INTRODUCTION
In today's era of rapid modernization across the globe, education administrators cannot afford to overlook or underestimate the value of quality education. As globalization continues to remodel the face of the world, states will increasingly require a solid education system to support the transmission of knowledge from one generation to another, to help sustain and develop existing know-how. An example will serve to illustrate the point. Unlike 40 years ago, computer literacy is now a significant aspect of the whole educational experience, in that it embodies skills which facilitate the efficient storage and management of information without which modern businesses are likely to collapse. It is therefore not unexpected that the current cadre of professionals in the job market are required to be computer literate. Education promotes literacy and numeracy and has enabled people to adapt to changing times by equipping them with such knowledge as is needed to inform the way they interact with one another. It is through education, whether formal or informal, that one learns the skills of logical reasoning, communication and survival.
As an investment in human capital, education is undeniably one of the most important means of sustaining or building on the level of socio-economic development in a country.Footnote 1 According to the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, education is also “the primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults and children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their communities”.Footnote 2 In essence, education not only makes it possible for underprivileged groups in society to understand why they are poor, it also allows them to learn how to improve significantly their chances of living a more comfortable life. This should make it imperative for countries to aim to have a good education system. Such a system should be capable of producing competent hands to join a skilled and professional workforce, which is able to enhance economic productivity and take advantage of the potential for technology transfer presented by the ever increasing movement of foreign direct investment across borders.
This article, however, does not seek to re-explore the relationship between education and development. Rather, it assumes that there is a symbiotic relationship between the two and proceeds to take the discussion to the next level by examining how the Nigerian government can improve an important element of the whole educational experience: secondary education. The objective is to study critically the Olusegun Obasanjo administration's proposals to privatize the management of federally-run secondary schools. The article highlights several legal and practical matters which merit further consideration, if the purpose of reversing the downward trend in academic standards in the schools is to be realized.Footnote 3 At this point, it is essential to introduce briefly the Nigerian secondary education system and the federally-run secondary schools, otherwise known as federal government colleges or unity schools.
At independence in 1960, Nigeria preserved its colonial educational heritage, with post-primary education involving five years of study to General Certificate of Education ordinary level and two years studying for advanced level, also known as the sixth form. Between 1977 and 1981 however, the sixth form was gradually eliminated with the adoption of the 6-3-3-4 system which split post-primary education into three years of junior secondary (JS) and three years of senior secondary (SS). In addition to traditionally taught academic subjects, the JS years introduced pre-vocational subjects in an attempt to equip students for further vocational training in a number of trades deemed essential in a modern economy. The SS years also offered subjects with academic and vocational content. The aim was to counter high unemployment rates by affording secondary school graduates the ability to choose from a diverse range of career tracks, be they academic or professional, vocational or technical.Footnote 4 The 6-3-3-4 system was later modified in 2004 to a 9-3-4 system, providing for nine years of compulsory, uninterrupted basic education from primary through to JS level, be followed by three and four years respectively of SS and tertiary education.Footnote 5
As was the case under the 1979 constitution, the 1999 constitution (the Constitution) also vests federal and state legislative bodies with concurrent powers to legislate upon matters relating to the establishment and running of post-primary educational institutions.Footnote 6 It is, however, the state governments and private entities that have taken on a greater share of the burden of providing secondary education.Footnote 7 According to fairly recent statistical data, only 102 of the 27,000 plus secondary schools in the country are run by the federal government. In enrolment terms, federal secondary schools provide enrolment for only about 2 per cent or just 132,000 of the 6.4 million or so secondary school students.Footnote 8 The unity schools are spread across the 36 states of the federation and the Federal Capital Territory, Abuja. They consist of 38 co-educational schools, 39 girls' schools, two boys' schools, one special school for gifted children and 22 science and technical schools.Footnote 9
As the name “unity school” partly suggests, the schools were set up to: (a) provide total education; (b) promote mutual understanding and tolerance amongst people from diverse ethnic, religious and cultural backgrounds; (c) entrench the values of patriotism and national unity; and (d) promote the pursuit of excellence in achievement and moral virtues.Footnote 10 In view of the twin objectives of providing quality education and promoting national integration, the unity schools were meant to serve as model schools for other secondary schools in the country.Footnote 11 Beyond this, the schools have historically played a unique role in society in that they have provided an avenue for underprivileged groups to break out of the poverty trap, and acted as a check on the development of an extreme elitist education system as obtains in some parts of the world. The reason is not far-fetched. By charging minimal fees, the schools have succeeded in producing some of the best results in national examinations and afforded graduates, both rich and poor, the means to compete on a level-playing field for the few available places in the country's tertiary institutions.Footnote 12
Under the current management structure for unity schools, the principal is responsible for the day-to-day running of individual schools as the head of a school-based management team. In line with a directive from the Federal Ministry of Education (FME), an advisory board has been set up in every unity school to provide non-binding educational advice to principals. Each board is usually composed of representatives of the FME, the Federal Ministry of Works, the relevant chapter of the parent-teachers' association (PTA) and the old students' association, in addition to a member of the local community and the principal, who is responsible for convening meetings of the board. The reporting line for the daily management of unity schools goes directly from the principal to the Unity Schools Directorate in the FME Department of Primary and Secondary Education.Footnote 13 The federal government of Nigeria, through the FME, is responsible for disbursing funds for the operation of the schools.Footnote 14 Furthermore, unity school teachers are employees of the FME and therefore are federal civil servants.Footnote 15
The FME is the government body saddled with the responsibility of implementing the country's educational policies. Among other things, the FME collects and collates data for the purpose of educational planning and financing. The ministry also develops curricula and syllabuses for all primary and secondary institutions in Nigeria.Footnote 16 The minister of education is statutorily empowered to appoint inspectors to keep her informed of the standards of instruction and examinations at approved institutions.Footnote 17 For this reason, the FME maintains a Federal Inspectorate Service Department (FIS) to monitor the adherence or otherwise, by secondary schools across the country, to set minimum standards of education.Footnote 18 Furthermore, the National Commission for Colleges of Education (NCCE), a federal parastatal, is charged with prescribing standards for the qualification of teachers at all educational levels below degree level, provided the prior approval of the minister of education is obtained.Footnote 19 The FIS and NCCE are a direct consequence of the exclusive authority vested by the Constitution in the federal legislative body to legislate on matters relating to the establishment and regulation of authorities “to prescribe minimum standards of education at all levels”.Footnote 20
