Several recent books attest to the evolution of the foreign and security policy of the Federal Republic of Germany over the two decades since unification in 1990. One set of studies tries to specify the content or identity of German foreign policy, while another set attempts to explain why and how policy has changed from one of semisovereign, reflexive multilateralism to one that exhibits greater self-confidence, even unilateralism (See Beverly Crawford, Power and German Foreign Policy: Embedded Hegemony in Europe, 2007; Hans Christian Kruger, “Review Essay: Current Trends in German Foreign Policy Analysis: A Farewell to Old Ideals?” German Politics and Society, 27 [Spring 2009]: 60–66.) Two new books by Dieter Dettke and Anika Leithner fit into the second type, concerned predominantly with explaining foreign policy changes.
Leithner begins Shaping German Foreign Policy by noting that since 1990, Germany has been caught between opposing influences—normalization tendencies based on the pursuit of national interests and continuity with the previously strong impact of the historical memory of World War II (the lessons of history) on national identity and behavior (pp. 4–5). By the late 1990s, a kind of compromise had emerged in which historical memories were still conditioning in a path-dependent manner, albeit with content significantly modified and adapted to the new circumstances. To test for the continued impact of historical memory on foreign policy, Leithner adopts a linguistic/discursive approach (“thought-talk action” model), which is applied to debates in the German Bundestag concerning proposed military interventions in Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq.
Leithner's first case study analyzes debates about the proposed NATO-led intervention against Serbian actions in Kosovo in 1999. With the aid of a rhetorical map (p. 30), the author shows that the lessons of history, coupled with weak but visible national interests—for example, to preclude a stream of refugees similar to what occurred during the Bosnian crisis—led to a policy course imbued with responsibility toward democratic values, allies, international law, and minority/human rights. Nevertheless, the Kosovo debates show that the notion of responsibility shifted from a traditionally passive to an active variant (p. 46), which justified, even necessitated, military involvement within a multilateral framework. Modified historical memories shifted lessons from “never again war” to “never again genocide.” Next, Leithner turns to discussions in late 2001 over supporting the post–9/11, U.S.-led effort to oust the Taliban from Afghanistan. Once again the notion of responsibility was key, yet this time, politicians emphasized the special relationship with the United States and the solidarity/gratitude that Germany owed its Cold War protector. The mission was eventually approved (through a vote of confidence), with the proviso that deeper socioeconomic causes of terrorism would be addressed. Although she discusses the use of so-called salami tactics—“slowly getting German and foreign audiences used to the idea of a more assertive German foreign policy” (p. 81)—she emphasizes the frequency of historical memory arguments: “It almost seemed as though there were a lesson for every occasion, and a particular democratic duty for every situation Germany has ever found itself in” (p. 80).
The final empirical chapter looks at debates in 2002 and 2003 over the potential war against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. In contrast to the other cases, a cleavage between the government and opposition emerged, with the former forcefully arguing against joining George W. Bush's “coalition of the wiling” and the latter arguing for participation. Both sides “claimed to act on the basis of history [even if] the exact interpretation of those lessons differed significantly” (p. 93). Whereas the government stated that responsibility and democratic values meant maintaining peace, utilizing humanitarian aid and looking for peaceful alternatives, the opposition stressed restoring peace, and maintaining Germany's reliability as an ally and that the disarmament of Hussein could involve force (p. 99). Gerhard Schroeder revealed a willingness to “go it alone” based on a calculus of national interest (“the German way”). Moreover, when the government was forced to choose, it stood by France (and Russia) at the expense of the United States. Leithner intimates that this “turn away from the traditional transatlantic partnership” (p. 120) may have been due to the greater youthfulness of the 15th Bundestag (2002–5), although the evidence is circumstantial.
Leithner concludes that “the rhetorical maps in all debates were largely identical” (p. 125). Substantiating a constructivist stance, memory clearly matters in order to understand German foreign policy, even though the interpretations of the lessons have evolved and are determined intersubjectively in each instance. Several taboos fell in the decade after unification—most importantly the prohibition of Bundeswehr deployment, but also inhibitions concerning discussions of the memory of German suffering from the end and aftermath of World War II or expressions of national pride. Interests and the lessons of history are now diverging because of generational changes and the transformed geopolitical reality, so that interests increasingly trump the lessons of history: “German foreign policy will become more self-assured and pragmatic” (p. 148) and much less Atlanticist.
Although Leithner demonstrates the prevalence of memory-based arguments in Bundestag debates, she does not provide contextualization into the wider memory and political discourses. Moreover, she does not convincingly demonstrate that memory (or other cultural) variables explain foreign policy attitudes and outcomes better than other interest- or institutional-based explanations. She repeatedly alludes to generational change and an increasingly self-confident pursuit of self-interest, but the evidence cited does not adequately support these explanations. The book also contains several factual errors and/or misprints; for example, the Historians' Debate was in the mid-1980s not the 1990s (p. 1); Helmut Kohl was born in 1930, not the 1940s (p. 132).
