I. INTRODUCTION
In June 2021, the FDA approved a new drug called Aduhelm to treat Alzheimer’s disease. Almost immediately, the decision was heavily criticized and met with resistance. This Note will explore the unusual approval process and the associated impacts of the decision, including the eroding trust in the FDA. Many Americans currently distrust the government and public health agencies—only 37% of Americans trust the FDA.Footnote 1 The approval decision may cause Americans to distrust public health agencies even more. As we navigate an ongoing public health crisis, this is particularly concerning. Ultimately, the Article proposes several reforms to help restore the public’s trust in the approval process, including agency officials following FDA’s established policies on meetings and the FDA following the advisory committee’s approval decisions in certain circumstances.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Alzheimer’s Disease
Alzheimer’s disease (“Alzheimer’s”) is a devastating illness that affects millions of people across the United States. Currently, an estimated 6.2 million Americans aged sixty-five and older are living with Alzheimer’s.Footnote 2 By the year 2060, a projected 13.8 million Americans 65 years or older will suffer from the disease. This progressive brain disease is the largest cause of dementia in older people. Although best known for impairing cognitive functioning, Alzheimer’s is also the third leading cause of mortality in people over 65.Footnote 3
Individuals suffering from Alzheimer’s dementia often suffer from other types of dementia as well. This makes the diagnosis of Alzheimer’s difficult. In fact, no single test for the disease exists, but instead diagnosis relies on the physician’s judgment. Ordinarily, physicians will make a diagnosis after obtaining medical and family history, conducting memory and cognitive tests, and sometimes obtaining different types of brain imaging. Even with these tools, it can be difficult to determine whether a person is suffering from Alzheimer’s disease or another form of dementia, as many people can suffer from multiple types of dementia concurrently. However, many individuals who might meet the diagnostic criteria for Alzheimer’s disease are not diagnosed,Footnote 4 which means this illness probably affects even more people than currently estimated.
Scientists have tried to understand the underlying biological causes of this disease. Most therapeutic development has focused on the “amyloid-cascade” hypothesis. The amyloid-cascade hypothesis proposes that the symptoms of Alzheimer’s result from beta-amyloid accumulation, also known as plaques, in the brain.Footnote 5 Even though many therapies have been developed around this hypothesis, no clinical trials have produced evidence of “meaningful clinical benefit.”Footnote 6 As a result, many experimental therapies targeting amyloid plaques have been abandoned.
Even though scientists have not discovered the biological cause, they have determined several risk factors that make individuals more likely to develop Alzheimer’s. Although anyone can develop the disorder, the most important risk factors are age, genetics, and a family history of Alzheimer’s.Footnote 7 Old age cannot cause the illness, but an individual’s risk of developing Alzheimer’s doubles every five years after the age of 65.Footnote 8 With age as the greatest risk factor, Alzheimer’s will continue to affect more people as medical advances increase lifespan and the baby boomer generation grows older.
Alzheimer’s progresses through four stages: preclinical, mild, moderate, and severe. In the preclinical stage, an individual will not show any type of symptoms, but the disease will cause many abnormal changes to the brain, including the aberrant build-up of proteins and loss of healthy neurons.Footnote 9 These changes to the brain occur years, or even decades, before any symptoms manifest.Footnote 10 Two of the most common brain changes involve the accumulation of proteins called beta-amyloid plaques outside of the neurons and the accumulation of the tau protein inside the neurons.Footnote 11 Scientists have hypothesized that these changes cause the dementia associated with Alzheimer’s.