In justifying the plan to hand over the management of these schools to private organizations, the FME and other commentators have identified a number of problems that have plagued the schools in recent times. These include dilapidation of physical infrastructure, neglect by the regulatory bodies, inadequate funding, as well as the poor utilization of available funding, falling standards of teaching and the retention of poor quality teachers, and the continued decline in the annual performance of graduates in national examinations.Footnote 21 In relation to the problem of the retention of poor quality teachers, government-run schools have generally been found to suffer from a weak system of teacher accountability in view of the public sector's characteristic reliance on terms of employment which are unrelated to performance.Footnote 22 This suggests that the decline in educational standards is the result of the combined effect of poor utilization of financial and teaching resources, as well as poor maintenance of infrastructural facilities in an administrative environment typified by lack of competent monitoring or supervision. As these relate to activities which fall under the umbrella of “school management and supervision”, it would be justifiable to ascribe the reason for the declining standards to a failure in the administrative system.Footnote 23
It is however important to point out that educational standards vary across unity schools, as some are better staffed and equipped than others.Footnote 24 Hence, although a number of the schools are still considered to be amongst the best secondary schools in Nigeria, others are believed to have lost their competitive edge and are no longer seen as model institutions. This disparity among the schools was noted by a former minister of education who, in spite of the commendable performance of eight unity schools after a 1993 school inspection exercise conducted by the FME, observed that some other unity schools performed “far below expectations”.Footnote 25 In the FME report submitted after the exercise, it was further revealed that unity schools were “losing the lead to state schools in academic performance in spite of superior inputs in human and material resources”.Footnote 26
The next section of this article sets out the proposal for the non-profit privatization of the management of unity schools.Footnote 27 Taking into account the dearth of scientific research showing the exact causes of the decline in the schools' educational standards, this article will examine the potential merits and demerits of the proposed model, with a view to determining whether it is likely to add any value to the currently applicable public administrative model. The third section begins with an analysis of the legal boundaries to any privatization exercise as derived from the law on the right to education in Nigeria. This is followed by a series of practical recommendations geared towards ensuring that the proposed reform takes the “best interests of the child” into consideration.Footnote 28 Among other things, this section will address the question of how the government can continue to play a meaningful role in running unity schools in the post-privatization period. The concluding section will identify areas where future research is required.
THE PROPOSED REFORM
The reform proposal
The proposed reform, the brainchild of Oby Ezekwesili, a former minister of education, is contained in the Education Reform Bill of 2007 (the Bill).Footnote 29 As indicated by Ms Ezekwesili, its goal is to deliver “significant innovation in school management” as well as to foster “sustainable improvements in teaching and learning for public good”.Footnote 30 It is based on the premise that, between the private and public sectors, the former is better placed to manage unity schools with a view to realizing the stated objective, and the reform therefore attempts to draw on the experience of private entities in doing so. Interestingly enough, an historical examination of the education sector in Nigeria will show that the country has considerable experience of two types of private participation in education: private ownership and management of schools without government support (unassisted schools); and private ownership and management of schools with government support (assisted schools).Footnote 31 Under the proposed reform, government agencies would still exercise ownership and supervisory control over unity schools and share the burden of supporting the schools financially, but would cease to partake in management activities. Under section 117(d) of the Bill, a Unity Schools Trust Department (USTD) is to be established within a trust fund to be called the Education Trust Fund (ETF). It is intended that the ETF will be the body authorized to collect revenue previously collected under the Education Tax Fund ActFootnote 32 and the Compulsory, Free Universal Basic Education Act,Footnote 33 while the USTD will specifically be “responsible for raising funds for the day-to-day running of the unity schools”.Footnote 34 Furthermore, the ETF is to be charged with facilitating the establishment of private school management organizations (SMOs) in every unity school, to take over the responsibility for managing the academic and administrative affairs of the schools.Footnote 35
Although the Bill outlines the functions envisaged for SMOs, it does not explicitly define the meaning of the phrase, “managing the academic and administrative affairs” of schools. Notwithstanding this, it appears that the Bill's drafters intended to link the phrase to the non-exhaustive list of functions to be carried out by SMOs which is contained in the same section.Footnote 36 Hence, in managing the academic and administrative affairs of unity schools, SMOs are expected inter alia to: maintain the schools' assets; commit to a minimum level of investment in the physical infrastructure of the schools; mobilize additional funding to augment government funds; employ the staff of the schools, including taking over the contracts of those already employed; provide continuous training and development for teaching and non-teaching staff; pay the remuneration and pension benefits of teaching and non-teaching staff; and ensure that only qualified teachers are appointed to teach in the schools.Footnote 37 Section 132(3) further provides that the management rights of the SMO will be specified in an operating and management agreement entered into with the USTD. Those agreements are to be reviewed every ten years.Footnote 38
The Bill requires that a SMO is registered under the Companies and Allied Matters Act (CAMA)Footnote 39 as a private company limited by guarantee.Footnote 40 By far the most significant implication of this requirement is that the SMO is prohibited from carrying on business for the purpose of making profits for distribution to its members.Footnote 41 Section 27(4)(a) of the CAMA provides further that, “[t]he memorandum of a company limited by guarantee shall also state that … no portion [of the income and property of the company] shall be paid or transferred directly or indirectly to the members of the company”. Beyond this, as a private company, an SMO is required, by its articles of association, to restrict the transfer of its shares.Footnote 42 Similar provisions apply to the directors of an SMO as well. As trustees of the company's property, directors are under a duty to account for all the funds over which they exercise control and can be compelled to refund any amount they are judged to have utilized improperly.Footnote 43 It is submitted that the meaning of “director” under the CAMA is broad enough to cover the principal officers of an SMO as envisaged by the Bill.Footnote 44 These officers are the principal, two vice-principals, a bursar and three unit heads.Footnote 45
The rationale for subjecting an SMO to these financial limitations stems from the expectation that the organization is solely meant to promote educational purposes. Enforcement of the limitations is made possible by virtue of the Nigerian Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC), a body which is statutorily empowered to arrange or conduct an investigation into the affairs of any company as required in the public interest.Footnote 46 The idea is to promote financial transparency and accountability of SMOs through a combination of public filings and the keeping of accounting and other records by the SMO. As a company limited by guarantee, an SMO is obliged to file, with the CAC, an annual return which includes certified copies of relevant balance sheets and auditors' reports.Footnote 47 In addition to these filings, every Nigerian company is also required to keep accounting records, while its directors are under a duty to prepare annual financial statements.Footnote 48 This article suggests later that additional scrutiny should be provided by the relevant PTA as well as the USTD and inspectorate services, to ensure that both publicly and privately generated funds are utilized for the purposes for which they were given.
