is undoubtedly going too far. However, so too is understanding the entire human resource dimension of the ADF solely through this Islamist-oriented lens, or failing to properly unpack the contextual dynamics that enabled this group to establish itself in the first place. Indeed, the Islamic-centric network was only one of many recruitment avenues operationalised, as the following discussion clearly demonstrates.

NALU and Additional ADF Components

Indeed, the ADF's recruitment networks were derived from a wide-ranging conglomeration of various borderland-based groups, foremost among these being NALU. In fact, Jourdan argues that after their defeat in Buseruka, the Tabliqs had chosen to relocate to the Rwenzoris precisely because of NALU's presence there (Jourdan Reference Jourdan, Pennacini and Wittenberg2008). The micro-region's long-standing tradition of rebel resistance against central authority, compounded by the proximity to the border, and the Congolese state's lack of effective authority over its territory, represented ideal rebel terrain. Thus, through the support of the Congolese government and local strongmen, in addition to the already existing and embedded Konjo-Nande ties, NALU was not only able to maintain their bases in eastern Congo, but even integrate with surrounding society. They took part in coffee cultivation, engaged in agricultural smuggling to Uganda, shopped in the local markets, and through all of this steadily gained more Congolese members to their ‘community’. One former combatant described NALU's pre-ADF period as living ‘disguised as civilians’, but with the surrounding local population knowing their identity and being ‘fine with it’ (Former ADF members 2010b int.).

Perhaps most importantly, though, NALU members continued to exude a deep sense of resentment and frustration over the unresolved status of their long-standing grievances. Foremost amongst these was the Obusinga bwa Rwenzururu (or Rwenzururu Kingdom) issue, and indeed the military trajectories of many ADF ex-combatants stretched back to the Rwenzururu Movement (RM) (Bollingtoft Reference Bollingtoft2006; Former ADF members 2010b int.).Footnote ¹⁰ Acting on their own, however, they realised they were unlikely to make progress with respect to addressing their grievances. Joining a somewhat disparate and unusually constituted group such as the ADF, therefore, represented an opportunity to pursue their agenda. According to one former rebel, ‘When NALU joined the ADF, all of us members voluntarily accepted. No one went home after NALU disbanded. We stayed in the mountains and joined the ADF’ (Former ADF members 2010b int.). Thus, incorporation into the ADF was perceived by many NALU followers as a positive and natural evolution for their force. It is important to note that the Congolese government, led by President Mobutu Sese Seko at the time, played an important role in facilitating the original development of the force. The Mobutu regime had previously allowed NALU to operate from Congolese territory before they joined the ADF, and then maintained this stance once NALU were incorporated into the ADF. The ADF were able to actually control a significant parcel of land, as well as have ‘roaming’ access within an even wider space. Lyavala Ali, an original leading member of the ADF, said that ‘under the direct authority of President Mobutu’ camps were opened in Bunia, Buhira and Beni (Titeca & Vlassenroot Reference Titeca and Vlassenroot2012: 165).

This points to the importance of looking beyond accounts of the ADF that focus on strictly religion; it is necessary to also consider the wider historical context in which this movement arose. While many analyses of the group paint a picture of an overwhelmingly Islamist-heavy force, it is worth bearing in mind that the ADF's military leader (‘Chief Commander’), Yusuf Kabanda, was a Konjo from NALU. Many other senior officials in the ADF were former Rwenzururu leaders too, such as Christopher Ngaimoko and Fenahasi Kisokeranio (Mbalibulha Reference Mbalibulha2008: 112). According to African Rights, it is examples such as these that shed light on the ‘extent to which the history of strife in the Rwenzori region facilitated the formation of the ADF’ (African Rights 2001: 7). It would be an exaggeration of course to perceive the ADF as a descendent of, or successor movement to, the RM or NALU. Nevertheless, ‘neither is it purely by chance that the ADF emerged in this particular area’, as Bøås observes (Bøås Reference Bøås2004: 291). It is telling, for instance, that when local residents of Kasese, Bundibugyo and Kabarole districts were asked to describe the causes of the ADF conflict, the vast majority started with the time period of the RM of the 1950s. Some have been harsher than others in their assessment of the lasting legacy of the RM: ‘There's been a group all along that has stirred trouble – always agitating for a Kingdom’, remarked a representative of one Kampala NGO (NGO representative 2011 int.). In any case, as Prunier succinctly states, ‘the ADF would not have got off the ground, had it not been for the festering sore of Bakonjo resentment since the 1950s’ (Prunier Reference Prunier2004: 383).