Eventually, an afflicted person will begin to experience symptoms of varying severity. In the mild stage of the disease, most people experience some type of memory problems but can function independently for the most part.Footnote 12 In later stages, including moderate and severe stages of Alzheimer’s, people begin to struggle performing routine tasks such as bathing and dressing.Footnote 13 Additionally, they may experience hallucinations or paranoia.Footnote 14 In its most severe stage, Alzheimer’s may mean a person cannot communicate at all and probably requires round-the-clock care.Footnote 15
B. Treatment for Alzheimer’s
Despite Alzheimer’s affecting millions of people, only a few treatments for the disease exist. While some non-pharmacologic therapies are used, this Note will focus on the pharmacologic treatments. The FDA approved the first drug targeting Alzheimer’s in 1993. Between 1993 and 2003, the FDA approved a total of five drugs to treat the disease: Rivastigmine, Galantamine, Donepezil, Tacrine, and Memantine. These drugs vary in the symptoms they treat and the stage of Alzheimer’s at which doctors will prescribe them. All drugs approved during that time treat symptoms but do not slow or stop the disease progression. This changed when the FDA approved Aduhelm on June 7, 2021.
C. Aduhelm
Aduhelm was the first drug approved to treat Alzheimer’s in almost two decades.Footnote 16 Biogen, Inc. collaborated with Eisai Co., Ltd. to develop this therapy. Unlike previous treatments, this is the first medication to target the underlying biological mechanism of the disease, i.e., to reduce amyloid beta plaques in the brain. As discussed earlier, many scientists hypothesize these plaques cause Alzheimer’s.
In 2015, the first placebo-controlled Phase 1b clinical trial showed that Aduhelm removed toxic amyloid plaques in the participants’ brains and potentially reduced cognitive decline.Footnote 17 At a meeting of Alzheimer’s experts several months later, however, the data looked less convincing, and many experts had concerns about the drug’s potential effectiveness as a treatment.Footnote 18
Ignoring these concerns, Biogen pushed ahead with two large Phase 3 clinical trials called EMERGE and ENGAGE. It proceeded with two identical clinical trials because the FDA generally requires two positive, well-controlled studies before approving new therapies.Footnote 19 Over the next three years, Biogen enrolled 3,300 people with early-stage Alzheimer’s into these trials.Footnote 20 Both were similar in design but EMERGE started in August 2015 and ENGAGE began a month later in September. One third of the participants received placebos and two thirds of the participants were randomized to receive monthly infusions containing either a low or high dose of Aduhelm. Biogen hoped to show that, after eighteen months, the volunteers receiving Aduhelm at either dose had a slower loss of cognition than the people in the placebo arm.Footnote 21
Biogen performed an interim futility analysis to assess the effectiveness of Aduhelm before the clinical trials were finished to boost confidence in its drug. In that analysis, Biogen biostatisticians calculated the clinical trial’s probability of succeeding based on the available data for people who had completed 18 months of follow-up through December 2018. Biogen’s biostatisticians and outside consultants believed that both the EMERGE and ENGAGE clinical trials should be pooled and analyzed together as one trial for this analysis, in part because they had almost identical clinical design.Footnote 22 However, performing futility analyses can be risky because they may prematurely determine that a drug is not effective.Footnote 23 This often causes companies to end trials before full term to save money. That is exactly what happened with Biogen and Aduhelm. On March 21, 2019, the company announced the premature end of both Phase 3 clinical trials and terminated the Aduhelm program. The preliminary analysis had shown there was a less than twenty percent chance that the clinical trial would meet the primary end point.Footnote 24
III. RELEVANT LEGAL RULES: DRUG APPROVALS
Traditionally, new drugs will either go through the New Drug Application (“NDA”) process or, in the case of Aduhelm, the Biologics License Application (“BLA”) process. Other approval pathways expedite and expand the process depending on the circumstances. This Note will focus on the approval framework for biologics,Footnote 25 and expedited approval through the Accelerated Approval pathway.