The proposed reform does not entail the federal government abdicating all its responsibilities in relation to unity schools. Under the Bill, the role of the FME will however be confined to the setting and maintenance of minimum standards through the passing of new laws, drawing up of new policies and conduct of regular school inspections amongst other things. In this sense, the FME's role with respect to unity schools will be the same as it is with respect to all other secondary schools in the country. The ministry's role would however have one difference, in that it will continue to be the primary provider of funding as well as the legal owner of the assets of unity schools. Despite the intended separation of the supervisory and management functions of the FME, there is nothing in the Bill to suggest that the federal government will no longer have ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the schools are successfully and responsibly run. As alluded to earlier, it is envisaged that the USTD will specifically oversee the running of unity schools, while another supervisory body, the Basic and Secondary Education Commission (BSEC), will be responsible for supervising all secondary schools in general, including the unity schools.
Section 132(2) of the Bill provides that the SMO “shall be accountable to the Unity Schools Trust Fund [sic] in the day to day running of the Unity Schools and implementation of policies of the Federal Government”. The Bill's drafters opted for a contract-based model for supervising SMOs. Hence, the Bill stipulates that the USTD and the SMO must enter into an operating and management agreement specifying the management rights of an SMO.Footnote 49 Beyond this, it does not provide any guidelines as to the extent or limits of the SMO's rights. Nonetheless, from the language of section 132(2) of the Bill, it is the view of the author that the USTD is intended to be the primary enforcer of federal government education policy in unity schools. If this is indeed the case, the author further posits that the BSEC must then be the secondary enforcer. The BSEC is to be created from the proposed merger of the Universal Basic Education Commission and the FIS department of the FME.Footnote 50 The aim is to empower it to oversee the provision of basic and secondary education in Nigeria, as well as to conduct regular inspections of basic and secondary schools with a view to ensuring that they satisfy national minimum standards.Footnote 51 The Bill is however silent on the type of relationship, whether vertical or horizontal, envisioned between the USTD and the BSEC.
Other FME parastatals whose functions are likely to have an impact on the performance of unity schools under the proposed arrangement include: (a) the National Education Resource Commission, which will be responsible for developing curricula at all levels of the education system;Footnote 52 (b) the National Examinations Council charged with conducting the national common entrance examination for admission into the unity schools and the senior secondary school certificate examinations taken on completion of secondary education;Footnote 53 and (c) the Teachers' Regulatory Council of Nigeria which will be given the mandate of registering and licensing qualified teachers.Footnote 54 It appears that the Bill has largely delineated the respective roles for the FME and SMO under the new arrangement. The FME will maintain its current role of devising curricula for the unity schools and other secondary schools, setting external examinations for the schools and ensuring quality control at a global level. Furthermore, with the unity schools' management being given greater autonomy over the use of the schools' resources, it is submitted that the need for the federal government to enforce financial accountability will in time increase. The SMO, on the other hand, will begin to perform the function of hiring and dismissing staff, fixing salary scales and conditions of service for staff, and developing teaching methods and criteria for promoting students and assessing their work.
Potential advantages and disadvantages of the reform package
There is some evidence to suggest that private schools across the country are generally superior in quality to their public counterparts, though the proposition would not be so clear-cut if private schools were to be pitted solely against the unity schools.Footnote 55 However, the persistent decay in the academic standards and infrastructure of these schools has cast some doubt over the federal government's ability to manage them. It was with a view to tackling this issue that the previous administration contemplated ceding its role in the management and staffing of the schools to autonomous private groups. Proponents of education privatization usually argue that public education, being bureaucratic in nature, is slow to change and usually unresponsive to the needs of primary stakeholders, whereas private education has built-in mechanisms to enable it to adapt in accordance with the wishes of the stakeholders.Footnote 56 Opponents of privatization (particularly for-profit privatization) contend however that, with privatization, responsibility for education is placed in the hands of businessmen and investors who have little or no knowledge or experience in the field of education.Footnote 57 Some also argue that privatization gives private hands greater control over access to government resources in a way that complicates constitutional accountability.Footnote 58 On a more practical level, a brief look at the United States and the UK, which have in the past introduced similar public-private partnership initiatives, may prove particularly instructive. A comparative analysis of what obtains in these jurisdictions is however beyond the scope of this article.
