There are not many international consensuses in the governance of biomedicine. One that exists concerns a general reluctance toward a commercialization of organ procurement. However, with reference to the problem of “organ scarcity,” there is an increasingly louder call in ethical and legal discourse to “give urgent consideration to any option that may make up the shortfall,”Footnote 1 and to establish a debate on financial incentives “without any taboos.”Footnote 2 Other ethicists and jurists criticize this development, and warn of injustice, exploitation of the poor, and a commodification of the human body.Footnote 3
Many theoretical contributions to this controversy entail empirical assumptions about citizens' views on and attitudes toward organ donation and their ideational and motivational backgrounds. This report is based on the conviction that a critical reexamination of these assumptions is essential for an evaluation of the practical efficacy and ethical legitimacy of the proposals discussed. Therefore, we conducted an empirical investigation of the conditions under which European citizens would actually consider accepting or refusing financial incentives for organ donation.
Our research took place within the framework of the EU project Challenges of Biomedicine (http://www.univie.ac.at/virusss/cob). It is based on socio-empirical material from focus groups with lay people as well as patients in transplantation medicine in four European countries. We first give an overview of the socio-empirical methods of our research. We then describe our findings with an emphasis on European citizens' perceptions of the problem of organ scarcity, their attitudes toward the commercialization of organ donation, and their underlying concepts of the human body. In the discussion, we revisit the academic debate on financial incentives in the light of our empirical findings.
Composition of Samples and Method of Data Collection and Analysis
Our research aims at exploring European citizens' views of and attitudes toward organ donation and their ideational and motivational backgrounds. This requires a socio-empirical method that allows for collection and analysis of data on people's opinions. Some work has already been done in this field, mostly using quantitative surveys.Footnote 4 However, to capture the richness and depth of cultural implications and the connotations and contexts of public attitudes, such quantitative methods need to be complemented by qualitative ones.Footnote 5 In qualitative socio-empirical research, Focus Group discussions are a convenient and established toolFootnote 6 for investigating common sense beliefs on a very general level.Footnote 7 Our analysis is based on the transcripts from eight group discussions that were conducted in Cyprus, Germany, the Netherlands, and Sweden.Footnote 8
Selection of Countries
Our selection of countries was aimed at obtaining a rough cross-section of the various national regulatory and organizational frameworks for organ donation in Europe. By choosing Germany and the Netherlands, we enlisted two central European countries. Both are member states of Eurotransplant with well-established, but differently regulated transplantation systems. In Germany, the Transplantation Law (1997) restricts living donation to close relatives and bases postmortem donation on an extended consent procedure involving the donor's relatives. In the Netherlands, the Organ Donation Act (1996) established a donor register for postmortem donation. Sweden is one of the northern European countries where organ allocation is organized by Scandiatransplant. According to the Swedish Transplants Act (1995), consent is required for postmortem donation. If the will of the deceased is unknown, the law takes the position of presumed consent, although the next of kin have a veto right. By selecting Cyprus, we also included a new EU member state from the Southeast where organ transplantation is not yet a well-established procedure. The total number of transplanted kidneys per year is about 50, 60% of which are living donations. Nevertheless, donation of body parts as such constitutes a prominent public and policy issue, as Cyprus has one of Europe's largest bone marrow banks.Footnote 9
Method of Socio-empirical Data Collection and Analysis
Two focus groups with 8–10 participants were set up in each country. One of these groups consisted of lay persons and the other of affected persons. The latter group consisted of patients who had received transplants, were waiting for a transplant, or had refused a transplant, along with relatives of such patients. In total, 66 European citizens took part, 34 men and 32 women. To allow for a broad range of sociodemographic criteria, the participants were recruited using different strategies. The composition of the groups was intended to be as heterogeneous as possible with respect to age, educational level, and religion.Footnote 10 The transcripts of all discussions were translated into English. The analysis of the material was conducted by two researchers using Atlas.ti scientific software to reduce bias. We followed a procedure based on Grounded TheoryFootnote 11 in which interpretative concepts were developed inductively. The focus was on commonsense arguments and positions that could be found in all groups rather than on differences that reflected national contexts.