It was not only the ‘festering sore’ of NALU that helped to solidify the ADF in its earlier stages. A myriad of other parties – all sustaining their existence in the Rwenzori borderland at the time – were important in this regard as well. One such faction was former Idi Amin loyalists, led by Moses Ali (Muhangi Reference Muhangi2004: 53; Romkema Reference Romkema2007: 67). Another constituency to become a part of the ADF were disgruntled UPDF soldiers (or simply soldiers looking for a supposedly more lucrative livelihood). In fact, the ADF Chief of Staff until 2000, ‘Commander Benz’, had been a UPDF officer before joining the rebellion. According to Prunier, next to the Tabliqs and NALU, one of the most significant groups in the ADF's original constitution were the ‘Rwandan Hutu radicals who were former members of the Interahamwe or FAR and had fled the attacks against the camps in the Goma area, moving northwards along the Rutshuru-Lubero-Butembo-Beni road’ (Prunier Reference Prunier1997: 18). Media reports at the time of the ADF's first attack were replete with references to Interahamwe involvement: ‘the supposedly extinct NALU rebels, with the thinly disguised support of the Interahamwe exiles and Zairian troops invaded Uganda through corridors in the Rwenzori ranges’, stated Benson Tusasirwe, for example (Tusasirwe Reference Tusasirwe1996).

It is also important to note the degree to which the ADF tailored their strategies to the disenfranchised and neglected borderland population in general. Kasese and Bundibugyo districts suffered from especially deplorable levels of representation in positions of political power, unemployment and access to schooling, with Bundibugyo's education levels amongst the worst in Uganda (Kyambogo University 2002: 1). As a result, of those who willingly joined the group, many reported being swayed by promises of lower tax rates, schooling opportunities, assistance in acquiring houses, or positions in local and national government structures once the ADF took power (Female development cooperative 2010 int.; Women's ADF survivor group 2010 int.; Former ADF members 2010c. int.). One development cooperative member explained, ‘Many of our children joined the ADF because of idleness or loss of hope in the government, and promises of jobs when Museveni fell’ (Female development cooperative 2010 int.). Women additionally described being guaranteed capital to start small businesses after the conflict (Former ADF members 2010c int.). A 1998 Sunday Monitor article reported, ‘Rebels of the Allied Democratic Forces are on a fresh recruitment drive, this time around the Bushenyi district … the rebels are luring the youths out of these sparsely populated villages with promises to big money and big posts in government after they capture power’ (Amanyire Reference Amanyire1998). Prunier interestingly observes that many UPDF officers seemed unable to comprehend this recruitment dynamic, asking, ‘we fought for an ideal; how can these people fight for money, especially so little money?’ (Prunier Reference Prunier2004: 371). But although Uganda had experienced economic growth throughout the late 1980s and into the 1990s, the results of such growth were mostly felt in more central areas of the country (Prunier Reference Prunier2004: 372). Through exploiting the socio-economic hardships of neglected border communities, then, the ADF were able to mobilise those with few opportunities and choices – ultimately, those who felt they would have little to lose by participating in rebellion.