In the USA, education management organizations (EMOs) became quite prominent in the 1990s when school boards began contracting out instructional services. Even before the passage of the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001,Footnote 59 several school districts had sought to reverse academic underperformance in ailing schools by inviting private enterprises to take over the management of publicly funded elementary and secondary schools. Typically, this involved the replacement of administrators, previously appointed by local school boards, by private firms or EMOs. The arrangement was a contractual one and was subject to a specific set of guidelines under which the EMO assumed responsibility for various aspects of school performance. It is now rather commonplace to find public schools with private management dotting the American educational landscape. It is instructive to note that, even when an EMO is vested with the authority to manage a public school, set its curriculum, sponsor professional development and staff the school, such a school nevertheless continues to depend on governmental sources for the bulk of its funds.Footnote 60 A good number of these hybrid schools are charter schools. These schools are typically the creation of a contractual relationship between a government and an independent school operator whereby, in exchange for greater freedom over personnel, budgetary and curriculum matters, the school operators are obliged to meet student achievement and other goals specified in their school's charter.Footnote 61
Experience in the UK is somewhat similar. In March 2000, the British government introduced city academies (now simply “academies”) in a bid to raise educational standards in deprived areas. The academies programme aims to achieve this by replacing poorly performing schools and building new schools where there is a demand for more school places. The stated objectives of the programme are to “drive up standards by raising achievement across the local area” and “increase choice and diversity by creating a new type of local school that provides a good standard of education”.Footnote 62 Each academy has one or more sponsors who commit to contributing to the capital costs and influence building design, curriculum, specialism(s) and ethos. The UK Department for Education and Skills continues to provide the full running costs and most of the capital costs of the academies. The sponsors are usually from the private or voluntary sectors though a local authority can also be a sponsor. They appoint members to the academy's governing body, which determines the terms and conditions for the employment of teachers and other staff. Academy trusts are required by law to be registered as companies limited by guarantee with charitable status and are obliged to file annual accounts subject to external audit.Footnote 63
As a whole, while reports on the performance of charter schools in the USA have not been particularly encouraging, the UK academies have shown more promising signs of success. In a recent survey carried out in the USA, it was found that students from charter schools on average had lower mean scores in reading and mathematics than students from public non-charter schools. The disparity was notably less in reading than in mathematics. However, the authors of the report have urged caution in interpreting the findings, in part due to their inability to capture some relevant student characteristics or completely eliminate the problem of selection bias. As charter schools are “schools of choice”, the non-inclusion of a variable, such as prior student achievement in non-charter schools, is bound to distort the complete picture of how charter schools have fared vis-à-vis other public schools.Footnote 64 On the other hand, the UK National Audit Office (NAO) has revealed that, taking pupils' personal circumstances and prior attainment into account, the General Certificate of Secondary Education (GCSE) performance of academies is better, on average, than the performance of other schools. Other findings contained in the NAO report show that GCSE performance in academies has improved when compared with predecessor schools and that it is improving faster in academies than in other types of schools. However, the performance of academies in advanced level study was found to be well below the national average. As with the US survey, there are a number of caveats to bear in mind in interpreting the results. In particular, since all the academy students surveyed had previously attended another secondary school, it is difficult to discount the potential influence this has had on their performance at the academy.Footnote 65
Taking into account the peculiarities of the Nigerian education sector, a dispassionate examination of the public-private partnership proposal should immediately reveal some of its potential merits and demerits. Proponents and opponents of privatization are likely to agree that the FME, being a bureaucratic government body, has not been as responsive to the needs of unity schools as it should be. The schools have been robbed of the benefits of having a school-based management team, as a disproportionate number of school level decisions are taken at ministry level. For example, a former minister of education is noted to have questioned why he as minister had to bear responsibility for approving student admission into unity schools.Footnote 66 The implementation of the public-private partnership is one way of removing some of the bureaucracy and putting control back into the hands of school-based management teams, thereby giving them the ability to become more responsive to the needs of their schools and stakeholders. Furthermore, without the additional strain of having to manage 102 schools across the country, FME officials will be in a better position to enforce minimum standards in schools and carry out other statutory functions. This approach to decentralization strikes at the heart of the matter; at least one study has found that, where decentralization is implemented as part of a package of changes in which the central authority has responsibility for defining the curriculum, monitoring quality and intervening as necessary, student learning outcomes show greater promise.Footnote 67
The ceding of managerial authority by the FME to SMOs also entails the latter being given greater autonomy over personnel issues. Not only will SMOs become vested with the power to dictate the terms and conditions of employment contracts with teachers, they will also be in a better position to monitor the performance of teachers and, in deserving cases, hold them accountable for their actions. Indeed, there is support for the underlying assertion that the chain of accountability is considerably weaker in government schools than in private schools.Footnote 68 Beyond teacher accountability, the Bill provides for a second level of accountability, this time for the SMO: the threat of cancellation or non-renewal of the operating and management contract the company enters into with the USTD. The role envisaged for the USTD is therefore one which involves ensuring that there are consequences for failure or underperformance by the SMO. In deciding whether or not to renew a management contract, it is suggested that the USTD should be able to utilize information provided not only by the inspectorate body, but by parents, PTAs, donors and other stakeholders as well.
Still on the subject of accountability, the non-profit angle to the proposed management of the schools is also believed to have certain advantages over the alternative of engaging private profit-making bodies. It has been suggested that, in situations in which ordinary contractual devices do not provide consumers with adequate means of monitoring the performance of service providers, the non-profit form offers consumers the protection of a broader “contract”, namely the organization's commitment to devote all of its income to the services it was formed to provide.Footnote 69 Hence, a non-profit company is less likely to reduce the quality of its services in a bid to generate surpluses for eventual distribution to its members. A discussion of potential advantages of the public-private partnership is incomplete without mention being made of the requirement that SMOs would have to raise additional funds to augment government grants. The increased funding would assist new managers to entice better qualified staff and improve existing facilities. The non-profit precondition would also make it relatively easier for the SMO to attract philanthropic donations and volunteer services.Footnote 70
In implementing the public-private partnership, one is equally likely to encounter certain difficulties capable of derailing the entire exercise, unless they are carefully managed. As with most privatization exercises generally, the menace of corruption and a flawed tendering process are high on this list of inherent dangers. Failure to take steps to avert the risk of handing management authority to an incompetent private body may very well lead to a state of affairs which is worse than the status quo. As a distinct professional field in its own right, the provision of educational services ought to be undertaken only by those with the right qualifications and required expertise, and not by cronies or charlatans. This basic requirement of competence is equally applicable to FME officials whose supervisory and regulatory role will become even more critical after SMOs are brought in to run the schools. It would surely be a shame if qualified SMOs ended up being frustrated out of business by intrusive or inept supervisors from the FME who fail to understand what their new role entails. This scenario may be avoided if the roles of all parties concerned are clearly defined during the pre-privatization period and a proper training or re-orientation programme is organized for FME staff in the immediate post-privatization period.
