Since the end of the Cold War, modern political science has struggled to classify political regimes and rulers who are not traveling the highway of liberal democracy. Many research agendas today, for example, include extensive analyses of “authoritarian resilience.” In his expansive history of tyranny from ancient to current times, Waller Newell reminds us that the strange career of tyranny has been part of human behavior and psychology from the beginning—as both the oppressor of liberty and the builder of civilizations. Newell believes that tyranny has always been both a form of government and a type of human being, as well as something of a youth employment opportunity. Because the drive to tyrannize is a permanent passion in human psychology and it will never go away, his reason for writing the book is to contribute to our ability to recognize the threat that it poses, to prepare to resist it, and, if need be, to fight it (191–92). But not always; some forms of tyranny are preferable to others—a distinction he highlights when comparing the ancient and modern understandings of tyranny.
Newell describes three main types of tyranny and sets about classifying some of the most famous tyrants throughout history into one or more of these varieties. The oldest and most common is what he calls the “garden variety” or kleptocratic tyrant, who treats their country and society as their personal property, exploiting it for pleasure and profit, advancing their own clan and cronies. In this group, he includes Hiero I of Syracuse, Emperor Nero, General Franco, and President Mubarak of Egypt. The second type of tyrants are the “reformers” or “enlightened despots” who are not mere hedonists or profit seekers. Although they possess complete power, they exercise self-control and wish to improve their society and people. These are the empire- and modern state-builders such as Alexander, Julius Caesar, the Tudors, Louis XIV, Frederick the Great and Napoleon I. They embark on large-scale projects of public improvement, employ violence for concrete aims rather than whimsical cruelty, and want nothing less than to impose order for the benefit of all.
The third type of tyrant comes strictly from the modern world and is called the “millenarian”: their goal is to create a utopia overnight and return to Year One through mass murder, warfare, and genocide. Tracing their origins to Robespierre's attempt to bring about Rousseau's Golden Age, this group includes the Jacobins, Lenin, Stalin, Hitler, Mao, Pol Pot, and today's jihadists. Newell shows how this pattern of tyranny was transformed from the collectivist Far Right of National Socialism to the Far Left of Marxism through Heidegger's influence on French intellectuals, including Jean-Paul Sartre and the Sorbonne-educated Algerian Frantz Fanon. Because the biographies of millenarian tyrants confirm that economic deprivation is not the root cause of terrorism—it is rather a fanatical quest for justice and revenge—economic sanctions against such tyrants will have little impact. Today's jihadist terrorists are the descendants of the Jacobin terror of the French Revolution, National Socialism, and Third World socialism—reinterpreted by Islamism's intellectual founder, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb, and the godfather of the Iranian revolution, Ali Shariati (200–204). They share the same vision of a worldwide Caliphate and include the Khomeinists, Al Qaeda, the Taliban, Hamas, Hezbollah, and ISIS (199). Terrorists, he adds, are tyrants in waiting, and tyrants are terrorists who have gained power. The real battle today is not with terrorism but between two regimes with diametrically opposed principles—liberal democracy and (millenarian) tyranny (213).
Newell has undertaken a monumental task with this book: to classify all of history's tyrants into just three categories. While Plato and Aristotle would have easily recognized the first two types of tyranny, and the various nuances within them, Newell's advancement of a third “millenarian” kind to help explain modern examples of ideologically driven mass slaughter is well argued theoretically, and it bridges the gap between the ancient experience with tyranny and modern-day genocide—often assisted by scientific and technological innovation. Yet his attempt to extend this beyond the most obvious examples is made less convincing—particularly in his coverage of Third World socialism—by his storytelling style devoid of any footnotes, references, or exceptions that might get in the way of his story. He also does his argument a disservice by playing fast and loose with some facts that can be easily checked or whose accuracy (and neutrality) is in many cases debatable. One such example is his claim that like the Bolsheviks and Nazis, the Khmer Rouge exterminated upwards of 6 million people (190), when the estimated total population before their rule (1975) was only around 7–8 million and the surviving population (1978) around 6–7 million; Cambodian experts conservatively put the real death toll at around 1–2 million. Nor is there mention of their systematic slaughter ending only after their invasion and occupation by another totalitarian regime—Vietnam (i.e., not a liberal democracy). Later he cites the “always smiling” former president Ahmadinejad of Iran as a modern example of a millenarian tyrant who sought the destruction of America and Israel through nuclear genocide—the revolution's utopian mission. Although Newell recognizes that he did not represent all political forces in Iran, he ignores his reformist successor who also won reelection after the guardian council disqualified Ahmadinejad's bid to run again. Newell also recalls that while Lee Kuan Yew of Singapore reminded him of Xenophon's Hiero, he believes that he transformed the island into a “quasifunctioning democracy” (224); whereas according to his own schema Lee should be classified as a reformer tyrant overseeing his creation of an enlightened or benevolent despotism—the latter being what Newell labels modern China, whose reformers also sought guidance from Lee. Unfortunately there is also no mention of one of the modern world's greatest garden-variety kleptocrats—former president Suharto of Indonesia.
In describing his three types of tyranny, Newell is cognizant that there can be movement of tyrants between them and certainly the possibility of transformation among the first two is a theme of the classics. Less persuasive is his position that a tyrant can be a part of all three—that is, that he can be a kleptocrat and a reformer with a dash of millenarian (213); you are either a genocidal mass murderer or you are not. Since this along with a destructive utopian vision seems to define his last category, these tyrants would stand alone, unless Newell believes that some kind of minimum body count added to the kleptocratic reformer qualifies as having a millenarian dash. Notwithstanding these faults, the book is a timely reminder that tyranny in all its forms is real and that the classics understood “authoritarian resilience” better than the moderns. Only through reading the Great Books, Newell tells us, can young people become aware of the richness of the psychology of honor seeking and hope to overcome the hopeless lack of realism in the social sciences which refuse to recognize that tyrannical ambition is a permanent motivation in political behavior (230).
