The coronial manual emerged in England in the eighteenth century.Footnote 1The Coroner's Guide (1756) and Lex Coronatoria (Umfreville, Reference Umfreville1761) were followed throughout the nineteenth century by several handbooks written specially for coroners, including John Impey's The Office and Duty of Coroners (Reference Impey1800), Sir John Jervis's A Practical Treatise on the Office and Duties of Coroners (Reference Jervis1829) and William Baker's A Practical Compendium (Reference Baker1851). While initially English handbooks served as guidance for coroners in British colonies, over the course of the nineteenth century, specialised manuals were written by local officers to address the particular circumstances of colonial life. In Canada, William F. A. Boys wrote A Practical Treatise on the Office and Duties of Coroners in Upper Canada (Reference Boys1864), while in New Zealand, Alexander J. Johnston published A Handy Book for the Coroners of New Zealand (Reference Johnston1868). In Australia, P. S. Tomlins (Reference Tomlins1837) and Thomas E. MacNevin (1875) produced manuals for the colonies of Van Diemans Land and New South Wales, respectively. Manuals written for colonial coroners differed from their English counterparts insofar as they addressed the problem of a paucity of technical knowledge and the difficulty of transmitting legal opinions across vast frontiers.
This paper examines the coronial manual as a technique of occupying office in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The manual guided coroners in the performance of their duties, their conduct towards the dead, and the scope of their jurisdiction. It was also preoccupied with questions of technical knowledge, administrative procedure and bureaucratic governance. The language of prudence that characterised juridical treatises prior to the eighteenth century was gradually supplemented in the professional manual by a rhetoric of technocracy. This history correlates with a story of empire-building, the bureaucratic expansion of colonial institutions, and the intensification of centralised governance. The paper thus argues that the technology of the handbook professionalised the role of the coroner in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The manual became an overwhelmingly technocratic document, occupying an important role in the formation of the modern office of the coroner.
The first section explores how this juridical device redefined the jurisdiction of the coroner and reshaped the technical operations of the role in the late nineteenth century. Coronial jurisdiction was never simply delimited by case-law or legislation in the colonies. The manual and its inventory of circulars, forms and precedents extended the authority of the coroner, instructed his office in the proper conduct of inquest proceedings, and altered the way in which he assumed responsibility for the dead.Footnote 2 The second section investigates the attention placed in handbooks in the early twentieth century on the liabilities and privileges of the role of coroner. Through the dissemination of the manual, the office became more accountable for its conduct, actions and behaviour, and the role became almost assimilated into the hierarchical career structure of the modern judiciary. This does not mean that the manual was bereft of an ethics of responsibility. The technology held on to the question of conduct by documenting procedures, forms and rituals for attaching the dead to law. The conclusion considers then the relationship between the bureaucratic logic of the manual and the possibility of an ethics of responsibility for coronial justice. It examines how the professional manual, as a jurisdictional practice, affected the way in which the coroner formed lawful relations with the dead and pursued justice during the death investigation process.
I. The technocratic manual
In the preface to the third edition of a Manual for Coroner's and Magistrates in New South Wales (1895), Thomas E. MacNevin highlighted what had been altered from the previous edition. MacNevin was employed at the time as the chief clerk of the Department of Justice, and he compiled the manual with the assistance of Mr Henry Shiell, the coroner of Sydney.Footnote 3 The second edition, which was published in 1884, was shorter in length and did not include any circulars. The third edition, by contrast, included all circulars issued to coroners by the Department of Justice since 1868. The reason for this addition was the necessity of addressing a ‘failure on the part of Coroners in many instances’ to adhere to procedure in completing forms and ‘avoid, as far as possible, needless correspondence on the subject’ (MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1895, p. ii). Irregularities included coroners failing to affix jurats, attach seals or properly compile forms, which, as MacNevin explained, ‘materially affect[ed] the validity of the Inquest’ (Reference Macnevin1895, p. ii). The importance of ameliorating such procedural errors was explicitly remarked, in the preface to the second edition, as an objective of the manual:
‘The first edition of this little work, which has been for some time out of print, was published in 1876, and distributed to the Coroners throughout the Colony for their guidance and assistance in the performance of the duties pertaining to their important office; and was rendered necessary in consequence of certain irregularities which occurred from time to time in connection with the holding of inquests in the county districts, and the defective manner in which the evidence of witnesses was taken, without, in many instances, the necessary jurats being attached to each disposition, tending to affect the validity and materially to lessen the usefulness of these investigations.’ (MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1884, p. v)
