1. Introduction
This article contends that the standard accounts of European integration in law and political science, and their structural explanations, are not entirely satisfactory, both theoretically and methodologically. While they are asking the right questions, they overlook the more accurate answers found by focusing on individuals. This article probably puts me in a different camp from many of the classic analyses, and on the path opened instead by those who study legal mobilisation within the EU legal system. Although I dedicate Section 2 of this article to justifying the theoretical and methodological dissatisfaction, and Section 4 to showing what is concretely gained by adding my framework, here is a very succinct explanation by way of context.Footnote 1
Many standard accounts of European integration understand the big events that led to the present within a multicausal framework grounded in some general theory of political behaviour, which has as at its core collective entities as agents: states, institutions and social actors. They also tend to rely on explanations that are lawlike generalisations – a general or ‘grand’ theory, a universal ‘always’ claim (‘if A, then always B’ – the same kind of cause reliably produces the same kind of effect). Those standard accounts provide what may be referred to as structural explanations.Footnote 2
In this article, I formalise a framework for the study of the behaviour of individuals using the tools developed by (some) historians and political scientists (Section 2). We could say that this framework seeks the ‘micro-foundations’ of EU law: instead of looking at the big picture, the focus is on the nuts and bolts of individuals’ choices. To what extent can we explain the choices that led to the European Union and its legal system in terms of the individuals (and their careers, choices, personal ideas, desires, and beliefs) who ended up shaping the European Union? The framework for attempting answers to this question is built on the synthesis of three interlocking concepts: methodological individualism (the commitment to explain phenomena by reference to behaviour of individuals as far as possible); explanatory ‘mechanisms’ (frequently occurring patterns);Footnote 3 and narrative legal history (the rhetorical device to weave individuals and their patterns into a story).Footnote 4 Following the classification made by the historical sociologist Tilly, we distinguish between environmental mechanisms (related to some external influence), behavioural mechanisms (related to individual perception) and relational mechanisms (which are about connections among people).Footnote 5 A recent strand of scholarship on legal mobilisation shows that this can be done with benefit to the field.Footnote 6
I contend that structural explanations and those relating to the behaviour of individuals are both necessary to accurately describe the complexity of reality (an aim I assume to be desirable in itself). I do not think we can establish conclusively which one matters most: the individual or the structural factor. But this article shows that we cannot neglect the former, and also hints at some ways in which the two interact.
The article applies the framework to a circumscribed series of events – the proposals by the Dutch foreign minister Jan Willem Beyen (1897–1976) for the creation of the common market (Section 3). The story I tell spans the time between the moment he took office in 1952 and the moment his plan was endorsed at the Messina conference of 1955. The plan was to go beyond sectoral integration: solely pulling together coal and steel, he believed, would have adverse consequences, and a common market was desirable instead. This moment was selected as object of study because it has two important characteristics: it is crucial in the history of European integration (we can say this now with hindsightFootnote 7 but, as the years of debates show, those involved were aware of its potential implications);Footnote 8 however, the story told from Beyen’s perspective is relatively less known. The primary sources on which my narrative is built are contained in the Dutch national archives (and either publicly accessible or already made available by the University of Luxembourg online archives on European integration), at the French Centre des Archives diplomatiques du ministère des Affaires étrangères and, of course, in Beyen’s own published memoirs of 1968, Het spel en de knikkers (The Game and the Marbles);Footnote 9 the secondary sources include also many of the standard narratives on European integration, as well as the (relatively few) works specifically on Beyen’s contribution to European integration.Footnote 10
What is to be gained? This individual-centred framework based on causal mechanisms offers a more accurate, finer-grained account of European integration than traditional structural explanations, so it is a necessary addition to those (Section 4). By focusing on Johan Willem Beyen, this framework challenges and complements some influential explanations such as Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism by showing the crucial role of small states, individual ideas and historical contingency, rather than just rational bargains between large powers. It also provides a useful addition – a prequel – to Weiler’s ‘equilibrium theory’ by spotlighting one politician who contributed to the creation of the legal system that courts later interpreted and shaped.Footnote 11 Applying the framework developed in section 2 to the empirical material of section 3, the failure of the European Defence Community is identified as the circumstance (this will be conceptualised as example of ‘environmental mechanism’) that created a political opportunity. Beyen’s personal conviction that sectoral integration was a protectionist trap was the belief that shaped his specific choice (an instance of a ‘cognitive mechanism’) of a common market. The informal, trust-based coalition-building between Beyen, Spaak and BechFootnote 12 is conceptualised as a ‘relational mechanism’, and it allowed the plan proposed by Beyen to gain momentum.
2. Beyond the state: An individual-centred framework for understanding EU law
To explain the existence of the European Union’s legal system (in its current or previous forms), traditional state-centric or institutional analyses have done much to advance the field. Schematically, by reference to the ‘agent’ they consider, the narratives may be grouped into four, partly overlapping, macro-categories: (1) Member State-based; (2) Court based; (3) those based on ‘law’; and (4) those based on social actors. I mention selected examples of each because it will help to demonstrate the extent to which the framework developed by this article differs.
The first set of accounts places Member States at its centre.Footnote 13 It views integration as ‘a series of rational choices made by national leaders’.Footnote 14 This is very promising indeed, but my framework differs because, in the accounts of Hoffmann, Milward and Moravcsik, what matters are not so much the desires and beliefs of the single leaders but more abstract, state-based, factors: ‘constraints and opportunities stemming from the economic interests, the relative power of each state in the international system, and the role of international institutions in bolstering the credibility of interstate commitments’.Footnote 15
The second category is based on institutions. It includes neo-functionalist and historical institutionalist accounts (hence the overlap with the previous category).Footnote 16 To take just two examples focused on the Court, in We the Court, Miguel Poiares Maduro argues that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) engaged in ‘majoritarian activism’, using its rulings to actively create a harmonised European Economic Constitution rather than just interpreting existing rules. Similarly, in The Judicial Construction of Europe, Alec Stone Sweet describes a process of legal integration ‘provoked’ by the ECJ, where the Court’s constitutionalisation of the treaties created a dynamic legal system that pushed integration far beyond the original intentions of the Member States. Presumably, Poiares Maduro and Stone Sweet refer to the Court as shorthand for the individuals who make it up.
