Beate Sissenich's book is about mechanisms and limits of cross-national rule transfer by international bodies. It investigates the ability of the European Union to transfer its social policy rules to Poland and Hungary in conjunction with their accession in 2004. The main thesis of the book is that the success of rule transfer, even when power is uneven between rulemakers and rule takers, hinges on two key domestic factors: strong state capacity and vibrant interest organization (pp. 5, 16).

The argument is developed on the basis of a detailed study of rule transfer in social policy. Sissenich focuses on two aspects of EU social policy: 1) secondary legislation (to be implemented by national governments) on workplace health and safety, equal treatment, labor relations, and the like and 2) social dialogue, a procedure for peak-level consultation between European-level employer and labor organizations that may result in legally binding agreements. Hence, an important aspect of rule transfer is the intended activation of nonstate interest organizations.

Rule transfer can follow both or either of two mechanisms: (rationalist) conditionality and (constructivist) social learning. EU accession and the field of social policy are presented as “most likely cases” for rule transfer as they combine “access conditionality, rapid postcommunist transformation, legal prescriptions for nonstate-actor involvement, and a range of policy elements conducive to either conditionality or social learning” (p. 19). The paired comparison case study of rule adoption in Poland and Hungary draws on a variety of solid data sources, both qualitative and quantitative: Sissenich employs semistructured interviews, surveys, government reports, and negotiation statements, and she analyzes cross-border relations among organizations in the EU social policy field through systematic network analysis.

The study tackles two key questions of broader interest. First, how effective is rule transfer toward accession states, considering the favorable conditions of power asymmetry, the highly integrated nature of the EU, and the relatively advanced status of the two target countries? Sissenich demonstrates that rule adoption of EU social and labor policy in Poland and Hungary has been largely formal, superficial, or incomplete, in particular with regard to the mobilization of stakeholders under the social dialogue. Second, what are the characteristics of the transnational ties among nonstate actors in both countries, EU institutions, and national governments, ties that underpin policymaking as well as mobilization processes? Social network analysis finds that despite much talk about transnational policy networks, state borders continue to matter: While links of nonstate actors to EU institutions and to governments are well developed, direct, cross-border communication is scarce. Intergovernmental links dominate, and there is no evidence that nonstate actors, in particular labor, have sought to leverage the EU to advance their domestic interests.

To explain why EU accession has remained an elite-driven, intergovernmental process, Sissenich turns to national politics. She argues that the weakness of civil society organization and interest mediation in transition economies combines with an underdeveloped state capacity to meaningfully implement EU social policy provision.

This book provides a fascinating case study of the limits of rule transfer in the highly integrated EU context. Consistently and clearly argued, and built on impressive empirical material, it creatively draws on and contributes to several scholarly debates dealing with such topics as EU integration and policymaking, cross-national rule transfer and adoption, postcommunist transition in Europe, and the role of nonstate actors in international organizations. Arguably, the book's most original contribution is the social network analysis of ties between various state and nonstate actors in EU social policy. Sissenich's findings on the resilience of borders challenge some tenets of the EU transnational policy networks literature, and it will be interesting to see if these findings hold for other policy areas, and also for links among old member states. In this way, the book not simply makes a strong argument but also lays the ground for further inquiry.

Inevitably, an ambitious study like the one presented by Sissenich rarely comes without weaknesses. To begin with, the study is not easy to navigate for readers without any background in EU integration and EU social policy. Very much driven by theoretical concerns and deductive reasoning (which is laudable), the author sometimes neglects to feed the reader with sufficient background information to be able to appreciate the argument. For example, the contours of EU social policy are only introduced very briefly (pp. 33–34).

An obvious limitation of the study is that this is a snapshot of a process still very much in flux. With the progress of transition processes, one could argue, both state capacity and civil society organization and involvement will evolve, and transnational ties may develop beyond limited intergovernmental linkages.

The most important limitation of the study's contribution to the literature on rule transfer resides in case selection, however. As acknowledged on several occasions by the author, social policy and social dialogue in particular lacked political salience in the broader accession picture. Unlike the issue of labor mobility between old and new member states, for example, it was neither a priority for the rulemakers nor for the rule takers. In the midst of radical economic and social transformation, it is, therefore, not surprising that these concerns elicited little stakeholder involvement or government attention to implementation, quite independent of state capacity and civil society strength. In short, actors, including labor, did not care enough about this arena to invest attention and resources, not because they were weak but because expected payoffs looked slim. And corporations and employers had little incentive (or pressure) anyway to push for social policy expansion in a general climate of market-liberal transformation.

In addition, other rule systems, such as single market rules and competition law and policy, could be considered more relevant to the broader success of EU rule transfer, as the EU continues to have market creation and not market correction as its core. Furthermore, the relevance of the lack of civil society involvement needs to be put into context: While it is constitutive of rule transfer in the particular case of social dialogue, it may be much less important for success in many other areas of institution building. In sum, social policy may not be the best testing ground to gauge conditions for rule transfer. Put differently, the outcome of failed rule transfer in this case is overdetermined, and more proximate explanations are available to account for it.

Despite these limitations, Building States without Society is an important, stimulating contribution to the comparative and European politics literature, breaking new ground in the study of transnational policy networks and nonstate actors.