A. Biologics License Application
Pharmaceutical companies need a BLA to market biologics lawfully in interstate commerce. Footnote 26 Biologics’ regulation is now functionally the same as the NDA process for more traditional small molecule drugs.Footnote 27 As part of a BLA, the drug manufacturer will perform clinical trials on human beings. This stage usually includes a great deal of consultation with the FDA to design a trial that can support the ultimate approval of the NDA or BLA.Footnote 28 Typically, a clinical trial investigation consists of three phases. A Phase 1 trial administers the medication to a small number of healthy test subjects.Footnote 29 Phase 2 studies are typically larger and involve several hundred people. Instead of healthy volunteers, the drug is tested on people who have the disease being studied.Footnote 30 Finally, after collecting enough preliminary evidence suggesting the drug may be effective, a Phase 3 study may commence. The primary purpose of a Phase 3 study is to collect enough data to prove the safety and efficacy of a drug, and thus substantiate drug approval.Footnote 31
Once clinical trials are finished, the drug manufacturer will submit a NDA or BLA, and the FDA will review the application. The FDA’s Center for Drug Evaluation and Research (“CDER”) evaluates the drug for safety and effectiveness based on its intended use.Footnote 32 The FDA can only approve an NDA or BLA once it has met several substantive requirements. First, there must be “substantial evidence” that the drug will have the intended effect on participants. The Drug Amendments of 1962 defined substantial evidence as “evidence consisting of adequate & well-controlled investigations … by experts … on the basis of which it could be fairly & responsibly concluded … that the drug will have the effect it purports … to have ….”Footnote 33 Traditionally, the FDA prefers two independent studies to prove drug efficacy, but this is not an iron clad requirement.Footnote 34 If a single study is well-controlled and accompanied by confirmatory evidence, the FDA may determine that its results are sufficient to establish effectiveness, especially for rare diseases.Footnote 35
In addition to efficacy, the FDA must evaluate the safety of the drug before application approval. For approval, “adequate tests by all methods reasonably applicable … [must] show whether or not such drug is safe for use….”Footnote 36 The FDA safety evaluation includes a risk benefit assessment “to facilitate the balanced consideration of benefits and risks.”Footnote 37 Ultimately, the evidence of benefit to the target population should outweigh any risks and uncertainties.Footnote 38
B. Accelerated Approval
While the NDA process is theoretically thorough for proving the safety and efficacy of a new drug, it can take years for the FDA to approve NDAs. To alleviate that problem, the FDA issued new regulations in 1992 allowing some medications to be approved through a new program called Accelerated Approval.Footnote 39 Only drugs that have been studied in the context of “treating serious or life-threatening illness… that provided meaningful therapeutic benefits over existing benefits” can be approved through the Accelerated Approval pathway.Footnote 40 Unlike the standard NDA or BLA process, the Accelerated Approval pathway allows approval “on the basis of adequate and well-controlled clinical trials establishing that the drug has an effect on a surrogate end point that is reasonably likely based on epidemiologic, therapeutic, pathophysiologic or other evidence to predict clinical benefit.”Footnote 41 A surrogate endpoint is any type of marker that does not measure clinical benefit on its own but is thought to predict clinical benefit.Footnote 42
The Accelerated Approval pathway permits the FDA to approve new products in a much faster timeframe because surrogate endpoints can be used. For example, in a cancer study, a drug could be approved if the tumor shrinks rather than having to wait to see if the drug actually extends patient survival.Footnote 43 As part of this approval pathway, phase 4 confirmatory clinical trials are usually required after approval to substantiate clinical benefits.Footnote 44 In the case of Aduhelm, the FDA has asked for confirmatory clinical trials verifying clinical benefits within nine years.Footnote 45
This approval pathway is becoming increasingly popular because of the streamlined process.Footnote 46 Over sixty-four percent of approved drugs between 2015-17 participated in expedited approval pathways. While this includes other expedited pathways besides the Accelerated Approval route, it emphasizes the growing FDA trend to approve drugs with abridged evidence of efficacy.Footnote 47 Twenty years ago, only thirty-five percent of new drugs were approved through these expedited pathways.Footnote 48 Even when Phase IV clinical trials fail to prove drugs have clinical efficacy, the FDA may take years or never act to remove the product from the market.Footnote 49