The third category, the ‘integration-through-law’ explanations, merges the previous two (intergovernmentalist and neo-functionalist/historical institutionalist) as it considers the interaction between Member States and institutions.Footnote 17 To these belong the classic ‘equilibrium theory’ proposed by Weiler,Footnote 18 Scharpf’s ‘asymmetry theory’,Footnote 19 Grimm’s ‘over-constitutionalisation theory’,Footnote 20 Lindseth’s ‘administrative governance’Footnote 21 theory and Schütze’s recent revisionism.Footnote 22
Those relying on social actors – groups such as political parties,Footnote 23 professional associations and epistemic communities,Footnote 24 trade unions or the resistance movements that developed during World War IIFootnote 25 – constitute a fourth category of standard accounts. Sometimes, these social actors are considered in their interaction with the ECJ.Footnote 26
These accounts have left a lacuna, which was aptly termed ‘the case of the missing agent’:Footnote 27 Methodologically, they refer to collective entities or groups rather than to individuals. The ‘missing agents’ in the history of European integration are therefore the individuals – and this article is dedicated to one of them (see Section 2.A).
Additionally, the explanations that those accounts propose often take the form of – or imply the existence of – lawlike generalisations.Footnote 28 Weiler’s ‘Transformation of Europe’ stemmed from a paradox: legal scholars considered that the EU was becoming closer to a federal state, political scientists the opposite.Footnote 29 This showed that a lawlike generalisation (of the kind ‘federal states are formed through this process’)Footnote 30 was implausible. But the explanation proposed by Weiler (in italics in the excerpt below) was also a generalisation:
Exit is the mechanism of organizational abandonment in the face of unsatisfactory performance. Voice is the mechanism of intra-organizational correction and recuperation … A stronger ‘outlet’ for Voice reduces pressure on the Exit option and can lead to more sophisticated processes of self-correction. By contrast, the closure of Exit leads to demands for enhanced Voice.Footnote 31
The present article also takes issue with lawlike generalisation and defends an alternative form of explanation (see Section 2.B).
A. Methodological individualism
Methodologically, I contend that lawyers should learn from history and the social sciences grounded in the principle of methodological individualism. As a well-established – although by no means uncontroversial – tenet in the social sciences, this is the commitment to explain social phenomena by means of the actions, beliefs and motivations of individuals.Footnote 32 The strongest case for it is that collective entities like ‘a Member State’, the ‘Council’ or ‘a political party’ do not act: only individuals do so. In other words, a decision ‘by’ an institution is in fact made by the group of individuals that make up the institution, and it is then executed by individuals. To say that an institution ‘does’ something is a figure of speech, a synecdoche. To explain the genesis of an EU treaty, therefore, we should look not (only) to the abstract interests of ‘France’ or ‘Germany’, but to the concrete choices made by the individual civil servants, ministers and diplomats who sat at the negotiating table.
Methodological individualism faces significant practical challenges. It is an ideal that is difficult to obtain in practice. Referring to France, as opposed to the millions of French people who (plausibly) make up ‘France’, is an intellectual shortcut with obvious practical benefits. Often, in my narrative, I will use such intellectual shortcuts as ‘France’ or ‘the Dutch government’, but I will try to disaggregate these as far as possible. Another difficulty with methodological individualism is that it is very hard to precisely identify the beliefs and desires of historical actors. As James Madison argues,Footnote 33 ‘this difficulty stems from three core problems: the motivations of historical figures were often not stable enough to be treated as simple causes; our minds are imperfect tools for conceiving of our own complex inner state, never mind others’; and language itself is an inadequate and often ambiguous vehicle for conveying the true intentions behind an action.’Footnote 34
Undoubtedly, methodological individualism is not a licence for ‘heroic’ explanations. There is no need to succumb to the temptation of romanticising individual agency. Obviously, individuals only matter if there are conditions that allow them to do so. The task of the scholar could be to identify those conditions. Methodological individualism is not a claim of monocausal personal authorship, but rather a commitment to unveil causal mechanisms (see next section) that should be easier to identify if we study individuals than if we study collective entities.
This individual-centred perspective has proved crucial for understanding the development of the EU, in which law holds such a fundamental role. The individuals who brought cases, crafted arguments and pushed national judges to engage with a new legal order, as well as the judges themselves,Footnote 35 have been objects of study – and fruitfully so for lawyers, social scientists and the public at large.Footnote 36 A quintessential example is the landmark case of Costa v ENEL,Footnote 37 which established the bedrock principle of the primacy of EU law. The standard account often begins with the dispute over a small electricity bill, but the case was in fact the deliberate creation of one man: the lawyer Gian Galeazzo Stendardi. As Amedeo Arena documented, Stendardi was the ‘prime architect’ of the lawsuit.Footnote 38 He conceived of the legal challenge to the nationalisation of the Italian electricity sector, found the ideal plaintiff in his colleague Flaminio Costa and orchestrated the strategy of refusing to pay the bill to create the dispute. It was Stendardi who, driven by his own political beliefs (an activist conception of the rule of law), crafted the arguments and pushed the small-claims court in Milan to make the fateful reference to the ECJ. Arena’s micro-history shows the centrality of Stendardi’s beliefs and actions, as well as how the final outcome depended on receptive procedural venues and on the cooperation (or at least acquiescence) of multiple institutional actors. The individual and the structure interact in a loop of feedback. Stendardi was not an anomaly: Tommaso Pavone reveals that the judicial construction of Europe was propelled by a small cohort of ‘Euro-lawyers’Footnote 39 who acted as ‘ghostwriters’ of change.Footnote 40 These pioneering lawyers acted as catalysts, within the given structural conditions but also pushing the boundaries of those conditions. They actively sought out clients, constructed test cases, educated national judges who were often ignorant of the new legal order and frequently drafted the very preliminary reference requests that judges would later sign and send to Luxembourg. This individual-led legal mobilisation, often operating ‘beneath the radar’, was the essential engine that connected civil society to supranational institutions, forcing the development of European law from the ground up.Footnote 41 More recent work has applied the individual focus to sanctions litigation.Footnote 42
B. All explanation is causal explanation and can be expressed through ‘mechanisms’
Let us unpack further how we can go from individuals to the event that requires explanation – in our case, Beyen’s plan – through causal explanations expressed through ‘mechanisms’.