The manual was indispensable for the nineteenth-century colonial coroner. Alongside a bundle of forms, recognisances, certificates and warrants, a Bible, writing material and ‘a sufficient quantity of foolscap paper’, MacNevin (Reference Macnevin1895, p. 24) recommended that upon receiving notice of a suspicious death in the community, coroners should carry his manual to the place of death. In the absence of any formal training for the role – individuals seeking office were presumed to be ‘acquainted in a general way with those duties’ (MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1895, p. 2) – the manual provided a set of instructions for guiding coroners in the procedures of the court and the performance of their duties. While MacNevin recommended that ‘every Coroner should [also] provide himself with a copy of “Sir John Jervis on the Office and Duties of Coroners”’ (Reference Macnevin1895, p. 2), he acknowledged that there was no equivalent textbook for the colony, and his manual, which was provided to all coroners upon their first appointment to the role, attempted to address this gap in the literature. MacNevin's ‘practical guide to the ordinary duties of their office’ (Reference Macnevin1884, p. v) was arguably most useful for coroners located in the outlying districts of the colony. The difficulties of obtaining access to circulars issued by the Department of Justice, opinions of the Crown Law Office, and forms distributed by the Government Printer catalysed the demand for manuals and influenced editorial decisions about what should be included and excluded in each edition. The second edition, for example, expanded the ‘practical’ component of the guidebook by adding legal opinions, revising the forms necessary for practice, and, in general, redesigning the typographical arrangement of the book for the sake of professional convenience, but also for ensuring consistency amongst a disparate number of coroners operating across a vast colonial frontier:Footnote 4
‘It is hoped, in conclusion, that, in the absence of any regular text-book treating of the practice of the Coroner's Court in this Colony, this manual will be found to be a trustworthy guide to the ordinary duties of the Coroner, and that the simple arrangement of the duties incident to the office, attempted in the present compilation may in some measure facilitate the performance of those duties, secure uniformity of practice, and assist the Coroner, conveniently and effectually, to discharge the important functions of his office. If these desirable objects be attained, the time, labour, and study that have been devoted by the compiler in the endeavour to produce a practical handbook upon a very difficult subject will have been profitably applied.’ (MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1884, p. vi)
The third edition of MacNevin's manual brought additional changes to the content and structure of the handbook. The chief clerk rearranged the order of chapters, revised the substance of precedents, and added a number of forms in an enlarged Appendix. Under ‘Forms of Verdicts’, MacNevin included death ‘during operation under chloroform’ (Form 19), ‘from effects of injuries’ (Forms 20 and 21), ‘accidentally overlain by mother’ (Form 22), ‘from asphyxia at birth’ (Form 23) and ‘from poison self-administered’ (Form 24). The forms of verdicts were expanded from twenty-five to thirty-two, which did not simply denote that individuals invented new modes of dying over the course of a decade, but rather that the coronial manual became increasingly supplemented with technical knowledge. The technocratisation of the coronial manual was further evinced when comparing such forms to the categories of verdicts in treatises from the eighteenth century. In The Coroner's Guide (1756), the anonymous author confined possible verdicts to felony (suicide or murder), mischance (act of god or act of man) and famine (poverty or pestilence).
Technical knowledge was not supplementary in handbooks to judicial statements defining the limits of the coronial jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the coroner of New South Wales was shaped in the nineteenth century by a combination of case-law and legislation.Footnote 5 However, in the third edition of MacNevin's manual, circulars, forms and precedent were interspersed alongside case-law and legislation throughout each chapter.Footnote 6 The procedures for conducting an inquest, from the proclamations made at the opening of court to the precedents for oaths for the swearing of witnesses to the form of vouchers for the advanced payment of jurors, were not ancillary to legal judgments on the scope of the coroner's authority. The technical aspects of court procedure and form-filling formed part of the official instructions that advised coroners on how to navigate through an inheritance of coronial law. In other words, substantive law and administrative procedure were not represented in the manual as mutually exclusive aspects of the practice of coronial law in the colony. Rather, the manual embedded techniques on how to interpret the limits of coronial jurisdiction, how to perform the ordinary duties of office, and how to conduct inquest proceedings amongst judicial consideration of New South Wales and English case-law and legislation.
Ian Burney's Bodies of Evidence (Reference Burney2000) examines the effects of the emergence of scientific expertise and technical knowledge in the English inquest in the nineteenth century. He argues that the technocratisation of the inquest witnessed the demise of the legal forum as a conduit for institutional civic participation. Inquests were conceived of as animated by traditions of public liberties in England, for example, juries ‘were encouraged to (and frequently did) question witnesses [and] append riders to their verdicts as a means of reflecting extralegal, communal judgment regarding the conduct of individuals or corporate entities’ (Burney, Reference Burney2000, p. 5). This tradition of civic participation, however, was not reflected in the coronial manuals written and disseminated in the colonies. In fact, where Burney examines medical knowledge in the English inquest as an external intervention, given that all colonial coroners were medically qualified, the technology of the manual should be conceptualised as augmenting the medical–legal expertise of the coroner.
