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Anticommunist White Ethnics in Search of True Americanness: Ideas and Alliances in the 1950s–1970s

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  21 August 2013

IEVA ZAKE
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Abstract

This study explores the ways in which certain groups of white ethnics understood the idea of the un-American between the 1950s and the 1970s. Their definition of the un-American was determined by their perception of true Americanness, which in turn was connected to their anticommunist beliefs. Such an understanding of true Americanness helped these white ethnics build political alliances, particularly with the Republican Party. However, by the mid-1970s, the white anticommunist ethnics found themselves outside of the political mainstream, with anticommunism a heavy ideological burden to carry. The article is based on archival materials from presidential libraries and sources from within the ethnic communities themselves.

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Type
Un-American Articles
Information
Journal of American Studies , Volume 47 , Issue 4: The “Un-American” , November 2013, pp. 1065 - 1080
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2013 

INTRODUCTION

This study explores the ways in which certain groups of white ethnics understood the idea of the un-American between the 1950s and the 1970s. As demonstrated here, their definition of the un-American was determined by their perception of true Americanness, which in turn was tightly connected to their staunch anticommunism. Such an understanding of true Americanness helped these white ethnics build certain political alliances and led them to occupy what was, at first, a relatively privileged position within the Republican Party. However, their links to the American political establishment did not last. By the time that Nixon's strategy of the silent majority had been developed, anticommunist white ethnics found themselves outside the political mainstream. In other words, their position and ideas on un-Americanism and on true Americanness were a political resource at first and heavy political baggage later on.

The actors discussed in this paper were a part of the population of the so-called white ethnics – groups that consisted of predominately Central and Eastern European ancestry. The term “white ethnics” has been widely used by scholars, politicians and ethnic groups themselves to identify the presence of ethnic identification among racially white Americans who did not fall into the category of the WASPs. Sociologist Irving Horowitz made it very clear that there was a difference in the US between “minorities” and “ethnics,” not only in terms of racial identification, but also political alliances and cultural attitudes.Footnote 1 Others who explicitly discussed white ethnics included Louis Gerson and Perry Weed, who analyzed the dynamic political role of Italians, the Irish, Poles, Lithuanians and Latvians and other Eastern and Central Europeans.Footnote 2 In the political realm, Nixon's reelection campaign was a particularly notable effort of going after the votes of the white ethnic – the “unmeltables,” as Michael Novak called them in his highly influential book.Footnote 3 Andrew Greeley's research and activism promoted a concept of white Catholic ethnics as a distinct political force.Footnote 4 He was interested in Italian Americans, Polish Americans, the Greeks, the Irish and other European descent groups as a unique voting bloc. It should be noted that groups placed under the category of “white ethnics” actually embraced the term, especially when trying to gain influence in the American political mainstream.

However, not all white ethnics had the same political goals and visions, as will be demonstrated here, where the prime focus is on Poles, Ukrainians, Latvians, Lithuanians, Estonians, Hungarians, Romanians, Bulgarians, Czechs and Slovaks, and other smaller groups from Central, Eastern and Southern Europe, such as Cossacks, Silesians, Serbs, Slovenes, Byelorussians, Croats and Armenians. A number of characteristics made this group of ethnics distinct from other white ethnics – they had experienced the transformative influx of post-World War II refugees fleeing from the Communist takeover of their homelands (the so-called captive European nations), and they had strong anticommunist political beliefs. Other white ethnics (“the silent majority,” as discussed by Greeley and Novak) tended to come from the Catholic urban working class and focused on domestic- as opposed to foreign-policy issues. As noted, the Republican Party recognized the anticommunist white ethnics' political potential and, calling them “nationalities” or “heritage groups,” actively tried to incorporate them into the party's political structure, especially in the 1950s and 1960s. However, as the American political context began to shift toward détente, the anticommunist ethnics were falling out of political favor and by the mid-1970s they found themselves on the margins of Republican politics.

This study mainly draws on archival materials from the Immigration History Research Center at University of Minnesota, Richard Nixon's papers in the US National Archives and Gerald Ford's Presidential Library. The sources include a variety of political materials developed by the ethnic communities, their communication with the American political establishment and internal documents from the presidential administrations of Nixon and Ford. Naturally, these materials do not represent a full survey of all political sentiments inside the ethnic communities discussed here, and there have always been many dissenting voices among them. Nevertheless, these sources provide a valuable glimpse into the dominant political ideas of, and perceptions among, anticommunist white ethnics.

WHITE ETHNICS AND THE IDEA OF UN-AMERICANISM

The anticommunist white ethnics' understanding of un-Americanism did not develop in a vacuum. It was naturally affected by the political conflicts and rhetoric of the American political realm. However, these ethnic groups put their own “spin” on the notion of what was un-American. Their approach included, first, opposition to the dismissive understanding of un-Americanism as an invented political concept. Instead, they favored views according to which un-Americanism was a real threat to the American way of life. Second, anticommunist white ethnics' perceptions of what was un-American were deeply connected to their understanding of what counted as truly American. Third, to them, true Americanness inevitably contained an element of anticommunism, so they made a direct link between anticommunism and opposition to un-American ideas and activities.