First, all explanation should be causal explanation. To explain something means to account for how A led to B that led to C (possibly with X, Y and Z also contributing as factors). It is a methodological error to explain a macro-phenomenon by citing its beneficial consequences for another macro-phenomenon (e.g. ‘religion exists to ensure social stability’). It might be entirely plausible that religion does in fact ensure social stability, but this does not explain its existence. To explain the existence of religion, one would need to cite the intention of those who created it (if it were possible to do so). To say otherwise, that the product (the consequence) explains its cause, is a form (meta)physical impossibility. Instead, one must show how individuals, acting on their beliefs and desires, brought about the phenomenon in question.Footnote 43
Second, explanation in the social sciences is often best expressed through ‘mechanisms’. A mechanism provides an explanation because it is more general than a description of a single instance, but it is less general than an ‘all-encompassing’, lawlike explanation (given cause A, event B must follow). They are a weaker, thinner and therefore more robust form of explanation that, following the historical sociologist Tilly, are called ‘mechanisms’. He defines mechanisms as a ‘delimited class of events that change relations among specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations’Footnote 44 (given cause A, we frequently, but not always, observe causes B or C or D). Some examples drawn from the classics or from history illustrate what I have in mind. At the level of individuals, it was suggested that a mechanism could be that ‘a man facing danger rarely remains as he was: he will either rise well above his habitual level or sink well below it’:Footnote 45
The proposition that when A favors B over C, the reaction of C is one of envy toward B rather than of hatred toward A is one premise of Tocqueville’s analysis of the French Revolution. In my view, it is a mechanism rather than a law: a child that is not offered the ice cream her sister received may react to the injustice of her parents rather than against the better fortune of her sibling.Footnote 46
At collective level, when in modern Europe the monarch needed extra finances for maintaining an army, it could either seek alliance with a parliamentary assembly or ditch it.Footnote 47 Punishment can either stimulate compliance or hatred towards the punisher, as many dictators have experienced.
It is impossible to know in advance what consequence would follow from the same single cause. Mechanisms are only retrodictive, not predictive. In his classic work, Micromotives and Macrobehavior,Footnote 48 Schelling demonstrates how macro-level patterns are often the (unintended) consequences of individual choices. Following Schelling, Jon Elster has forcefully argued that providing micro-foundations is the central requirement of any valid explanation in the social sciences.Footnote 49 To explain a social phenomenon is to ‘open the black box’ and identify the causal process that links individual actions to the aggregate outcome.
Tilly’s crucial contribution to this micro-foundational inquiry is to categorise the causal mechanisms, identifying three main types: environmental, cognitive and relational mechanisms.Footnote 50 Environmental mechanisms are external influences on social life, such as resource depletion or enrichment. Cognitive mechanisms operate through changes in perception and understanding, such as the recognition of a new opportunity or the reinterpretation of a political identity. Relational mechanisms, which are central to political processes, alter the connections between people and groups; brokerage, for example, is a classic relational mechanism that connects previously separate social sites.
Applied to the history of EU law, I contend that this idea, in combination with the other tenets of the framework, is transformative of standard accounts. A traditional, holistic (functional) analysis might explain the creation of the Common Market by citing the ‘need’ for economic recovery in post-war Europe. My quest for micro-foundations disaggregates that claim, and insists on explaining this outcome by reconstructing the choices of individuals such as Johan Beyen. It asks: What were his specific beliefs about economic policy? What were his desires regarding the Netherlands’ position in Europe? How did these mental states, interacting with those of his counterparts, produce the specific text of the Treaties of Rome? The goal is to explain (to describe more accurately) the macro-level legal text by reconstructing the micro-level interactions that generated it, rather than simply describing the function or effects of the legal text. This means moving beyond the mere description of the legal text and of how it came about to explain it by subsuming under one or more mechanisms. Mechanisms are more general than a description of a single episode, but less general than a lawlike explanation.
Identifying causal mechanisms is essential for a rich(er) historical explanation because it permits the elimination of spurious explanations. Take again the central claim of Weiler’s equilibrium theory: ‘A stronger “outlet” for Voice reduces pressure on the Exit option and can lead to more sophisticated processes of self-correction. By contrast, the closure of Exit leads to demands for enhanced Voice’.Footnote 51 This is a generalisation that needs to be nuanced and modified by introducing exceptions and qualifications. The closure of Exit could also lead to absence of demands for Voice – for example, out of fear of consequences.Footnote 52 Crucially – and this is what I mean by ‘mechanism’ – lack of opportunity (for Exit) can lead to increased or decreased desire for correction (Voice), with the net effect being undetermined.Footnote 53 The generalisation is fragile. For example, Schütze’s discussion of alternative patterns of interaction between (I simplify) law and politics shows at least one instance in which the explanation offered by the ‘equilibrium theory’ is not empirically verified.Footnote 54
C. Narrative Legal History: Telling the Story
To make explicit (or even merely to suggest) causation is to tell a story.Footnote 55 The kind of narrative I suggest, which is emerging in the literature on legal mobilisation, is more than just a description of the choices, beliefs and desires of the key individuals involved: it is a causal narration. It examines how individuals acted, and how their interactions governed by identifiable mechanisms aggregated into the final legal text. In addition to those cited above on legal mobilisation, many other works tell these kinds of ‘EU law stories’.Footnote 56
This method also departs from the notion that EU law’s history should be told in a linear, incremental fashion.Footnote 57 Instead, as Nicola and Davies argue, it reveals that ‘EU law evolves in a contingent manner in response to efforts by private and public interest lawyers, social movements, leading personalities or jurists working behind the scenes’.Footnote 58 My preference for this approach does not merely stem from a philosophy of history, but follows from the fact that mechanism‑based and other ‘weak’ causal claims are more robust and fine‑grained than ambitious, law‑like generalisations, which tend to become fragile once one starts adding exceptions and qualifications. Mechanisms, by contrast, open the black box of causation at the micro level and reduce the risk of spurious explanation by forcing us to specify the concrete chains that link individual choices to institutional outcomes. The framework I formalise and propose therefore makes sense, at this stage, only at the level of small‑scale decisions: for the moment, we focus on the tree, and only once we have assembled many such trees will it be possible to say something meaningful about the forest.