The technocratisation of the manual in the British colonies revealed how circulars, forms and precedent emerged as devices for the transmission and representation of the expertise and authority of the coroner. In Jurisdiction, Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh describe jurisdiction as a ‘technique and craft of legal ordering and the art of creating legal relations’ (Reference Dorsett and Mcveigh2012, p. 4). It is a practice, an activity and a technology not simply confined to case-law or legislation. The technology of the circular, which transmitted the opinions, minutes and advice of the Attorney-General or the Minister of Justice to coroners, was an example of such a device ‘designed to, or … capable of, authorising, changing or altering lawful relations’ (p. 14). For instance, the Colonial Secretary's Office admonished coroners on 15 March 1845 for overstepping the limits of their territorial jurisdiction. It transmitted notice of its decision by the use of a circular that stated ‘in future no Coroner is to act except within the Police district in which he may reside and for which he is understood as holding his appointment’ (Government Gazette, 1845, p. 300). Yet MacNevin noted in the preface to the third edition of his manual that in 1892 the Department of Justice issued another circular expanding the territorial jurisdiction of the office to enable coroners to hold in special circumstances inquests beyond the limits of their appointed district. He thus included both circulars in the Appendix of the manual, but they also appeared as authority for delimiting the territorial jurisdiction of the colonial coroner. In the nineteenth century, circulars issued to coroners ranged from instructions for the mode of transmitting dispositions to procedures for stamping official correspondence to processes for remunerating medical witnesses, jurors and undertakers for assuming different roles in the death investigation process.
Examples of the circular gesture towards a more expansive definition of jurisdictional techniques that is irreducible to case-law and legislation. In Chapter 4 of Jurisdiction, Dorsett and McVeigh examine how practices of writing, mapping, precedent and taxonomy are techniques capable of creating and representing lawful relations. In the preceding chapter they also analyse ceremonies of law, such as the rituals of the making of oaths, which ‘mark the existence of legal institutions and give shape to lawful relations [and] the institutional forms of the authorisation of law’ (2012, p. 34). This paper, however, is concerned with examining how the technology of the coronial manual and the practice of anthologising a legal inventory functioned as jurisdictional techniques in British colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. It is preoccupied with the question of how the art of compiling and arranging circulars, precedent and forms in a guidebook or handbook for coroners executing their duties, enabled office holders to create lawful relations with the dead and cultivate an institutional form of coronial law.
The coronial manual exemplifies what Dorsett and McVeigh define as a jurisdictional technique because it attached and bound technical relations to coronial law. It determined the scope of the authority of the office by representing coronial procedures, such as the custom of super visum corporis, as relations that properly belong to law. A short section on the practice of requiring the jury to view the dead body prior to an inquest can shed further light on how the manual provided tools for creating lawful relations. In Chapter I of Part II, ‘Authority and Jurisdiction of Coroners’, MacNevin noted under the duties of coroners that the practice of super visum corporis was necessary to ensure the validity of the inquest. In the absence of this practice, ‘the inquisition is void, as being an extra-judicial proceeding. If the body cannot be viewed, the Coroner can do nothing’ (MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1895, p. 24). The coroner only possessed authority over the inquest proceeding where there was a body and where it could be viewed by the jury. However, the manual went further in delimiting the jurisdiction of the coroner by setting out precise instructions for charging the jury both before and after the view of the body, and providing guidance for how the body should be viewed. The coroner should accompany
‘the jury [to] examine the body minutely and carefully … The position of the body, any external marks of violence, the state of the clothes, the position, appearance, and direction of the wounds (if any), and the relation of the surrounding objects, as well as any stains, marks, or appearances of blood, whether on the clothes of the deceased or near to the place where the body was first discovered, should be observed and accurately noted.’ (MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1895, p. 36)
The validity of the inquest depended as much on whether the body was in fact viewed by the jury as it was by the quality of that view. The question of whether the jury paid close attention to the appearance of the body and, more importantly, whether the coroner accompanied the jury to view the body, bound technical, sensory and intimate relations between the living and the dead to the corpus of coronial law. In collecting and interpreting precedent and forms, the manual set out tools by which the coroner could form and manage lawful relations with the dead.
Transformations of the technology of the manual in the latter half of the nineteenth century institutionalised the office of coroner in British colonies. Dorsett and McVeigh write that the concept of technology derived ‘from the Greek technê, meaning craft, art or strategy. In a classical sense, technê described a power or capacity to produce things whose eventual existence was “caused by the craftsman”’ (Reference Dorsett and Mcveigh2012, p. 55). For Marcel Mauss, technê was conceived of as an implement, tool or instrument capable of producing ‘a mechanical, physical, or chemical effect’ (Reference Mauss and Lussier2006, p. 98). Techniques involved a skilful, operational or industrial process, action or practice, which could only be harnessed by human ‘technician[s]’ (p. 114). In the British Empire, coroners occupied the role of Mauss's technicians, who, with the assistance of devices such as manuals, guidebooks and handbooks, were capable of forming and shaping relations properly belonging to law. The language of technocracy, which was gradually introduced in the manual across the nineteenth century, signified that the practice of coronial law was much more than the interpretation and application of case-law and legislation. It was an institutionalising process that materialised in ceremonial rituals, form-filling and other administrative procedures. It was this strategic process of institutionalisation, the technê of the coroner-craftsman, that attached relations between the living and the dead to the machinations of coronial law.
