In this book Lee MacLean makes a plausible if not always persuasive case that Rousseau's varied rhetorical appeals to free will reflect his actual belief that human beings are possessed of wills that are free. She counterposes her argument to the influential interpretation, advanced by Marc Plattner and grounded in commentaries of Leo Strauss, that Rousseau only pretends to believe that men differ from animals by virtue of possessing free will. When employing the rhetoric of free will, in other words, Rousseau is in effect lying about what he believes regarding the issue; he does so in order to avoid contradicting Christian doctrine but also to avoid undermining the salutary commonly held belief that our wills truly are free and truly are our own (9). For Plattner and Strauss both, Rousseau's real view is that humans differ from animals only in terms of man's “perfectibility”—the nonteleological capacity of the species to progress or decline in reaction to changing external circumstances and historical accidents—and thus only in terms of man's malleability as such. In The Free Animal, MacLean respectfully challenges that line of interpretation. Without denying that perfectibility is one respect in which Rousseau finds man to exhibit “relative independence of instinct,” MacLean attempts to show that important aspects of Rousseau's system of thought depend on and therefore testify to his own belief in the freedom of the human will (8, 10). Precisely because Rousseau also considers man to be the free animal, MacLean argues, it cannot be said that human nature for Rousseau is reducible to the purely animal.
MacLean begins by emphasizing aspects of the second Discourse that have been downplayed or dismissed as rhetorical by a number of Rousseau's Straussian interpreters (53). Rousseau's claim, early in the Discourse, that man's “consciousness of free will” is a spiritual power is for MacLean “too intriguing . . . to have been merely rhetorical” (18). In particular, she suggests, Rousseau's occasional subsequent references to man's “potential faculties” indicate that Rousseau regards that spiritual power to be latent and not yet operative in the original savage, who at first displays “purely animal functions” (44). On MacLean's view (contra Plattner's), Rousseau's recognition of such latent original potentialities implies that he does not regard man's nature to be merely a contingent product of history and environment. That recognition also raises the possibility that Rousseau does not regard perfectibility to be an entirely reactive faculty. For MacLean, “the heart of what Rousseau understands by perfectibility” involves man's own “ability,” grounded in his spiritual capacity for choosing freely, “to bring his latent faculties to fruition” (44).
MacLean acknowledges the obvious objection that she could be misconstruing what is merely a rhetoric of potentiality and spirituality to be indicative of Rousseau's actual views. For Plattner, for example, the passive quality of perfectibility implies that Rousseau is really a comprehensive materialist who is disingenuously employing a salutary (and safe) rhetoric of dualism. MacLean concedes that Rousseau writes esoterically but argues that the layers of his writing should be identified differently. In her view, it is materialism that lies near the surface of the Discourse, serving to obscure a deeper and genuine dualism of matter and spirit (41, cf. 124–25, 153). The materialist layer is useful, on one hand, because it enables Rousseau “to insulate himself against attacks” from Enlightenment philosophes (14, cf. 125). On the other hand, “if Rousseau stresses the contingency of the [human] faculties' development, it is because this supports his opinion of the natural goodness of man” and not because Rousseau harbors a historicist's understanding of human nature (41). According to MacLean, the deeper layer in Rousseau's writings is really the dualist layer, for certain defining features of Rousseau's system itself can make sense only in context of the dualist tenet that man possesses free will.