The three elements of the framework sketched here – methodological individualism, mechanism–based explanation and narrative legal history – can be understood as a formalisation of what scholarship on EU legal mobilisation already does in practice, at least in embryonic form.
3. The architect of the Common Market: Johan Willem Beyen
A. Beyen: A pragmatist among pessimists
The story can start in the summer of 1954. Frida Kahlo died, Angela Merkel was born, West Germany won the football World Cup, Akira Kurosawa’s Seven Samurai was released and The Fellowship of the Ring was published. Europe had a structural problem: how to square the need for an American security guaranteeFootnote 59 with the need to ensure ‘the independence of the European vis-à-vis the US as the leading power’.Footnote 60 The project of European integration, which was one of the political solutions to that problem, appeared to be in ruins. The French Parliament had decided not to vote on the ratification of the European Defence Community (EDC) Treaty, which essentially determined the political death of a project that had a strongly federalist design. The EDC Treaty went so far as to foresee the virtual abolition of national armies, and to put a common European army under a single, unified command. Considering that it was the French themselves who had proposed military integration in the first place, that the stakes were raised by the United States, which threatened a withdrawal from Western Europe in case of failed ratification,Footnote 61 that France was engaged in war in Indochina and that the two camps (in favour and against) domestically had been campaigning vocally for months, the lack of ratification sent a shockwave across the continent. It created what Beyen, who was then as far from a federalist as any founding father ever got,Footnote 62 would later describe as a ‘deep discouragement’ and a ‘confusion of the mind, characteristic of the mood “après une défaite”’.Footnote 63 Not his own discouragement: he was talking about that of others. The grand ambition of a European Political Community (EPC), which was to provide the political superstructure for the EDC and the existing Coal and Steel Community, had collapsed with it. Many of the most ardent supporters of integration, who had invested years of political capital in the military and political tracks that had been opened by their realisation (and acceptance) that the rearmament of West Germany had become necessary,Footnote 64 concluded that any further attempts at supranational cooperation were futile.Footnote 65
Europe, it seemed, would have to content itself with the limited sectoral integration of the ECSC and the intergovernmental cooperation of bodies within the Atlantic framework, such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the European Organisation for Economic Cooperation (OEEC), the precursor to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD).Footnote 66 The momentum of the EDC, which some hoped would be towards a federal future,Footnote 67 had been broken.
Our narrative can start in the summer of 1954 because it was in this atmosphere of stalemate and disillusionment that Beyen, a man whose career had been forged in the world of international finance rather than traditional diplomacy, insisted on a vision that would ultimately break the deadlock in spite of the great discouragement felt by the ideologues who supported the EDC.Footnote 68 Beyen was, in many ways, an unlikely ‘builder of Europe’.Footnote 69 As mentioned, he was neither a federalist ideologueFootnote 70 nor a career politician. This set him apart from the typical ‘founding fathers’. He was born in Utrecht, into a culturally open and internationally oriented family: he inherited a pragmatic approach from his father, a high-ranking railway official, and an artistic sensibility from his mother, a pianist.Footnote 71 He studied jurisprudence in Utrecht during World War I, and worked at the General Treasury of the Ministry of Finance, where he was appointed acting Treasurer General in 1923. He then embarked on a career in the private sector. Having served as a secretary of the board of the electronics giant Philips, he continued his career as director of the Javasche Bank in Amsterdam and of the Rotterdamsche Bank in 1927.Footnote 72 He went on to have a stellar international career: he was appointed vice president of the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) in Basel and in 1937 was named president of BIS. During World War II, he continued his international career from 1940 to 1946 as chief financial officer at Lever Brothers and Unilever in London. During his time in London, he also worked as a financial adviser to the Dutch government,Footnote 73 a position he held until 1952. During this same post-war period (1946–52), Beyen was the executive director of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in Washington.Footnote 74 Thanks to royal nudging, Labour Prime Minister Willem Drees appointed him minister in late 1952.Footnote 75 He brought a technocrat’s eye for economic realities to the often-idealistic project of European unity.Footnote 76
B. The elaboration of the plan for a single market (1952–54)
Let us go back a couple of years. For context, the Netherlands during the postwar years was engaged in the process of decolonisation of Indonesia, a debate over the modernisation of the constitution and the development of the welfare state.Footnote 77 The Dutch domestic political context was shaped by government coalitions between the Labour Party and religious parties.Footnote 78 Zooming in to the process of European integration, Beyen believed that the cart of political integration was being put before the horse of economic reality. He feared the creation of a political façade with no solid foundation behind it.Footnote 79 To be taken seriously, his dissent required a concrete alternative so, as early as 11 December 1952 (two months after taking up the office of foreign affairs minister), a four-page memorandum landed on the desks of his counterparts in the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) arguing that their guiding principle should be ‘no political integration without economic integration’. This was ‘a descendant’Footnote 80 of the Stikker plan for economic cooperation, proposed by the Dutch foreign minister to the OEEC Council meeting in July 1950. The Stikker plan was formulated by the Dutch government, for the progressive abolition of quantitative restrictions on intra-European trade, in coal, steel, agriculture and other manufacturing industries, based on the rationale that sectoral economic integration would have negative economic consequences, and that an European Integration Fund should be established for restructuring key industries.Footnote 81 As Harryvan writes, the Dutch government
remained ambivalent on the question whether to head for overall (or “horizontal”) economic disarmament and cooperation in Western Europe, or, alternatively, to promote a succession of less ambitious sectoral (or “vertical”) market integration projects, until, in Autumn 1952, Stikker’s successor Beyen squarely opted for the first.Footnote 82
As Van der Beugel put it, ‘It is the only thing Beyen has ever been committed to.’Footnote 83 This is a point on which the individual-centred narrative adds something to statist or structural accounts: the personal convictions of Beyen mattered in his choice for this form of economic integration.