Un-Americanism as a real threat

A majority of the anticommunist white ethnics strongly rejected the definition of un-Americanism that formed in the post-McCarthy era and treated “un-Americanism” as a political fiction. According to this perspective, un-Americanism had been generated by hysterical and narrow-minded chauvinists who wanted to exclude everything and everyone who was different from them. In other words, “un-Americanism” was a mere tool of political rhetoric. In the most extreme cases of this perspective, the meaning of “un-Americanism” was solely linked to McCarthy and activities of the committees (both state and federal) that investigated Communist infiltration and sought “to make America over in its image.”Footnote 5 This approach argued that McCarthy and the House Committee on Un-American Activities (HUAC) were themselves un-American, not the alleged evildoers that they pursued. The fight against un-Americanism was essentially a direct attack on labor unions, the political left, Democrats, socialists, liberals and feminists, and an attempt to build up political sentiments for the victory of conservative Republicans.Footnote 6 According to this view, the hunt for un-Americanism and un-Americans was all about a “partisan politics” that did not involve any deeper understanding of what was American and what was un-American.Footnote 7

Anticommunist white ethnics deeply disagreed with this position. Their ideas were more aligned with an understanding of un-Americanism as a descriptor of actions by people who were in fact a real threat to the American nation, state and way of life as defined by the American Constitution and Declaration of Independence. They agreed with William Buckley's defense of HUAC as a necessary measure in the context of the post-World War II political situation and looming Soviet aggression.Footnote 8 According to this position, HUAC's investigations were uncovering facts, not delusions, and there was an actual Communist conspiracy in the US to worry about. Participation in procommunist or Communist-supported activities constituted un-Americanism because it was an anti-American action. Although the opponents of HUAC argued that the free market of ideas could eventually eliminate the Communist influence in the US, Buckley warned that this was wishful thinking: “the Communists do not, not any longer at least, compete in that market; their business is not persuasion but subversion.” Therefore Americans had to collect information about the Communists' un-American activities in the most “widely dispersed investigation” that could generate a comprehensive picture of Communist intentions and methods. According to Buckley, any nation was entitled to a chance to define what movements and ideas constituted a threat, and to discipline them.Footnote 9

The anticommunist white ethnics generally agreed with this understanding of un-Americanism as a true threat. Therefore, when HUAC visited, for example, Minneapolis to hold a hearing about the growth of the Communist influence in the state of Minnesota in the mid-1960s, the anticommunist white ethnics there mobilized in defense of the committee and its goals. They created an organization called the Council for the Liberation of Captive Peoples from Soviet Domination, which claimed to represent “about 8,000 Minnesotans, victims of the worldwide Communist conspiracy.” It was led by a Latvian émigré, Eriks Dundurs. On 22 June 1964, just before the arrival of the HUAC in Minneapolis, the council met for an extraordinary session and prepared a press release:

We welcome the House Committee on Un-American Activities to Minneapolis as an investigative body which brings no charges against anyone and persecutes no one. Therefore all Minnesotans, whether of liberal or conservative persuasion, should unite to assist the Committee to bring out the full truth at its public hearing in Minneapolis June 24 to 26. Any attempt to interfere or hinder the work of the Committee is a disservice to our democratic process of ascertaining the facts in order to assist Congress – the representative of the people – to frame the proper legislation to strengthen American security, safeguard our liberty and freedom and assure progress of the American way of life. We are sure that the majority of Minnesotans will join us in welcoming the Committee to Minneapolis. The minority, of Communists, fellow-travelers, ill-informed and misguided citizens who oppose the Committee and are spreading lies and distortions about it, should be put on notice by all well-informed and freedom-loving Americans, that no matter what their intentions and deeds, the Committee will prevail and with it a strong and free America.Footnote 10

According to the white ethnics who supported this statement, HUAC was ultimately a defender of freedom and as such deserved to be respected and taken seriously. At the same time, those who attempted to subvert or resist its activities were not friends of the American nation as a whole. The white ethnics did not see HUAC as an oppressive government instrument that abused authority, but rather as a justifiable tool needed to protect democracy.

Later the same year, Erik Dundurs published an article in the journal Means which was intended as a polemic against a vehement local opponent of HUAC Denis Wadley. While Wadley's article consisted of a detailed description of HUAC's hearings in Minneapolis emphasizing particularly their blunders, mistakes and overstatements,Footnote 11 Dundurs's article was short and formal, and at least a half of it consisted of the press release mentioned above. Dundurs stated that the committee's hearings had shown the existence of “intricate and subtle plans of the Communist Party to infiltrate our institutions of Higher Learning,” while the subpoenaed witnesses had often acted contemptuously and in a collective conspiracy. Therefore, he claimed, the hearings of HUAC showed that “additional remedial legislation” was needed in order to “curb the conspiratory activities of the Communist Party of the United States and its members.” While Wadley brought up examples of how badly HUAC had handled the legal side of its process, Dundurs insisted that its hearings had been characterized by “high standards, fairness, objectivity and unpretentious conduct.”Footnote 12