Rousseau's distinctive genealogy of vice serves as her chief exhibit. To MacLean that genealogy appears to depend on the assumption that human wills are spontaneous and self-determining causes in themselves, capable of initiating new series of events on their own (45). If Rousseau believed that human wills were not free in that sense but rather were utterly determined effects of prior material causes, then Rousseau would not be able to maintain that the moral evils of society are in part unnatural vices of man's own making (60–62, cf. 47–48, 73). Moreover, MacLean argues, both of Rousseau's accounts of human development—of the historical corruption of the species in the Discourse; of the progress of an individual's passions in Emile—are predicated on the emergence of the “consciousness of free will” and especially on the recognition in others of the ability to act independently of natural causation. That recognition makes it possible to perceive and appraise others with respect to their “intention to act freely in our favour or disfavour,” and so that recognition plays a crucial role in the development of amour-propre and of all the passions and artificial vices that arise in its wake (71, cf. 12, 74–78). For the historical account per se, Rousseau “relies on the notion of men's consciousness of free will to explain how man spirals out of nature”—in particular, how amour-propre arises from the savage's amour de soi; how moral self-consciousness succeeds primitive innocence; how intentionality and the propensity for resentment and vengeance replace a salutary indifference to others; and ultimately, how the corruptions of society supplant man's primitive condition of natural goodness (65). In general, Rousseau needs to posit free will as an “anti-natural quality” in order for the historical account of the Discourse to make sense as an exculpation of man's original nature (20, cf. 80–81).
In the last two chapters MacLean sounds the depth of Rousseau's dualism. She examines Emile in context of important private letters to show that the Savoyard vicar's Profession of Faith, which links free will to the belief that man is animated by an immaterial substance, “really does contain much of Rousseau's own position about metaphysics and religion” (123). MacLean argues that Rousseau in fact embraces complementary versions of dualism. The first is the basic soul/body dualism while the second is a “moral version” that contradistinguishes two fundamental principles of the human soul, “one . . . oriented towards justice and order and another . . . oriented towards bodily appetites” (128). The second dualism explains how conscience is possible and confirms that Rousseau understands virtue not only as a product of habituation but also as a possible choice for man as a free agent. Yet the spiritual freedom of the will serves as Rousseau's “Archimedean point outside physical nature” (56), and it is on the basis of his genuine belief in that capacity that Rousseau is able to conceive both of man's self-wrought corruption and of his self-legislated improvement (cf. 12, 62, 94). Appropriately for her main argument, MacLean concludes The Free Animal with a shrewd and compelling demonstration, based on her reading of the Fourth Reverie, that Rousseau's own principles regarding pious lying would not have allowed Rousseau to lie about his belief in free will.
Many inferences in MacLean's main argument are not only plausible but convincing, clearly linked to careful explication of Rousseau's main writings as well as his writings about those writings. Other aspects of the argument amount to speculations as to what Rousseau really believes. To her credit, MacLean identifies some of these as her own favored conjectures; furthermore, it is understandable that, in context of any inquiry bearing on Rousseau's rhetoric, some speculations might well arise or be called for. One might even overlook MacLean's dependence on her conjecture that Rousseau's dualism emerged as his thought evolved over time (cf. 107, 108, 120, 132)—notwithstanding Rousseau's own characterizations of the system of his thought. Nevertheless, one of MacLean's speculations ultimately begs the question that her main argument purports to resolve.
The important matter at issue is the nature of matter for Rousseau, and in particular, how any episode in the history of matter could ever give rise to a spiritual power or dimension. The issue pertains directly to Rousseau's history in the Discourse and to how exactly, in the course of historical development alone, a physical being of “purely animal functions” became the possessor of spiritual freedom. MacLean insists that Rousseau is not intentionally describing a false consciousness; on her view, Rousseau really does believe that man's consciousness of his will's freedom corresponds to its actual freedom. Yet it is one thing for MacLean to assert that the “anti-natural capacity” Rousseau needs to posit is the actual freedom of the human will (12); it would be quite another to explain how Rousseau understands that antinatural capacity to have emerged from what was natural, or how any such view of his would not end up incriminating original nature. Unfortunately, MacLean largely avoids those puzzles, even as her own argument creates them. “It seems likely,” MacLean does speculate at one point, “that savage man has a rudimentary physical ability to will and not will that later develops into free will” (45, cf. 80–81). But MacLean offers no accompanying conjecture as to why Rousseau himself never endeavors in the Discourse to explain such a cataclysmic development. His silence on the point, one might choose to think, is deafening.