Germany Says No thoroughly describes the postunification evolution of German foreign policy especially during the Schroeder chancellorship (1998–2005). Dettke begins by recounting Red-Green efforts to come to terms with the past, a process of “self liberation” (p. 25) that enabled the country finally to focus on coming to terms with its future (p. 1). He stresses the process of “normalization,” which does not imply forgetting the Nazi past or rehabilitating noxious nationalism. Rather, current postmodern circumstances mean that the notion of normalcy is shifting with the times toward the emergence of a responsible foreign policy “commensurate with its economic weight” (p. 3). With Germany's new, healthy national pride, deeply internalized sense of responsibility, and acceptance of its need to lead, the lessons from the past have changed. Echoing Leithner, there has been a shift from “never again war” to “never again Auschwitz”—that the country could become guilty again by not acting: “[T]he civilian power paradigm … was turning out to be morally unsustainable” (p. 75). Policymakers are thus embracing a “defensive structural” (p. 15) or “cosmopolitan” (p. 48) realism, leading to a synthesis of Europeanization/multilateralism with global great-power bilateralism. Dettke stresses the strong support from the George H. W. Bush administration for unification (in contrast to the actions of other European powers) and the lingering debt of gratitude that petered out by the Iraq crisis. A strong section on the relationship with Russia recounts Schroeder's leadership in reinvigorating the relationship and managing Russian sensitivities over NATO and European Union expansion—rapprochement through interdependence (p. 217).
Dettke's empirical chapters begin with the first Gulf War during which Germany continued a “without me” policy of checkbook diplomacy (p. 72). This “pacifistic otherness” did not meet new international expectations that the unified country would have to behave differently, a reaction that prompted Helmut Kohl to pursue a policy of continuity (for domestic audiences) and change (internationally). Later, in response to allies' efforts to restore peace in the Balkans, several Constitutional Court decisions reinterpreted the Basic Law to allow the Bundeswehr to participate in out-of-area missions (p. 85). All of this paved the way for the country's participation in the NATO-led intervention against Slobodan Milosevic in Kosovo in 1999—although this was extremely divisive, especially within the new Red-Green coalition. This policy course was made more palatable by exhausting diplomatic means, emphasizing aid, strengthening the European level, and utilizing carefully crafted United Nations Security Council mandates. Dettke includes a useful overview of postunification reforms to the Bundeswehr aimed at addressing the persistent transatlantic capability gap, increasing defense spending and troop levels (currently around 150,000), modernizing the forces (creating a rapid reaction force), and increasing Europeanization—even if much more progress is needed and “a change in Europe's strategic culture appears necessary in order to create a credible military force” (p. 114).
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks produced deep shock in Germany, prompting policy changes at the domestic (antiterrorism measures), UN, and European levels, as well as debates about the nature of the terrorist threat (“new” versus old/societal terrorism), asymmetric warfare, and the appropriate policy balance between coercion and diplomacy. After much controversy, the Bundeswehr joined both Operation Enduring Freedom and the International Security Assistance Force (peacemaking and peacekeeping operations) in a paradigm-shifting deployment. Nevertheless, “Germany always saw its Afghanistan commitment more in terms of a civilian reconstruction mission than a military commitment” (p. 134). Much changed a year later when the George W. Bush administration started to prepare for an invasion of Iraq. Schroeder had many conflicting pressures and considerations, including his desire to create a more independent policy profile, a “German Way” (p. 174); almost consensual domestic opposition to the war (pacifism, anti-Bush sentiment shading into anti-Americanism); winning the fall 2002 election (and keeping the center-left coalition together); and possibly having to choose between two close allies' preferences. “Germany did not want to be put in a position of having to choose between France and the United States,” writes Dettke. “All German chancellors before Schroeder had avoided such a choice, but Schroeder was willing to make a different choice” (p. 178). In any case, he chose to oppose Bush's Iraq policy—a stance that probably won him reelection, but at the expense of the worst period of German-U.S. relations since 1945, as well as the collapse of pan-European solidarity. Bush felt personally betrayed by Schroeder, who had promised to stand by the United States in the war on terror. Schroeder was unconvinced that toppling Hussein's regime was part of this struggle (see Gerhard Schroeder, Entscheidungen: Mein Leben in der Politik, 2007); George W. Bush, Decision Points, 2010)
In the future, Germany faces numerous challenges: to build trust abroad, now as a normal “complete” European power; to adjust to norms surrounding “the responsibility to protect;” to foster the acquis democratique; to help rehabilitate the U.S. and more general Western image; and to embrace the “new culture of realism” (p. 239). The Red-Green government “legitimately sought to liberate Germany not only from the past but also from the lack of inner freedom associated with its sense of obligation to other nations” (pp. 240–41). Germany, as a commercial and trading nation, must lead in this process of renewal and, while maintaining its anchor in the transatlantic community, can become a bridge to the “world without the West.”
Despite Dettke's narrative achievement, the book has several shortcomings. First, his overview of the various foreign policy paradigms is incomplete and noncommittal. He appears to have adopted a realist, interest-based approach for explaining policy change, but this is often difficult to discern and is not consistently applied. Second is the author's often uncritical stance towards Schroeder. This is understandable, inasmuch as Dettke was the head of the Social Democrats' Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Washington for many years, but a more balanced examination of the Red-Green government's tenure and the chancellor's leadership in particular would have been desirable. Third, like the Leithner book, the focus on foreign policy is divorced from larger developments in domestic and partisan politics, institutions (the Foreign Office, foundations, and think tanks), and other bilateral influences (the UK). These are minor points, however, and should not take away from Dettke's overall success: comprehensive description and penetrating insights from a seasoned observer of German foreign policy and the transatlantic relationship.