In Jurisdiction, Dorsett and McVeigh present precedent as a technique that binds ‘a judgment or case to the body of law’ (Reference Dorsett and Mcveigh2012, p. 58). In the compilation of the coronial manual, precedent did not function in exactly the same way. Instead it bound judgments and procedure to the practice of coronial law. Precedent consisted of pro-forma proclamations to be issued at the opening of an inquest,Footnote 7 or templates for the making of oaths or affirmations of jurors, witnesses and interpreters. It also assumed form in the instructions requiring coroners not simply to provide specific information on inquest forms (Figure 1),Footnote 8 but requiring them to transcribe and transmit the forms according to specific guidelines. Witness depositions were to be recorded on ‘half-sheets of foolscap paper, quarter margin, and only on one side of the sheet’, while a copy of the inquest proceedings, including depositions and vouchers, were to be circulated to the Department of Justice ‘under registered cover … with duty stamps affixed’ (MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1895, pp. 41, 57).Footnote 9 The jurisdiction of the coroner was determined as much by whether the dead body was viewed by the jury as to whether the inquest documents were properly ‘fastened with tape or a metal fastener’ (p. 41). The absence of a view of the dead body or a seal accompanying documents could both lead to delays, if not a declaration that the inquest was void.Footnote 10 The inconsistency of procedure between colonial coroners, and the irregularities of the transcription and transmission of inquest proceedings all contributed to a growing need to standardise and institutionalise the conduct of the coroner.
The professional manual set out instructions and guidance for performing the duties, obligations and responsibilities that pertained to the assumption of the office of coroner. In compiling precedent, forms and circulars, certificates, warrants and vouchers in a handbook, MacNevin sought to bind technical, procedural and ceremonial relations between the living and the dead to ‘an institutional practice of law’ (Dorsett and McVeigh, Reference Dorsett and Mcveigh2012, p. 34). To put this differently, the manual bureaucratised the way in which the coroner formed relations with the dead. It set out precise instructions; in fact, it even operated as a script book for the ceremonial staging of law:
‘The Coroner then asks them if they have agreed in their verdict, and if they say “Yes,” he asks them, “Who shall say for you?” to which they will say, “Our foreman.” The Coroner will then say, “Mr. Foreman: How do you find A.D. came to his death, and by what means?” The foreman then standing, relates and gives the verdict, which it is the Coroner's duty to receive, enter, and record.’ (MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1895, p. 51)
The procedure of his court, which was meticulously outlined through the genre of a dramatic work, contained a range of devices for establishing the limits of his authority and the lawfulness of his conduct. What was of particular importance was a collection of forms, precedents and circulars detailing the process for remunerating individuals who took part in coronial inquests. The coroner was required to occupy the role of a bookkeeper, in applying for an advance to pay jurors for attending an inquest, compensating such jurors for their time spent on the jury and then submitting accounts of expenditure, ‘properly vouched and receipted’ (MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1895, p. 10), to the Audit Office within a fortnight from the date on which funds were advanced. Here, the coroner was reimagined as an accountant, a bureaucrat and an administrative assistant. He was required to request forms from the Government Printer, issue vouchers, pay fees, write legibly, and ensure that correspondence was properly sealed and stamped.
The jurisdiction of the coroner was shaped in the nineteenth century by case-law and legislation, but also by the use of the manual and its array of techniques for institutionalising the practice of coronial law. The transformations of this technology witnessed changes to the professionalisation of the role of the coroner. Eighteenth-century guidebooks had always included forms and precedent for exercising coronial duties and obligations. Yet the modern manual amplified the technocratic role that coroners assumed in the administration of justice in the colony. It supplemented judicial statements with technical knowledge, administrative procedures and more specialised forms and precedents. It augmented official instructions with opinions, advice and minutes from governmental departments and public bureaucrats. The language of technocracy, professionalism and institutionalisation was embedded in and through the manual. Indeed, Hilary Golder remarks that by the end of the nineteenth century, the role of the Sydney coroner ‘was fully integrated into the magisterial career structure’ (Golder, Reference Golder1991, p. 118). The jurisdictional technique of the manual professionalised the role of the coroner, yet as I argue in the following section, it is precisely through this technology that the office of coroner held on to an ethics of responsibility.
II. The ethical coroner
William Ramsay Smith was one of the most questionable physicians to have ever assumed the office of coroner in Australia. Smith was educated in arts, natural sciences and medicine at the University of Edinburgh between 1877 and 1892. He was first employed as a physician at the Royal Adelaide Hospital in 1896, and then appointed as the Inspector of Anatomy, chairman of the Central Board of Health and coroner of Adelaide in 1899 (Elmslie and Nance, Reference Elmslie and Nance1988). He wrote over eighty books, pamphlets and journal articles on a range of topics, including A Description of Some Tasmanian Skulls (Reference Smith1900), Medical Jurisprudence from the Judicial Standpoint (Reference Smith1913), and In Southern Seas: Wanderings of a Naturalist (Reference Smith1924). It was alleged in the twentieth century that Smith plagiarised the writings of indigenous author David Unaipon in Myths and Legends of the Australian Aborigines (Reference Smith1932) (Lynch, Reference Lynch1998). Smith apparently compiled the anthology to ‘preserve indigenous folklore’, because he believed ‘tribal Aborigines were dying out’ (Elmslie and Nance, Reference Elmslie and Nance1988). In his entry on ‘The Aborigines of Australians’ in the Official Year Book of the Commonwealth of Australia (Reference Smith1909), he wrote that indigenous Australians ‘[are the] most interesting [race] at present on earth and the least deserving to be exterminated by us and the most wronged at our hands’ (Elmslie and Nance, Reference Elmslie and Nance1988).
