The Akhbār-i Moghulān dar Anbāneh Qutb, penned though not necessarily authored by Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī (1236–1311),Footnote 1 recounts the rule of Hulegu Khan and his son Abaqa and the travails and ultimate demise and death of Abaqa's brother and would-be successor, Ahmad Tegudar. It is an original and independent source and although it covers well-known events and personalities, it throws new light on these events and makes some startling and controversial claims concerning other matters that are only lightly touched upon elsewhere.
Quṭb al-Dīn Maḥmūd ibn Mas’ūd Shīrāzī (634-710/1236-1311) is best known for his association with Naṣīr al-Dīn Ṭūsī (d.1274) and his work at the famous observatory of Maragha. Born into a cultured and educated family, Quṭb al-Dīn received medical training from his father, Żiāʾ-al-Din Masʿud Kāzeruni, a well-known physician and Sufi, who died when the boy was only fourteen, leaving his son's schooling in the hands of some of Shiraz's leading scholars. Shīrāzī left Shiraz in 1260 and is believed to have finally arrived at the Rasadkhāna in 1262.
From its inauguration the observatory attracted scholars from all over Iran and beyond, and Shīrāzī resumed his education under Ṭūsī adding astronomy to medicine, ophthalmology, Avicenna's Qānun and the other sciences in which he had already been schooled. Religion had of course comprised a major element of his early education and he had received his Kherqā, a Sufi robe, from Najib-al-Dīn ‘Ali b. Bozḡosh Shīrāzī. His father had received his own Kherqā from the renowned Shehāb-al-Dīn ʿOmar Sohravardi. Shīrāzī had been a precocious and avid student of theology, but he was a true polymath and he matched Ṭūsī's passion for the stars, becoming instrumental in the composition of the astronomical tables (Zij) for which the Maragha observatory became justly celebrated. A revealing anecdote from the comparatively short time that Shīrāzī stayed in Maragha recounts how the Ilkhan, Hulegu, revealed to the young scholar on a visit to the royal court that the only reason that he did not have Ṭūsī executed was that he needed him to finish the Zij. The earnest Quṭb al-Dīn responded by assuring Hulegu that he should not fear because he would be quite capable of finishing the tables for him. When Ṭūsī asked his star pupil if this story were true, the guileless Quṭb assured him that it was. Warned that Hulegu was unlikely to have appreciated Shīrāzī's ironic banter, Quṭb assured his master that he had not been joking.Footnote 2 It is worth noting that in Ṭūsī's later records of the Rasadkhāna, Shīrāzī's name is absent from the list of his assistants despite the vast amount of important work that he had devoted to the composition of the tables. Rashīd al-Dīn and Wassāf similarly omit mention of Quṭb al-Dīn in their accounts of the Maragha observatory. However, confirmation of Shīrāzī's crucial contribution to the Zij is attested to indirectly when, in his will, the waṣiya, Ṭūsī advises his son, Aṣil-al-Dīn, to work with Shīrāzī on the completion of the astronomical tables.
As well as erudite and voluminous commentaries and analyses of Ṭūsī's astronomical and occasional astrological calculations, Shīrāzī produced his own novel mathematical solutions to the problems with which this learned elite at the Rasadkhāna were grappling, along with his own ideas on among other things, the motion of the planets and other heavenly bodies. However, his stay in Maragha ended after he travelled to Khorasan with Ṭūsī and then decided against returning, instead remaining in Jovein to study under Najm-al-Dīn Kātebi Qazvini.Footnote 3 Sometime after 1268 it is recorded that he travelled widely around the country ending up in Anatolia where it is known that he encountered the Sufi-poet Jalāl al-Dīn Rūmī.Footnote 4 In Konya he again resumed his studies, with Ṣadr-al-Dīn Qunawī (d. 1274) guiding his progress. When the governor of Rum, the Parvana Moʿin-al-Dīn Solaymān, appointed Qunawī judge of Sivas and Malatya, Shīrāzī went with him, all the time increasing his circle of friends and contacts. It was Quṭb al-Dīn who was chosen by the Ilkhan, Ahmad Tegudar, to travel to Egypt in 1282 as his representative to the court of Sayf-al-Dīn Qalāwun (r. 1279–1290) to whom he was described as the Ilkhan's chief judge. It was on his return from Egypt that he began work on the Akhbār-i-Moghalān. After settling in Syria where he taught the two celebrated works of Avicenna, the Qānun on medicine and the Shefāʾ on philosophy, he moved to Tabriz, where that he died at the age of 75 and was buried in the Charandāb Cemetery, close to the tomb of Qāżi Bayżāwī.Footnote 5
Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī is remembered as an intellectual giant in an age of exceptional scholars. However, he is famous not only for his prolific intellectual output and the passion with which he acquired knowledge but for his good-nature and humour, a zest for life and a generosity of spirit. Khwandamīr records that “his major characteristic was mirth, and he constantly told jokes and pleasantrie”.Footnote 6 He was known as a proficient chess player and as a musician who entertained with the rabāb, and he cultivated a wide circle of diverse friends and acquaintances. Hitherto he had not been noted as an historian, but his many contacts in the political world and his influence with the ‘movers and shakers’ of the Ilkhanate made him an ideal commentator and observer. However Quṭb al-Dīn has now been credited with the transcription rather than the authorship of this newly edited, short history of the early Ilkhanate though the extent of his input of the content is certainly debateable.
The actual date of writing is given early in this annotated chronology as 680/1280, where on the first page of the manuscript (folio 22b) listing the rulers of the house of Jochi and their dominion over the Qipchaq steppe (Khifjaq in text), it states that “after him [Monkū Timūr], Tūtā Monkū who is pādeshāh at this time (sā’at), that is the year 680”.Footnote 7
Known more for his thoughts on astronomy and theology, Quṭb al-Dīn's work as a calligrapher is often overlooked. In fact a considerable number of mediaeval Persian manuscripts from collections around the world are written in the hand of Shīrāzī including the codex from which the present historical chronicle is taken. This codex is currently in the library of the Ayatollah al-’Uẓmā Mar'ashī Najafī in Qom (MS Mar'ashī 12868) and remains accessible for researchers. For many years the codex had been broken up and dispersed before being collected, collated and rebound and eventually acquired by the current library in Qom. A detailed study of the Mar'ashī codex by Reza Pourjavady and Sabine Schmidtke appeared in 2007 in Studia Iranica. As well as a careful itemised analysis of the contents of the codex Schmidtke and Pourjavady revealed the extent of Shīrāzī's work as a copyist, demonstrating that he penned not only many of his own works but those of his contemporaries, including his colleague Naṣir al-Dīn Ṭūsī.