Now it is worth pausing to consider Beyen’s plan more closely. The core idea was that the functional integration of specific sectors, as exemplified by the ECSC (the so-called Monnet method) was insufficient. Beyen saw the sectoral approach – then in vogue – as a dangerous trap. For him, creating a pool for coal and another for transport meant building a series of economic fortresses. Each ‘partial integration’, he warned his Benelux counterparts in April 1955, tends to transform into a protectionist cartel, solving the problems of one sector at the expense of others and, above all, at the expense of the consumer.Footnote 84 It is a parochial logic, a solution that will only hinder overall European productivity – the ultimate goal in his eyes. But Beyen’s critique goes further, subordinating economic analysis to the political aim. After the failure of the EDC, he felt that Europe needed an electric shock, a bold project to counter the rise of nationalism in France and Germany. A technical and limited integration, he warned, ‘lacks psychological appeal’.Footnote 85 It was not with small measures that the European flame could be rekindled; what was needed was a broad vision, a ‘fusion of interests’ that could create a true ‘feeling of solidarity’.Footnote 86 This echoes both the Schuman declaration ‘de facto solidarity’ and the Stikker plan of sharing each other’s burden. For Beyen, this solidarity could only be born out of a ‘common responsibility’ for the ‘common good’. And this responsibility had to be embodied in a strong organisation, endowed with an executive body that was not at the mercy of national governments, but accountable to a supranational parliament. This was a direct and unambiguous call for a transfer of sovereignty, a conviction that placed him at the forefront of the debate.
Back to the narrative. From December 1952, the Beyen Plan languished. With a conference of the foreign ministers looming in Rome at the end of February 1953, Beyen knew his vision was in danger of being politely ignored, a technical matter to be deferred while the more important work of political constitution-making proceeded. He needed to force the issue, to translate his abstract principle into a concrete, unavoidable proposal. And so, on 14 February 1953, he sent a follow-up letter to his colleagues. This was no mere diplomatic courtesy. The letter was a work of careful, almost legalistic, construction. It moved beyond the generalities of the December memo, proposing that the ‘creation of a “common market”’ be explicitly announced as a core objective of the EPC.Footnote 87 It gave substance to this goal by calling for the immediate formation of a Customs Union. Most significantly, it detailed the supranational mechanics of his vision. The clauses de sauvegarde, designed to protect national economies from ‘fundamental troubles’, would not be a unilateral escape hatch; their use would require the consent of the Community’s political authority. And to prevent these troubles from occurring in the first place, Beyen proposed a ‘common fund’ to finance adaptation and modernisation. Here, in the technical language of a financier, was the blueprint for a new kind of European solidarity: not just a free trade zone, but a managed community with shared responsibilities and resources. The letter was a direct challenge to the prevailing wisdom, an attempt to prove that the only viable political community was one built on the solid, pragmatic foundations of shared economic life. On 24 and 25 February 1953, the Foreign Ministers of the Six (Alcide De Gasperi, Paul Van Zeeland, Jan Willem Beyen, Georges Bidault, Konrad Adenauer and Joseph Bech) met at the Aldobrandini Palace in Rome to discuss the European Defence Community (EDC) and Beyen’s proposal to include a general Common Market in the plans for the EPC. This would be presented again at the Conference pour la communaute politique europeenne in Rome in September 1953, where it was not the ministers but their ‘suppleants’ who met.Footnote 88
We now know that this vision would eventually prevail. But how was it received at the time? With ‘interest (but not much more than that)’.Footnote 89 The focus of the Six remained squarely on the high politics of the EDC – that is, until the summer of 1954.
C. The road to Messina
While the reasons for the lack of ratification of the EDC Treaty by the French National Assembly are a matter of historiographical debate,Footnote 90 Beyen certainly had his views on this. In his memoirs, he put it down to Mendès France (President of the French Council of minister and foreign minister in the summer of 1954), who, in Beyen’s recollection, tried to almost bully the allies into accepting an array of French demands in return for ratification by Paris.Footnote 91 Beyen considered the requests unreasonable and impossible to meet, despite the other five partners’ effort in this sense. First, the Treaty had been signed by all, and ratified by four (and, we can add, had the strong support of the Eisenhower administration).Footnote 92 Second, the requests ran counter to the very idea of a political community: France wanted to insert a right of veto against decisions which, in the view of a government, were contrary to the vital national interests of the country. Third, the demands of the French were motivated by petty personal antipathies.Footnote 93 The paradox of French stubbornness in that context is illustrated by Beyen’s anecdote of Adenauer’s rhetorical question to Mendès France: ‘Must the German Chancellor beg you not to put him in the position that he will soon have to start working on the re-establishment of a German National Army, with a German General Staff?’Footnote 94 Beyen, like others, had run out of patience.Footnote 95 Despite some hard feelings between Beyen and Mendès France, the Dutch foreign minister was well aware that the destiny of Europe did not really depend exclusively on the personal preferences of his French counterpart (a view confirmed by historians):Footnote 96 the French Parliament itself was unwilling to transfer sovereignty at the time.