C. Advisory Committees
The CDER performs the primary review of a drug approval application. However, as part of its review, each division of the FDA can enlist the help of advisory committees. Advisory committees are meant to provide the FDA with advice from leading experts in the field about a variety of scientific, technical, and policy matters.Footnote 50 The FDA commissioner appoints members to advisory committees based on their relevant scientific expertise.Footnote 51 The advisory committee that evaluated Aduhelm was the Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory Committee,Footnote 52 which consisted of experts in the fields of neurology, neuropharmacology, neuropathology, otolaryngology, epidemiology, statistics, and related specialties. Seven voting experts were present at the Aduhelm meeting (with two voting experts not present), three temporary voting members (including the patient representative) were also there, along with several non-voting members, including an industry representative and several FDA participants.Footnote 53
The FDA first began using Advisory Committees in the 1970s to compensate for the limited technical capabilities of its professional staff.Footnote 54 The added technical assistance was intended to improve credibility of the approval process and help build trust in the agency’s decisions and decisionmaking process.Footnote 55 The committees also provide a forum to discuss the risks and benefits of more controversial drugs, devices, or biologics.
Although CDER has discretion to convene an advisory committee whenever it chooses to do so, in certain situations, it must use one. The Food and Drug Administration Amendment Act (“FDAAA”) of 2017 requires the agency to use advisory committees in approving all new molecular entities.Footnote 56 Because of this, CDER had no choice but to use an advisory committee in evaluating Aduhelm.Footnote 57
Even when the FDA solicits an advisory committee’s advice, its conclusions are purely recommendations. The final decision to approve still lies with the FDA, regardless of how the Advisory Committee votes.Footnote 58 Under the Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act (”FDAMA”), the agency must make a final decision on any matter the advisory committee reviews within 90 days of the committee’s recommendation.Footnote 59 If the agency does not decide, then it must explain why it failed to do so.
IV. ADUHELM APPROVAL PROCESS
The Aduhelm approval process was unusual and extremely controversial. Many people accused the FDA of having an improper relationship with Biogen and being biased in favor of approval from the start. Most of the criticism stems from the highly unusual (but favorable) process Biogen experienced. Many are concerned that the basic standard for evaluating drugs has changed after this unorthodox decision.
A. Project Onyx
After Biogen decided to end the EMERGE and ENGAGE trials, the company’s scientists began to examine the Aduhelm data to understand what had gone wrong. These scientists believed that the data hinted Aduhelm might be effective after all.Footnote 60 After this discovery, in May 2019, Biogen reached out to Dr. Dunn, the director of the FDA’s Office of Neuroscience, to discuss the future of Aduhelm.Footnote 61
Dr. Dunn and Biogen’s Head of Research and Development, Al Sandrock, convened at an off-the-books meeting at a neurology conference. The occurrence of such a consultation is highly unusual. FDA policy states that drug makers may only share clinical data with regulators in scheduled, documented settings.Footnote 62 No record of the conversation exists, but it seems to have been productive for Biogen. An anonymous Biogen employee stated, “It was clear that Billy Dunn was an ally, so the job for Biogen became figuring out how to support his efforts within the FDA.”Footnote 63 Biogen launched Project Onyx to advance Aduhelm’s approval and began to share clinical data and other information with FDA officials by mid-May. At this time, no one outside Biogen and a small number of regulators knew that the company was resurrecting the product.
On June 14, 2019, the two sides had an important meeting. Biogen planned to seek formal guidance from the FDA on how best to interpret the results from the two clinical trials. After reviewing the data shared earlier in May, the FDA told Biogen that “the available data… do[es] not provide convincing evidence that the drug is ineffective,” and it viewed the EMERGE study as potentially strong enough to submit an approval application.Footnote 64 The agency proposed five different possible options to review Aduhelm.Footnote 65 Importantly, only one option required Biogen to complete another clinical trial, despite the weak clinical efficacy evidence of the original trials.