Both Wadley and Dundurs spoke from politically driven positions and neither seemed interested in a true debate. Dundurs's perspective wholly rested in the conviction that there were real communists threatening freedom in the US and that un-Americanism was malicious and prevalent. He was speaking from a position of a recent émigré who actually had a firsthand experience with the Communist regime. Moreover, many of the anticommunist émigrés from Eastern and Central Europe were direct targets of the covert operations of the Communist regimes. There is historical evidence that the Communist intelligence and security organizations paid much attention to these anticommunist communities and attempted to use them as channels for intelligence activities against the US.Footnote 13 Undoubtedly, such experiences greatly influenced Dundurs's perceptions on HUAC's role and mission.

Wadley, on the other hand, focused on “informers” – those who “spied” for the government and showed up as witnesses to spread smears about their neighbors. Those willing to work with HUAC were either FBI agents or “former Communists, refugees from Communist countries, or just freelance rightwingers with axes to grind.”Footnote 14 Clearly, Wadley and his supporters meant people like Dundurs. Indeed, archival documents showed that Dundurs received substantial hate mail after publicizing his position. He was accused of opposing Americans and not understanding the situation because he was an immigrant and a refugee.

True Americanness

Importantly, both sides in cases like Dundurs versus Wadley saw themselves as fighters for freedom. Wadley opposed the government and its agents such as HUAC as forces that corrupted American society. Dundurs looked at the American government as the last guarantee of freedom from worldwide Communist oppression. Wadley and his supporters thought that they were fighting to protect democracy. Dundurs and other anticommunist ethnics perceived themselves as true patriots affirming the democratic principles of the American system. Anticommunist ethnics completely rejected hints that they were not “American enough.” In fact, they were convinced that they were the only true Americans left in the US.

In their view, they were Americans not only because they were pro-American, but also because they were deeply invested in preserving their ethnic identity. According to anticommunist ethnics, to be an American meant having an ethnic identity outside one's American sense of belonging. For example, the Ukrainian community prided itself in having raised “three generations of American-born Ukrainians” who had been taught

by the parents, the church, and various cultural and educational institutions to believe that it was their almost sacred obligation to speak Ukrainian, to preserve their ethnic heritage, and to combat Communism. Doing this, they were taught, was good for the United States as well as for Ukraine.Footnote 15

Thus, while remaining committed to their ethnic heritage and identity, the white ethnics saw no contradiction in their claim that they were the most loyal and reliable citizens of this country. As the president of the Croatian American National Congress, I. B. Dzinich, wrote to US President Ford, “the Ethnics are loyal citizens of this great country, served and still serving in American Army and under American Flagg [sic] all over the world never involved in any unconstitutional activity, militancy etc.”Footnote 16 They argued that they were immigrants and refugees “in a classically American way (a flight from the repression of the Old World to the freedom of the New)” and they nurtured both forms of patriotism – for their homeland and for America.Footnote 17

Their understanding of Americanness combined loyalty to the United States, a powerful sense of belonging to their ethnic roots and revulsion towards those who saw one's identity as incompatible with Americanness. This is why a Czech ethnic activist, Sonia Havelka, wrote to the Heritage Groups (Nationalities) Council of the Republican National Committee that ethnics who had arrived in the United States were “fully aware of the following facts: 1. This is an Anglo-Saxon country (majority of population, laws, customs, etc.); 2. The one and only official language is English.” The ethnic, according to Havelka, did not become an “ethnic-American or any other kind of hyphenated American. He becomes an American. A citizen of the United States of America.” Therefore, from Havelka's point of view, ideas such as introducing bilingual education or Spanish as the second official language or ethnic and racial groups refusing to celebrate the Bicentennial of the United States were an appalling travesty that did not make sense.Footnote 18 For anticommunist white ethnics, racial and ethnic diversity in the US was not in conflict with the basic facts about the American nation, culture and form of government. They openly favored ethnic diversity and cultural pluralism, but they were also strictly opposed to diminishing Americanism.

A telling manifestation of this understanding of Americanness was the ethnics' preparations and events during the Bicentennial celebration of the US in 1976. The ethnics enthusiastically organized week-long celebrations with exhibitions, lectures, cultural events and social gatherings that all told the story of the ethnic experience in the US as undoubtedly and fundamentally American. Armenians in Massachusetts spent four days in April with a traveling exhibition that displayed historical research about this community in the US.Footnote 19 The Armenian Bicentennial Commemoration Committee mounted a bronze sculpture in Philadelphia depicting Armenian national mythology and historical events. The goal of commissioning the sculpture and displaying it was to show the Armenian community's gratitude and sense of belonging to the American people.Footnote 20 The Polish community in New York held a Memorial Day at the United States Military Academy at West Point to honor General Thaddeus Kosciuszko as a true American and to thank “Almighty God for the manifold blessings and grace that have come to our people in the United States.”Footnote 21

