This book collects together papers given at a conference, held in Birmingham in 2008, on the multiple ways in which the uses of our bodies are regulated. This is, as is evident from the variety of subjects discussed here, an exceptionally broad theme, covering embryo research (both human and interspecies); preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD); cosmetic surgery; elective amputation and self-harming practices. Margaret Brazier's masterful introduction pulls together themes from these diverse and eclectic papers, the most basic of which is that our bodies are inevitably implicated in almost everything that we do. Those of us who work in universities hire out our brains to our employers, but we also rely on a range of lowlier bodily functions in order to propel us to the lecture theatre, communicate with students and operate a computer.
The moral and legal status of the embryo, and the uses to which it can legitimately be put, is at the heart of several of the essays collected here. Mary Ford's chapter dissects a number of different approaches to this thorny question and argues persuasively that we are on much surer ground when we describe what the embryo or foetus is not (i.e. it is not a person, but it is also ‘not nothing’), than when we try to describe what it is. The reason for this may be that it is impossible to find a ‘one size fits all’ label for an entity whose status varies. For pregnant women, happily anticipating the imminent birth of a child, there is no doubt that the 36-week-old foetus is regarded as an unborn baby. Few women take home images from the 20-week scan in order to show friends and family their ‘foetus’. To them it is a baby, and the fact that the law does not regard a child as coming into being until birth is frankly neither here nor there.
A frozen embryo – stored following IVF treatment – has an especially ambiguous status. To its would-be parents, it is undoubtedly their potential child, and not simply a ‘ball of cells’. It was this status of ‘child in waiting’ that was at the heart of the acrimonious and sad dispute between Natallie Evans and Howard Johnston. For Ms Evans, the six frozen embryos were irreplaceable, representing her only chance of having a genetically related child. To Mr Johnston, they were the product of a relationship that had ended, and his desire not to have a genetically related child with his ex-partner was, in accordance with the ‘bright-line’ consent provisions of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, permitted to trump Ms Evans's interest in using the embryos.
Sonia Harris-Short's chapter suggests two alternative ways in which a dispute like this might be resolved. First, she points out that the interests of the embryo itself were given short shrift by all of the courts which considered the matter. It was a dispute between the two people whose consent was necessary to the use of an embryo, as if the embryo were indeed a ‘thing’, in which the conflicting quasi-proprietary rights of its ‘producers’ had to be resolved. Harris-Short suggests that when the gamete providers agree, the interests of the embryo are not strong enough to trump an agreement to dispose of the embryo or donate it to research. But, she argues, in a finely balanced dispute between the parties, the embryo's independent interests – which will almost always be to be transferred to a woman's uterus rather than to be disposed of – should be allowed to tip the balance. In reality, this would simply reverse the current hierarchy: if the embryo's independent interests were allowed to tip the balance in a dispute over use, the party who wished to use an embryo would almost always have priority. This could, of course, lead to difficulties if the person seeking to use the embryo is the male partner: he would clearly not be able to force his now unwilling ex-partner to carry the embryos on his behalf. Rather his ‘right’ to use the embryos would be contingent upon finding a willing surrogate mother who would be prepared to carry the pregnancy to term.
Harris-Short's second suggestion is that we should allow private ordering in relation to these disputes, meaning that someone should be able to agree, in advance, that they relinquish any right to veto the subsequent use of embryos if the couple later split up. Harris-Short rightly points out that the HFEA's consent forms already require patients to decide, in advance, what should happen to their embryos in the event of their death or incapacity. Why not have another box on the form dealing with what would happen in the event of divorce or separation, in effect, a ‘pre-nup’ for embryos? Of course, many of the objections to enforcing pre-nuptial contracts might apply here. Circumstances are likely to have changed, for example, and it may be unfair to hold people to agreements made when they were unaware of subsequent events – such as infertility-inducing treatment for cancer – which would have altered their willingness to be bound.
Harris-Short points out a further possible objection to this sort of contractual ordering, namely that couples who are contemplating their future separation might appear – to a clinic like the one that treated Natallie Evans – to be indicating that they believe their relationship to be unstable, which might be held against them when the clinic carries out its ‘welfare of the child’ assessment. In my view, the clinic in this case was manifestly wrong to suggest that if Natallie Evans had sought to use donor sperm or egg freezing, this would have given grounds for concern about her relationship with Mr Johnston. Anyone who thinks that contemplating future separation marks someone out as an unfit parent does not live in the real world. On the contrary, potential parents who believe that there is a 100 per cent certainty that they will stay together for the rest of their lives are – while cheeringly romantic – perhaps rather naive.
Heather Widdows's chapter is also concerned with the use of embryos, but this time in relation to PGD. She argues that the use of technologies like PGD might lead to the commodification of children, in which we set conditions for the sort of child we want, rather than taking, gladly, whatever we are given. Perhaps curiously, the examples she uses of people striving to achieve clever, tall, male offspring, and beautiful girls, involve the selection of donors, where there is clearly both as much and as little chance that they will take after the gamete donor as there is in natural reproduction. It is unlikely that PGD could ever be used for conditions like height, beauty and intelligence, partly because there is no single ‘gene for’ these sorts of multifactorial traits, and as we understand more about epigenetics, the idea that it is all ‘in our genes’ is looking decidedly unpromising. In addition, in one cycle of IVF, a couple will not produce enough embryos to engage in a search for a wide range of genes. The reality of PGD is that it is gruelling, time-consuming and expensive, and pregnancy rates are low.