The Shīrāzī codex containing this short history of the early Ilkhanate, comprises 147 leaves and originally belonged to the library of Rashīd al-Dīn in the Rab’-e Rasīdī, Tabriz, as indicated by stamps on some of the leaves bearing the insignia “waqf-e-ketābkhāna Rashīdī”. The folios are incomplete and there are leaves missing from many sections including from the beginning and the end of the codex itself. The codex has undergone various preservation measures and now contains fourteen sections whose disparate contents throw much light on the intellectual interests of Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī and the cultural milieu in which he lived. There are various Persian and Arabic quatrains and poems including verse by ‘Umar Khayyam, fragments of works on philosophy, extracts from the sayings of Plato, extensive fragments from the work of Tāj al-Dīn Shahrestānī, various quotations from pre-Islamic Persian and Greek thinkers, large tracts by his contemporary, the Jewish philosopher Ibn Kammūna and Samaw'al al-Maghribī's ‘Silencing the Jews’ (Ifḥām al-Yahūd) and also the anonymous Mongol chronicle currently under review.
The chronicle was composed between 1281 and 1285 but gives no indication as to its authorship or whether it was a collaborative project, although the repetition of certain phrases and verb forms throughout the work suggests one author. No irrefutable evidence exists to prove the argument either way. Īraj Afshār, the editor, suggests that there are various external reasons for presuming that Quṭb al-Dīn is the actual author, but at the same time he cites two reasons for doubting Shīrāzī's authorship. First, there is inconsistency in the spelling of certain names found throughout the chronicle. This, however, was not an uncommon phenomenon at this time and since no system of efficient proof–reading existed it is hardly surprising. Afshār points out that variations in spelling within a single document were common at this time. Second, there is the claim by the author of this chronicle that he had been at Hulegu's court “very often” [bisiyār uqāt]Footnote 8 whereas, the editor recalls, there is only one recorded meeting between Shīrāzī and Hulegu Khan when in 660 ah Ṭūsī took his colleague to the Ilkhanid court. Despite these many visits of the author of the chronicle to Hulegu's court, there remains only this one cited reference to Shīrāzī meeting with Hulegu, a discrepancy which at best constitutes flimsy evidence either way.Footnote 9
The present pagination of the folios no longer corresponds to the original order of writing. As he explains in his introduction to the Akhbār-i Mughulān, Īraj Afshār is responsible for re-ordering the folios and arranging them in the correct chronological sequence. Both the original and the chronological order of the folios are given in the introduction along with a summary of each section and sheet. However, whether by loss or through design, the chronology of these early decades of Ilkhanid rule do not flow smoothly and gaps of differing lengths occur intermittently. The years between 658 and 662, and the eight years between 667 and 675 are missing. Other gaps then appear throughout the remainder of the history. The seven–year gap between the years 667 through to 675 is the longest omission and the final year, 683, receives the fullest and most detailed treatment. As well as the problem with the erroneous rebinding of the original folios, the editor has also had his own problems with his edited version. The page for the year 656 has inexplicably appeared on page 41, whereas it should appear as page 35.
The appearance of this previously little–known volume of chronological notes dating from the second half of the thirteenth century, detailing among other events the fall of Alamut, the siege of Baghdad, and the collapse of relations between Ahmad Tegūdār and his nephew, Arghun Khan, is both welcome and very exciting. Published in Qum, Iran, this slender tome contains a short introduction with a skeletal outline of the chronology and the corresponding events, an edited text, and also a facsimile copy of the original manuscript. Why someone of Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī's stature should task himself with such a work and why he has not been awarded any acknowledgment for his efforts remains a mystery, but his contributions to our knowledge of this turbulent and controversial period of Iranian history are undoubtedly valuable and offer insights on major events and characters some details of which are not found elsewhere despite the possible use of this manuscript as a source for Rashīd al-Dīn's Jāma’ al-Tavārīkh or the use of a common source by both histories. The extent of Shīrāzī's involvement in the authorship of the manuscript remains uncertain and this controversy is explored in the introductory pages, but it must be presumed that Shīrāzī harboured sympathy for the views expressed in this record and the greatest respect for the author or even authors of the chronicle.
Īraj Afshār presents the text with a minimal amount of commentary and there is also very little scholarly analysis; this factor therefore invites future study and research on this important text. The language of the chronology is plain, direct and stripped of the usual Persian excesses and hyperbole so characteristic of the style of that time although various idiosyncrasies do occur: for example, to specify just one, the use of ‘na-māndan’ to signify death and ‘birūn na-mānad meaning ‘not to remain living’ that is, ‘to die’.
“The beginning of the Mongol government and the advent of Chinggis Khan” the title of the short introductory chapter, opens with the names of the Great Khan's forefathers and the date of Chinggis Khan's emergence which is given in five calendars: The Arab calendar at 599 ah, the Rūmiyān calendar 1514 [sic], the Zoroastrian calendar of Yazdegerd III 572 and both the Uyghur calendar and the Chinese calendar recording the year of the PigFootnote 10 corresponding to 1202/3 ce. However, it is not clear to exactly which events the dates refer: 1202/3 being a year prior to Temujin's enthronement. This generous serving of dates, which reflects a cosmopolitanism and a global awareness and attitude in the author, is mirrored in certain other textual sources from this era and is in striking contrast to the more parochial outlook commonly found at this time in the local sources whether Arab, Persian, or Armenian. Other examples of the use of multiple calendars, such as the early fourteenth–century Persian tombstone unearthed in Hangzhou belonging to a amir and merchant resident in the former Song capital along with a mid-fifteenth-century mosque stele, while no doubt reflecting the same sophisticated and worldly nature, can be more readily explained by their location far from home on the other side of the planet. These men were ex-patriots, far from their homes, who were truly part of an international community. The use of these multiple calendars in Iran suggests either that the small community residing at the Rasad-knana of Maragha was itself international or that it was composed of members of the Toluid elite, men who travelled from west to east and back again and who regarded themselves as citizens of a dynamic and growing empire where the traditional limitations and labels of identity no longer applied, and the old restrictions of religion, class and family could no longer constrain.Footnote 11
With the dates establishing the author's attitude and world view rather than a historically precise moment in time, the tone of the chronicle is set. Chinggis Khan is introduced with an anecdote from the ‘lean years’ when at Baljuna his core supporters pledged their loyalty and fidelity. The story, or rather the topos, relates how Chinggis Khan along with 70 of his faithful followers were stranded in the desert at Wadi Balchuneh (Baljuna) without food. One of his soldiers manages to shoot down a desert sparrow and the bird is then roasted and offered to the Khan. The Khan orders that the bird be divided into 70 parts from which he then took his share, no larger than any one of the other portions. As a result of such righteousness and exemplary behaviour, the text continues, all the people became devotees and followers of Chinggis Khan and gave their souls to his cause. So starts Quṭb al-Dīn's history of the Mongols and the Ilkhans up until the ascension of Arghun Khan on Friday, 27 Jumāda I, 683 (11 August 1285) and it is clear the regard in which the author holds the grandfather of the regime under which he served.
