Scholars and pundits of war powers conventionally assume that the U.S. Congress provides little check on the modern president's decision to use military force. University of Chicago professors William Howell and Jon Pevehouse, deploying the tools of quantitative political science, engagingly and persuasively challenge that assumption. Their While Dangers Gather: Congressional Checks on War Powers, sure to become an instant classic in the field, presents evidence that the partisan composition of Congress systematically affects presidents' willingness to commit the nation to hostilities.
The book is refreshingly straightforward in presentation. Its first two chapters set forth the authors' hypothesis, stated with appropriate caution. Conventional wisdom, they say, focuses too much on Congress's formal legislative actions; far more important is Congress's ability to challenge or support the president's proposed action informally through public statements. In doing so, Congress exerts informal power by signaling the extent of the nation's resolve internationally and by influencing public opinion domestically. The authors do not contend that this power makes Congress the dominant player in use-of-force decisions, but they reject what they call the “assumption of legislative impotence” (56). In particular, they suggest that Congress's influence is likely greater in situations where the opposition party controls Congress (especially with large and cohesive majorities); where the military operations contemplated are large (and thus potentially more controversial); and where the proposed operations focus on less-strategic regions (and thus the president may be more open to influence) (33–47).
Chapters 3 and 4 attempt to test these hypotheses empirically. Chapter 3 examines post-World War II uses of force, finding a significant relationship between major (though not minor) uses of force and Congress's partisan composition. Chapter 4, more intriguingly, attempts to quantify “opportunities” to use force—that is, incidents of major turmoil in the world—where presidents might have been tempted to initiate military action but ultimately chose not to. Examining these “dogs that did not bark,” a novel approach in war powers literature, the authors again find statistical correlations between increased partisan division and reduced uses of force. In particular, the authors emphasize that (consistent with their hypothesis) large and more cohesive oppositional majorities in Congress are correlated with reduced presidential war-initiation.
One of the book's strengths is that it does not rely merely on arrays of statistics, but provides accessible examples and explanations to support them. Most forcefully, in chapter 5, the authors use prominent historical episodes to illustrate how Congress has exerted its informal channels of influence. In each of these episodes—Indochina (1954), Nicaragua (1981–1988), Lebanon (1982–1984), Panama (1989), Bosnia (1992–1994) and Kosovo (1998–1999)—the authors demonstrate Congress's vital role (sometimes opposing force and sometimes cautiously supporting it) so persuasively that one begins to wonder how the contrary conventional wisdom ever attained its status.
Chapters 6 and 7 return to statistical analysis to identify a mechanism for Congress's influence. First, the authors find empirical support for the so-called indexing theory of influencing the media—that the media looks to government spokespeople to develop the information and arguments they present to the nation. Because of the media's tie to government spokespeople, “Congress … is the single most important institution to check the kinds of arguments the President can make” (164). Second, the authors find empirical support for the proposition that the media in turn substantially shapes public opinion. Thus “Congress … wields considerable influence over media coverage of a planned use of force, and influence on the media … translates into additional influence over public opinion” (217).
These are important and challenging arguments, presented in a readable yet carefully documented way, and they serve as a needed antidote to the conventional view that Congress plays little role in war-initiation decisions. The danger is that they are taken to stand for more than the authors intend. It is sensible to use measures of partisan divisions to test for the presence of congressional influence. But it is easy to slip into a more simplistic conclusion that united government means aggressive uses of force while divided government does not.
The authors themselves seem to succumb to this temptation in their conclusion (chapter 8), where they get somewhat carried away by distaste for the George W. Bush administration. They attribute Bush's aggressive use of force (and general aggressive use of presidential power) in part to the fact that “during Bush's first term and the early part of his second … Republicans retained control of both chambers of Congress” (229). To begin, this is not factually accurate. After Vermont Senator James Jeffords left the Republican Party in May 2001, Democrats controlled the Senate until the end of 2002; during this time Congress authorized broad uses of force against al-Qaeda and in Iraq. Further, the periods of united government Bush did enjoy (in early 2001 and beginning in 2003) were not remarkable for initiations of major conflicts. True, Bush began the Iraq war in 2003, but that had already been approved by Congress under partially divided government and there is no reason to think different results in the November 2002 elections would have altered Bush's decision. Iraq aside, the 2003–2006 Bush administration was circumspect in initiating major conflicts despite substantial provocation from Syria and Iran (no doubt because the U.S. military was already heavily committed in Iraq and Afghanistan and public opinion had turned against the Iraq war). Thus the picture of the Bush administration turned loose by united government to initiate force is misleading.
More broadly, there have been approximately ten years of united government in the last forty years (1977–1980, 1993–1994, early 2001, and 2003–2006); none of these periods saw major initiations of conflict (aside from the 2003 Iraq war, which had already been authorized). For reasons having little to do with Congress, neither the president nor the public had much appetite for new conflicts during these times. Conversely, modern periods of divided government have witnessed frequent initiations of force. Recent history does not suggest that united or divided government is decisive. The book's central claims are not to the contrary; indeed, the authors frequently emphasize that Congress's influence is often marginal and that it depends more on the size and cohesiveness of the opposition party than simply on divided government. Nonetheless, straining to tie their conclusions to headline-grabbing issues, the authors' somewhat overstated final chapter detracts from an otherwise careful presentation.
These are quibbles only—the central importance of the authors' contribution stands. The key is to state it cautiously. The book does not prove that presidents will necessarily use force more often with united government, nor that divided government will prevent aggressive military actions. Congress's influence, not just through legislation but by shaping public opinion, is incremental and one factor among many. But it is—contrary to conventional wisdom—one factor.