The fees payable in unity schools have remained remarkably low over the years, compared to what is payable in other secondary schools. Hence, a good number of parents from the lower income earning groups still send their children to the schools. This makes it conceivable that some of them may object to the privatization exercise out of fear that fees will increase after the appointment of private bodies to the schools. This fear is certainly not unfounded for a number of reasons. First, the provision of quality education can be quite an expensive affair, which is conditional upon the ability to maintain a learning-friendly environment, equip laboratories and libraries, and attract the right calibre of staff. Secondly, with the introduction of SMOs, there are bound to be other significant costs unique to the running of an average private company, such as payment of market-driven salary packages to directors and other principal officers. Thirdly, due to the limited information on the amount SMOs are required to generate to augment government funds, one cannot eliminate the possibility that the additional revenue will not meet the additional costs. For these reasons, newly privatized schools may legitimately feel constrained to charge higher fees to cover additional capital and running costs. This is a likely development unless a workable and sustainable plan for generating sufficient revenue to cover these costs is drawn up before the SMO takes over.
Another important question has to do with what the fate of teachers currently employed in the schools will be. Although SMOs are expected to take over their contracts of employment, the Bill does not stipulate that they must retain incompetent staff.Footnote 71 In fact, section 133(j) of the Bill provides that an SMO must ensure that only qualified teachers are appointed to teach in unity schools. Oby Ezekwesili had wanted any teacher who lost his or her job on account of the privatization to be absorbed by the FME.Footnote 72 However, it is not clear if she would have also wanted to have a time restriction placed on the absorption. Does this mean that currently employed teachers who wish to retain their more secure federal civil service jobs would have the opportunity to opt for joining the FME at the time of the handover? What role if any are these teachers expected to play at the ministry upon absorption? The failure adequately to address these and many other concerns may in part have accounted for the reversal of the reform programme by the administration of President Yar'Adua.Footnote 73
In closing, one may legitimately take the view that there are considerable risks involved in implementing the reform proposal. However, its potential rewards also make it a rather attractive policy option. As the unity schools are among the few remaining secondary schools capable of inducing upward social mobility, the stakes are indeed high, particularly for lower income groups or, in other words, the majority of the populace. For these stakeholders, surely one of the acceptable end goals would be the return of the schools to their previously held esteemed position as model schools or standard setters for other schools. In order to unlock the promise held by the reform, its aggregate benefits must however outstrip the aggregate costs without unduly prejudicing any of the affected parties. The following section discusses the protection offered by applicable human rights provisions, with a view to highlighting the need for any reform proposal to address relevant legal considerations. The section also examines several other considerations informed by the “best interests of the child” principle and aimed at developing practical solutions which should minimize the downside to the reform.
RECONSIDERING THE PROPOSED REFORM
The right to education
The main issue for consideration in this section is the extent to which the right to education in Nigeria protects current and future secondary school students from prejudicial changes in education policy. Put differently, are there limits to the powers of the federal government to implement changes to secondary education policy? This section argues that there are enforceable limits to such policy changes: limits dictated by statutory and constitutional provisions on the right to education. The right falls under the umbrella of social, economic and cultural rights, otherwise known as egalitarian rights. As one writer succinctly puts it, they are “claims to social equality, aimed at just and equal distributions of economic and social goods”.Footnote 74 In Nigeria, the right to education is primarily enshrined in the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Charter),Footnote 75 article 17(1) of which provides that “every individual shall have the right to education”. Regrettably, the charter does not elaborate on the scope of this right. Moreover, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Commission), the body empowered by article 45(3) of the African Charter to interpret the provisions of the charter, has not yet provided any authoritative interpretation of article 17. Despite initial appearances, there is however no lacuna in the law. Hence, this article contends that the right to education in Nigeria also encompasses an ancillary right to secondary education.
