Most governments pay lip service to the importance of cost-benefit analyses of policy changes. However, even when such changes offer prospective economic benefits or movement towards socially valued goals, their distributive effects risk strong political resistance from beneficiaries of existing policies. Michael Trebilcock's Donner Prize-winning book Dealing with Losers explores various strategies for mitigating transitional costs through seven case studies of major domestic, comparative and international policy changes.
The seven studies explore reforms to un(der) funded public pensions (ch. 3) and the US home mortgage interest deduction (ch. 4), and immigration policies (ch. 7), and the liberalization of trade policies (ch. 5), particularly agricultural supply management systems (ch. 6). They also explore extending climate change policies (ch. 7) and institutional reforms intended to foster democratization in developing and authoritarian countries (ch. 8).
Trebilcock begins by canvassing a range of normative discourses, including efficiency theories, utilitarian, contractarian, communitarian, libertarian and public choice perspectives, each subsequently applied to his chosen case studies. His central thesis, rooted in public choice theory, is that mitigating opposition to economically and socially beneficial reforms from beneficiaries of existing public policies may require partial compensation of groups disadvantaged by such changes, even if it results in offsetting efficiency and other societal gains. Trebilcock acknowledges public choice's limitations, not least their predictive limits and the reality that individuals are not “wholly self-interested” or consistently “rational” (26). He extends his analysis to include structural, institutional, psychological and ideational factors which may influence the outcomes of major policy changes in dynamic settings, noting that “the more foundational a policy change, the greater the proposed impact of values and principles on the decision-making process” (27).
Chapter 3's study of reforming underfunded pension systems builds on Alan Jacobs' Governing for the Long Term (2011). Noting the reversal of French pension reforms since 2012, Trebilcock discusses transition options for intergenerational burden-sharing, recognizing that political imperatives necessitate phasing-in proposed changes and (reluctantly) acknowledging the need to protect existing beneficiaries. The subsequent reversal of partisan challenges to the Harper government's cautious, fully grandfathered phasing-in of changes to Old Age Security suggest future tests of Trebilcock's analysis.
Chapter 4 explores prospective conditions for dismantling the US home mortgage interest deduction (MID) as a regressive policy which has contributed to rising housing prices and widespread social inequities. Trebilcock suggests the MID's phased reduction over a decade to limit short-term effects of its withdrawal on housing prices, possibly offset by allowing continued eligibility for first-time homebuyers to “maintain the American dream.”
Similar principles inform Chapter 5's analysis of conditions for successful trade liberalization: gradualism, reciprocity and safeguards against sudden market shifts (“reversibility”). Trebilcock argues that most current industry-specific subsidies are no longer “theoretically defensible” (80), and that well-designed active labour market measures tend to be more effective in facilitating worker transitions than expanding passive income subsidies or targeted trade-related adjustment assistance.
Chapter 6 explores ways of overcoming the “transition gains trap” which hinders reforms to Canada's agricultural supply management programs: the anticipated drop in the value of existing investments expected to undercut agricultural producers' adaptation to more market-based pricing regimes. Trebilcock suggests including phased reduction or abolition of quotas in prospective trade agreements, while funding transition assistance through a “milk tax” on beneficiaries of lower milk prices and growing export markets, though noting such strategies’ dependence on broader public acceptance.
Chapter 7 examines ways of overcoming political opposition to large-scale immigration visible in American and European political discourse, while recognizing wide variations of policies and outcomes across countries at different times and the inherent tensions among communitarian, liberal and certain multiculturalist values in articulating the public interest. Given inherent uncertainties of predicting the labour market effects of admission quotas, Trebilcock argues for “devolving and decentralizing power over immigration decision making to private parties” (108) much more than at present. He would balance lower regulatory barriers to immigration while requiring sponsors to internalize related costs of social benefits through insurance. Whatever their economic rationality, these proposals overlook the potential for increased social polarization over immigration policies and entitlements, especially in countries lacking broader cultures of social inclusion which have evolved in Australia and Canada.
Chapter 8's discussion of the challenging problem of co-ordinating national and global responses to climate change provides a lucid analysis of transitional difficulties resulting from competing interests and institutional structures. Trebilcock suggests that co-ordinated action among major countries, reinforced by carbon tariffs on imports, may be more effective in promoting global change than multilateral negotiations subject to radically competing national interests and their citizens’ reluctance to pay the costs of such measures unless they can be effectively disguised or shifted to politically defenceless outsiders.
Chapter 9 discusses the limited effectiveness of past “utopian” efforts to promote and sustain institutional reforms to promote good governance in authoritarian states with limited histories of promoting democracy, the rule of law or effective property rights. Trebilcock emphasizes that creating contexts for effective reforms must address their historical and institutional contexts along with the interdependence of relevant institutions (and vested interests).
Trebilcock's proposals are generally economically rational and sensitive to distributive effects in the context of neoclassical economic analysis. He emphasizes that their successful pursuit requires an ongoing willingness of political and social factions to compromise and accept incremental policy change. But he probably underestimates the degree of political courage or capacity of the political institutions needed to secure public consent to or to implement these proposals, especially when they affect large pluralities of voters. Consensus is often elusive in defining a “generally socially beneficial” (152) basis for policies and reforms. Unfortunately, recent economic and social dislocations have been corrosive for the consensus politics and public trust in political and economic elites needed to implement such complex technocratic reforms.
Realizing Trebilcock's vision requires gifted political leadership and stable coalitions of major social interests. Absent such conditions, political rationality, however seemingly perverse at times, will continue to set the conditions and limits for economically rational policy change. However, Trebilcock's ideas may help astute leaders to secure greater public legitimacy for such reforms.