The author's and by implication, Shīrāzī's sympathetic view of the Chinggisids is made clear from the start. This was a regime of which he felt himself a part and an empire in which he saw himself as both a player and a beneficiary. He summarises the Chinggisid conquests and the individual rulers before observing that with the ascension of Mongke Qa'an “The wolf and the sheep drank water together”12,13 a sentiment expressed also by Sa'dī in the introduction to his Gulistan.Footnote 14 Echoing Juwaynī, who was also particularly effusive in his praise for the new Qa'an, Mongke, the author, (hereafter “Shīrāzī” to denote the man whose opinions are expressed), portrays the Toluid ascendancy in very positive terms typified in such statements as “The like of the days of justice and equity that dominated during his [Mongke's] days are few”,Footnote 15 but he adds that after taking measures “such as killing, beating, shackling and the like not one person from among those that had been co-conspirators in opposition remained alive but not one innocent person suffered loss”.Footnote 16 His final observation claims: “When the work of those provinces, Turkestan, and Khitai, and Oxiana, and Tibet, and Tangut, and many other provinces were put in order [rāst kard], he sent his own brother Hulegu in the direction of [the river] Jayhūn that is to say the provinces of the Arabs and of the Persians in order to put them in order [rāst konad]”.Footnote 17
The vast extent of the conquests is repeatedly emphasised and the ambitions for total conquest that were still harboured as Hulegu moved westward are underlined with the explicit threats made to the still unconquered Arabs also recorded. Coupled with the threats of violence are reminders of the justice which īl [obedience and submission] can bring and the fact that word of these conquests and the justice of the Mongol edicts had even reached the lands of the Franks and the Rūmiyān.Footnote 18
Hulegu's first appointment after crossing the Jayhūn (Oxus) was with the despised mulāhadeh, the Ismā’īlīs, though the language used in reference to these ‘feared’ heretics has none of the loathing and almost pathological hatred evident in the writing of Juwaynī and other Sunni commentators. The writer goes into great detail in describing the preparation that had gone into the planning of Hulegu's advance. After a summary of the many countries that had submitted to Hulegu's forces and an account of the justice that had been delivered as these lands were ‘liberated’ [mastakhlas], witnessed by the author on his many trips to Hulegu's court, a detailed description is given of the armaments that Hulegu had brought with him to deal with the perceived threat from the mulāhadeh. The precise picture that emerges of the giant Kamān-ha-ye Cherkh or crossbow recalls Juwaynī's Kamān-i-Gav and the illustration from the Wu Jing Zong Yao (武 經 總 要)Footnote 19 1044 of a lethal machine quite capable of delivering explosive devices. These powerful crossbows were able to deliver heavily re-enforced arrows wrapped in leather with deadly precision over great distances to hit moving targets, a “vulture [or] eagle in flight high in the mountains” or strapped together to pound a castle's walls and ramparts. Whether the Chinggisid forces were employing explosives at this stage, a view strongly supported by the Yuan scholar Stephen Haw,Footnote 20 and that the word ‘batān’ or possibly ‘panbeh’ refers to some kind of explosive material is an intriguing possibility.To sustain the slow-moving army that accompanied these massive machines, provisions had already been put in place by Arghun Aqa and other commanders, as reported by Juwayni in his history of these events, “emirs and local rulers. . .began to prepare provisions (‘ulūfa) and get together tuzghu or offerings of food; and they set down their offerings at every stage (of the army's advance.)”.Footnote 21 “Shīrāzī” itemises some of the preparation that was in place to meet the demands of this vast body of men who were launched onto the Iranian plateau.
And from all the provinces they brought out provisions and supplies without limit and beyond compare. They set off by donkey, camel and cow and asses (long ears) and such like. They had brought limitless noodles and cooked porridge (Tatum ash, Tatumaj),Footnote 22 and pounded millet (gāvrus-i kufteh) from the provinces of Khitai and Uyghorestan to the foot of Alamut and Mimundaz and that castle, and every half farhang they had stacked ample flour and rice and necessities /ingredients (staples) in bags of fine linen so that everywhere was found great hills [of provisions].Footnote 23
The huge war machine that is so precisely described had been transported from Turkestan along with trained experts, and upon its arrival on the borders of Khorasan written orders and messengers were dispatched to the malūk and pādeshāhān of the provinces. In these messages Hulegu Khan solemnly pledged that if the royal recipients of his messages should undertake to assist him with troops, armaments and military supplies in his forthcoming confrontation with the mulāhadeh, he would be under an obligation to provide peace and security for them and their provinces. Should they decline his invitation Hulegu would deal with them after he was free from the Ismā’īlī business and that later any excuses that they might offer him would not be accepted. The menace lurking in his messages was almost palpable and the author of this history itemises the response to Hulegu's request. The Atabeg of Shiraz, the sultans of Rum, the kings of Khorasan, Sistan, Mazanderan, Kerman, Rustamdar, Shirwan, Gorjestan, Iraq, Azerbayjan, Arran, and Luristan and some other representatives all came. Others sent their brothers or relatives and they all sent men, military supplies, provisions, and gifts and placed themselves at his service.Footnote 24
The writer's point is clear. Hulegu Khan operated with the support of the rulers of the whole country. The account of Hulegu's slow negotiations with Alamūt culminating in the young Rukn al-Dīn's final surrender do not differ from other accounts in any significant ways although there is the suggestion that cholera (wabā)Footnote 25 proved a factor in the reluctant surrender of Lamasar.Footnote 26 The scale of the military operation is stressed from the start with the claim that the siege of the first castle, Girdkoh, was “such as nobody had ever seen [before]”.Footnote 27 The castle set a formidable task for the assailants. A moat had been dug around the fortified outer walls which protected the houses which lay between the outer walls and another inner wall and moat, with this whole structure surrounding and protecting the innermost buildings access to which was restricted by these moats and walls. After “a day or two” with the operation proving more difficult than anticipated, Hulegu ordered his top commanders to initiate a prolonged siege which resulted “after a year more or less” in the deaths of a great many of the besieged from cholera. News was brought to the Ismā’īlī leader the Khwarshāh ‘Alā’ al-Dīn to inform him that not a man remained in Girdkoh and that the castle was lost. His response was to order the mobilisation of a hundred men under the command of Moqdam al-Dīn Mohammad Mobāraz who was able to lead his troop through enemy lines and into the castle itself suffering only one casualty – a man who fell into the moat and broke his leg. Though this story appears in Rashīd al-Dīn, there are important embellishments: for example, that Mobāraz and his men each carried two maunds of henna and three maunds of salt for the sick of Girdkoh in the belief that henna was a cure for cholera. Other slight differences and additions suggest that Rashīd al-Dīn had additional sources of information.Footnote 28 Once in the castle Mobāraz and his men were able to strengthen the defences and continued to defy the enemy for another 20 years. “Shīrāzī” adds that finally after twenty years the defiant Ismā’īlīs surrendered and came down from their fortress only to be seized and summarily executed.Footnote 29