Empirical Analysis
This section begins with an analysis of the participants' perspectives on the problem of organ scarcity. We then explore their perceptions of and attitudes toward economic and commercial considerations in the context of organ donation. Finally, we explicate some of the underlying conceptions of the body and its relation to the self.
Moral Perspectives on Organ Supply
Organ scarcity, that is, the discrepancy between supply and demand of human donor organs, is often described as a central social obstacle to transplantation medicine.Footnote 12 Much social research has been dedicated to the causes of this discrepancy.Footnote 13 One frequently mentioned factor is that, although on an abstract level a majority of the population usually takes a favorable position regarding organ donation, the concrete willingness of individuals to become donors remains low. Consequently, many of the political attempts to reduce organ scarcity are directed at informing the general public about the problem itself and the possibility that they can become donors. Obviously, this approach is based on the assumption that the public is ignorant of the lack of organs and their ability to help by becoming donors and assumes that once informed they will recognize this as a serious moral problem and help to alleviate it.
In all focus groups, the discrepancy between the supply of and demand for donor organs constituted a central topic. The majority of participants seemed to be quite aware that “there is no balance now,” because “the demand is much greater than the supply.”Footnote 14 Perspectives differed, however, in the groups of lay and affected people.
The affected people tended to characterize the situation as one entailing a lack of donor organs. This implies an evaluation from the perspective of demand: that the number of organs is too low, given the number of people who need one. At the same time, many of these participants entertained the notion that “everybody, no matter how old he is, likes living and … therefore he should be given the chance … to receive a matching transplant or an auxiliary organ.”Footnote 15 From this point of view, the discrepancy as such already constitutes a serious moral problem, because the legitimate desire to survive remains unfulfilled in many cases. As a consequence, debates in the groups of affected persons focused on proposals for increasing the overall number of donor organs. Many participants thought the readiness to donate would grow if the public only knew how great the need really is and how easily they could help. Therefore, the dissemination of information via educational measures and public campaigns constituted one of their major concerns. Other proposals bore directly on the current legal regulations on living or postmortem donations and involved obligatory registration or presumed consent.
The lay people, on the other hand, tended to accept the current number of donor organs as a given fact. Consequently, their discussions were less concerned with strategies for increasing the number of organs and more concerned with the fair allocation of the available supply. Their debates on allocation criteria were more extensive and differentiated than the ones conducted in groups of affected persons. They advocated approaches that consider the differences between individual cases and took into account medical considerations such as urgency or compatibility, as well as factors like social status and age.
Areas and Degrees of Commercialization
In light of organ scarcity, novel and radical solutions have been introduced into the public and academic debate. One of them entails heightening the personal motivation of potential donors by offering financial incentives. A variety of instruments and strategies have been conceptualized, based on the idea of compensation, of “rewarded gifting” or on market models.Footnote 16 All proposals rest on the empirical assumption that people see no major problem with the commercialization of organ procurement and would be financially motivated to donate their organs.
Overall, a general rejection of the full commercialization of organ procurement was articulated throughout all group discussions. However, in at least two respects this line of resistance was blurred. First, the question of whether donations are living or postmortem made an important difference for the evaluation of commercialization. Second, there are different degrees of commercialization, some of which were perceived as more acceptable than others.
Wanted: dead or alive?
Many participants considered it less problematic to offer financial incentives for postmortem donations than for living ones. This attitude might be rooted in the general idea that the self is, in principle, separable from its body and uses the body as a means to certain ends. Against this background, a person's death has two important consequences for the status of the body: On the one hand, the deceased person does not need his or her body anymore. On the other hand, that body can still remain useful to third parties.
Economic categories and deliberations involving the utility value of the body or its parts played an important role in the discussion of decisionmaking processes concerned with postmortem donations. Cost–benefit calculations were frequently made when the pros and cons of postmortem donations were considered. Thus, many participants would regard it as “a waste … if you had an accident, and apart from that, you are still okay, and that you principally could help another person.”Footnote 17 This instrumental valuation of donor organs was also reflected in the discussion of allocation. Because donor organs were regarded as a scarce resource, the ability to utilize them economically was described as a moral virtue of transplantation coordinators and recipients. According to this view, one task of transplantation professionals is to “invest” the organs in the most profitable way, for example, by distributing them with respect to a maximal prospect of “medical” success. Likewise, recipients have the responsibility to take “maximal advantage” of their new organ, for instance, by good compliance with medical advice.