The ADF also took advantage of a different dimension of this phenomenon, namely the lack of peaceful avenues through which grievances could be addressed in the borderland, and the belief that ‘[President] Museveni only understands the language of the gun’, as an NGO representative from Kasese stated (NGO representative 2010b. int.). A Human Rights Watch report argued that despite ‘important reservations about the purported political motivations of Ugandan rebel groups, it would be a mistake to suggest that rebel activity is completely unrelated to the suppression of political opposition activity in Uganda’ (Human Rights Watch 1999: 127).Footnote ¹¹ The report discusses this in relation to various national political issues, such as Bugandan federalists and multi-partyists ‘who turned to armed opposition [the ADF] after their proposals for a federal, multiparty system were rejected at the 1995 Constituent Assembly’ (Human Rights Watch 1999: 128–9).Footnote ¹²

Yet on a much more local level, in the borderland, this phenomenon had been at work as well. The relative absence of the state, and heightened ‘lawless’ character of the area, very much encouraged this. Numerous former ADF fighters recounted their decision to join the rebels due to what they had perceived as undue or excessive harassment by the UPDF, unfair treatment by local authorities, or simply revenge for individual grudges (Former ADF members 2010d int.). One described joining the ADF out of anger after his land was stolen by fellow villagers and there were no official means of resolving the dispute, while another enlisted in order to exact revenge on the UPDF who had unlawfully ransacked his store (Former ADF members 2010d int.). Such experiences from ex-combatants fully mesh with the following by African Rights:

Of course, while the above scenarios refer to voluntary involvement, the ADF gained a significant proportion of their force through more coercive methods. At one end of the spectrum was abduction, usually done during violent raids on villages or internally displaced persons camps. Between 1996–2003 it is estimated that over 3,000 abductions took place in Kasese district alone (Local government official 2010c int.). Yet the ADF also employed more subtle and conniving strategies of forced recruitment, often involving the manipulation of transnational kinship or ethnic networks. One of the most common strategies was to have ADF fighters cross the border and infiltrate villages where their family members or co-ethnics were located and warn them of an impending attack. They would be ordered to advise their relatives and/or friends to join the rebellion in order to save themselves from being killed in an upcoming raid (Former ADF members 2010d int.). Indeed, many ex-combatants described joining the force due to warnings from kin members.

Dynamics on the ground in Congo during this time period were quickly changing, and the country was engulfed in a brutal, regionalised war. The extensive amount of fighting taking place in the east of the country proved strategically beneficial for the ADF. For example, there was an increase in the already considerable size of non-government-secured territory in North Kivu, and thereby an enlarged potential recruiting ground for the ADF. As the ADF's popularity dwindled in western Uganda, recruitment initiatives became more Congo-focused. Congolese were recruited not only for military or military support functions, but also to be part of the group's work force involved in, among other pursuits, mining and timber (INGO representative 2010 int.). Abductions were common, but so were attempts to exploit the marginalised status of the Congolese side of the Rwenzori borderland. The Konjo-Nande cross-border relationship was important in this respect, with many Nande joining due to the Konjo presence within the ADF (Congolese think-tank representative 2010 int.; Congolese journalist 2011 int.).

This discussion of the ADF's recruitment practices between 1996–2003 has attempted to illuminate just how multi-faceted the ADF's constitution became during this time period. In fact, largely owing to this significant heterogeneity, the ADF came across as a somewhat incoherent group, leading to descriptions of the conflict as a ‘rebellion without a cause’ (Hovil Reference Hovil2003: 5). As Prunier explains, ‘Since the Tabliq component of the ADF was at the same time preaching through its mosque circuit that it was fighting for an Islamic state with Jamil Mukulu as its president, while Bakonjo prisoners told UPDF interrogators that they were fighting because they had been promised that they would finally get their autonomous kingdom, there seemed to be a radical problem of political coherence’ (Prunier Reference Prunier2004: 375). This supposed political incoherence, however, demonstrates how important it is to go beyond the narrow narrative of the ADF being solely an Islamist constituted group, to considering instead the extent to which the ADF's place within a transnational borderland context pivotally influenced their formation and composition as well.