The coroner of Adelaide first raised the ire of the medical profession by holding inquests into deaths in hospitals and lunatic asylums, particularly following surgery, which had not until then been conducted in the colony of South Australia (MacDonald, Reference Macdonald2010, p. 190). However, what caused the most controversy was Smith's fondness for ‘unlawfully’ dissecting what he called ‘government corpses’ in the Adelaide morgue at West Terrace Cemetery (MacDonald, Reference Macdonald2010, p. 191; Reference Macdonald2009, p. 40.1).Footnote 11 He maintained that the purpose of such ‘experiments’ was to test his theories of death causation. It was reported that Smith used mallets to cause puncture wounds, knives to create stab wounds, and a range of bullets to analyse the distinctive effects of different weapons on the flesh and thus further his work on medical jurisprudence (Scobie, Reference Scobie2009; MacDonald, Reference Macdonald2009). Yet the coroner was also dismembering indigenous (and non-indigenous corpses) and sending their remains – including skulls, organs, skin and genitalia – to the University of Edinburgh and the Royal College of Surgeons in Edinburgh, or adding them to his own personal collection. Smith became renowned by the beginning of the twentieth century as a ‘prolific colonial collector’ of the remains of the Ngarrindjeri people (Scobie, Reference Scobie2009), which were well documented in his numerous manuscripts on anatomy, anthropology and odontology. He gleefully compared – in pamphlets co-written with Sir Edward Charles Stirling on indigenous burial grounds (Reference Smith and Stirling1907–1911) – his adventures in grave robbing to prospecting for gold.
The ‘government corpses’ subject to the coroner's forensic experiments appeared in the Adelaide morgue through the manipulation of legal procedure. Through the writing of warrants, Smith was capable of diverting corpses ‘from their lawful destinations (the grave or the medical school)’ to his moribund laboratory in an Adelaide cemetery (MacDonald, Reference Macdonald2010, p. 194). In the late nineteenth century, coroners were permitted, after the end of an inquest, to lawfully dispose of an unclaimed corpse – which was defined as a corpse that was not claimed by relatives within twelve hours of death – to a medical school, alongside the dead did not object to such use of their cadaver before they passed away. Smith would thus first issue a warrant for an unclaimed corpse's burial following an inquest, while secretly ‘filleting’ the corpse prior to placing what remained of its cadaver in a wooden coffin (p. 194). His unlawful conduct was exposed in 1903, when he was charged with being ‘indiscreet’ in his dealings with the dead under the decency clause of the Anatomy Act 1884 (SA).Footnote 12 He claimed, however, at the Board of Inquiry, which was set up in the wake of the scandal, that he was
‘unsure whether a coroner had that power to dispose of unclaimed bodies when an inquest concluded and spoke of having asked the government to change the law to enable him to do so since inquest corpses often made excellent subjects for dissection.’ (MacDonald, Reference Macdonald2010, p. 194)
While Smith was initially suspended from his role of coroner once his conduct was exposed, the Board of Inquiry eventually cleared him of any wrongdoing and commended him for ‘his painstaking research’ in medical jurisprudence (Elmslie and Nance, Reference Elmslie and Nance1988).Footnote 13 In 1904, he was reinstated to his office – but not to the role of inspector of anatomy, which was found to conflict with his other positions – and he continued his art of dissecting, dismembering and collecting corpses. Smith also wrote A Manual for Coroners (Reference Smith1904), which not only set out guidelines for holding inquests in South Australia, but also compared the legal framework in that state to coronial law across Australia, New Zealand and England.Footnote 14
Smith's guidebook was innovative for how it intervened in the genre of the professional manual. In the first instance, it transformed the coronial manual into a textbook that standardised the practice of compiling or anthologising legal devices. The textbook was divided into eight parts that corresponded to different elements of the inquest proceeding. Each chapter in Parts I to V began with an examination of coronial law and procedure in South Australia, before highlighting the differences and similarities between other states and countries. Part VIII listed coronial legislation from England, New Zealand and Australia. In contrast to nineteenth-century manuals, this edition did not contain an Appendix; it integrated circulars, precedents and forms throughout a comparative analysis of coronial law and procedure. The emergence of this new form of the manual correlated with a pluralisation of readers. The enlarged scope of the subject matter appealed to a diverse audience, including students, doctors, barristers, solicitors, justices and coroners, who sought an authoritative guide for navigating through the procedures of the coroners’ court in different common-law jurisdictions.