With the collapse of the EDC, and the solution to German rearmament found through the Paris accord and within the NATO framework,Footnote 97 the logic of Beyen’s position became increasingly acceptable. The path of military and political integration was blocked; the only way forward was through economics (and even that, as we shall see, was far from straightforward). In the spring of 1955, Beyen wrote, ‘The atmosphere was ripe for a “relance européenne”. Independently of each other, Spaak and I sensed this.’Footnote 98 The Dutch position would be strengthened with Belgium and Luxembourg on board. Beyen contacted first his Belgian and Luxembourgish counterparts, Paul-Henri Spaak and Joseph Bech.Footnote 99 The three men, who had forged a close working relationship during the creation of the Benelux union, shared a similar outlook on their countries’ need for international cooperation. As Beyen recalled, their consultations were informal, often taking place over a well-provisioned dinner table,Footnote 100 free from the large entourages of officials that characterised most ministerial conferences. In his words, ‘All three of us belonged to the now virtually extinct breed of ministers who did not carry briefcases.’Footnote 101 Out of these informal discussions grew the plan for a common market that would be endorsed in the Messina Conference in June 1955.
But Jean Monnet had hopes of expanding the ECSC to nuclear energy as well. In the absence of support from the French government, he contacted Spaak, who proposed it to its counterparts: Beyen was opposed to this, as he regarded it as another example of sectoral integration.Footnote 102 In a note to Spaak and Bech on 4 April 1955, Beyen laid out his strategy instead. The failure of the EDC, he argued, meant that the scope and powers of a supranational community had to be now ‘restricted primarily to the economic domain’.Footnote 103 He reiterated his rejection of the sectoral approach, of which Jean Monnet was a proponent. He also pragmatically acknowledged that the United Kingdom, ‘vu sa position spéciale’, should be associated (not a full member), as it was for the ECSC. The German ministers Ludwig Erhard (economy) and Franz Josef Strauss (nuclear) liked neither; Adenauer considered economic integration unhelpful for the political interests of Western Germany.Footnote 104
Beyen’s and Monnet’s apparently contradictory initiatives constitute the background for the Benelux Memorandum of 18 May to the ECSC partners, which was a masterclass in political compromise. In April, Monnet drafted a common declaration for the six. This was significantly edited by Beyen on 23 April; he ‘struck the name Monnet from the submission out of consideration for the French government’.Footnote 105 In his memoirs on the Benelux Memorandum, Beyen does not mention Monnet. He simply recalls the Benelux initiative:
That is how we arrived at our proposal. We knew that the wind was not yet favourable and that, in politics as in sailing, you need to have the wind behind you, but also that even with the best wind, you cannot sail if you do not have a ship. We decided to start by building a ship.Footnote 106
The ship was a plan that did not foreground the (by now controversial) goal of political integration, but proposed as a compromise a two-track approach: cooperation on atomic energy (Euratom), which was popular with the French, and the establishment of a general common market, which was Beyen’s central objective. Crucially, the memorandum called for the creation of a community with an executive that would have its own responsibility to a common parliament, but it carefully avoided the ‘supranational’ label that had become so controversial – I almost said toxic – in the EDC debates.Footnote 107 It is possible that, in his memoirs, Beyen might have somewhat overstated his own role in proposing the plan, but historiansFootnote 108 and other sources from the timeFootnote 109 tend to agree that it was prominently his – not a Benelux – initiative.
The choice to hold the conference in Messina was due to pure contingency. The only day when the other five where available, the Italian foreign minister had to be in Messina.Footnote 110 And the conference itself was a low-key affair, attracting little attention from the press, which did not expect much would be decided.Footnote 111 But the resolution that emerged from the meeting, on the very last night, contained the seeds of the future. It endorsed the Benelux proposal for a general common market,Footnote 112 but there was no agreement on the institutional arrangements: the Germans, with the support of the French, being opposed to a new High Authority proposed by Benelux, the Italians being neither in favour nor against.Footnote 113 Most importantly, we can now affirm that the Messina conference was a crucial event because it established a study committee, under the leadership of a significant politician (it would be Spaak), to prepare what would eventually become the Treaties of Rome establishing the European Economic Community. This was the decisive breakthrough. As Beyen noted, ‘I know of no one else who could have achieved what he, in a good year and a half, brought about.’Footnote 114 With Spaak driving the process forward, the work of the intergovernmental committee culminated in the signing of the Treaties of Rome in March 1957. The vision of the pragmatic financier from the Netherlands, first articulated in the dark days of the EDC debate, had become the foundation of a new Europe.
What explains Beyen’s choice to present (and insist on) this plan? It was influenced by various factors, each contributing in proportions I am unable to determine, but which show a strong role for his personal beliefs, at least as professed in political contexts. The plan was in fact due to a vision grounded in the classical liberal belief in the benefits of free trade, but also in more than that. It has been shown in the secondary literature on Beyen, especially from Harryvan,Footnote 115 Voss and Vassallo,Footnote 116 that his beliefs on economic cooperation were shaped by two historical experiences. First, the global crisis of the 1930s had convinced him of the destructive folly of economic nationalism and the absolute need for international cooperation. This led him to develop his own theories, close to Keynesianism, that emphasised the need for government intervention to ensure social welfare and economic stability: economics ‘should be at the heart of post-war politics’.Footnote 117 Second, his wartime exile in London, and his subsequent work in Washington in the nascent Bretton Woods institutions, gave him a front-row seat to the dramatic shift in global power. He witnessed firsthand the decline of the United Kingdom and the ascendancy of the United States. This experience solidified his European identity and convinced him that the nations of Europe had to unite if they were to avoid becoming dependants of the new superpowers. Beyen was convinced that, ‘Holland must remain Holland but that this is only possible if Europe knows how to unite without falling into a sort of dependence on the United States.’Footnote 118 This concern for European economic autonomy was a direct result of his time in Washington.Footnote 119 Appointed as a non-partisan Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1952, he was an outsider, a technocrat ready to apply the lessons of decades in finance to the problem of European unity.Footnote 120 Similarly, Patel and Kaiser point to Beyen’s interwar experience and later work as foreign minister as one example of the continuity that existed between European cooperation before and after World War II.Footnote 121
The plan had also been the policy of the Dutch government before Beyen took office, so there is a degree of path dependency in his proposal. But it is also clear that Beyen insisted on the plan out of personal conviction, despite the scepticism voiced by his prime minister,Footnote 122 who is reported as saying, as late as March 1955, that other countries did not want economic unity now that the military option was virtually impossible, because where intergovernmental cooperation failed, how could supranational cooperation succeed – a view with which Beyen openly disagreed.Footnote 123
There are, of course, also competing or complementary explanations that do not depend on Beyen. One is that ‘there was a growing number of firms and branches urging the elimination of hindrances to trade’.Footnote 124 The others are also somewhat structural: the narrative does not imply that Beyen ‘caused’ the common market in isolation. His proposals operated within a dense web of constraints that were structural: cabinet politics in The Hague, the preferences of the larger Member States, but also the political context of the Netherlands, the failure of the EDC and so on. Individual initiatives only mattered insofar as they could be translated into coalitions, and those coalitions into concrete institutionalised steps.