Corresponding statements in the discussions of living donations indirectly support these interpretations. As many participants noted, a living person still needs his or her organs and depends on them for full bodily integrity and functionality. Against this background, some participants expressed the conviction that nobody would voluntarily give away his or her organs while still alive unless there were a compelling reason for doing so. Given the vital value one's organs have for oneself, sheer altruism or benevolence alone were not regarded as psychologically plausible motives for making a living donation. The only factor that was widely thought to provide substantial grounds for making such a donation was a personal relationship with the prospective recipient. The concrete possibility of relieving a close family member or friend from severe suffering, or averting their death, was viewed as an adequate counterweight that balances the potential damage a living donation holds for the donor.
At the same time, however, living donations among relatives seem to transcend the whole logic of commerce. Thus, a speaker from Cyprus “would donate both kidneys to my daughter and let me die.”Footnote 18 In this case, the willingness to sacrifice one's own life for a close relative contradicts the idea of self-preservation, without which a person's organs do not have any utility for that person. In contradistinction, the whole idea of giving away one's organs when there is no compelling reason to do so, that is, out of sheer greed for monetary profit, often only elicits an uncomprehending shrug of the shoulders.
Between altruism and profit making
Throughout the group discussions, several kinds and degrees of commercialization were distinguished and differently evaluated. Many speakers expressed the feeling that even an organ donation based on altruism is not a one-way street, but entails a relationship that is associated with notions of reciprocity and mutual exchange. For participants in all groups, this sense of reciprocity generates certain responsibilities on the side of the receiver and promotes the feeling of indebtedness to the donor. Some lay people saw this as an argument against accepting a donor organ at all, because they felt unable to “do enough in return”Footnote 19 and feared they would feel guilty for the rest of their lives.
Many affected persons seemed to have found ways to cope with this feeling of indebtedness by “repaying” something, for example, by participating in self-help groups or public campaigns promoting organ donation. It is significant that such societal engagement seems to concentrate on activities aimed toward increasing the number of donor organs. This might be attributable to the notion that the principle of reciprocity not only posits a debt, but also determines the appropriate “currency” for its redemption. This idea also seems to be involved in another idea tied to the ethics of organ exchange, specifically that there “should be a connection between donor and receiver,” so that “if you do not wish to donate, then you should not receive either.”Footnote 20 This view that organ donations involve a give-and-take reciprocity was favored by a considerable number of participants in all groups. For many, it seems to satisfy certain fundamental intuitions regarding justice and fairness.
In contrast, the only form of monetary remuneration for organ donations that found at least some acceptance among the participants is the model of financial compensation. It is based on the notion that the donor has provided something that has caused that donor to incur a loss or damage that entitles him or her to reimbursement. Farther-reaching market-based models for the commercialization of organ procurement that are driven by profit motives were rejected unanimously.
Underlying Conceptions of Self and Body
The ethical question of whether the commercialization of the human body and its parts is justifiable also touches on basic assumptions about what the body means for the self.Footnote 21 We investigated what kind of body–self concepts people actually share and the role these play in their willingness to donate or receive an organ.
My body, my business? Bodily self-determination and the property paradigm
Participants in all groups emphasized the idea of autonomy. For many of them, this idea also entails bodily self-determination in the sense that one has the right to freely dispose of one's own body. In the context of organ transplantation, this right plays an important role in decisionmaking processes. The idea of bodily self-determination was often articulated in terms of ownership. The notion that “my body belongs to me”Footnote 22 appears to be deeply rooted in everyday intuition and bodily experience, because it was often presented as a consensual and nearly self-evident point requiring no further justification.
The idea of bodily self-determination based on ownership seems to bring the human body into line with other pieces of private property. However, an acceptance of this ownership paradigm does not necessarily imply that commercialization of the body, in the sense of making money with one's own body or its parts, is being advocated. To the contrary, money often seemed to be perceived as a factor that has the potential to destroy self-determination by corrupting a person and distorting his or her own proper will. Thus, the autonomy and authenticity of decisions concerning the body were occasionally called into doubt when financial motives are involved.