The text does not dwell on the suspicious murder in 653 of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Mohammad and the assumption of power by his young son, Rukn al-Dīn, known as the Khwarshāh. The short opening paragraph for this year, 653, simply states that a trusted and close servant of ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Mohammad killed him, describing the man as a ‘shakhsī-ye mortad’, an apostate, the standard derogatory term for an Ismā’īlī.Footnote 30 Rashīd al-Dīn repeats the widely held belief that the Khwarshāh was indirectly responsible for his father's death and Juwaynī provides the detail and background to the complex father–son relationship.Footnote 31 “Shīrāzī's” account is shorter than both Rashīd al-Dīn's and Juwaynī's, but the inclusion of slight differences suggests that it might have had an independent source. “Shīrāzī” relates that Hulegu thundered down unexpectedly fast to surround the area where the Khwarshāh was camped but that his arrival was hampered by extremely heavy rain. “If there had not been such heavy rain that night it was possible that they would have captured Rukn al-Dīn at the foot of the castle. Rukn al-Dīn became aware and in the morning went into the castle”.Footnote 32 The grip of the besieging army was tightened as troops from all directions converged in the manner of a nerge Footnote 33 engulfing the whole area in less than 24 hours for six farsang around the castle so densely that a single man could not walk through those ranked soldiers.Footnote 34 Cholera (wabā) is also credited with finally destroying the castle of Lamsar which the Khwarshāh's relatives held onto for more than a year, a fact which is not mentioned by Juwaynī. The warm reception afforded the young Rukn al-Dīn gladdened and encouraged him to call for the surrender of his remaining strongholds, most of which duly surrendered. The killing of Rukn al-Dīn on his trip east to Mongke's court followed by the extermination of his extended family, his harem and his retainers is reported coldly and factually without comment in striking contrast to Juwaynī's exuberant version of events.Footnote 35
“Shīrāzī” or whoever authored this chronicle does not share the antipathy felt towards the Ismā’īlīs commonly found in the works of Sunni commentators. The standard offensive epithets for the Ismā’īlīs are used almost by convention, but the author perhaps reveals the true direction of his sympathises later when discussing the appointment of Shi'a governors to Damascus. The incident occurs in the year 651 following the death of the Caliph in 656. The conquest of Syria is dealt with summarily with Aleppo, which endured a massacre, contrasted with Damascus, which escaped the former's fate after having sent envoys to Hulegu bearing gifts. Rashīd al-Dīn explains the background to the welcome laid out for Hulegu by the grandees of Damascus and the two accounts agree on at least the names of the two Persian governors appointed to the city, ‘Alā’ al-Dīn Jāstī and Qadi Shams al-Dīn Qumī, although Rashīd al-Dīn names another Persian governor, Jamāl al-Dīn Qaraqāī Qazvīnī, and claims that a Mongol shahna was sent to oversee the three Tajiks.Footnote 36 “Shīrāzī's” account comments on the surprisingly warm welcome afforded the envoy from the people of Damascus, explaining first that the two Persians were Shi'a from the holy city of Qom. “Shīrāzī” is ‘amazed’ that the two ‘Shi'a-ye Qumī’ were greeted so warmly and that no adverse incidents or emotions emerged during their tenure. However, what marks this passage as significant is the epithet used by the author to describe the people of Damascus. “Shīrāzī” states that “many people of Damascus are generally Yazīdī”,Footnote 37 a reference to the second Umayyad Caliph Yazīd ibn Mu’āwiya ibn Abī Sufyān (645-683ce/60-63ah) who is held in contempt by all Muslims but who is particularly hated by the Shi'a who hold him responsible for the murder of Imam Husein bin ‘Alī. Referring to Sunnis as ‘Yazidis’ would be considered both provocative and insulting and its use here also suggests that the audience for this chronicle must have been limited or restricted. The acknowledged presence of the chronicle in Rashīd al-Dīn's library is therefore noteworthy.
The four short pages devoted to the fall of Baghdad contain one significant addition to the usual accounts of what has since been described both as a disastrous calamity for Islamic civilisation and as final liberation from Arab dominance. The addition is the role of cholera in swelling the final death toll of Baghdad and revealing the use of the Tigris for the disposal of bodies. Otherwise, the account of events leading up to the momentous confrontation between what has been depicted as the forces of good against the forces of evil, the battle between ancient foes, the Arabs and the Persians, or even the pitting of the steppe versus the sown, is here outlined and summarised in non-committal terms. Once again, the author stresses the united front that the Iranian forces were able to present in the build-up to the attack on Baghdad.
From the province of Pars to the province of Rum, one body of men beyond borders and beyond number, descended on Baghdad.Footnote 38
The position and role of each province's troops are then specified, along with the position and role of Hulegu's top commanders and noyans, but the political intrigues and shenanigans which occupy so much space in other, fuller accounts of this pivotal event are barely touched upon. Subtle differences between the words of Rashīd al-Dīn and “Shīrāzī's” account shape the readers’ understanding of events. “Shīrāzī” describes “the armies of Pars and Kirman coming from the road of Khuzistan and Shishtar in such a way that their left hand came [along] the shores of the Omani sea”,Footnote 39 whereas Rashīd al-Dīn refers to Ket Buqa Noyan, Qudsun, and Elgai entering “the left wing from Luristan, [Dezful] Khuzistan, and Bayat as far as the shore of the gulf ”.Footnote 40 In “Shīrāzī's” account, the reader is given a picture of Persian armies massing and then moving towards Baghdad where Mongol commanders directed them into battle, whereas with Rashīd al-Dīn the emphasis is on the Mongol commanders; the fact that they had Persian soldiery under their command is almost ignored. Rashīd al-Dīn repeats certain details that suggest that he had access to, and was willing to use, parts of “Shīrāzī's” work. For example, both accounts observe that when the supply of mangonel stones in Baghdad was exhausted, rocks were brought in from Jalula and Jabal Khamrin and then “date palms were cut down and hurled instead of stones”.Footnote 41 What is interesting, however, is not what Rashīd al-Dīn copied but rather what he possibly chose to ignore or to deliberately leave out.