These types of celebration were meant to demonstrate that the anticommunist white ethnics truly appreciated the US, but that they also wanted to be noticed for their significant contributions to this country's development. Pride and patriotism characterized the white ethnics' attitude toward the US, which they openly contrasted with the attitudes of other, less patriotic groups in the US. The anticommunist white ethnics' understanding of themselves as true Americans was partially built on a conflict with the ethnic and racial minorities who, according to the white ethnics, were critical because they had failed to appreciate the US. For example, Havelka's note was particularly aimed at groups who voiced a sentiment that they could not “celebrate,” but only “commemorate,” the Bicentennial. Un-patriotic or anti-American attitudes of this kind were held to be explicitly un-American, from the point of view of the anticommunist white ethnics.

At the same time, these ethnics worried that the American government had become too responsive to the demands of its critics instead of appreciating its true supporters. It was unfair that the needs of white ethnics were ignored, while the government's attention was constantly on racial minorities and their problems. This had led to ethnic divisiveness and each ethnic community trying carve out something for itself only, which threatened the unity of American nationhood.

Un-Americanism as anticommunism

Finally, what separated the white ethnics from American minorities was their notion that being a true American meant opposing communism. Anticommunism played a huge role in the ethnics' self-understanding of true Americanism as opposed to un-Americanism.Footnote 22 In their mind, it was inconceivable that one could be a loyal American while being supportive of, or even neutral on, communism. Naturally, white ethnics were highly concerned about the fate of their countries of origin under Communist regimes. But they also argued that fighting communism was a truly American thing to do. Unwillingness to liberate, along with America, other parts of the world from communism was an un-American position.

For example, the pastor of a Polish Catholic church in Chicago wrote to President Ford in the 1970s demanding that the US free occupied Europeans from communism. He claimed that Americans had the obligation to fight international communism because it was a truly American characteristic not to distinguish between their freedom and the freedom of others.Footnote 23 A similar view of the relationship between anticommunism and true Americanness was formed by some of the Polish organizations. One of the most respected Polonia groups – the Polish American Congress – argued that communism was a threat to both Poland and the US, and therefore to be a true domestic patriot meant fighting communism internationally (Pienkos 2009). The openly anticommunist Romanian community became deeply concerned about Communist penetration of their community during the 1970s and asked the US government for protection. They argued that by defending its own society against Communist infiltration, it was also fighting communism globally. This was America's obligation and responsibility.Footnote 24

Unsurprisingly then, anticommunist white ethnics were in favor of building up American military strength. For example, in a statement regarding American foreign policy in 1976, the Czechoslovak National Council of America made it clear that, “speaking for Americans of Czech and Slovak descent, [it] fully supports a strong United States.”Footnote 25 Military power would enable the US to fight worldwide Communist threats, which was a response of true Americanism.

RELATIONS WITH THE AMERICAN POLITICAL SYSTEM

What political opportunities and difficulties did this understanding of the American versus the un-American create for anticommunist white ethnics? At first, it granted them a fairly privileged position in the Republican Party, specifically its “Nationalities” or later “Heritage Groups” Division. Anticommunist ethnics became interested in the Republican side of American politics after the Yalta agreement. They felt that Democrats had fundamentally failed in the struggle against communism, while Republicans appeared to have taken on the mantle of anticommunism. Thus, for a certain period in American political history, groups of white ethnics and Republicans shared one understanding of true Americaness and un-Americanism. This political cooperation culminated in the election of Richard Nixon as President and went downhill from there.

In general, Republicans were latecomers to the idea of attracting the so-called ethnic vote. Democrats had been focused on getting the ethnic vote already since the 1930s. During President Truman's campaign in 1948 the Democrats had already established a permanent Nationalities Division within the Democratic National Committee.Footnote 26 It achieved a notable degree of influence that was acknowledged both inside and outside the party. During the campaigns of 1956 and 1960, Democrats pursued ethnic groups by organizing state-level conferences and carrying out surveys where the ethnics were consulted about the issues they would like to see included on the election platform.Footnote 27 Based on the results, Democrats became convinced that ethnic groups were primarily interested in domestic issues such as Social Security and only secondarily in foreign affairs such as Communist domination in Eastern and Central Europe.Footnote 28 During J. F. Kennedy's campaign, the Democratic Party tried to make white ethnic groups feel “that they were a part of the national structure” and “had important people to whom to report their conclusions.”Footnote 29 Thus Democrats tried to pull the ethnics in as advisers so that, by 1960, there were already twenty-nine different language sections within the Democratic Nationalities Division.