In a memo summarizing the 2019 meeting,Footnote 66 the FDA stated that Biogen might want to consider seeking Accelerated Approval for Aduhelm. Although not discussed at length in the meeting, the FDA suggested that if Biogen was interested in this route, the parties should have another “independent, detailed discussion.”Footnote 67 Notably, the FDA, not Biogen, initiated the discussion of the possibility of Accelerated Approval.Footnote 68 The contemplation of Accelerated Approval at this stage is significant. The memo directly contradicts the FDA’s public statements that it only discussed Accelerated Approval with Biogen starting in March of 2021,Footnote 69 after the advisory committee recommended against full approval. Clearly, this was not true.
Biogen and the FDA established a work group collaboration with staff from both organizations. This group worked together to analyze clinical data and communicated almost daily in June, July, and August of 2019. Biogen had previously decided to “officially” end the clinical trial in March 2019.Footnote 70 But in the amount of time it took to analyze the interim data between December 2018 and March 2019, 2,066 more participants had completed 18 months of the same study, making more data more available. After incorporating this new data into their analysis, Biogen decided to seek a standard BLA license. On October 22, 2019, Biogen announced that the higher dose of Aduhelm reduced clinical decline and planned to submit the drug for full FDA approval.Footnote 71 Though the ENGAGE trial had showed no benefit in either the low or high dose arms, the EMERGE trial showed a statistically significant result in the higher dose arm.Footnote 72 Biogen argued the futility analysis was incorrect because EMERGE was actually “trending positive,” and additional participants’ post-data analyses pushed the results over the threshold of significance.Footnote 73
Given that these trials were supposed to be identical, the differing results made many people skeptical of Aduhelm’s claimed efficacy. Biogen argued that the combination of the two trials into one futility analysis had obscured the differences between them. Additionally, even though the trials were supposed to be the same, they argued crucial differences existed. First, EMERGE began before ENGAGE did, and thus had enrolled more participants by the time Biogen shut the trial down.Footnote 74 Second, Biogen argued two protocol amendments affecting both the EMERGE and ENGAGE studies caused different results between the two trials because of the difference in the studies’ enrollment timing.Footnote 75 These protocol amendments (implemented in July 2016 and March 2017) increased the maximum dose for certain people and increased the duration of the medication.Footnote 76 This change allowed more participants to receive the high dose Aduhelm treatment that Biogen believed was effective. Biogen argued that the later data set “included more patients with sufficient exposure to high dose [Aduhelm]” compared with the original futility analysis.Footnote 77 Despite these explanations, the scientific community remained skeptical that the differences between the two clinical trials had generated vastly different results, especially since the trials had only differed in patient enrollments for 1 month.Footnote 78
B. FDA’s Biostatistical Analysis
On July 7, 2020, the Office of Biostatistics (“Office”) in the Center for Drug Evaluation and Research examined the clinical data for both clinical trials as part of the approval process decision. They concluded, at best, the EMERGE study may have positive results, but the ENGAGE study directly conflicts with those results.Footnote 79 Additionally, both studies had sporadic unblinding for dose management for both Aduhelm doses linked to Amyloid Related Imaging Abnormalities (“ARIA”).Footnote 80 Based on the FDA’s own guidance for substantial evidence,Footnote 81 this weakened the strength of evidence. Thus, the Office concluded the totality of the data lacked “sufficient evidence to support the efficacy of the higher dose.”Footnote 82
C. Advisory Committee Decision
On November 6, 2020, the Peripheral and Central Nervous System Drugs Advisory Committee met to discuss approving Aduhelm’s BLA. The committee discussed a variety of issues associated with the drug and its clinical trials. Former FDA officials and other people observing the meeting were stunned at how strongly Dunn argued for the approval of Aduhelm. Some even called his actions and tone throughout the meeting “promotional” for Aduhelm.Footnote 83 Traditionally, an FDA official’s role during this type of meeting is to be unbiased or even skeptical of, a new drug.