Marie Fox tackles an entirely different use of embryos – for research purposes – and she describes an especially interesting aspect of the process of reforming the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990, namely the government's u-turn on animal − human hybrid embryos. From the government's initial opposition, and consequent decision that the HFE Bill would prohibit the creation and use of cytoplasmic hybrid embryos in research, an extraordinarily well-organised campaign, co-ordinated by the Science Media Centre, persuaded them to change their mind. In the end, the new legislation not only permitted the creation of ‘cybrids’ – created using cell nuclear replacement, so that the stem cells extracted would be almost 100 per cent human – but also ‘true hybrids’, where there would be equal contribution of animal and human DNA.
For many commentators, the government's change of heart is a success story, demonstrating the power of rational argument and persuasion. For Marie Fox, on the other hand, there is a darker side to this. Opposition to the creation of hybrids was portrayed as irrational, uneducated or anti-science. The HFEA's public consultation on the issue demonstrated that people were generally initially hostile to the creation of hybrids, but that when they understood why scientists wanted to do this sort of research, and the sort of benefits that might flow from it, they were more supportive. This was seized upon as evidence that opposition could not be grounded in anything other than a lack of understanding. The existence of objections in principle – not necessarily grounded in religious belief – was thereby downplayed and debate was effectively closed off.
Other chapters in this book deal with the bodies of adults, and what they can legitimately do with them. Robert Smith has had personal involvement with the limits of permissible intervention with the body, as the doctor who carried out two elective amputations of healthy limbs on patients suffering from a species of body integrity identity disorder, described here as amputee identity disorder (AID). This is a condition which manifests itself in a desire to be disabled, so that a person's body corresponds to his internal body image of himself as an amputee. There is some evidence from brain scans that this may be due to an abnormality in the ‘hard wiring in the brain, present since birth’ (p. 148). Robert Smith suggests that there is evidence that successful amputation cures the condition, whereas psychiatric therapy does not. Moreover, sufferers commonly attempt self-amputation in painful and violent ways. Given this, should doctors be prepared to carry out safe, elective amputations of healthy limbs on such patients?
For most of us, the desire to be disabled is profoundly shocking, but it could be argued that this is analogous to gender identity disorder, where a person's body does not fit his internal image, and where treatment is commonly surgery rather than therapy. Of course, changing gender does not harm someone in the way that creating a disability does, but for the AID patient, the amputation does not harm him, but rather benefits him by curing a condition which causes considerable distress and shame. Being an amputee clearly imposes costs on health and social services, but Smith argues that these may be offset by the savings in psychiatric therapy which the ‘cured’ patient no longer undergoes.
The question of what counts as harm is also at the heart of Sullivan's chapter on self-harming practices. Mill's ‘harm principle’ is notoriously vague as to what counts as ‘harm to others’. Is causing the majority of the population profound disgust sufficient to permit the state to prohibit certain practices? The standard liberal answer would be ‘no’. The sado-masochistic activities practised by the defendants in the Brown Footnote 1 case may have shocked people, but, despite the judgment of the House of Lords in that case that consent offered no defence to a charge of assault and unlawful wounding, that does not mean that, in private, consenting adults should not be allowed to engage in such activities. On the other hand, there are practices which the ordinary tolerant liberal may find more challenging, an obvious example being the case of the German man who agreed to be eaten alive and killed. As Sullivan points out, the liberal who wants to retain her laissez-faire attitude to what people do in the privacy of their own homes, but finds the prospect of agreeing to be eaten too much to bear, may try to seek refuge in questioning the volunteer's capacity. But if a competent adult has freely and voluntarily decided to sacrifice himself in this way, we may need to admit that our only ground for intervening is paternalistic concern that someone may not know his own best interests, and that if he is prevented from making this decision, he may in the future be glad of this. Of course, there might also be sound reasons for the criminal law to outlaw the possibility of consent as a defence to a crime where, by definition, the victim is no longer around to verify that he did, in fact, consent to be murdered. Sullivan's suggestion, though, is that the criminal law is inappropriate here. Rather, he would favour some form of civil law confinement with ‘robust review and release procedures’ (p. 232). If, however, after release a person is still determined to engage in some sort of extreme self-harming practice, there is probably little the good liberal can do to stop him.
This is an eclectic collection of essays, on a range of subjects concerning our relationships with our bodies. This book does not attempt to define exactly what this relationship is – do we own our bodies, for example? – rather its contributors tackle much more practical questions about how we should behave in relation to our bodies and the products of our bodies. Given that our relationships with our bodies are at the heart of some of the most difficult current issues in medical law, this book should be welcomed as an interesting and topical contribution to the literature.