On the Republican side, there was little movement in terms of gaining the ethnic vote apart from making some appeals through the ethnics' public relations and advertising division up until the early 1950s.Footnote 30 Then, the Republican Party began realizing the importance of the ethnic vote, although its efforts in recruiting the ethnics were still uneven. At first, Republicans created state-level campaign committees and the Nationalities Division within the Republican National Committee (RNC). Both of these structures were activated only during the election seasons. In addition, to create ethnics-oriented materials, Republicans collected recommendations from their liaisons in different ethnic groups. The resulting statements were tailored for each separate group, which occasionally led to situations where Republicans ended up making contradictory pronouncements to please different groups.Footnote 31 Undoubtedly, this lack of continuity and consistency had a detrimental impact on Republicans' success with the ethnic voters, as became particularly clear during Goldwater's campaign.Footnote 32

During the 1956 campaign, the RNC made a decision to divide its work with ethnic constituencies among three sections – nationalities, ethnic and minorities. The nationalities section worked with the white ethnics, the minority section focused on African Americans, while the ethnic section dealt with Jews.Footnote 33 The Republican Party tried to catch the attention of all types of ethnic voters, but it also inevitably realized that it needed more focus. So, by the time Richard Nixon finally made the Nationalities Division into a permanent structure, it had become clear that Republicans' main ethnic target audience was going to be the anticommunist white ethnics or nationalities.Footnote 34

This development was hardly surprising. Over the years, the Nationalities Division had been very active and managed to evolve into a notable player inside the Republican National Committee. It kept close relations with the ethnic communities;Footnote 35 published a newsletter, GOP Nationalities News; sent its staff to the ethnics' meetings and events; helped the ethnics receive appropriate recognition from the White House; and even created an “ethnic talent search” or “bank” that listed deserving and trustworthy ethnic Republicans who could be appointed to honorary or political positions. It processed complaints and requests from the ethnic groups related to both domestic and foreign-policy issues and delivered them to the White House. The Nationalities Division perceived itself as the ultimate helper of the Administration in terms of advising on the ethnics' concerns, supplying information about the ethnics and mobilizing them in support of the President.Footnote 36 In 1970, to supplement the division's work, the RNC created an additional structure called the Heritage Groups Council with a purpose to recruit and maintain an ethnic volunteer base for the Republican Party.Footnote 37

One of the main actors who helped the Nationalities Division gain prominence in the Republican Party was Laszlo Pasztor. He was a Hungarian émigré who had been working in the Republican National Committee since the 1950s. During the 1960s and 1970s he was at the helm of both the Nationalities Division and the Heritage Groups Council. He had close connections with the post-World War II émigré populations and garnered respect from their leaders. Some of them described Pasztor as “the Hungarian freedom fighter” who had managed to organize the ethnic Republicans into a “politically influential force.”Footnote 38 Pasztor was also a controversial figure. According to some accounts, he had been a member of the Hungarian Arrow Cross – a pro-Nazi organization in Hungary – who after World War II had mysteriously found his way to the US, where he had aimed to set up a pro-fascist émigré network.Footnote 39 He was a convinced anticommunist who persistently pushed Republicans to show as much support as possible to the ethnic groups that were concerned about their Communist-dominated homelands. Pasztor was a full proponent of the ideas of true Americanness as connected to anticommunism, patriotism and militant loyalty to the US. The influence that he accumulated within the Republican Party speaks to the fact that the Republicans at the time were aligned with these white ethnics' political perceptions.

As noted, from the white ethnics' point of view, it made tactical sense to support Republicans in the post-World War II period. For example, Polish Americans' anticommunism and their concern for the fate of Communist-dominated Poland were among the most important factors facilitating their switch from supporting Democrats to Republicans.Footnote 40 When, during the 1960s, a large number of Latvians and other former displaced persons from the Baltics finally obtained American citizenship, they immediately used their newly acquired political influence to align themselves with Republicans in order to promote their explicitly anticommunist agenda.Footnote 41

In 1972, Pasztor suggested that Nixon's administration should establish a National Heritage Day marked by a presidential proclamation. It is hard to miss that his goal was to reaffirm the ideological affinity between the Republicans and the white ethnics. In the proposed text, Pasztor advised Nixon to say that during this day “all Americans will be called upon to reflect on the heritage of America” in order to “stimulate recognition of the fact that this country is a nation of nations, the product of contributions from many national groups.” Pasztor pushed Nixon to stress “the greatness of the United States as a country that encourages its citizenry to be proud of their ethnic heritage.”Footnote 42 On behalf of the anticommunist white ethnics, Pasztor equated Americanism with a focus on ethnic heritage, that is, to be a true American meant reconnecting to one's ethnic roots and supporting one's Communist-dominated homeland. Consequently, as noted before, according to the anticommunist white ethnics, it was un-American to expect that one would give up or deny one's ethnic identity or privilege one's ethnicity over one's Americanness.

Although this position had made ethnics into welcome allies of the Republican Party, with time their political position became controversial. This trend began to emerge during Nixon's administration and it caught ethnics off-guard. They had seen Nixon as a staunch anticommunist and an opponent of un-Americanism defined in their terms. However, the American political context was moving in a different direction and Nixon, while responding to the changes, did not hold on to his promises to white anticommunist ethnics.