The main issue the committee considered was whether sufficiently strong evidence supported BLA approval for Aduhelm based on the data from the clinical trials. When asked if the EMERGE trial, independently and without regard for the identical ENGAGE trial, provided strong evidence supporting Aduhelm’s efficacy in treating Alzheimer’s disease, only one expert voted yes, with eight voting no and two others voting uncertain. Footnote 84 The advisory committee member casting the sole yes vote argued that the EMERGE trial met its primary endpoint and showed independent, positive trends.Footnote 85 The committee members who voted no and uncertain, however, struggled with divorcing the opposing results from the identical trials even though the results for the EMERGE trial were encouraging.Footnote 86 When asked to evaluate the totality of the evidence for using the EMERGE trial as primary evidence of Aduhelm’s effectiveness for treating Alzheimer’s, almost all of the committee members believed that it was not reasonable.Footnote 87 Ten committee members voted not to approve Aduhelm and only one member voted uncertain. Not a single committee member voted for BLA approval of the drug.
D. FDA Review of Biogen’s Application
Strong pushback from the committee caused the FDA to delay its review of the Biogen application by several months beyond the initial decision date of March 2021. Officials presented the application to the Medical Policy and Program Review Council (an internal group that sets agency policy) in two meetings at the end of March and early April 2021.Footnote 88 During these meetings, agency officials settled on using the Accelerated Approval pathway to evaluate the drug.Footnote 89 They agreed that no evidence showed that Aduhelm slowed Alzheimer’s, but the Council believed there was convincing evidence of Aduhelm’s effect on amyloid plaques.Footnote 90 The Council believed approval was appropriate even though the trials showed no proof that removing plaques slows Alzheimer’s.Footnote 91 This surprising conclusion contradicts the FDA’s own biostatistical analysis, which concluded that Biogen produced insufficient evidence to support the efficacy of the high dose.Footnote 92
On June 7, 2020, the FDA approved the drug through the Accelerated Approval pathway rather than the traditional BLA process. This decision was a source of great controversy. Patient advocates praised the decision as a watershed moment allowing for better treatments and earlier diagnoses for Alzheimer’s patients.Footnote 93 In the scientific community, however, the decision only heightened the debate over the amyloid hypothesis and whether the FDA was truly unbiased in its decision.Footnote 94 A member of the advisory committee called it “probably the worst drug approval decision in recent U.S. history.”Footnote 95
1. Approval based on Surrogate Endpoint
Dr. Dunn states in a letter explaining the FDA’s rationale for approval that the uncertainty permeating the advisory committee meeting “raised consideration of the accelerated pathway.”Footnote 96 Ultimately, the agency concluded that the Accelerated Approval requirements had been met because “substantial evidence [showed] that the drug reduces amyloid beta plaque and that this reduction is reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit.”Footnote 97
The FDA’s decision to use a surrogate endpoint for approval was notable for several reasons. First, the agency never asked the advisory committee to discuss whether Biogen had produced sufficient evidence to approve Aduhelm under an expedited pathway. In fact, during the advisory committee discussion, the agency specifically stated its intention not to use the amyloid plaque as a surrogate for efficacy.Footnote 98 Thus, the decision to approve the drug through a pathway the advisory committee did not consider only reinforced the perception that the FDA would approve Aduhelm regardless of the committee’s recommendation. As Susan F. Wood, a research professor at George Washington University and former assistant commissioner at the FDA, argued, “the whole point of advisory committees is to discuss the range of data and questions that remain about the data. If they were thinking of that pathway, it should have been brought to the advisory committee.”Footnote 99 Additionally, a majority of the advisory committee members wrote a Perspective article in the New England Journal of Medicine questioning whether sufficient evidence existed to prove the efficacy of amyloid plaques as a surrogate endpoint.Footnote 100
Second, the use of amyloid plaques as a surrogate endpoint goes directly against the FDA’s own guidance. In 2018, the FDA issued draft guidance for developing drugs for treatment of early Alzheimer’s wherein it stated that, at present, the agency had “no sufficiently reliable evidence that any observed treatment effect on such biomarkers [like amyloid plaques] would be reasonably likely to predict clinical benefit.”Footnote 101 While this guidance was not binding, the FDA changing its view on the issue just a few years later, especially without any type of explanation, is still remarkable.