In the second instance, the textbook provided practical advice on how coroners should behave in their public roles. Following his exoneration by the Board of Inquiry of all charges of indiscreet dealings with the dead, Smith took great care to account for the manner in which he conducted his office. In Part VI he set out the ‘Liabilities and Privileges of a Coroner’, and he reiterated opinion from the nineteenth century that a coroner was not liable for any acts committed by him ‘in his judicial capacity, and within scope of his jurisdiction’ (MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1895, p. 18). He even insisted that coroners were free ‘from all vexatious actions for any act done by him in his judicial capacity’ (Smith, Reference Smith1904, p. 94; emphasis added), which revealed the extent to which his previous experiences before governmental inquiries affected the way he conceptualised the privilege of holding office. It is notable that Smith conspicuously omitted from this section any discussion of the possibility that coroners may be liable, under the Anatomy Act 1884 (SA), for unlawfully dissecting the dead. Yet it was not surprising that he cautioned readers that coroners may only be fined or imprisoned under the common law for corruption in office, and could only be removed from office for misbehaviour, wilful neglect or incapacity in the discharge of a duty.Footnote 15
The most contentious aspect of Part VI revolved around the rules pertaining to a coroner's discretion to hold an inquest. Earlier in the textbook, Smith maintained that inquests into deaths taking place in hospitals and asylums, particularly following surgery – a practice which, as I mentioned above, raised the chagrin of the colony's medical profession – should fall under the scope of the coronial jurisdiction. He further explained that coroners were obliged by their fealty to office to investigate these deaths. The coroner was bound to exercise his duties because ‘the public mind should be satisfied that persons in such institutions, who are outside the circle of their relatives and acquaintance, received proper medical care and attention’ (Smith, Reference Smith1904, p. 6). The issue here was that the decision to hold an inquest did not simply involve a question of authority, but raised the question of an ethics of responsibility. The obligation to hold an inquest into a death was inherent in the way a coroner conducted himself in office.
The problem of coronial discretion was irreducible to the question of whether to hold inquests into hospital and asylum deaths. Smith counselled that ‘[r]efusing without adequate reason to hold an inquest’ or ‘[h]olding an inquest unnecessarily’ constituted an offence that could result in liability (Reference Smith1904, p. 93; see also MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1895, p. 15; Mathews, Reference Mathews1902, p. 3). The main reason for this was that an inquest was a considerable expense for a colonial government, particularly given that jurors, witnesses and coroners were all paid for their attendance. Indeed, most colonial coroners in the nineteenth century were paid partially by salary and partially by a fee for conducting an inquest (see Freckelton and Ranson, Reference Freckelton and Ranson2006, p. 48). They were also reimbursed for travelling expenses to the place of inquest. The holding of unnecessary inquests could thus be a ruse for making money, or to shroud the kind of actions that Smith was accused of before the public inquiry, namely the unlawful dissections of ‘government corpses’.
Given the personal stakes at play, Smith sought to clarify precisely when a coroner could lawfully exercise his discretion to hold an inquest. The usual course of action was for the coroner to make a decision after he received a police report. In fact, according to Smith, a coroner only assumed jurisdiction after he received a ‘message’ from a constable. He quoted from the English case of R v. Price (1884) 12 QBD 247 in support of this supposition:
‘The coroner has no absolute right to hold inquests in every case in which he chooses to do so. It would be intolerable if he had power to intrude without adequate cause upon the privacy of a family in distress, and to interfere with the arrangements for a funeral. Nothing can justify such interference, except a reasonable suspicion that there may have been something peculiar in the death, that it may have been due to other causes than common illness. In such cases the coroner not only may, but ought to hold an inquest … He should not go, generally speaking, until he is sent for.’ (Smith, Reference Smith1904, p. 15)
However, Smith also surmised that ‘he would not be acting illegally if he proceeded on his own knowledge or upon the information of a private person’ (Reference Smith1904, p. 13).Footnote 16 That is, alongside ‘he honestly believes information which has been given to him to be true, which, if true, would make it his duty to hold such inquest’ (p. 93). In other words, coronial discretion was a question of conduct. It was a question of assuming responsibility for forming lawful relations with the dead. What Part VI highlighted, then, was that the manual proffered a code of conduct. It functioned as a legal device for advising coroners how they should discharge their duties and how they should account for their actions and behaviour in office.
The language of office, which derives from the Latin word officium, refers to the conduct of individuals occupying a public role. Cicero described ‘an office’ in De Officiis as the assumption of moral duties, obligations and responsibilities (Burchell, Reference Burchell, Burchell and Leigh2002, p. 75). In Ancient Rome, to appear in public life, politicians, priests, artists and jurists had to assume an office, and during their incumbency they were bound by certain powers, rights and privileges. As Jeffrey Minson notes, the term ‘office’ not only denoted the assumption of duties, but the performance of ‘a kind of public demeanor’ (Reference Minson, Burchell and Leigh2002, p. 129). It signified the manner in which individuals occupied public roles; that is, the way they performed obligations that corresponded to a particular role. In other words, an office can be described as a public stage for a self-performance, while the manner, mode or way an office-holder took to this stage can be said to gesture towards their ethical character. Office-holders negotiated in their performance a range of ethical practices, and they differentiated between their various roles in life and the responsibilities that were inherent in such roles.