Undeniably, on the symbolic level, Nixon had been a major supporter of the white anticommunist ethnics. He had made the Nationalities Division into a permanent structure of the RNC and appointed Mike Balzano as his special assistant on ethnic issues.Footnote 43 He was intently focused on hiring more ethnics into his administration and other high-ranking government jobs.Footnote 44 But at the same time, Nixon was persistently looking to enlarge the parameters of his ethnic politics by recruiting Spanish-speaking groups.Footnote 45 And, as time went on, it became clear that Nixon and his staff distrusted the RNC's Nationalities Division and Heritage Groups Council. To them, these structures appeared ineffective, especially Laszlo Pasztor himself. Nixon came to see him and his associates in the Nationalities Division as too “traditional” in their Republicanism and clueless about the politics of détente.

As late as 1974, the Heritage Groups Council still campaigned on behalf of Nixon,Footnote 46 because they saw him as “the strongest supporting element” for “Americanism and patriotism.”Footnote 47 But already in 1972 Nixon's campaigners had begun pushing the anticommunist ethnic Republicans to the side.Footnote 48 For example, they used the Republican ethnic structures during the pre-election campaign only partially, leaving them to campaign among ethnic groups that Nixon's staff actually did not see as the most important ones. Nixon's campaign organized its own ethnic Citizens' Committees that brought in young and vigorous activists and created new coalitions. Nixon's people did not trust the Republican Party's ethnic constituencies either and secretly tried to control the decisions made by the white ethnic activists. When, in early May 1972, the Heritage Groups Council was planning to hold its second annual convention in Chicago and Laszlo Pasztor wrote to Nixon's staff asking for any resolution recommendations,Footnote 49 White House aide Dick Howard immediately turned to Nixon's special assistant for ethnic affairs Mike Balzano requesting that he take control over this convention to ensure that only positive resolutions about the President were passed.Footnote 50

Moreover, at the end of 1972, Nixon embarked on his strategy of the so-called New Majority as inspired by Michael Novak's writing.Footnote 51 In his mind, there was a notable group of American ethnics willing to focus on the domestic issues of law and order. These were white urban ethnics and Catholics, but not the anticommunist types that were pursued by the Nationalities Division and Heritage Groups Council. Pasztor's ethnics, with their emphasis on anticommunist Republicanism, pro-Americanism and anti-un-Americanism, did not fit into Nixon's plans.Footnote 52 Nixon continued to lose interest in the anticommunist white ethnics to the point where their leaders, who had noticed the shift, began conversations about giving up on the Republican ticket entirely.Footnote 53 Some of them even proposed forming a “third force” outside the two mainstream parties and “composed of American citizens of all these nationalities, whose homelands are enslaved by Russia and communism.”Footnote 54

Pasztor was aware of these trends and warned Nixon's staff about the growing “credibility gap” between the White House and the white anticommunist ethnics, while adding that he himself was considering leaving his political position and returning to private business.Footnote 55 In late January 1973, Pasztor was notified of budget cuts to the ethnic operation inside the RNC by its chairman, George Bush. Pasztor was taken by surprise. He pleaded with Bush not to cut the funding because of “the sensitivity of the ethnics” and the long-lasting and negative effect that this could have on the ethnic base of the Republican Party.Footnote 56 But the restructuring went through. It was a clear indication that white anticommunist ethnic Republicans of the 1950s and 1960s were becoming less valuable to the Republican Party in the 1970s. Unsurprisingly, by mid-1975, Pasztor was the chairman of neither the Heritage Groups Council nor the Nationalities Division.

CONCLUSION

Un-Americanism initially brought anticommunist white ethnics into the Republican Party and its political structures. However, the same understandings of what counted as un-American were also those that led to Nixon gradually begin pushing them aside politically. Being a supporter of HUAC and a persistent anticommunist was no longer a position of consistency, but a position of controversy by the mid-1970s. At the same time, it cannot be denied that Pasztor and anticommunist white ethnics, whom he represented, perceived the Republican Party and its Presidents as vehicles in their efforts to gain inroads into the American political scene. But Nixon wanted to decide about the political usefulness of the white ethnics himself. For the ethnics, this meant that they were to respond to Republican appeals as opposed to taking an active and transformative role inside the Republican Party. This also meant that the connection between their pro-Americanness and their ethnic identity was to be seriously challenged. In the 1950s and 1960s they were able to maintain their political alliances because Republican politics allowed them to think of themselves as Americans, while pursuing their strongly anticommunist and anti-un-American position. After Nixon, the politics of détente and the dramatic changes in American political context, that was becoming more difficult, if not outright impossible.

Footnotes

1 Horowitz, Irving, Foundations of Political Sociology (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1997).

2 Gerson, Louis, The Hyphenate in Recent American Politics and Diplomacy (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1964); and Weed, Perry, The White Ethnic Movement and Ethnic Politics (New York: Praeger Publishers, 1973).

3 Novak, Michael, The Rise of Unmeltable Ethnics (New York: Macmillan, 1972).

4 Greeley, Andrew, Why Can't They Be Like Us? (New York: E. P. Dutton 1971).

5 Fried, Albert, ed., McCarthyism: The Great American Red Scare. A Documentary History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 118.