Certain rather unedifying details are included, such as the report of the dispatching of 12,000 ears belonging to the defeated army of the Caliph's Dawātdār (secretary of state) to Hulegu; the massacre of unarmed civilians after they had surrendered and gathered outside the city walls; the lack of space for burial of the dead, compounded by the dearth of porters to dispose of the bodies; and the eventual donation by the Caliph of his own private grounds to be used for the burial of the growing numbers of putrefying corpses. The use of ears to verify the number of those slain has a long history and is recorded by the European witnesses to the Mongol campaigns in Liegnitz and eastern Europe, with one account recording Batu being presented with nine sacks of ears.Footnote 42 The destruction of the city and citizens of Baghdad was caused to a large extent by the bombardment from massed mangonels, a 16-to-1 ‘tower’ and their 5-to-100 mann Footnote 43 payloads. These awesome machines, “Persian Towers” (Borj-e ‘Ajamī) which had been erected by the Aleppo Gate and the Triumphant Gate, rained terror on the city day and night, pulverising its battlements and defences.Footnote 44
Most interesting however is the significance the writer attributes to cholera for swelling the reported numbers of the dead. Possibly because of his background in science, “Shīrāzī” seems more aware of the direct and indirect role that cholera (wabā) played in warfare and especially its devastating effect on cities under siege. In Baghdad many people, particularly the Sunnis, had flooded into the city from the suburbs and from Suwāb at the approach of the Mongols. Whereas the Shi'a had come to an accommodation with Hulegu, and their religious spokesman, Ibn Tavvus, had pleased the new king with his fatwa endorsing the rule of a just infidel over an unjust Muslim,Footnote 45 the Sunnis were represented by the Caliph al-Musta'sim who had rejected all overtures for peace made by Hulegu.
Cholera struck and many people died. The number of deaths got to the point that the treasury's (bayt al-māl) priority was to provide the necessary equipment as well as burying the dead. Meanwhile it got to the point that they could not cope with ablutions and burying the dead so they threw the bodies into the Tigris. In the end it got so bad that they could not even carry the dead to the Tigris as the porters did not have time to even carry the corpses to the Tigris. At this point the Caliph ordered each area to assign an empty property in which to put the dead. When it became full they would carry them and as they got the opportunity they would bury them. Even when the army arrived they could not cope.Footnote 46
Cholera struck not only the citizens of Baghdad but their invaders as well, and the chronicle claims that a great many Mongols fell ill with the pestilence and great numbers died and that Hulegu Khan himself was among those struck down. However, after 20 days the Ilkhan recovered and was able to spend the winter recuperating in Arran and Mughan.Footnote 47
The Caliph is awarded little space in the text other than the final paragraph for the year 655 and his slaughtered generals even less. It is acknowledged that many civilians were murdered in cold blood after demanding that the Caliph make peace and be īl on their behalf, and that those who had not accepted the promises of safe conduct and had hidden in the dark nooks and crannies, and even in bath-stoves, within the city had survived. A couple of short sentences for the following year, 656, disposes of the Caliph and his family. Three words suffice for the Caliph himself, “khalīfeh-rā shahīd kardand” (they martyred the Caliph).Footnote 48 There is uncertainty whether the Caliph's two sons died before or after their father. The whole episode concludes with the observation that the warm weather that year caused a dreadful stench from the putrification prevailing in Baghdad. “Shīrāzī's” chronicle paints an incomplete and sketchy portrait of the besieged city but added to other far fuller accounts it fills in some very important gaps and provides an independent and personal narrative with details not found elsewhere.
Both the Mamluks and the beginnings of the conflict with the Qipchaq Khanate are briefly dealt with in the entries for the year 658, once again with chance remarks providing important insight into the development of the Ilkhanate. The year opens with a eulogy to Ket Buqa, who is described as being the modār, the pivot, the central cog of the army while acknowledging that at the same time there were in fact amirs and other officers of greater and higher rank than he. Ket Buqa's demise is acknowledged as signalling the end of Mongol military victories, “ba'd az u lashgār-i moghūl-rā beh hīch jāneb-i fathī [unreadable] etafāq niyoftāb”Footnote 49 and indeed the Battle of ‘Ayn Jalūt in 1260/658 though militarily of no great consequence had profound symbolic significance, recognised by “Shīrāzī”. Rashīd al-Dīn describes the battle in considerably more detail, along with Ket Buqa's last stand and his brave last words before his death at the command of the Mamluk Quduz. “Shīrāzī” includes a short exchange between Ket Buqa and the amir Bāydar, who retreated before Qutuz to await his commander. Ket Buqa demands to know why he had not stood his ground. “Why did you not stand until in this very place you were killed?” Bāydar replied, “I couldn't stand; you should have”.Footnote 50 The following day at dawn those of his army who stood their ground were killed; while the remnants of his army including Ket Buqa himself, were chased down and massacred on the banks of the river ‘Āsī near the Syrian town of Homs. Ket Buqa's wives, sons and concubines were captured in Ba'lbak. “Shīrāzī's” report of the Battle of ‘Ayn Jalūt is followed by a short account of the succession of Rukn al-Dīn Bunduqdar Baybars to the Egyptian throne in which he explicitly accuses the Mamluk sultan of murdering his predecessor. He considers Baybars to be unique and his judgement and order (rāī va tartīb) unrivalled, as exemplified in the Sultan's first edicts forbidding wine and also forbidding assembly and consultation between grandees, especially between the military and the Turks.Footnote 51
Rashīd al-Dīn makes no reference to any of this, dwelling instead on Ket Buqa's final moments. In Rashīd al-Dīn's account the Mamluk sultan upbraids the Mongol general for his pride, accusing the Mongols of relying on magic and artifice. “Speak not so proudly of the horsemen of Turan, for they perform deeds with trickery and artifice, not with manliness like Rustam.” (“Kār-hā-ye beh nīrang va dastān mīkonand”).Footnote 52 The word ‘nīrang’ has connotations of miracles, sorcery and otherworldiness, bringing to mind the Mamluks rebuking the Ottomans for their use of firearms and the Polish accusations of magic and sorcery when they witnessed the Mongols’ use of explosives. “Shīrāzī” does not recount this exchange, but when he reports the use of subterfuge and deception by the Franks in the following story, the word he employs is hiylat kārī rather than nīrang.