Article 60 enjoins the African Commission to “draw inspiration from [the] international law on human and peoples' rights” in interpreting the charter. It further stipulates that interpretative guidance should be sought from the provisions of a number of instruments, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)Footnote 76 and other instruments adopted by the United Nations and African countries in the field of human and peoples' rights. Examples are the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)Footnote 77 and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).Footnote 78 Articles 13, 28 and 26 of the ICESCR, CRC and UDHR respectively give a good overview of the scope of the right to education under the “international law on human and peoples' rights”. These provisions show that the right to free and compulsory primary education is entrenched in all three instruments. The guarantee of secondary education, however, seems to be limited to ensuring that it is made generally “available and accessible” to all by every appropriate means, for example by “the progressive introduction of free education” or by “offering financial assistance in case of need”.Footnote 79 One writer has argued that “states have an obligation under international law to ensure access to inclusive school systems that facilitate secondary school completion by extending free, compulsory education to the end of secondary [school]”.Footnote 80
While many may disagree with the above conclusion, a closer look at the instruments, particularly the ICESCR, will probably leave few in doubt as to the robustness of the guarantee of the right to secondary education under international law. The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has identified four interrelated and essential features of a state's obligation to respect and protect the right to education and, by extension, the right to secondary education: availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability.Footnote 81 “Availability” obliges the state to ensure that functioning schools and programmes are made available in sufficient quantity. An arbitrary closure of a secondary school without a corresponding opening of another would, in the author's view, infringe upon the right to (secondary) education. In Free Legal Assistance Group and others v Zaire, the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights decided that the closure of universities and secondary schools over a two year period in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire) amounted to a violation of article 17 of the African Charter.Footnote 82 “Accessibility” is synonymous with schools being affordable, physically accessible and free from discriminatory practices.Footnote 83 Concerning affordability, even though the ICESCR does not guarantee free secondary education, it provides for the next best thing: the progressive introduction of free secondary education. An increase in school fees where current fees are barely affordable would, in the author's opinion, be contrary to the spirit of article 13 of the ICESCR, unless a complementary financial assistance scheme were established simultaneously.Footnote 84
“Acceptability” and “adaptability” are derived from article 13(1) of the ICESCR, to the effect that “education shall be directed to the full development of the human personality and the sense of its dignity, and shall strengthen the respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Some of the main factors for determining the acceptability or otherwise of a secondary school are relevance, cultural appropriateness and quality.Footnote 85 Left unchecked, the continuous decline in a school's educational standards could, for instance, constitute a violation of the right to education. Furthermore, if a child's education is meant to be directed to the full development of his or her personality, then it must effectively be adaptable to the changing needs of society, in economic, social and cultural terms. Adaptability ensures that a child's education remains relevant to the needs of both the child and society at large. Most importantly, whenever there is doubt in construing the scope of a state's obligation, the best interests of the child must always be a primary consideration.Footnote 86
This section has explored the scope of the right to education under article 17(1) of the African Charter. Having ratified the charter, the Nigerian government is required to give full effect to its spirit and provisions. In interpreting the charter, the government may also draw on the provisions of chapter II of the Constitution, which comprise the non-justiciable objectives and directive principles of state policy.Footnote 87 Section 18(1) of this chapter urges the government to direct its policy towards ensuring that there are “equal and adequate” educational opportunities at all levels. It goes further by calling on the government to strive to eradicate illiteracy by providing, among other things, free secondary education “as and when practicable”.Footnote 88 Another piece of legislation, the Child Rights Act, guarantees the right of a child to free, compulsory and universal education up until the end of junior secondary school.Footnote 89 This was a significant improvement on what existed before the act's enactment in 2003, when the guarantee of free and compulsory education was limited to primary education. Under section 4 of the same act, every child is additionally vested with the right to survival and development. Unlike the provisions of chapter II of the Constitution, these provisions are justiciable.
As a whole, based on a combined reading of article 17(1) of the African Charter and the relevant provisions of chapter II of the Constitution and the Child Rights Act, it is perhaps safe to say that the government has an obligation progressively to implement free and compulsory secondary education. It is further submitted that the government implicitly recognized this obligation with the enactment of the Child Rights Act. In line with international practice, this act increased the government's obligation to provide free and compulsory education. With the introduction of the right to survival and development, the act has now made it possible for a child to seek further protection of the right to education. Seeing that the available evidence suggests that the key to reducing poverty is secondary rather than primary education, the right to survival and development may be rendered meaningless if the government fails to take more progressive steps towards ensuring that secondary education is accessible to all.Footnote 90
The above analysis however begs the question of how one resolves the potential conflict between two or more pieces of legislation dealing with the provision of secondary education. Put differently, in cases of conflict between the provisions of the African Charter and the Bill (if enacted), which one will prevail? On the international plane, such as in proceedings before the African Commission, there is no doubt as to the primacy of international over domestic law. Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties expressly provides that a state may not invoke the provisions of its domestic law as justification for its failure to abide by a treaty.Footnote 91 The domestic status of the African Charter was one of the issues before the Supreme Court in the landmark case of Abacha v Fawehinmi.Footnote 92 Regrettably, the ratio decidendi of that case did not include a pronouncement on this issue. Ordinarily, in cases where different justices express inconsistent views on a point of law as was the case in Abacha v Fawehinmi, the rule is that, while the rationale of the lead judgment is binding, those of concurring judgments amount to obiter dicta.Footnote 93 As it turned out, however, the opinions expressed in the lead judgment of Ogundare JSC and the judgments of the other learned justices were obiter on the point. Hence, it would seem that the case has not laid down a binding proposition of law on the status of treaties in the domestic sphere.
Despite the somewhat conflicting opinions expressed by the learned justices, the case may nonetheless be cited as persuasive authority for the view that the rights and obligations covered by the African Charter are fully and legally enforceable, as is the case with domestic statutes. This principle was endorsed by a significant number of the justices. Furthermore, the case supports the view that, where the provisions of a domestic statute are inconsistent with those of the African Charter, neither the statute nor the charter will necessarily invalidate the other. The charter may however be removed from the body of Nigerian law by an express repeal of the statute which has given it the force of law. Even so, for as long as the charter remains in force, the presumption is that a statute will not be interpreted in such a way as to violate its provisions. The rationale for this, as expressed by Ogundare JSC in his lead judgment, is that the legislature is presumed not to intend to breach an international obligation, unless it does so expressly. It is therefore the author's view that, in cases of conflict, the provisions of the African Charter will prevail over those of the Bill unless the latter expressly amends or repeals the former.
The Supreme Court also decided in Abacha v Fawehinmi that the African Charter is inferior to the Constitution. One of the implications of this aspect of the decision is that it leaves the provisions of the charter vulnerable to validity challenges in the event of a conflict with section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution. As mentioned above, this sub-section provides for the non-justiciability of the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy under chapter II of the Constitution. Despite the theoretical possibility of inconsistency, it is the author's view that, because the nature and scope of the right to education as guaranteed under the African Charter is different from the provision in section 18 of the Constitution, there is little risk of actual inconsistency between the two provisions, thereby rendering section 6(6)(c) practically inapplicable. Moreover, as item 60(a) of the exclusive legislative listFootnote 94 empowers the legislature to make laws for the establishment and regulation of authorities to promote and enforce the observance of chapter II, it can be argued that the Constitution's drafters intended to give them the power to legislate on the provisions of the chapter and make them enforceable against government bodies and private persons.Footnote 95 Hence, it seems that the Constitution itself has not completely prevented the enforceability of the provisions of chapter II. This conclusion appears to be in line with the decision in Attorney General of Ondo State v Attorney General of the Federation and 35 Others,Footnote 96 where the Supreme Court upheld the power of the legislature to enact a justiciable law containing provisions regarding the authority of a government body to enforce the observance of section 15(5) of chapter II of the Constitution.