2. Broader Approval than Trial
Initially the FDA approved Aduhelm broadly for anyone suffering from Alzheimer’s disease.Footnote 102 This decision caused even more surprise because traditionally, the agency approves drugs for patients similar to those in the relevant clinical trial. In Aduhelm’s case, that would include only people in the earliest stage of Alzheimer’s who had amyloid plaques that the drug would attempt to clear. FDA officials asserted by way of explanation that, if Aduhelm could help clear amyloid plaques, it could theoretically benefit patients in any stage of the disease.Footnote 103 Peter Stein, director of the FDA’s Office of New Drugs, maintained that the “drug would provide benefit across [the Alzheimer’s] spectrum,” including patients who were asymptomatic to those with severe disease.Footnote 104 Even scientists involved in the Aduhelm trials themselves, however, sharply criticized the decision.Footnote 105 Dr. Scharre, a neurologist and director of Cognitive Neurology at Ohio State Wexner Medical Center, and an investigator in the trials who advised Biogen, stated “[t]his medication would not help anyone who has more than just mild changes … Everyone with Alzheimer’s disease should not be on this drug.”Footnote 106
A month later, the FDA revised the controversial prescribing information to recommend Aduhelm only for people with mild cognitive impairment or the mild dementia stage of the disease.Footnote 107 A change to the label so soon after approval is highly unusual, especially because the revision was not motivated by safety concerns.Footnote 108 For many critics of the approval, the label revision amounts to more evidence of the way Aduhelm’s approval failed to follow the science. Peter Bach, a drug safety researcher and chief medical officer of Delfi Diagnostics, argued that the label revision just amounts to a “talking point… [to prove] the agency ‘listened,’ rather than actually reflecting attention to more careful science.”Footnote 109
E. Biogen Pulled Article from JAMA
Traditionally, drug companies will publish clinical trial results in peer-reviewed journals before obtaining FDA approval.Footnote 110 In July 2021, Biogen withdrew its paper on Aduhelm from the Journal of the American Medical Association (”JAMA”). According to various news articles, JAMA required edits to the paper to publish and Biogen refused to make the necessary changes.Footnote 111 Neither Biogen nor JAMA have confirmed this.Footnote 112 Upon learning of this, Scott Emerson, a University of Washington biostatistician and a member of the advisory committee that voted against approval, speculated that “[Biogen] is reluctant to have the full data undergo the greater scrutiny that the peer review process would provide.”Footnote 113 In January 2022, Biogen’s CEO Michel Vounatsos stated an article is under review and will be published very soon.Footnote 114 However, he did not provide any more details such as to which peer-reviewed journal the company’s manuscript was submitted. At the time of publication, Biogen still has not published data about Aduhelm’s effectiveness in a peer-review journal.Footnote 115
V. IMPACT OF ADUHELM’S APPROVAL
The impact of Aduhelm’s approval has been far-reaching. While some patient advocates have applauded the approval, many others have questioned the highly unusual approval process. Even nearly a year after the approval decision, the pharmaceutical industry continues to be affected by the aftermath of this decision.