Seven hundred Franks appeared before the Muslims, although names, dates and places are not specified, claiming that in a dream they had become Muslims and that in their hearts they feared the religion and faith of the Franks. They had come to offer their service to the sultan (beh khidmat-i sultān āmadeh ‘īm) in order that the Muslims might present the religion of Islam to them and teach them in a school so that they could learn the Qoran. The Franks wished to have a waqf created to cover their instruction in the Sunna and the Shari'ah. They planned to gain the Muslims’ trust and then during ‘Eid Qorban when “all Muslims would be outside and standing in prayer they could put hand to sword and strike down the Musselman”.Footnote 53 However, Bunduqdar's suspicions were aroused and he ordered the men seized and their persons inspected. It was soon discovered that beneath their clothes they were wearing jerkins and chain mail and each man possessed a small sword of fine Damascus steel (nīmcheh-ye ābdār). The story had a satisfactory ending with prayers met and wishes granted. The Franks were bound and carried to the square for public prayer and then their request for instruction in the rites of Islam was granted. “Tell them, first you must learn to stand for prayer. Then we will teach you the qurbān, the sacrifice”.Footnote 54 When the congregation of Muslims had prayed, the Franks were ordered to be prepared in the manner of a sacrificial animal and their throats were cut with a knife in the same way as an animal was sacrificed. When their clothes were removed all of them were seen to be wearing the finest jerkins and the finest chain mail and the congregation realised the true nature of their guests. From that time on great fear was instilled in the hearts of the Franks and when on the few occasions Hulegu sent his armies into Syria the Franks did not respond.Footnote 55
It was in the north rather than with the Franks or the Mamluks that Hulegu found himself embroiled. The fate of three Jochid princes, Bulghāī, Tūtār and Tūlī, complicated an already tense situation upon which “Shīrāzī” fails to throw new light.Footnote 56 Berke, the brother of Batu who had died shortly before the attack on Baghdad, had openly challenged the legitimacy of Hulegu's presence in Iran and had instigated hostilities. Both Hulegu and his brother the Great Khan Qubilai had opposed Berke's claim to the Jochid throne and Berke in turn had backed Ariq Buqa's challenge to his older brother for the Qa'anate itself. “Shīrāzī” explicitly states Berke's position as regards Iran. “Berke's shahnas and governors and his people had the finest and the best of the choice provinces of Khorasan, Iraq, Azerbaijan. Arran, Georgia, and they claimed that our special land was their inju [land]”.Footnote 57
The story of Jalāl al-Dīn, the son of Baghdad's dawātdār, is another episode found in other accounts of the time, but again the significance of “Shīrāzī's” account is not the information common to the other histories but rather the details which the other historians chose to ignore. The dashing figure of Jalāl al-Dīn is dealt with in the entries for the years 656 and 662. He immediately brings to mind another Jalāl al-Dīn who was also a controversial and ambiguous figure who excited passion and conflicting reaction. For Juwaynī, Jalāl al-Dīn Khwārazmshāh was the romantic symbol of Persian bravery and steadfastness, standing against the irresistible tide of Turanian brutalityFootnote 58 although for most the final Khwārazmshāh was a duplicitous bandit who fully deserved his fate on a lonely Kurdish hilltop when he was waylaid and murdered for his fine clothes.Footnote 59 It was Jalāl al-Dīn in “Shīrāzī's” chronicle who survived the fate of his father, the lesser dawātdār of the Caliph al-Musta'sim, only to be very publicly awarded a position of great trust and power under Hulegu Khan.
Hulegu had been humiliated by Berke after his disastrous adventure in the Caucasus where according to “Shīrāzī” his armies had suffered a serious defeat. In “Shīrāzī's” account, Hulegu's reaction to this defeat is emphasised and the subject of his health once again is mentioned. He felt such great stress that he became sick, but every time he began to recover the same stressful thoughts would return and he suffered a relapse.
It was while Hulegu was nursing his wounds and contemplating the form his retaliation should take that he heard reports of the young Jalāl al-Dīn. According to “Shīrāzī” there was no one spoken off so highly and graciously in all Hulegu's lands or in his armies. Jalāl al-Dīn claimed that in the Caliph's domains at that time there were several thousand Qipchaq Turks who were intimately acquainted with the land and the culture (shīveh) of the Qipchaq steppes. He then offered to assemble these Turks and to lead them into battle against Berke's armies still occupying the strategically and politically important Caucasus. Much to the discomfort of the Perso-Mongol elite Jalāl al-Dīn was first given the ear of the king who he had advised on the sensitive issue of the Jochid princes and then given sweeping powers to assemble his own armies and supplies with the full co-operation of all and without interference from anyone.Footnote 60 Jalāl al-Dīn arrived in Baghdad in 662 and he struck everyone as a man with a mission. In secret he told his troops that the king had sent him to recruit men for the frontline “who would die there or who would make a name for themselves. If you are killed in that place, in your place, you others will continue the very same work”.Footnote 61 The wording is close enough to that found in Rashīd al-Dīn to presume either a common shared source or possibly that Shīrāzī is Rashīd al-Dīn's source. Jalāl al-Dīn continues, “Now you all know who I am and whose son I am and that I would not allow you to become sword fodder for the infidel”. He reveals that Hulegu had been admonishing him and he now wanted to “abandon this state and fortune of the infidels . . . let us cast ourselves away from the hand of the Mongols”.Footnote 62 To the roll of the drums Jalāl al-Dīn led his army across the bridge and away from Baghdad, raided the Khafāja Arabs for plunder, including a few camels and a few buffalo, and with supplies from Baghdad's treasuries he announced his intentions of visiting the holy shrines, but his true plans and destination were soon made plain to his troops.
He then famously betrayed that great trust placed in him by Hulegu and defected to the Mamluks with many of the men under his command. However, “Shīrāzī's” account credits the whole incident with far greater significance than it is given elsewhere and suggests that Hulegu suffered deeply from this betrayal, “wringing his hands and gnashing his teeth”,Footnote 63 so much so that he became gravely ill with a malady which defied the treatment and knowledge of a variety of doctors. Yet again “Shīrāzī”, who had seen Hulegu in person on many occasions, focuses on Hulegu's health and his mental state in particular. The account quotes the anguished Hulegu, who it suggests regarded the young Jalāl al-Dīn as almost a son, as crying, “a child cannot play with me like this”. There is even the hint that by immediately following the report of this incident with the account of the Ilkhan's death on the banks of the river Jaghatu in 663 Hulegu never recovered from the trauma and died soon afterwards. Rashīd al-Dīn recounts this same incidentFootnote 64 though mentioning only that it left the king furious. Once again, it is likely that this was the source or there was a shared source for the later story. Both accounts refer to Hulegu using the men as “sword fodder” (alof-i-shamshīr) and both repeat the need to cast off the “Mongol yoke” (dast-i-īn mogholān bīrūn afkonam). The two accounts also refer dismissively to Jalāl al-Dīn's diversionary attacks on the Khafaja Arabs. A decision must have been taken to reject the details of Hulegu's severe reaction to the treachery.