The Islamist Terrorist Narrative

During the 2003–2013 time period the dominant narrative of the ADF's recruitment practices persisted, although shifts could be detected. The focus on a Sudanese role received less attention in light of a diminished interest in Ugandan affairs on the part of Sudan. However, attention to Islamic terrorism greatly increased. An important source of recruits for the ADF throughout this time period undoubtedly did come from Islamic networks tapped into by the ADF – and specifically those involving disenfranchised and aggrieved Ugandan Muslims. For example, in a MONUSCO DDRRR debriefing note about Colonel Bwonadeke Winny, the ADF's former Director of Military Intelligence, it is noted that Winny explained the following: ‘The sheikh [in Ugandan mosques] will give a message and those that are interested will express interest and recruiters [from the ADF] will see if they are suitable. The message is that Shari'a is the supreme law and that in Uganda Muslims are not allowed to practice freely. They are told that if you fight and die you go to paradise and that if you fight and win other blessings will come to you’ (Confidential document two). From 2005 onwards, taped recordings of sermons delivered by Mukulu were played in mosques. ‘Muslims should kill non-Muslims, and kill also Muslims who are not fighting for jihad’, and ‘Let curses be to Bush, Blair, the president of France – and more curse goes to [President] Museveni and all those fighting Islam’, he proclaimed in one of the recordings (Terdman Reference Terdman2006: 3). Various important mosques in Kampala, such as those led by Sheikh Sachimbi Abdoulhakim on William Street, and Sheikh Suleiman Kekedo on Market Street, were known to be in connivance with the ADF.Footnote ¹³

An additional Islamic recruitment source were former ADF fighters of the Tabliq faction, who had gone through the amnesty process (and thus become ‘reporters’), but later opted to rejoin the rebels, with some even becoming double agents (Mwenda Reference Mwenda2010a, b). According to intelligence reports from a body of Uganda's security apparatus, the Joint Anti-Terrorism Taskforce (JATT), many reporters were extremely unhappy with their treatment from the Ugandan government upon leaving the bush. At an October 2008 meeting in JATT's headquarters in Kololo, Kampala, leaders of the ADF reporter community conveyed messages of deep resentment over having been ‘forgotten, used, and dumped’ by the government (The Independent Team 2010). Minutes from the meeting noted accusations of ‘rampant arrest and prolonged detention without trial mainly targeting members of Muslim Salaf sect and other Muslim youths based on trivial information. They have … been subjected to physical and psychological torture … and use of dangerous objects to extract information. Many of such nature are languishing in government prisons with some having been deliberately denied amnesty’ (The Independent Team 2010). The minutes also made reference to more mundane complaints, including: ‘the resettlement package given to former ADF was too small to start up a new meaningful life as most of them have no capacity to start an income generating activity. As a result, they now live below poverty line, hence making them idle and redundant. Most of the reporters are vulnerable and potential recruits who can easily be lured back into terrorist activities against the government’ (The Independent Team 2010).

In December 2001 the ADF were added to the United States’ ‘Terrorist Exclusion List’. In order to reap the military and financial benefits that derive from being seen to be ‘fighting terrorism’, the Ugandan government was thereafter steadfast in its efforts to highlight the group's ties to Islamic networks. While the ADF's previous relationships with regimes such as the Sudanese had drastically declined in importance, by 2008 there began to be reported incidences of communication and movement between the ADF and the Somali Islamist group, Al-Shabaab, as well as suggestions that the ADF were partly acting as a proxy for the force. In December 2009 the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) noted a significant number of Ugandan Al-Shabaab fighters, and Major Ba-Hoku Barigye, the AMISOM spokesman, met with one who discussed his ADF membership (Bogere Reference Bogere2009). As the UPDF became more embroiled in Somalia through its participation in AMISOM, Al-Shabaab threatened the Museveni regime with bringing its war to Uganda (United Nations official 2010 int.). Then on 7 July 2010 a series of bomb blasts went off in central Kampala, killing over eighty people and wounding dozens more. While Al-Shabaab claimed responsibility for the attacks, the Ugandan government was quick to point to ADF involvement as well. Although the details surrounding this still remain unclear, it is likely that the ADF role – if there was one at all – was minimal, and exaggerated for strategic purposes by Kampala.Footnote ¹⁴ Indeed, the supposed relationship between Al-Shabaab and the ADF continued thereafter to receive a great deal of attention by the Ugandan government (Lumu Reference Lumu2013; IRIN 2014). International conflict resolution experts in close contact with the ADF remain doubtful over how close the relationship between the two groups actually was, however. Moreover, as the July 2014 UN Group of Experts report describes the Ugandan government's rhetoric about the ADF, ‘Statements about ADF actions and capabilities appear to have become detached from reliable information and credible analysis. This is most evident with regard to statements about ADF links to Al-Shabaab and Al-Qaida’ (Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2014b). The following analysis by Titeca and Vlassenroot is therefore convincing: ‘this Islamic linkage should be considered sporadic and not too strong … The relationship with Al-Shabaab – which was held responsible for the July 2010 bombings in Kampala – has to be seen in the same light. Even if our sources indicate that there has been some communication with Al-Shabaab representatives, the ADF has not taken up any concrete action in support of Al-Shabaab because it is not willing to do so’ (Titeca & Vlassenroot Reference Titeca and Vlassenroot2012: 167).