4. The power of the particular: Analytical payoff and complementarity to existing structural explanations
What is the analytical payoff of the framework developed by scholars of legal mobilisation and formalised in this article? What does a micro-level, historical study of the contribution of a person like Johan Willem Beyen to the creation of the common market show us that more traditional, macro-level approaches do not? To answer this question, it is useful to place the narrative developed in Section 3 in dialogue with two of the most influential theories of European integration: Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism and (Weiler’s variety of) ‘integration through law’. While both offer compelling explanations for key aspects of the European project, they operate at a level of abstraction that obscures the very causal processes that an individual-centred approach is designed to reveal. My framework does not necessarily refute structural explanations – it is, in fact, agnostic on their empirical validity,Footnote 125 and on other occasions shares the same interpretation of facts as other theories have;Footnote 126 in a sense, it provides their essential prequel. It explains how national preferences are formed and aggregated before the ‘grand bargains’ studied by liberal intergovernmentalism even begin. The narrative showed the political agent (Beyen) who operationalised the Dutch ‘interest’ and the relational mechanisms (the Benelux coalition) that gave a small state the bargaining power Moravcsik observes. Similarly, the framework can also be used to provide the ‘political pre-history’ to the legal revolution observed by Weiler in his ‘equilibrium theory’. All integration-through-law varieties start with the law in place; the framework formalised here helps to explain how that initial legal text – with all its potential – was created, more or less intentionally, by political agents, revealing an earlier, foundational part of the causal chain.
A. A Challenge and a complement to Liberal Intergovernmentalism
Andrew Moravcsik’s The Choice for Europe is a landmark study of European integration. His theory of liberal intergovernmentalism posits that the major steps toward European unity can be understood as a series of ‘grand bargains’ between the leaders of Western European states. In this view, national leaders are the key actors, but their preferences are not their own: they are shaped by the rational (economic) interests, which are the expression of powerful domestic constituencies, but also by the relative power of each state in the international system, and by the role of international institutions.Footnote 127 European integration is therefore driven by the convergence of these (commercial and material) interests, which national leaders aggregate and then pursue through rational bargaining. Supranational institutions, such as the European Commission or the Court of Justice, are tools created by the Member States to enforce commitments and reduce transaction costs, but they do not drive the process.
From this perspective, the Treaties of Rome would be explained as a rational bargain struck between the leaders of the six founding Member States, reflecting a convergence of their national economic interests in creating a larger market. While this explanation has a certain parsimonious power, the case study of Johan Beyen reveals two things that liberal intergovernmentalism overlooks.
First, the individual-centred approach shows the importance of actors who are more than simple transmission belts for domestic commercial interests. Beyen’s vision for a Common Market was not the result of a straightforward calculation of Dutch economic interests (although it was also that, of course). While a larger market was undoubtedly beneficial for a trading nation such as the Netherlands, Beyen’s specific proposal (a supranational customs union, assisted by a common fund and with safeguard clauses managed by a central authority) was a product of his unique intellectual and professional biography.Footnote 128 There were many ways to achieve Dutch economic interests. The Dutch government itself hesitated between sectoral integration and a fuller, horizontal integration. The decisive choice was Beyen’s.
Second, the narrative shows the profound contingency of the historical process. It puts the notion of choice at the centre. Moravcsik’s model, with its focus on rational actors pursuing clear interests, can sometimes give the impression that the outcomes of these ‘grand bargains’ were almost inevitable. The fine-grained story, however, is one of near-failure and serendipity. The Beyen Plan was initially met with a lukewarm reception; the Messina conference itself was convened primarily to appoint a successor to Jean Monnet as president of the High Authority of the ECSC – the Benelux proposal was almost an afterthought on the agenda. Spaak agreed to Jean Monnet’s plan on atomic energy cooperation only because Mendès France had been replaced by a new, pro-European government. Had any of these contingent factors been different, Messina might never have occurred. And even after Messina, it was far from obvious that the work chaired by Spaak would have resulted in new treaties. This is the world of causal mechanisms rather than deterministic laws: we can perhaps explain ex-post, not predict. The failure of the EDC was an ‘environmental mechanism’ that created a political vacuum. The outcome that today we can see clearly was the product of a specific, unrepeatable, unpredictable concatenation of these events, a story of ‘episodes and contingencies’ that is lost in a more abstract, structural analysis.
Naturally, the narrative focused on Beyen also offers support to the liberal intergovernmentalism framework. The rélance for a common market was not initiated by the ‘big three’ of the time – France, Germany and Italy – although it could not go ahead without their endorsement. It was, in its origin, a quintessentially small-state affair, a Benelux initiative. The fact that Beyen decided to go through Spaak and Bech, to present his plan as a Benelux (rather than as a Dutch) one, is consistent with the tenet of liberal intergovernmentalism that the relative bargaining power of states is one of ‘the primary sources of integration’:Footnote 129 the Netherlands alone could hardly be persuasive, but having half of the Member States back a proposal gave it a different weight altogether.