If the proposed contractual arrangement for the management of unity schools is to be implemented, one may legitimately ask whether the government would thereby be able to delegate its obligations under the relevant laws to an SMO. After all, it is the SMO that would have to bear the primary responsibility for school failure in individual cases. The SMO would also have to respect all the rights and freedoms of prospective and current students,Footnote 97 as well as the conditions specified in its operating and management agreement. Be that as it may, the tenor of articles 1, 26 and 62 of the African Charter makes it abundantly clear that the state (that is, the government) will continue to bear ultimate responsibility for ensuring that the rights guaranteed under the charter are protected and promoted. Although the government cannot contract out of its responsibility progressively to promote secondary education, the nature of its obligation would change from a duty of action as a manager to a duty of proper and adequate supervision and, where necessary, timely intervention. In other words, after privatization, the government would have to oversee the functioning of private operators and intervene where they fail to meet their obligations.Footnote 98
Many of the concerns expressed by stakeholders may therefore already be subject to protection by law. For example, the author's view is that an increase in school fees, which results in restricting access to school, could violate a child's right to education. In a similar vein, an SMO is constitutionally and statutorily bound to adopt a non-discriminatory approach in its admission and treatment of students. In order to allay further the fears of some of these stakeholders, it may be useful to introduce directly into the Bill certain safeguards to help strengthen the human rights position. The provisions of this aspect of the Bill should ideally be a product of a meeting of stakeholders convened to discuss how best to address issues of availability, accessibility, acceptability and adaptability. At a minimum, the Bill must guarantee that no child will be excluded from a unity school on the basis of financial incapacity.Footnote 99
Considerations in the “best interests of the child”Footnote 100
It has been said that the principle of the “best interests of the child” acts as a check upon those with authority over a child to ensure that their responsibilities are carried out for the child's well-being and longer-term development.Footnote 101 As children often lack the maturity or competence to determine what is in their best interests, parents and government bodies are usually better placed to make certain choices on their behalf. Section 1 of the Child Rights Act provides that the best interests of a child shall be the primary consideration in every action undertaken by any public or private body concerning the child. In other words, every administrative action or policy decision which has a direct impact on the well-being or development of children must be informed by the dictates of this principle. On the basis of a literal interpretation of section 1, a student who is able to show that action taken by the government in respect of unity schools “concerns” him or her should be able to invoke its protection. Beyond this, it is difficult to predict how the courts will apply the principle in individual cases.Footnote 102
Nevertheless, this article now highlights certain basic issues which, in the author's opinion, should always form part of an inquiry into what is in the best interests of a child in the context of the proposed reform. These questions focus on two aspects of the reform likely to have a direct impact on its effectiveness. First, in the pre-privatization period, there is the question of how one introduces the reform package to maximize its potential advantages and minimize its perceived disadvantages. And secondly, there is the matter of how best to address, in the post-privatization period, factors that have been found to have an impact on secondary school performance. This section will therefore consider procedural issues of reform implementation for optimal utility as well as structural matters that need to be addressed after privatization if the reform is to have any positive effect on the way unity schools are administered. This section is premised on the assumption that the application of the “best interests of the child” principle ought to produce a beneficial outcome: an overall improvement in the situation of the schools.
A key element of the reform package is the belief that, in comparison to the public sector, the private sector is better placed to manage unity schools. This belief is rooted in the current reality that private schools in Nigeria generally perform better than their public counterparts.Footnote 103 This is consistent with the finding that private schools are usually more responsive to the needs of students and parents, a situation which most likely has had a positive impact on private school management practices. As a result of their statutorily compelled altruistic nature, non-profit private operators present policy makers with the added advantage of a potentially superior ability to raise additional funding from other sources. The SMO happens to be the vehicle through which the reformers intend to unlock the promise held by private sector participation and, for this reason, it is suggested that SMO pre-qualification criteria must be highly selective to ensure that only deserving organizations are offered management contracts. To achieve this, the entry barriers must take at least three factors into consideration: (a) experience or proven track record in school management, particularly of the principal; (b) the ability to attract additional funding; and (c) the nature and types of measures to be put in place to ensure accountability and transparency in financial dealings and other operational matters. Failure to enforce these requirements effectively at the outset could lead to disastrous consequences.
Related to this issue is the need to ensure that the manner in which the reform package is implemented leaves room for experimentation and evaluation. It seems that the original idea was to contract out the management of all 102 unity schools to SMOs at the same time. This approach is dangerous and may discourage meaningful research and development activities in that it assumes, without the benefit of impact evaluation studies or further research, that implementing public-private partnerships is the best solution to the problems facing unity schools. It would limit the possibility of simultaneously pursuing public sector reform as a competing ideology. The author is of the view that these concerns are best addressed by the adoption of a phased approach to implementation, allowing for regular critical evaluation of the reform. If only a limited number of unity schools undergo reform at any time, pacing and sequencing the reform programme will give those schools under public management the opportunity to compete against privately operated ones. Ideally, the formula for phasing should take the varying academic standards across unity schools into account to maximize the potential for research. The greater scrutiny brought on by competition and ongoing research and development activities should also act as a check upon financial malpractice by school operators. Another advantage of a phased approach over a simultaneous approach is that it will enable mistakes to be corrected more easily.