Moreover, the actual Islamic ideology behind the recruitment of Muslims to the ADF was sometimes questionable. Government personnel were keen to talk of the rebels’ drive for Jihad, obsession with infidels, and goal to Islamicise Uganda. However, looking at the wider context paints a more nuanced picture. For example, it is worth bearing in mind that the Muslim community in North Kivu is an extremely tolerant one, with little tendency towards extremist behaviour. And while many Ugandan and Congolese Muslims indeed joined the ADF through Islamic networks, they were often spurred to enlist because of practical issues of poverty, unemployment, frustration with the government, or false promises of future opportunities (Ugandan government official 2011 int.). There were additional factors and developments that put into question the importance of extremist Islamic ideology as a recruiting force for the ADF. For example, there is evidence that over time the volume of recruitment targeted specifically towards Muslims significantly decreased. And interestingly, by 2011 it appeared that Christian recruits were no longer being forced to convert to Islam (Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2011: 26). Furthermore, even in areas heavily under the ADF's influence in Beni territory, Shari'a law was not enforced. Perhaps what is most telling, however, is that during preliminary negotiation talks with the Ugandan and Congolese governments in 2008, the ADF's initial list of demands contained no religious-related requests (INGO representative 2010 int.). Nevertheless, video footage obtained by the UN of an ADF training camp showed women with AK-47 s participating in training drills, with most of the women wearing hijab. However, while this would seem to give credence to a strong Muslim orientation within the ADF, it is also important to consider the possibility that this was a kind of promotional tool to be shown to potential Islamic donors (a practice not unheard of with the ADF) (Senior analyst with international think-tank 2012 int.).

Of course, it would be going too far to attribute the Islamic factor to representing nothing more than an instrumental ploy. It is undeniable that it continued to affect the recruitment practices of the group throughout this time period. However, characterising the ADF rebellion as one inspired only by Islamic ideology is misleading.

NALU and Additional ADF Components

While the Islamic dimension of the group certainly helped to ensure a continued supply of recruits during this time period, other elements within the force – especially those strongly embedded in the borderland context – proved pivotal for recruitment efforts as well. This was so much so the case, that by mid-2011 the ADF had a relatively consolidated human resource base. In fact, they had grown into a larger force than at any time in the previous ten years, going from only 200–300 fighters in 2006, to an estimated 1,500 in 2011. As of the end of 2013 their force had an estimated 1,400 well-trained, organised fighters, and if including women and children, the ADF numbered somewhere between 1,600 and 2,500 personnel (Group of Experts on the Democratic Republic of the Congo 2014a; Katombe & Mvano Reference Katombe and Mvano2014; Mueller Reference Mueller2014; Reuters 2014).

