It is probably fair to note that far too much has been written over the last several years about China's rise, as the majority of this work was all too often predictable and sensationalistic and, as a result, quite forgettable. There would then seem to be no need for yet another book that trudges through this already well-trodden terrain. However, Edward S. Steinfeld's Playing Our Game resoundingly demonstrates how wrong such a conclusion is as it adroitly surpasses many of the limitations in the existing literature, and does so in a manner that is highly readable, empirically rich, and intellectually stimulating. The book accomplishes this task by identifying the deep linkages that exist between China's shifting relationship with the rest of the world and the ongoing economic and political developments unfolding within China itself. Rather than treat these as three discrete phenomena, Steinfeld examines them as integrally related parts of the larger narrative of the country's century-old “quest for modernity. . . as defined concretely by the world's wealthiest and mightiest nations” (p. 49). According to the book, this drive, especially over the last twenty years, has changed all of these dynamics in profound ways.
Steinfeld argues that such a story is the product of the intersection between broad trends in the contemporary global economy and the decisions that China's leaders made during the 1990s. On the world stage, he contends that over the last several decades the international economy has been defined by the gradually diminishing significance of trade relations between states through the emergence of geographically dispersed, tightly integrated, global production chains beholden to no single state. Such a pattern has demanded any who participate in it to “play our game” (p. 18), in other words, accept the practices and standards of the industrialized nations and firms that dominate the upper echelons of these hierarchal groupings. It was within such a system that the Chinese leadership during the post-Tiananmen period made the high risk bet that preserving their power and developing their country could only be accomplished through more deeply integrating with the world economy. It is already well known that such a move proved to be more successful than anyone might have imagined at the time; however, Steinfeld seeks to demonstrate that it also created a wide-ranging set of unintended consequences, ones that have already made China a part of the existing international order, revolutionized its economy, and, transformed its political system.
The opening chapters of the book characterize such processes as the products of economic and political “outsourcing” (p. 24) whereby the wholesale importation of foreign expertise, management styles, oversight, and standards into China has taken place. Chapter 3 then lends greater specificity to such a claim through describing the modular production patterns that have bound China to the global economy since the early 1990s, while chapter 4 details the broader implications of these developments (highlighted by a particularly lucid overview of Chinese currency policies). The remainder of the book studies China's high-tech and energy sectors. Its conclusion argues, with reference to recent trends in Taiwanese politics toward democratization, that Beijing may already be quite a way along the road toward “self-obsolescing authoritarianism” (p. 218), in which the current Chinese state is nowhere near as enduring as it appears to be at first glance.
Some readers may object to various aspects of Steinfeld's rather bold claims. To begin with, his depiction of China's international profile is rather skeletal and pays almost no attention to the issues of military modernization, rising nationalist sentiment, and nascent signs of increasing Chinese assertiveness in Asia and beyond. In other words, it is possible that economic integration may not be as restrictive for China's behavior on the world stage as Steinfeld feels it is. Second, the book largely glosses over the plethora of social and economic dislocations that “outsourcing” have caused within China, and the extent to which they may be capable of generating violent revolutionary upheavals in the country rather than the relatively peaceful, evolutionary, albeit sweeping, changes that Steinfeld anticipates to be on the horizon. Finally, there is almost no mention in the book of the willingness Beijing has shown over the years to use force to stifle dissent and punish anyone bold enough to directly challenge the current regime. A more extensive consideration of these darker sides of China's recent past would have made what is already an outstanding book even better. However, despite such a shortcoming, Playing Our Game is clearly deserving of a wide readership as it forwards a memorable, innovative, and important argument about China and how it is likely to continue to change in the coming years.