To a large extent, the reform's success will depend on the quality of teachers the SMOs are able to attract. In one study of school-related factors known to affect the academic performance of secondary school students, it was found that students and teachers considered four main factors as having the greatest adverse effect on students' performance: lack of adequate resource materials for teaching; poor teaching methods; poor attitude by teachers to work; and teacher shortages.Footnote 104 Furthermore, there is evidence to suggest that poor service conditions, large class sizes and inadequate teaching facilities lead to stress in teachers, causing them to be ineffective and less committed to their work.Footnote 105 In order to be successful, therefore, SMOs would have to invest heavily in human and other teaching resources, for example by properly equipping laboratories and libraries, employing the best qualified teachers and ensuring that they are entitled to adequate reward, and seeking to deploy more effective instructional strategies. It is envisaged that, with greater competition, schools may begin to experience difficulty in attracting and retaining highly qualified teachers. The provision of attractive salary packages, training and professional development opportunities, and other appropriate incentives for performance will therefore go a long way to keeping staff motivated.
The role of a school principal will vary depending on the degree of autonomy the school enjoys. At present, in addition to administrative and supervisory functions, the unity school principals act as middlemen inasmuch as they routinely implement school decisions taken at a higher level. A change to private management would entail principals taking over functions previously exercised by the FME and involve them focussing more on the leadership and school development aspects of their role. As mentioned elsewhere, a principal must take charge of three main issues: student learning; mobilization of stakeholder support; and allocation of resources.Footnote 106 On student learning, the principal would constantly need to ensure that effective use is made of learning time. This aspect of the principal's work places significant emphasis on pedagogical supervision. The principal would also need to put in place adequate structures for rewarding excellence and penalizing poor performance as part of a duty to supervise and appraise staff. In allocating teaching resources, the principal must guard against high student-teacher ratios and teacher absenteeism. Further, with the need to attract additional funding, it is expected that SMOs would begin to pay more attention to a principal's ability to draw support from the immediate community, parents and other stakeholders.
Another major plank on which the success of the proposed reform is supposed to rest is the need for proper and professional school supervision by regulatory bodies. The term school supervision is deemed to include all activities undertaken by regulatory authorities to ensure that the federal government's education policies are implemented and, in the particular case of unity schools, that private operators abide by the terms of their management contracts and are accountable in the way they use all resources. As noted, two FME agencies (the USTD and the BSEC) would jointly share responsibility for supervising privately managed unity schools. The separation of managerial and supervisory functions would allow the FME to concentrate its resources solely on the latter. This opportunity to take advantage of resources released due to the reform process would however also necessarily entail a commitment to internal restructuring to ensure that staff are deployed according to their competencies. The importance of training and re-orientation programmes cannot be overemphasized, as FME officials would need to become accustomed to the ministry's diminished role in managing unity schools and its increased role in providing support and ensuring quality control.
As a matter of practical importance, the Bill should provide for a clearer definition of roles between the main regulatory bodies on the one hand, and between the FME and SMOs on the other. In particular, the proposed relationship between the USTD and BSEC requires greater clarity from a hierarchical and territorial standpoint. The Bill will also need adequately to define what it refers to as “school management” and what it envisages by the term “school supervision”. In addition, management contracts must be clear on the rights and duties of SMOs as well as the manner in which their performance is to be assessed. The contracts must set realistic targets and timelines based on internationally recognized benchmarks which should form the cornerstone of any review process. To strengthen the accountability regime further, the contracts must unambiguously specify the circumstances for termination. Enforcing financial accountability is another matter that would probably require some degree of financial expertise in addition to a disciplined approach to information sharing by FME agencies, as well as between the FME, CAC and other partners or stakeholders. As the principal regulatory body, the USTD should be the focal point for collating all relevant information on unity schools and initiating appropriate follow-up action where necessary. In so doing, it should make the best use of reports by the inspectorate division and seek to partner with relevant PTAs and donor agencies to strengthen its information gathering capabilities.
It is appropriate to highlight the possibility of reorganizing the PTA system to greater benefit. At present, PTAs contribute to school resources. They are sometimes also involved in the allocation of these resources and occasionally intervene in conflicts between the teachers' union and the government. It is the author's view that the PTA system can be restructured to formalize its role in providing support for schools, while simultaneously working as an early warning system to alert regulatory bodies to statutory and contractual breaches by SMOs. In a study carried out in Uganda, an inverse relationship was found to exist between the monitoring of grants allocated by the central government authority to government primary schools and the degree to which the grants were misappropriated by district officials. An increase in the level of monitoring by parents and teachers was shown to lower the incidence of financial misappropriation by officials.Footnote 107 In closing, it is suggested that the spirit of the reform would be greatly served if PTAs were accorded a statutory oversight status with the power to put pressure on regulatory bodies to act in cases where financial impropriety or school mismanagement is suspected. This enhanced role for the PTA is based on the recognition that parents and teachers are probably amongst the best placed to take educational decisions that are in the “best interests of the child”.
CONCLUSION
Much has been said in the debate as to whether the public-private partnership model, which has been the subject of this article, is the appropriate vehicle for reforming the rapidly deteriorating unity schools. Although this article takes a rather sympathetic view towards the partnership model, it has fallen short of endorsing it fully. It has highlighted several advantages and disadvantages of the partnership model and put forward certain legal and practical considerations, which need to go hand in hand with the reform. To avoid any doubt, it is strongly suggested that the proposed reform be set aside in its entirety if these considerations are effectively to be ignored. The rationale for this is that the stakes are far too high for low income families seeking to break out of the poverty trap by sending their children to unity schools. As part of an ongoing debate, this article has only addressed a small part of the big question: what role, if any, should the government continue to play in connection with unity schools? In view of the importance of this enquiry, an examination of alternative models of reform is highly recommended. Examples of such alternatives include various models of public service reform with or without private sector participation, for-profit privatization of school management and outright school sale.