6 See Sexton, Cayo Patricia, The War on Labor and the Left: Understanding America's Unique Conservatism (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1991), 144; Nielsen, Kim E., Un-American Womanhood: Antiradicalism, Antifeminism, and the First Red Scare (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 2001). Nielsen's work proceeds in this direction and, although it attempts to present an objective analysis, her overall argument still treats un-Americanism as a rhetorical construction. According to her, those who opposed un-Americanism were also vehemently opposed to the communist and Bolshevik political beliefs. Her research focuses on the conservative women's movements in the 1920s and shows that they were opposed to any form of radicalism, including the feminist one. According to Nielsen, the conservative women's movements used the term “un-American” to characterize their political opponents claiming, that “feminist influence upon the new enfranchised woman citizen would cause her to support, in ways never possible before, dangerously radical state-expanding measures” (Footnote ibid., 1). These antifeminists saw radical feminism as destroying the very essence of the American nation and its liberal democratic system's foundation; that is, the family and patriarchy. In other words, being un-American meant, to them, being opposed to the traditional family in the name of womanhood – or being a feminist. Based on this evidence, Nielsen argues that un-Americanism was used by the conservative women's movement as an accusatory political tool against the feminist-oriented movement.

7 Friedrich, Otto, City of Nets: A Portrait of Hollywood in the 1940s (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 301.

8 Buckley, William F. Jr., The Committee and Its Critics: A Calm Review of the House Committee on Un-American Activities (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1962).

9 Footnote Ibid., 141–42.

10 Council for the Liberation of Captive Peoples from Soviet Domination, Press Release, 23 June 1964, Eriks Dundurs Papers, Folder 7, Box 6, Immigration History Research Center, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN.

11 Denis Wadley, “HUAC,” Means (Nov.–Sept. 1964), 8–29.

12 Eriks Dundurs, “HUAC,” Means (Nov.–Sept. 1964), 9–11.

13 See Zake, Ieva, ed., Anti-communist Minorities in the U.S.: Political Activism of Ethnic Refugees (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009); Zake, Ieva and Gormley, Graham, “Integration or Separation? Nationalities and the Republican Party's Ethnic Politics, 1960s–80s” Nationalities Papers, 38, 4 (2010), 493–514.

14 Wadley, p. 11.

15 Kuropas, Myron, “Fighting Moscow from Afar: Ukrainian Americans and the Evil Empire,” in Zake, Anti-communist Minorities in the U.S., 43–66, 62.

16 I. B. Dzinich to Gerald Ford, 16 Jan. 1976. Gerald Ford Library, Myron Kuropas Papers, Box 2, Folder “Croatian Ethnic Groups.”

17 Kuropas, 62.

18 Sonia Havelka, Additional Notes, 15 August 1975, President Ford Committee Records, Folder “DeBolt Subject File – Eastern Europeans,” Box A13, Gerald R. Ford Library, Ann Arbor, MI.

19 James Tashjian to Edward Dervinski, 1 March 1976, Gerald Ford Library, Myron Kuropas Papers, Box 1, Folder “Armenian Ethnic Groups.” It has to be noted that the Armenian community wanted President Ford to announce an Armenian American Day; however, the National Security Council put a veto on this idea by advising against any President's messages to the Armenians. See National Security Council to Myron Kuropas, Gerald Ford Library, Myron Kuropas Papers, Box 1, Folder “Armenian Ethnic Groups.”

20 M. George Mooradian to Gerald Ford, 11 Sept. 1975, Gerald Ford Library, Myron Kuropas Papers, Box 7, Folder “Armenian Bicentennial Commemoration.”

21 Steven Markowski to Myron Kuropas, 14 May 1976, Gerald Ford Library, Myron Kuropas Papers, Box 7, Folder “Polish-American Bicentennial Committee of New York, 5/30/76.”

22 Radzilowski, John, “Ethnic Anti-Communism in the United States,” in Zake, Anti-communist Minorities in the U.S., 1–24, 2.

23 Rev. Walter Szczypula to Gerald Ford, 12 Oct. 1976, Gerald Ford Library, Myron Kuropas Papers, Box 5, Folder “Polish Ethnic Groups,” File 7.

24 Anonymous, “Romanian Ethnic Group: Memo Prepared for the use of Dr. Myron B. Kuropas, Special Assistant to the President for Ethnic Affairs,” undated, Gerald Ford Library, Myron Kuropas Papers, Box 5, Folder “Romanian Ethnic Groups.”

25 The Czechoslovak National Council of America, “Foreign Policy towards the Soviet Union and East Central Europe,” 8 June 1976, Gerald Ford Library, Myron Kuropas Papers, Box 2, Folder “Czechoslovak Ethnic Groups.”

