In July 1993, a flashy New York Times headline announced the discovery of the ‘gay gene’, the holy grail of research on sexual behavior. Based on a study of forty pairs of gay brothers, whose results were published in Nature, a team led by geneticist Dean Hamer of the US National Cancer Institute determined that a small region at the tip of their X chromosome was the likely culprit. Offering the first molecular evidence that human sexual orientation might be biologically determined, these findings sparked controversy, and lots of it. While many found the idea that we were ‘born this way’ reassuring, some gay rights activists denounced the study as yet another attempt to draw an implacable line between homosexuality and heterosexuality and worried about future efforts to engineer gays away. The finding was also fiercely debated in the scientific community. Pointing to previous failed attempts to make a direct genetic link to behaviour (like alcoholism or depression), critics argued that such reductionist claims were not only flawed but also impossible to justify with available tools. Even those who agreed that same-sex desire was probably inherited questioned Hamer's research design and the validity of his results.
Despite the chronically controversial status of the claim and the air of sensation, the elusive ‘gay gene’ nurtured dozens of studies, publications and scientific careers. The continuous buzz also raised behaviour genetics’ public profile and Hamer himself (whose work has been cited over 19,000 times, according to Google Scholar) went on to become a scientific celebrity, appearing on prime-time television, authoring bestsellers and offering his speculations on the genetic roots of anything from personality traits to religious belief.
Tracing behaviour genetics’ development from its beginnings in the 1950s to the postgenomic present, Misbehaving Science offers an original, sharply intelligent and timely analysis of the historical conditions, social mechanisms and cultural forces that made this brand of unreliable, vulgar and inflammatory science possible. Rather than attribute the field's notoriety, as others have done, to inherent racism, or an overriding political agenda – Richard Lewontin, for instance, has argued that behaviour genetics came of age as part of a wider cultural investment in biological determinism, itself fuelled by a backlash against the egalitarian ethos of the 1960s and its reform sensibilities – the book frames behaviour genetics’ ‘misbehavior’ simply as ‘the context in which behavior geneticists work’ (p. 11). Taking his cue from Pierre Bourdieu's sociology of science, Panofsky convincingly demonstrates that the collective embrace of racist or otherwise socially conservative claims and an ‘astrological’ style of reasoning was an unintended consequence of field dynamics, not a matter of ideology or values or even intellectual leanings. In other words, behaviour geneticists adopted positions that under conditions of normative uncertainty gave them an edge over others or allowed them to continue on a trajectory, thus securing the ongoing production of scientific capital. Historically, Panofsky interestingly argues, this repertoire of provocation and scandal has itself been shaped by controversy. Specifically, facing attacks from within and without in the wake of the IQ wars – the brouhaha that ensued when in 1969 psychologist Arthur Jensen suggested that the gap in intelligence-test scores between black and white students was inborn – the fledgling behaviour-genetics community adopted a defensive ‘bunker mentality’, as Panofsky aptly dubs it, that in time became the governing logic of practice in the field and shaped its knowledge products.
Beyond its merits as an explanation for the development and culture of behaviour genetics, this fresh take on scientific controversy is, in my opinion, the book's most notable contribution. According to conventional wisdom, disputes among scientists are necessary for the progress of reason; science proceeds by working through discord and doubt, finding ways to dispel them. More sceptical about the conflict resolution capacities of science's methods, historians and sociologists have emphasized instead the social order – the pressure of community norms, the workings of peer policing, professional sanctions and rewards – at the basis of expert consensus. And yet, whether celebratory or critical, positivist or constructivist, studies of scientific controversy all assume its inevitable end. Indeed, Panofsky points out, the resolution of controversies – the capacity to deliver agreed-upon facts time and again – is seen as the very hallmark of science, what sets it apart from other cultural spheres, and arguably constitutes the most important source of its immense authority. As a result, disagreement about findings, or standards of evidence, or even the right tools, often feature in this narrative as a troubled stage in the life cycle of science –adolescence if you like – to be invariably followed by normal science as the field reaches ‘maturity’. Rejecting this developmental view, Panofsky insists on asking what happens when science fails to grow out of controversy.
His account of ‘controversy as a way of life’ (p. 230) thus forces us to reconsider what we know about the moral economy of modern science. Throwing into sharp relief our long-held belief that science works when scientists behave, the case of behaviour genetics proves that playing nice, in fact, isn't necessary. Making extravagant and often unfounded claims, being controversial, courting the media and picking fights will get the job done just as well.
The book insightfully ends with the suggestion that these may not be problems afflicting one unruly field, but rather the predicament of contemporary science. It is a sign of the times, Panofsky concludes, that we encounter more and more reports of scientific misconduct, retraction of published research and public distrust of expert judgement. Sea changes in science's institutional landscape and ethos, like the rise of scientific entrepreneurship and the quest for monetized results, the impact-factor culture and ever more demanding benchmarks for promotion or the alienation-brewing spread of adjunct affiliation are some of the processes eroding normative controls, which in turn cost science its credibility. It is a strong and much-needed critique, and yet one cannot help noticing the normative tone with which it is deployed. Though he acknowledges the historicity of criteria for what constitutes ‘bad’ (irresponsible, unthinking) science and their evident cultural (or field) variability, Panofsky seems to believe or at least hope that those we learned to cherish are still the only measuring rod for healthy, functional and productive knowledge making.