One significant dimension was the influential role played by the NALU component of the group. At the most obvious level, there were still those attracted to the ADF due to the presence of various Rwenzururu Kingdom ‘diehards’ in the force, and their claims of fighting for the establishment of a Rwenzururu Kingdom. Interestingly, even after the Kingdom was actually granted in 2007, this dimension still pulled weight. In early 2011, for example, UN officials were presented with two former ADF officers who had deserted; they talked of the ADF ‘planning to establish the Rwenzururu Kingdom in the name of the Supreme Chief of both the Banande … and Bakonjo (Uganda), tribes’ (Muhame Reference Muhame2012). Despite the majority of Konjo being happy with the official recognition of their Kingdom, there remained a hard-core element that vied for a more independent arrangement. Many also remained enthusiastic about the idea of being officially joined with the Nande, as Facci describes: ‘The movement's representatives pursue the dream of reunification with the Banande people, at least as an ideal’ (Facci Reference Facci2009: 353). Some Konjo hoped for an autonomous Rwenzururu state, and saw joining the ADF as a means of attaining this.

However, such sentiment was by no means exclusively limited to western Uganda, but could also be found amongst many Nande communities in North Kivu. While not uniformly throughout Nande society, there were sections that purported as high a degree of loyalty to the King (Mumbere) as western Uganda. From 2007 onwards, many traditional Nande chiefs paid allegiance to Mumbere, and according to an official at the King's coronation, multitudes of delegations and officials travelled from eastern Congo to attend the event in Kasese (Baguma & Thawite Reference Baguma and Thawite2009; NGO representative 2011 int.). It is important to clarify that by no means did the Rwenzururu Kingdom or its figureheads ever condone the ADF conflict, before or after the official establishment of the institution.Footnote ¹⁵ Nevertheless, there were radical Kingdom supporters who did, and there existed a general perception that those in the Konjo-Nande population were more inclined to be sympathisers with the rebellion. Numerous non-Konjo residents of Kasese, for example, claimed to profess with certainty that they knew of local Konjo men who had joined the ADF (Tribal community leader 2010 int.).

Perhaps the NALU faction's larger impact when it came to recruitment during this time period, however, was the sizeable number of ordinary Nande they helped to attract, albeit in an indirect manner. NALU's long-term establishment in eastern Congo and their integration into the population had engendered a certain degree of trust amongst the locals towards the ADF. Konjo-Nande cross-border ties were strong and interconnected, and they were both overwhelmingly more oriented towards each other than their respective national populations (Local development co-operative 2010 int.). Since the Nande saw the ADF as being partly composed of their brethren the Konjo, they were that much more inclined to join. This helps to explain why the majority of the Congolese in the ADF were of Nande affiliation (Kavanagh Reference Kavanagh2010).

With the increase in Nande members, came changes in the rebellion's overall character and objectives. For one thing, the anti-Rwandan stance grew in significance. The Nande and Rwandophone populations in North Kivu have historically been hostile towards each other, but during the Congolese wars (between 1996–2003) the Nande's anti-Tutsi discourse, in particular, intensified. Thus when the CNDP – which was a largely Rwandan-backed, Congolese Tutsi rebel group – began to be enfolded into the Congolese national army, the Nande turned even more against the national state (Beni Lubero Online 2011). They perceived the ADF as a force that could help stave off this Rwandan ‘infiltration’ into North Kivu, but more specifically, could counter the ‘Rwandan-tainted’ military (INGO representative 2011 int.). According to a conflict analyst in Goma, ethnic sentiments were so strong with regards to the Rwandophone-Nande relationship, and the hatred towards the Congolese national army so severe after the incorporation of the CNDP, that Nande were joining the ADF ‘just to ensure that [the army] didn't succeed’ (NGO representative 2011 int.). Relatedly, many of the Nande who had voluntarily joined the ADF, described having been motivated to do so for reasons of ‘protecting’ their local community – most often from the Congolese military, but also from other rebels (United Nations official 2011 int.). Like many other borderlands, there were few official avenues through which to pursue the resolution of grievances in eastern Congo, and thus support for rebellion appeared to be a logical solution in such an environment.