26 Reminiscences of James Sheldon (1972), in the Columbia University Oral History Research Office Collection, 17.

27 Footnote Ibid., 24.

28 Footnote Ibid., 104–5.

29 Footnote Ibid., pp. 46–47.

30 Gerson, The Hyphenate, 214; Reminiscences of James Sheldon, 22.

31 Reminiscences of James Sheldon, 126.

32 Footnote Ibid., 159.

33 Footnote Ibid., 35.

34 Zake and Gormley, “Integration or Separation?”. Undoubtedly, the white ethnics groups welcomed this since they had been asking for it. For example, the Croatian community in Illinois made it very clear that having participated actively in the election of Nixon in 1968 they expected that “our Nationalities groups' work be continued at once.” See Thaddeus Ripa to I. B. Dzinich, 25 Nov. 1976, Gerald Ford Library, Myron Kuropas Papers, Box 2, Folder “Croatian Ethnic Groups.”

35 Laszlo Pasztor, “Annual Report of the Heritage Groups (Nationalities) Division,” 1 June 1970–31 Dec. 1971, White House Central Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Michael P. Balzano, Folder “(RNC-Heritage Groups Nationalities Division) Reports,” 1.

36 Footnote Ibid., pp. 2–8.

37 National Republican Heritage Groups (Nationalities) Council, “Monthly Report,” Jan–Feb. 1972, White House Central Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Michael P. Balzano, Folder “(RNC-Heritage Groups Nationalities Division) Reports.”

38 Spilners, Ilgvars, Mēs uzvarējām! (Riga: Elpa, 1998), 84.

39 Lee, Martin, The Beast Reawakens (New York: Little, Brown and Co. 1997).

40 Pienkos, Donald, “The Polish American Congress, Polish Americans and the Politics of Anti-communism,” in Zake, Anti-communist Minorities in the U.S., 25–42.

41 Zake, Anti-communist Minorities in the U.S.; Zake and Gormley, “Integration or Separation?”.

42 Laszlo Pasztor to Charles Colson, Memorandum and Proposal, 9 June 1972, Michael Balzano Papers, Box 5, White House Central Files: Staff Member and Office Files, College Park, MD.

43 Charles Colson to Fred Malek, “Advertising in Catholic and Ethnic Newspapers,” 20 June 1972, White House Special Files, Staff Members and Office Files, H. R. Haldeman, Box 99.

44 John A. Volpe to Daniel T. Kingsley, “Ethnic and Minority Census,” 7 Sept. 1971, White House Central Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Michael P. Balzano, Box 1.

45 Robert M. Teeter to John Mitchell, “Spanish-American Bloc,” 12 June 1972, Gerald Ford Library, Robert M. Teeter Papers, Box 65, Folder “June 10, 1972 – John N. Mitchell – Spanish-American Bloc.”

46 Laszlo Pasztor to Vice President Gerald Ford, 15 Jan. 1974, Gerald Ford Library, Ford Vice Presidential Papers, Box 118, Folder “National Republican Heritage Groups.”

47 Laszlo Pasztor to Tom Evans, Memorandum, 11 May 1972; Laszlo Pasztor to Rogers Morton, Memorandum, 9 June 1970; Laszlo Pasztor, Proposal, June 1972, Michael Balzano Papers, Folder “(RNC – Heritage Groups, Nationalities Division) Reports,” White House Central Files: Staff Member and Office Files, College Park, MD.

48 Fred Malek to Laszlo Pasztor, “Assignment of Responsibilities,” 22 June 1972, White House Central Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Michael P. Balzano, Folder “(RNC-Heritage Groups Nationalities Division) Reports.”

49 Laszlo Pasztor to Chuck Colson, 13 March 1972, White House Central Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Michael P. Balzano, Folder “(RNC-Heritage Groups Nationalities Division) Pending Requests.”

50 W. Richard Howard, “Memorandum for Mike Balzano,” 14 March 1972, White House Central Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Michael P. Balzano, Folder “(RNC-Heritage Groups Nationalities Division) Pending Requests.”

51 John Volpe, “Memorandum for the President,” 13 Dec. 1972, White House Central Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Michael P. Balzano, Folder “(RNC-Heritage Groups Nationalities Division).”

52 Charles W. Colson to Bruce Kehrli, “Volpe Letter with Recommendations re the Relationship of H.G.'s effort to the RNC Action Memo,” 21 Dec. 1972, White House Central Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Michael P. Balzano, Folder “(RNC-Heritage Groups Nationalities Division).”

53 White House Central Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Michael P. Balzano, Box 1.

54 Anathole Bedriy to Nohemi Labrada, 30 Oct. 1975, Gerald Ford Library, Myron Kuropas Papers, Box 6, Folder “Ukrainian Ethnic Groups,” File No 3.

55 Laszlo Pasztor to Michael Balzano, 26 Jan. 1973, White House Central Files, Staff Member and Office Files, Michael P. Balzano, Box 7.

56 Laszlo Pasztor to George Bush, 30 Jan. 1973, White House Central Files, Staff Member and Official Files, Michael P. Balzano, “(RNC-Heritage Groups Nationalities Division) Reports.”

ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.