The comparatively short space given to Abaqa Khan's reign is concerned chiefly with the conspiracy against the Juwaynī brothers although some space is also given to the Mamluk invasion of Anatolia.
In 675 Baybars Bunduqdar brought his army to Rum where at Āblastān he confronted the Ilkhanid army commanded by the grand amirs Tūqū bin Alkāī and Tūdavān bin Sodūn. The Ilkhanid army suffered a defeat and the two amirs were killed. Rashīd al-Dīn covers these events but in far more detail and with slight variations, suggesting that the two accounts are completely independent.Footnote 65 Both accounts include Baybars, to whom they both refer as either “Bunduqdar” or “Rukn al-Dīn Bunduqdar”, occupying Kayseri for a week and his armies suffering deprivation as a result of his strict discipline, restrictions on expenditure (nafqeh barīshān tang shod)Footnote 66 and orders forbidding looting and pillaging. He called on Mu'in al-Dīn, the Parvaneh, to attend him at court, offering the governor of the Ilkhanid-dominated Saljuq Sultanate of Rum the kingship of Rum if he would overcome his fear of the Mongols and come to Kayseri. “Shīrāzī” reports only that the Parvarneh failed to go to Bunduqdar's court and that the Mamluk sultan eventually abandoned his short-lived occupation and left Anatolia. “Shīrāzī” makes no mention of the rumours of Mu'in al-Dīn's treachery sown by the frustrated Mamluk ruler, nor of his execution, nor of the dreadful claim made by Armenian chroniclers that it was ordered that he should be eaten by his Ilkhanid jailers.Footnote 67 Eventually Abaqa himself marched on Syria and, after appointing him commander, he dispatched his brother Mongke Timur, son of Uljā Khatun, along the Diyarbakir road in the direction of Syria. Mongke Timur encountered the Mamluk army in the vicinity of Homs and Hama and the two armies clashed, with the young and inexperienced Mongke Timur suffering an ‘ugly’ defeat. Abaqa Khan was so angry at Mongke Timur's ignominious rout that, “Shīrāzī” claims, he could not look his brother in the face. He announced that the situation should not present a problem and that the following year he would go to Syria himself “to see what could be done”.Footnote 68 That winter Abaqa remained in Baghdad. “Shīrāzī's” last word on this matter is the observation that Bunduqdar died during these events and that the throne was passed to Malek Alfī, “a Qipchaq (Qifjāq) who was also a slave of the sultans of Syria, that is the people of Salah al-Dīn”.Footnote 69
The travails of the Juwaynī brothers occupy the rest of the entry for 675 and are the sole topic for the entry for the year 679, the intervening years remaining unrecorded by “Shīrāzī”. Once again the repetition of small snatches of the narrative and the use of common phrases suggest that “Shīrāzī” was Rashīd al-Dīn's source or, perhaps more likely, the two shared a common source. “Shīrāzī” claims that ‘Alā’ al-Dīn was arrested, his property confiscated, his palaces and houses pillaged and he himself placed in the cangue. This had come about after the wily Majd al-Mulk had forced himself into the king's presence (beh khidmat-i-Abaqa andākhteh)Footnote 70 to make his accusations which had then been compounded by the smears and attacks by 40 or 50 writers and notables. Once started, the campaign gathered pace and the Juwaynīs were abandoned; and it is their isolation that “Shīrāzī” stresses. Mustawfī fleetingly covers these events although he does not dwell on the details. What makes his account noteworthy is his obvious high regard for Majd al-Mulk who elsewhere is treated at best neutrally. While acknowledging the misfortune that Majd al-Mulk caused Shams al-Dīn, whose family were of course fierce rivals of the Qazvin-based family of the generally objective and highly respected historian, Mustawfī's sentiments are made clear. “There was a man of Yazd who was wise, liberal, and eloquent, full of knowledge and nobly born. . . on the 20th Jammadī Avval that great man met destruction”.Footnote 71
It is unclear exactly when these events surrounding Aṭā Malik took place since the year 675, under which the editor Īraj Afshār places them, is clearly too early. A later entry for 679, referring to Majd al-Mulk's audience with Abaqa in the public disrobing room of the bathhouse (moslikh-i-garmāveh) of the Ribat-i Musallim opens with the words “To continue. . . in the season of spring of the year 679”, suggesting more realistically that these tumultuous events occurred around the latter part of 678. This would concord with Rashīd al-Dīn's account even though the two versions differ substantially in the detail. Though the two Juwaynī brothers were fearful and extremely downcast, “broken” (shekasteh shodand) in “Shīrāzī's” words, Shams al-Dīn did not show any outward sign of this and his inner turmoil was not apparent. Summoned from Baghdad, he was confronted in Siah Koh and ordered to surrender all the money and material (māl) he had taken from the king. It was his former colleague, his nawāb Majd al-Dīn ibn Athīr, who confronted him, demanding that he reveal what he had obtained from “such and such a person and from such and such a place”.Footnote 72
“Shīrāzī” and Rashīd al-Dīn, in almost identical words, record Shams al-Dīn advising his brother not to deny anything until forced to do so, “beh hīch bāb (vojeh) ankār makon ke (tā) tu-rā be-ranjānand (zaḥmatī naresad)”.Footnote 73 “Shīrāzī” adds that the “money” is not worth the loss of honour, while both commentators agree that ‘Aṭā Malik was forced to pay three million pieces of gold. “Shīrāzī” concludes his account of the unfortunate minister with the observation that before Abaqa's death in 680, ‘Aṭā Malik was subjected to a further mulct. Rashīd al-Dīn elaborates on this development with the claim that the fallen minister was forced to sell everything he had, including his children.
Majd al-Mulk's own personal triumph finds similar treatment in both sources and once again the wording is almost identical, with Abaqa, in Maragha's Buddhist temple in the presence of all his relatives, nobles, wives, ministers and amirs, ordering the public proclamation of his edict concerning Majd al-Mulk. “Never have Mongol kings given such a decree to a Persian (anybody)”.Footnote 74 “Shīrāzī” quotes more from the edict than Rashīd al-Dīn, but both convey the significance of the decision and its implications for the Juwaynīs. “Shīrāzī's” account has Abaqa being far more extreme in his regard for Majd al-Mulk. The king declared his kingdom, his property, the treasury, his flocks – all that he possessed – should henceforth be shared with Majd al-Mulk, and that their duties would be borne by the minister and his deputies (nawāb), “those who are friends of you are my friends. After this if a person should plot against you, I will be with you”. He urged the minister to take care of himself and never to leave him. “Shīrāzī's” account of this incident suggests that Abaqa Khan's behaviour is extremely eccentric, whereas Rashīd al-Dīn dilutes the hyperbole and modifies the context. Reactions to Abaqa's extraordinary edict were predictable, with all the amirs and notables switching sides and deferring to the newly promoted minister Majd al-Mulk, whose deputies were immediately dispatched to oversee the notables and tax districts of all the “provinces from inside Rum to the ends of Khorasan, from the deserts of Arabia to Darband of Saqsīn”.Footnote 75 In obvious admiration, “Shīrāzī” notes that in one particular project Majd al-Mulk “raised an edifice” the likes of which no one could remember and “in the space of seven or eight months somebody who was of no account anywhere should manage a project of such greatness”.Footnote 76 Though he is generally portrayed in a negative light, in “Shīrāzī's” account Majd al-Mulk surprisingly accrues some credit with an acknowledgment that his achievements amazed “every living creature”.Footnote 77 “Shīrāzī” delivers a balanced account of one of the most emotive events in Ilkhanid history, a story from which nobody emerged untainted or blame-free. In any final analysis or conclusive summary of “Shīrāzī”, his stance on the plight of the Juwaynīs must hold some significance.