Many Nande were motivated to join the ADF for far less political reasons, and rather out of concerns of a much more socio-economic nature. In North Kivu the Congolese wars had left a population of young men with little education and few employment prospects. Furthermore, an extremely high percentage of them had been members of various rebel factions, and post-conflict were often demobilised, but not reintegrated. Many returned home only to find the same conditions that had led them to fight in the first place, making successful ‘reinsertion’ effectively impossible and leading them to reconsider rebel life simply to meet basic needs. As the eastern Congolese borderland had been the ‘heart’ of the violence during the Congo wars, the Grand Nord of North Kivu was inundated with such young men. Frequently compounding these issues were grievances on a local level concerning citizenship and land rights. Eastern Congo was an area very much marginalised by Kinshasa, where mistrust of central authority was rife, and ‘the linkages and fibres between the community and government were weak’, as a Kasese NGO representative described (NGO representative 2010b int.). As a result of all of these factors, North Kivu simmered with violence – and sometimes open conflict – post-2003, and in many respects remained the ideal recruiting ground for rebel groups.

Similar to before, the ADF moulded and tailored their strategies to appear as though responding to the disenfranchised and neglected state of the borderland population in general. They paid a minimum of USD 100 a month to members (United Nations official 2011a int.; Confidential document four). ‘This is huge money, relatively speaking’, a MONUSCO DDRRR official explained, especially when considering that for most rebel groups in eastern Congo, payment was simply the provision of a weapon (United Nations official 2011b int.). In fact, this was not only a sum far higher than the amounts offered by other forces, making it an attractive opportunity for many in the area, but by 2011 there was evidence that they were the only rebel group left in Congo actually providing salaries to their members (which also points to the relative success of the ADF's various economic ventures) (United Nations official 2011a int.). As an INGO representative in Goma pointed out, ‘So many Congolese are joining ADF for a career. There's not many business opportunities in this area’ (INGO representative 2011 int.).

Partly for this reason, the ADF during this time period saw higher rates of voluntary membership than most other rebel groups operating in the Congo (United Nations official 2011 int.). The force undoubtedly still practiced forced recruitment, however this was less so than during 1996–2003. Furthermore, in the past, the majority of these local Congolese recruits would have ‘known little of the tactical strategy of ADF High Command’, instead ‘being used mostly to provide services and support for the camps’ (Confidential document five). However, the changing composition of the group helped to alter internal power structures, and Nande ADF consequently started to attain positions of higher authority – roles that in the past would have almost solely been filled by founding members of the group. ‘We can see a shift in the weight that the Congolese members now carry’, the INGO representative noted, principally due to sheer numbers, but also because of the important access to the local area that the Nande provided (INGO representative 2011 int.). Recruitment of Nande was largely focused along the Beni-Eringeti axis, slightly further south in the Graben valley, as well as in the towns of Butembo and Bunia (Mugisa Reference Mugisa2008; Tusiime Reference Tusiime2008; Local government official 2011 int.). In ADF-controlled regions recruitment drives were carried out quite openly, but in front-line propaganda areas – namely those where ADF presence was more precarious – it was done relatively quietly, for example through brochures and pamphlets, small church and social gatherings, or private meetings.

It was by no means only the Congolese side of the borderland that was heavily targeted for recruitment. Initiatives to attract western Ugandans (and to a lesser extent, Ugandans from other regions of the country) continued as well. Indeed, while no longer waging direct attacks against western Uganda, the ADF still used the area for a multitude of purposes and had extensive networks throughout the territory, facilitating recruitment practices. Peripheral and marginalised, western Ugandan towns such as Bundibugyo suffered abject levels of poverty – in 2010 for example it was estimated that 56% of Bundibugyo residents lived below the poverty line, compared with the national average of 31% – which the ADF worked at exploiting (Womakuyu Reference Womakuyu2010). In fact, there was no need for the ADF to appeal particularly to Muslim populations, as the area's exceptionally high rate of unemployment was providing a sufficient amount of recruits.Footnote ¹⁶ Particularly vulnerable in this respect were those living in the more isolated parts of the western Ugandan borderland, where employment opportunities beyond subsistence farming were essentially non-existent due to the abject underdevelopment and neglect from the state.

During the time period of 2003–2013, then, the ADF's recruitment practices were clearly shaped by a variety of political, social and economic borderland undercurrents. Together with the influence of various Islamist networks, the ADF's constitution was thus as multifaceted as ever.