Jonathan Quong provides a sustained critique of recent leading strands of liberal perfectionism, especially the work of legal theorist Joseph Raz, and crafts a stout defense of a minimal political liberalism grounded in what he calls the “internal conception” of political liberalism. Quong deftly moves us back to political liberalism's founding in John Rawls's writings, with its emphasis on the question of justification, specifically how a liberal state can justify its policies in a plural society of reasonable citizens who adhere to diverse comprehensive doctrines. Liberal perfectionists, in contrast, argue that the state should advocate a specific version of the good life, even if it runs counter to the views held by many of its citizens.
For Quong, it is crucial at the outset to decide between two general conceptions of political liberalism. The grander “external conception” holds that “a liberal conception of justice can be justified to all (or most) actual citizens in liberal democracies, even those people who do not accept certain basic liberal norms” (p. 5). His more modest internal version asks what “kinds of arguments, if any, citizens already committed to certain basic liberal norms can legitimately offer to one another” (p. 5). The liberal state needs to justify itself to “an idealized constituency of persons who are committed to certain fundamental, but fairly abstract, liberal values” (p. 5). These minimal liberal values include the belief that all individuals are free and equal, a commitment to a general sense of fairness, and an acceptance of the inevitability of reasonable disagreements about the good life. As the author shows, this modest version proves quite resistant to many common critiques of political liberalism.
After an introductory chapter that previews Quong's argument and delimits the scope of the study, Chapter 1 provides an excellent summary of the major tenets of liberal perfectionism and political liberalism. The next section offers the author's three main critiques of liberal perfectionism. First, he takes on Raz's claim for autonomy as a foundation, arguing that noncoercive strategies, such as state subsidies required to promote the good life, amount to manipulation, which is a form of coercion and thus an infringement on autonomy itself. Then, Quong argues that liberal perfectionism is a paternalistic theory because it pushes individuals toward a particular conception of the good life, thus disrespecting their abilities to freely decide among competing notions of it. Finally, he argues that perfectionists have conflated justification with legitimacy; while perfectionist states may find legitimacy in their conception of the good life, it does not necessarily follow that they are able to adequately justify their policy choices to citizens who fundamentally disagree with such a conception.
The largest section of the volume then develops in fine detail Quong's argument for a minimal political liberalism based upon his internal conception. Most interesting are the chapters where he deviates significantly from Rawls's work.
Pace Rawls, in Chapter 6 Quong argues that the “common view” of the overlapping consensus has wrongly positioned it as a second justificatory step that any notion of political justice must pass. For instance, the free-standing argument for political liberalism, which Rawls developed through the thought experiment of the original position, must be justified by an overlapping consensus, where it must be found congruent with our radically different comprehensive doctrines about the good life. Quong argues, though, that if our comprehensive doctrines are all compatible with political liberalism, the overlapping consensus is superfluous. If political liberalism is not compatible, then in our drive for consensus, we would reject some of the basic tenets of political liberalism. The author addresses this dilemma by repositioning the overlapping consensus to the first step of his argument. For him, the overlapping consensus is an agreement about the fundamental tenets of liberalism (that we are free and equal, committed to general fairness, and accept the burdens of justice). If any comprehensive doctrine does not accept these tenets, it is branded as unreasonable. In this way, the fundamental tenets of liberal society serve as starting points for deliberation among diverse conceptions of justice.
This argument leads to the very common asymmetry objection of political liberalism discussed in Chapter 7. Why should political liberalism treat disagreements about the good life and disagreements about justice differently? Quong argues that disagreements about the good life are almost invariably “foundational disagreements” about first principles, whereas disagreements about justice are almost always “justificatory disagreements” whereby we draw differing conclusions starting from the same first principles. The original, neutral principles upon which Quong bases his modest political liberalism remain, even if differing conceptions of justice emerge. He argues that only such an internal conception of political liberalism is capable of rebutting this asymmetry objection successfully.
While Rawls held that public reason—the idea that political decisions must be based upon reasons considered valid by all citizens—should be applicable only to questions of constitutional essentials and questions of fundamental justice, Quong extends the public-reason requirement to all political decisions. Though admitting that such justifications might not always be possible, he asks of Rawls, “[W]hy are all instances where citizens exercise political power over one another not subject to the idea of public reason?” (p. 274).
Overall, Quong's work is well argued. He patiently clarifies his assumptions, systematically develops his arguments, gives a fair hearing to critics of political liberalism, and anticipates many of the objections to his positions. The work is well referenced and thus provides an excellent overview of the main debates and literature in political liberalism. It could serve as a required book for courses in liberalism or even global justice. In more general political theory courses, an instructor could require a chapter or two next to texts by Rawls and Raz in order to show how to engage spiritedly and honestly with such texts. In more specialized courses, a useful comparison could be made with Martha Nussbaum's recent lengthy article that covers the same ground but provides a more robust account of political liberalism with a focus on respect (“Perfectionist Liberalism and Political Liberalism,” Philosophy & Public Affairs 39 [no. 1, 2011]: 3–45), or Steven Leece's Against Perfectionism: Defending Liberal Neutrality (2008), which advances similar critiques of Raz's perfectionism but provides the historical background to these debates and expands on their policy implications.
Most readers of Quong's work who are already conversant in debates between political liberal thinkers such as Rawls and Charles Larmore, on the one hand, and liberal perfectionists like Raz and Isaiah Berlin, on the other, will find his detailed, nuanced arguments quite provocative. For those readers outside of, or unfamiliar with, the debates in analytical political philosophy, this contest could appear as an internecine battle founded on what Freud called a “narcissism of small differences,” especially as the philosophies of the two protagonists, Rawls and Raz, keep threatening to collapse on each other. Numerous scholars have claimed that Rawls advocates a type of minimal perfectionism, and most perfectionist thinkers, such as Raz, offer a tempered or moderate view of perfectionism. Those expecting to find responses to the vexing justificatory problems of political liberalism, such as whether the basic structure masks injustice, will be disappointed, as Quong intentionally eschews such questions.
A more robust concluding chapter that discusses the implications of Quong's arguments would have been helpful. If the best defense of political liberalism is an overlapping consensus of such minimal propositions and an unrealistic prohibition on states refraining from judgments about the good life, what has become of the Rawlsian project? In addition, are the resulting founding principles so minimal that they fail to ensure stability, one of the primary goals of Rawls's thought?