In the eighteenth century, the coronial manual explicitly linked the problem of who should occupy the office of coroner to the question of ethical character. The criteria of assuming office in England was described in relation to the qualities of a person – there were five in total – which were designed to ‘prevent Men of small Value and little Understanding to be chosen Coroners’ (1756, p. 4). He was required to be a good man (Probus Homo), a lawful man (Legalis Homo), knowledgeable, and capable and diligent in performing his office. He was also required to be a landowner such that he could exercise his duties without drawing a salary. For county coroners were elected officials, occupied the role for life and ‘paid on a fee-per-inquest basis’ until the mid to late nineteenth century (Burney, Reference Burney2000, p. 3).Footnote 17 The process and criteria for becoming a coroner was transformed in the British colonies. Not only were they appointed directly by the colonial government, but there were no special criteria for being appointed to the office. Nonetheless, the manual still held on to the question of ethical character:
‘[I]t is presumed that gentlemen accepting the office, and taking upon themselves the duties, are acquainted in a general way with those duties, and prepared to act on their own independent judgment and discretion in all matters in relation thereto in such manner as they may think best in the public interests and in the interests of the administration of justice.’ (MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1895, p. 2)
This rhetoric echoed the introduction to A Practical Treatise on the Office and Duties of Coroners in Upper Canada (1864), where William F. A. Boys lamented a decline in the criteria for entrance into the office:
‘It has … now fallen from such pristine dignity and though still of great respectability, no qualifications are required beyond being a male of the full age of 21 years, of sound mind, and a subject of her Majesty, and possessing the amount of education and mental ability necessary for the proper discharge of the duties.’ (p. 2)
Boys emphasised in subsequent editions of his manual the usefulness of cultural capital, literacy, refinement, chivalry, ‘noblesse oblige’ and social connections in gaining appointment as a coroner in Upper Canada. Aspiring coroners were advised to seek a ‘recommendation of a member of Parliament, or other person possessing influence with the Executive’ (Boys, quoted in Leslie, Reference Leslie2008, p. 227). Myles Leslie reflects that Boys's manual and its lament of a decline in criteria for assuming office professionalised the office of coroner in the nineteenth century. It ‘reformed as a professional instrument of modern government, rather than as a minor parochial office’ (p. 225). While this is not to be disputed, the question of ethical character, as evident in the manuals discussed in this paper, played an integral role in the professionalisation of the office. The office was not devoid of an ethics of responsibility once coroners were appointed directly by government, their expenses were controlled through centralised accounting practices, and their discretion was limited by standardised procedures. In each subsequent edition, the manual asked coroners to consider how they practised their role, and how they could achieve justice for the dead.
The question of how to form an ethics of the self in the coroners office signified for Smith the difficulties of negotiating between the different roles an official may occupy in colonial life. Like other coronial manuals in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Smith's textbook advised coroners not to act in cases where they may have attended the dead ‘professionally during the last illness or at the time of the death of such person’, or acted as solicitors ‘in the prosecution or defence of a person for an offence for which such person is charged by an inquisition taken before him as a coroner’ (Smith, Reference Smith1904, p. 1; see also MacNevin, Reference Macnevin1895, p. 20). However, for Smith personally, his advice against acting in the office of coroner, when assuming other roles inside or outside the public service, had greater significance. The South Australian Board of Inquiry acquitted Smith in 1903 of all charges that he contravened the Anatomy Act 1884 in dissecting, filleting and collecting indigenous and non-indigenous remains. They also found that there was a conflict of interest in the fact that he occupied multiple roles in public service. He was thus exonerated on the basis that he would need to choose to occupy the role of either coroner or inspector of anatomy.
The development of an ethics of responsibility in the coronial manual involved mitigating conflicts between the ethical demands that pertain to different roles in an individual's life. For Smith, he wrote his manual at a time in which the office of coroner became professionalised, and, as I discussed in the preceding section, the technology of the manual was part of a process of institutionalising the conduct of this office. But at the same time his manual was a paradigmatic example of how bureaucratisation held on to the question of an ethos of office.