Two brief entries are recorded for 680 and 681, outlining Abaqa's infamous end from an excess of alcohol. There is a suggestion that the king fell drunkenly from a lavatory (kursī), a rare reference to such an object,Footnote 78 after having had to go outside for his needs (beh hājat). There is no mention of any croaking ravens or dramatic visions forewarning him of his imminent death that so many of the accounts of his death include. Since his body was showing some signs of life, they carried him back inside the house, but he died on the way. He was laid to rest near the bodies of his father and some brothers on the island of Shāhiyeh, today renamed Islamiyeh Island, near the village of Dehkhwārqān.Footnote 79 Both Rashīd al-Dīn and Mustawfī convey the apprehension felt at Abaqa's demise and both accounts express admiration for the king and the justice of his reign: “When he passed by his crown and throne, fortune turned its face from the Mongols, as a result”.Footnote 80 Rashīd al-Dīn quotes a contemporary chronogram of his death which begins, “Tyranny became apparent and justice went into obscurity with the death of Abaqa, king of the world”.Footnote 81 In contrast “Shīrāzī” remains unemotional and non-committal.
The entries for the years 682 and 683, running to just over 12 edited pages, are concerned with the prolonged conflict between Ahmad and his nephew Arghun Khan. The wealth of dated detail, along with the names of the main players, their wives and associates, makes this account an immensely valuable primary source of late thirteenth-century Ilkhanid Iran. What makes this a particularly interesting account is that it can be readily compared and contrasted with other detailed versions of the conflict between these two major figures, in particular the accounts found in Rashīd al-Dīn's Jāmi’ al-Tavārīkh, Mustawfī's Zafarnāma and even Khwandamīr's Ḥabīb al-Siyar. Again, it is not so much what these accounts share in their reports or how some details differ but more their omissions which are potentially significant. For example, whereas Rashīd al-Dīn and other contemporary sources remark on Ahmad's relationship with the mysterious figure of Īshān Ḥasan Manglī, this disreputable influence is not once mentioned in “Shīrāzī's” account of Ahmad's reign. Shīrāzī's own trip to Egypt as Ahmad's ambassador to the Mamluk court is neither discussed nor even referenced in the Akhbār-i-Moghūlān, an omission which perhaps suggests that the author of this chronicle was not “Shīrāzī” himself.
The two final events that are described and scrutinised in this chronicle are first, the execution of Ahmad on the night of Thursday 9 August 1284 (25th Jumāda I, 683) after his refusal to answer the charges concerning the murder/execution of his brother Qonghurbāī, and second, following this, Arghun Khan's coronation on 11August 1285 (27th Jumāda I, 683). Sultan Ahmad was executed in the same manner that he had killed his own brother, after a yarghu court in both instances had declared the guilt of the accused party. The edicts of Chinggis khan laid down that those who damage the posht-i-molk (back of the country) national security must in turn have their own backs (posht) broken.Footnote 82 However, Prince Qonghurbāī's fellow defendant, Kuchak Unuqchi, initially escaped the fate of his partner in crime and was asked by Ahmad's yarghu court to detail the conversations between Qonghurbāī and the royal fugitive, Arghun Khan. He claimed to have no knowledge of this and remained silent despite being subjected to 100 strokes of the cane. Ahmad's response to his silence was to declare him “a sly old bastard” (mardakī pīr gozbuzand) and to order his execution along with that of his son.Footnote 83
This detailed final section of the chronicle; concentrating exclusively on the bitter conflict between the two royal princes Ahmad and Arghun, poses some intriguing questions and conveniently lends itself to comparison with other Ilkhanid accounts of this divisive dispute. Developments are tracked on an almost daily basis and most of the leading amirs are identified according to their allegiance and the level and nature of their support. It is possible that “Shīrāzī” had realised the fundamental nature of this split that was emerging at the core of the ruling elite and he understood that the repercussions from this conflict would reverberate long after the death or victory of the leading protagonists. An analysis and exploration of this final episode in “Shīrāzī's” chronicle is beyond the scope of the present study, but the subject will be engaged with fully in a follow-up paper. This paper will contain a translation of the entries for the year 682 and year 683 and an assessment of the characters and their relationship to the main players, Ahmad Tegudar and Arghun Khan.
This edited version of “Shīrāzī's” previously almost unknown chronicle adds to our knowledge of a period of Iranian history which has only recently come under the intense scrutiny of scholars eager to reassess an exciting four decades which until recently were idly dismissed as lost to dark barbarian rule. In fact, the creation of the Ilkhanate gave birth to a Persian renaissance and a period of spiritual and cultural regeneration as Iranians looked east and opened their horizons to the potential stirring in Yuan China. These early decades of the Ilkhanate oversaw the blossoming of a Toluid empire where Persian was fast becoming the lingua franca, and individual Persians were assuming power and influence far beyond what was justifiable by their numbers. In Iran also the glory of the once-reviled Mongol century is being recognised and old texts are not only being re-edited and reissued but are being edited, translated and even discovered for the first time. In 2002 Ibn Fowaṭī's history of Baghdad (626–700) was translated into Persian from Arabic, while new editions of Rashīd al-Dīn's lesser-known works have regularly appeared over the last decade. Volume I of Shabānkāra’ī's Majma’-ansāb was published in 2002, and most exciting of all the discovery and publication in 2003 of the magnificent literary compendium, the Safīneh-ye Tabrīzī, painstakingly copied out by Abu al-Majd, cast the whole culture and literary milieu of Ilkhanid Iran in a new, far more sophisticated light. From its opening lines establishing Iran as part of a global, transcultural empire through its chronology underlining the intimacy which existed between Turk and Tajik, this history at least penned by Quṭb al-Dīn Shīrāzī will prove crucial in establishing a greater understanding of Mongol rule in Iran.