On the other hand, arguments for bodily self-determination do show a clear affinity for a certain kind of body concept. This became apparent in the discussion of a future scenario in which self-preservation through infinite organ replacement is feasible. Here, the participants frequently employed images from the sphere of handicrafts or engineering that suggest analogies with the repair and restoration of machinery in order to articulate their position: “It actually will be just like cars: Well, gosh, the radiator is broken … out with it, put a new one in.”Footnote 23
Inherent in such mechanistic descriptions of the human body is a tendency to accentuate aspects of function and performance. Hence, when discussing the origin of a donor organ, some participants exclusively discussed the functional capabilities of the organ, explicitly denying that any other features play any role. From this perspective, organs are bereft of any symbolic meaning and do not have any significance for the person. This perspective plays no small role in the fact that mechanistic body concepts generally tend to promote an open, positive, and optimistic attitude toward the technological possibilities of modern biomedicine.
The body as part of divine creation or natural order—limits to bodily self- determination
Some participants also pointed out limitations to autonomy and to the free disposal of one's own body. One limitation arose from the belief that the body is not merely a piece of machinery with replaceable components, but an organic entity with its own intrinsic structure and dynamics that resist external interventions. This more holistic conception was rarely ever articulated in a direct and positive manner, but rather addressed indirectly by negating mechanistic descriptions. Nevertheless, it seems to have important implications for peoples' moral views. It often is associated with a reluctant attitude toward science and with the conviction that there are moral limits to technological possibilities. Especially when moral directives could not be derived from the principle of self-determination, for example, in the case of proxy decisions for deceased relatives, the conception of the holistic or organic nature of human beings and their bodies was brought to bear.
This sense that certain limits are given can be related to the idea that nature itself has an intrinsic, self-contained order that sets limits to all human interventions. In part, this notion is based on a religious conception of nature as divine creation. Thus, under the premise that human beings were created by God and embody divine will, one Dutch speaker interpreted the body in a teleological manner as “a creation with a goal.”Footnote 24 On the other hand, the holistic insistence on limits is sometimes embedded in the nonreligious idea of a natural order of things. This order is believed to have normative implications for human existence because it imposes limits on human action and invests human life with certain aims. This conviction often manifested itself when speakers referred to interventions in moral terms, calling them “natural” or “unnatural.”
According to this line of thought, the body is often seen less as a passive object that is separate from the self than as something more or less congruent with the person as such. One way to conceptualize this monistic intuition of an embodied self is to speak of the body as having its own inherent authority or wisdom that can influence a person's attitudes, behaviors, and lifestyles. When it comes to attitudes toward organ donation, such conceptions often seemed to promote the idea that (a part of) the donor lives on in the body of the recipient via organ transplantation.
Conclusions
We carried out an investigation in which European citizens discussed three aspects of the topic organ donation: the phenomenon of organ scarcity, attitudes regarding different kinds of financial incentives, and concepts of body and self. Significant findings were made in regard to all three of these topics.
With regard to the issue of organ scarcity, it turned out that it is neither self-evident nor necessary to describe the discrepancy between the supply of and the demand for donor organs in terms of scarcity. This way of posing the problem, rather, seems to be based on a preconception of the situation formed from the demand-driven point of view of recipients. Such a preconception tends to narrow the scope of discussion: Once the quantity of donor organs is identified as the central problem, the search for solutions is restricted to strategies that aim at increasing the number of available organs. However, many lay people in our groups tended to take the number of organs as a given fact and addressed the problem of fair allocation instead.
This finding sheds a critical light on the use of “organ scarcity” as a moral knock-out phrase. Ethicists who base their claims on drastic descriptions of organ scarcity are in danger of becoming biased. By tacitly taking sides with the views and needs of only one involved party, they preclude alternative perspectives and solutions. Of course, this does not imply an appeal for the adoption of the opposite form of one-sidedness by ignoring the fears and suffering of those on waiting lists. Rather, our findings should serve as an admonition that such biases should be detected, made explicit, and reflected on. This is not merely a matter of intellectual honesty; it entails a fundamental ethical principle: to respect and consider the viewpoints of all parties involved in organ transplantation.