Paul du Gay aims to recover, In Praise of Bureaucracy: Weber, Organization, Ethics (Reference Du Gay2000), an ‘ethos of bureaucratic office’ (p. ix). This is ‘a certain ethical dignity for a particular form of institution – the bureau – and the category of person – the bureaucrat – that have been the target of considerable critical denigration in recent years’ (du Gay, Reference Du Gay2000, p. ix). Du Gay is critical of the work of bureaucratic government; however, he reproaches critiques that reductively position conscience against procedure, ethics against rationality, and conduct against technocracy. In praising the ethics of bureaucracy, du Gay draws from Max Weber's (Reference Weber and Livingstone2004) canonical analysis of the public service in ‘Politics as a Vocation’. For Weber, the civil servant practises a certain ethics ‘or Lebensfuhrung – not only an ensemble of purposes and ideals within a general code of conduct but also ways and means of conducting oneself within a given “life-order”’ (du Gay, Reference Du Gay2000, p. 4). Indeed, following Weber, as du Gay explains, the techniques of bureaucracy – ‘strict adherence to procedure, acceptance of sub- and superordination, abnegation of personal moral enthusiasms, commitment to the purposes of the office’ (p. 29) – should be conceptualised as ethical in themselves. For these practices constitute the conduct of a vocation (Beruf), which Weber defines both as a calling and a profession. Vocation grants bureaucrats a particular ethical character and shapes the way they conduct themselves in office.
The transformations of the coronial manual in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries represent the transition of the coroner as an honorary office holder to a technocratic public servant, a salaried employee of a bureaucratic government department, which, as Paul Finn writes, took place ‘at the expense of the older public officer–public relationship’ (Reference Finn and Chapman1993, p. 139). This transition in colonial society was far from a complete, seamless process. Influenced by and similar to the reshaping of the British coroner from an elected freeholder to appointed officer, this process reflected ‘new forms of bureaucratic management’ (Burney, Reference Burney2000, p. 2). The augmentation of technical knowledge, a culture of form-filling and adherence to precedent, and the intensification of court procedures comprised a bureaucratic logic of the coroner's office. So too the monitoring of coronial expenses, the management of performance and the centralisation of decision-making. However, as I have shown in this paper, the bureaucratisation of the office still held on to the question of an ethics of responsibility. The use of the manual and its array of jurisdictional techniques cultivated and transmitted an ethos – an obligation to adhere to procedure, to develop technical forms and adopt the persona of a bureaucrat in the pursuit of forming and conducting lawful relations with the dead. This bureaucratic conduct ‘represent[ed] the product of particular ethical techniques and practices through which individuals develop[ed] the disposition and capacity to conduct themselves according to the ethos of bureaucratic office’ (du Gay, Reference Du Gay2000, p. 4). The manual technocratised the way in which the professional coroner conducted himself in office, while at the same time holding on to the question of how to assume responsibility for the dead.
III. Conclusion
In the preface to A Manual for Coroners (1904), William Ramsay Smith cautioned that knowledge of legislation and the common law was alone ‘not sufficient’ for interpreting and practising coronial law in Australia. ‘It is as difficult to conduct an inquest properly from merely reading acts of parliament’, he wrote, ‘as it is to make a logically connected speech from perusing a dictionary’ (p. v). What was necessary was a guidebook that instructed coroners on the procedures of the coronial jurisdiction, not only in Australia, but also New Zealand and England. In the twentieth century, the coronial manual became a comparative textbook that guided a pluralised audience through the bureaucratic logic of the coroner's office.
In this paper I have approached the manual as a practice, an activity and a technology that cultivated lawful relations between the living and the dead. I have also demonstrated how, through the evolution of the manual, the coroner became a bookkeeper, statistician and a bureaucrat. Upon the completion of an inquest, coroners would file, fasten and transmit documents, including jurors’ and witnesses’ paysheets to government departments; he would submit a warrant to bury the corpse to the police, and tabulate and transmit particulars for annual publication in the Government Gazette.Footnote 18 The personas of the bookkeeper, statistician and bureaucrat were not antithetical to the duties of the coroner in British colonies. The obligations to issue vouchers, submit forms, collect statistics and stamp correspondence formed part of the jurisdiction of the coroner's office. The professional manual set out this bureaucratic logic in painstaking detail, but it did so through an array of jurisdictional techniques that guided the coroner in forming lawful relations with the dead. The coronial bureaucrat was required to perform his duties in a way that held on to the question of ethical conduct.
The manual reshaped the way in which the coroner cultivated technical relations between the living and the dead. It centralised and professionalised the office of coroner, while setting out the liabilities and privileges of holding office, the duties, obligations and responsibilities that pertained to the assumption of a public role in colonial society. This paper investigated what was involved in the shift towards a bureaucratic logic, what that shift may have allowed to come into existence, and how the manual developed different techniques for assuming responsibility towards the dead. Shaunnagh Dorsett and Shaun McVeigh write that ‘[m]uch of the administration of modern law takes place through bureaucratic modes of writing – an obvious example is the form” (Reference Dorsett and Mcveigh2012, p. 62). In coronial law, this form of writing, compiling and anthologising was represented by the manual. The technology of the manual bound the procedures of the performance of office – its ceremonies, rituals, duties and obligations – to the institutional practices of coronial law. And, importantly, it revealed that coronial justice could never simply be expressed in the form of a verdict, but in the technical, lawful relations that were formed between the coroner, the living and the dead.