B. The Political Foundations of Law
If liberal intergovernmentalism focuses on the political bargains between states, Weiler’s equilibrium theory focuses on the legal revolution engineered by the courts in spite of lacklustre political integration. In ‘The Transformation of Europe’, Weiler argues that the European Court of Justice (ECJ), in partnership with national courts, was the true engine of integration. Through the landmark doctrines of direct effect and supremacy, the ECJ ‘constitutionalised’ the Treaty of Rome, transforming it from an international treaty into a legal order that conferred rights on individuals and took precedence over national law. This was a ‘quiet revolution’, carried out by judicial actors, often empowering lower national courts against their own national judicial hierarchies. In this account, the political process that created the treaties is less important than the legal process that interpreted and transformed them.
The case of Johan Beyen adds to this court-centric narrative by revealing the political pre-history of the legal order that the courts would later interpret. It reminds us that before there could be ‘integration through law’, there had to be law, and that that law was itself the product of a contingent political process and of (more or less rational) choices. Further, since courts are essentially reactive institutions, their activism is limited by definition to the cases arriving before them. This also entails that court may be mobilised.Footnote 130 And this puts the question of agency elsewhere, outside courts.
It will be recalled that Amedeo Arena’s micro-history of Costa v ENEL Footnote 131 shows that this landmark case was the deliberate creation of a single lawyer, Gian Galeazzo Stendardi.Footnote 132 Tommaso Pavone’s work on the ‘ghostwriters’ of Europe reveals how a small group of ‘Euro-lawyers’ constructed test cases and cajoled national judges into making references to the ECJ.Footnote 133 The case study of Beyen takes this logic a step further back in the causal chain. If lawyers such as Stendardi were the agents who mobilised the law, Beyen was one of the key agents who created the law that would later be mobilised. By putting individuals at the centre of the story, we can trace the full chain of agency, from the political creation of the legal framework to its subsequent legal mobilisation and judicial interpretation.
C. The analytical payoff: Contingency, mechanisms and the human dimension
The ultimate value of the framework lies in what it adds to our understanding of causality in history.
First, it brings the role of contingency to the fore. The creation of the EEC was not an inevitable outcome of rational bargains. The study of individuals and their choices helps us understand why the Treaties of Rome were signed (they might not have been)Footnote 134 and why they took the form they did (and not another one – for example, on sectoral integration). This focus on contingency is a powerful antidote to the teleological tendencies that can creep into historical explanation.
Second, it allows us to identify specific causal mechanisms and exclude spurious explanations. As argued in Section 2A, explanation in the social sciences consists of identifying these ‘mechanisms’ – that is, frequently occurring and easily recognisable patterns of behaviour. The story of Beyen is replete with them: the cognitive mechanism of his deeply held belief in the primacy of economics; the relational mechanism of the informal, trust-based coalition he built with his Benelux counterparts; the environmental mechanism of the political vacuum created by the failure of the EDC. It is the specific combination of these mechanisms in a particular historical sequence that explains the outcome.
Finally, this approach restores the human dimension to history. The creation of the European Union was the work of individuals with passions, beliefs, ambitions and fears. It was a story of Beyen’s frustration with a capricious French policy, of belief in the pragmatism of economic integration and in the pursuit of his country’s long-term interests. Like anyone else, he was only a person whose life unfolded on the canvas of bigger events. This framework does not defend a ‘grand man’ theory of integration, but by telling this story with a focus on Beyen’s perspective, we gain not only a more accurate causal account, but also a richer and more compelling understanding of the past. We are writing narratives – perhaps slightly different from the traditional ones – but still narratives. Perhaps we are one step closer to how things actually happened.
5. Conclusion
Standard accounts focus on one level; I chose another one. By proposing and applying an individual-centred framework, I have sought not to discard structural explanations, but to supply their missing micro-foundations. The story of Johan Willem Beyen and the birth of the Common Market serves also as a demonstration of a method. It shows how the abstract forces of state interest and legal constitutionalism are, in the final instance, the products of concrete, contingent and consequential human choices. The analytical payoff of this approach – looking for the micro-foundations of political agents – is its ability to create a richer and more complete causal story. It complements Andrew Moravcsik’s liberal intergovernmentalism by providing its essential prequel, revealing how national preferences are defined and operationalised by individual actors like Beyen before the grand bargains can be struck. The framework does not deny the reality of state power, but instead uncovers the relational and cognitive mechanisms through which individuals build the coalitions and forge the ideas that give that power its direction. Similarly, it provides the ‘political pre-history’ to Weiler’s equilibrium theory. Weiler’s powerful narrative begins with the law in place; this one explains how that specific legal text, ripe with constitutional potential, was first designed and built by political agents. By tracing the full causal chain of agency – from the politicians who create the law to the lawyers who later mobilise it – we can finally unite the study of European politics and law into a single, coherent narrative.
The contribution is not meant to replace structural explanations with biography, but to specify the interaction: how macro–constraints and institutional pathways shape what an individual can do, and how individual initiatives (when they succeed) help select among multiple structurally available equilibria. This article is just a sketch, a first step toward a broader research agenda. Who were the other politicians, both celebrated and forgotten? How did competing visions clash and compromise to produce the Union we have today? By asking these questions, we restore the human dimension to our understanding of Europe. We are reminded that the grand, post-national structure of the European Union, much like the game Beyen so shrewdly played, was ultimately built one move at a time, by a generation of statesmen and women with a great sense of responsibility, who decided to build a ship even when the wind was not yet favourable. And, by telling their stories, we give them recognition.
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to Diamond Ashiagbor, Amedeo Arena, Lorenzo Gradoni, Alezini Loxa, Skyla Kluge and the anonymous reviewers for their comments. This article is dedicated to my friend Mike.
Competing interests
The author has no conflicts of interest to declare.