Regarding attitudes toward the use of financial incentives for organ donations, we found discussion in all groups was based on the paradigm of reciprocity. Participants accepted a give-and-take model (indeed, many even seemed to prefer it to current unconditional regulations), but an overwhelming majority strongly rejected the idea of making money with human organs. Even though affected people view organ scarcity as unjust, they nevertheless adhere to the idea of reciprocity in their own way: In order to “give something back,” they engage in campaigns for donations, have a donor card, or try to convince their close relatives to donate.
This finding suggests a revised perspective on the issue of financial incentives: At least for our European citizens, the morally relevant demarcation line does not seem to set monetary against nonmonetary incentives, but rather sets a reciprocal spirit of donation against the profit-oriented logic of the marketplace. This means that models involving money are not perceived as objectionable per se, as long as they are compatible with the principle of reciprocity, which applies to compensation and—arguably—rewarded gifting.Footnote 25 Conversely, the mere absence of cash payments does not provide a moral “carte blanche” for incentive schemes, because these can be motivated by hopes of personal enrichment and nonmonetary greed. Furthermore, the central role of reciprocity also provides grounds for critical reflection on excessively altruistic models that conceptualize organ donation as a moral one-way street. Although academic discourse has tended to focus on organ donors and the psychological and moral dimensions of their motives, the participants in our groups were also concerned with psychological and moral aspects of the recipient role, for example, the wish or obligation to return something. Because these observations also hold true for the affected people, ethicists who advocate financial incentives should attempt to do so without claiming to speak on behalf of and for the benefit of prospective recipients on waiting lists. Apart from the fact that such persons do not necessarily agree with this view, those affected may not appreciate being used as instruments to promote the interests of third parties.Footnote 26
Regarding the topic of body–self concepts, a broad variety of these concepts and concomitant moral attitudes emerged. Generally speaking, the human body and its parts were not viewed as commodities, even within the framework of the property paradigm of maximum bodily self-determination. In fact, a status is usually ascribed to body organs that is based on an evaluation of these organs as vitally important or at least as constituents of an individual's personal identity. Insofar as body parts are deemed to be a necessary precondition of human self-preservation or personal existence, they are invested with a kind of “inherent value” that is neither strictly intrinsic nor purely instrumental.
This valuation is reflected in a prominent attitude toward living and postmortem donation: In both cases, one basic assumption is that certain organs have a vital utility value. With respect to living donations, this results in the impulse to preserve one's own bodily integrity and functionality as long as possible and thus to consider organ donation only as a last resort in exceptional cases of emergency. With respect to postmortem donation, the death of the person seems to annihilate the logic of utility or ownership, thereby turning the organs into a common good that can be used by those in need. In both cases, financial incentives would appear to be neither a legitimate nor an efficacious means of encouraging organ donation.
These findings raise a series of important questions. First of all, they show that a great variety of body concepts are entertained by the European public. These concepts are interwoven with peoples' moral attitudes toward organ donation in complex ways. Therefore, ethicists who base their evaluation of commercialization in organ procurement on commodification argumentsFootnote 27 must be careful to avoid ultimately begging the question. They must be aware of and reflect on the ideas regarding the human body that underlie their own arguments. Otherwise, they run the risk of simply presupposing what needs to be shown: that the body concept they draw on really is appropriate or at least more acceptable than alternative ones.
Whether there is any way of ever proving the adequacy or plausibility of certain body concepts is questionable, however. Therefore, the question is how ethical discourse and political practices should confront the plurality of body–self conceptions present in the European public. There are at least two basic possibilities. An “anthropologically informed” ethics that assumes that the body can either resist or be suited for commodification would seem to claim definitive insights into the nature of human beings and their corporeal existence. It would be interesting to see how this approach would handle the plurality of views within a ethically acceptable framework. How, for example, would it deal with uninformed, ignorant, or disinterested lay people who simply insist on maintaining their own views regarding their body and self? Because of these difficulties, the liberal tradition attempts to rid itself of all substantial assumptions from the start in order to build a neutral moral and legal framework for the peaceful coexistence of a plurality of world views. When adopting this spirit of tolerance, however, the liberalists must be especially aware of their own elective affinity to the world view of modern science, which implies and promotes mechanistic conceptions of nature, the self, and the body.Footnote 28 To this end, they might have to abandon the pretence that they take a truly agnostic perspective on the body and engage instead in an explicit discussion of the plurality of existing body concepts.