A. Public Backlash
Almost immediately, many diverse groups and individuals released statements to express their disagreement with the Aduhelm approval. The decision shocked other pharmaceutical company executives. Speaking on the condition of anonymity, one executive told STAT News that the approval was “a disaster on so many levels” because the “drug seems to have more evidence that it causes harm than good.”Footnote 116 Additionally, Michael Carome, the director of the consumer advocacy nonprofit Public Citizen’s Health Research, thinks that the “FDA became a partner with Biogen,” and its members were shirking their responsibilities to be “objective, unbiased regulators.”Footnote 117
Many of the members of the advisory committee who evaluated the drug also criticized the agency’s decision to overrule their recommendation. Almost all the doctors wrote a Perspective piece in the New England Journal of Medicine arguing that the approval decision “is at odds with the evidence,” and the use of the surrogate endpoint was inappropriate.Footnote 118 Of these doctors, three different advisors resigned in protest from the committee, including Dr. David Knopman, who was an investigator during Aduhelm’s clinical trials.Footnote 119 Dr. Knopman did not vote in the committee meeting because of his conflict of interest as a trial investigator, but before the meeting, he publicly stated that Aduhelm should not be approved.Footnote 120 Another member of the committee, Dr. Aaron Kesselheim, the director of Brigham and Women’s Hospital’s Program on Regulation, Therapeutics, and Law, wrote in his resignation letter that the Aduhelm approval “was probably the worst drug approval decision in recent U.S. history.”Footnote 121 He resigned because the FDA was not “capable of adequately integrating the Committee’s scientific recommendations into its approval decisions.”Footnote 122
Kesselheim, however, had concerns about the use of advisory committees and the FDA approval process even before the Aduhelm decision.Footnote 123 In 2016, the FDA overruled the advisory committee to approve Eteplirsen, a new drug for Duchenne muscular dystrophy (”DMD”).Footnote 124 The advisory committee voted 7 to 3 (with three abstentions) not to approve the NDA for the drug in April 2016.Footnote 125 Additionally, the committee voted 7 to 6 against Accelerated Approval.Footnote 126 Like the Aduhelm decision, the FDA delayed the final approval decision by several months after the committee’s negative recommendation until finally approving the drug through the Accelerated Approval pathway in September 2016.Footnote 127 Notably, the Committee for Human Medicinal Products (”CHMP”) of the European Medicines Agency (which serves a function similar to that of the U.S. advisory committees) declined to recommend the drug as well.Footnote 128 Eteplirsen remains unapproved for use in Europe.Footnote 129 In December 2021, the CHMP declined to recommend Aduhelm for approval in Europe. The parallels between the approval decisions further reinforced concerns about the FDA approval process.Footnote 130
For Kesselheim, the Eteplirsen decision was the first time he had reservations about the FDA’s decision-making because the “decision was made based on considerations (including concerns about the sponsor’s finances) that were not part of the advisory committee’s discussions.”Footnote 131 Like Aduhelm, Eteplirsen was the first treatment approved to stop the progression of the disease. Some critics of these decisions believe unmet treatment needs have contributed to unwarranted approvals.Footnote 132 Both diseases have vocal patient advocacy groups who vigorously supported approval of each drug. In a Viewpoint article, Kesselheim worried that the Eteplirsen decision encouraged drug manufacturers to follow a worrisome model of submitting trial data with less evidence supporting efficacy, planning to then activate the patient community to demand approval.Footnote 133 Although patient advocacy groups can certainly be a powerful force, a recent study analyzing the cases in which committee recommendations and FDA decisions differed found that the only major predictive factor for the FDA overruling a committee recommendation was the degree of consensus expressed in the advisory committee’s vote.Footnote 134 In Kesselheim’s resignation letter, he argued both the Eteplirsen and Aduhelm approvals demonstrate the need to “reassess [the agency’s] decision-making processes, including … how Committee recommendations are used (or ignored) by FDA officials.”Footnote 135
B. Investigations
As backlash to the Aduhelm approval mounted, many people began demanding investigations into the decision-making process to understand whether anything improper had occurred. On July 9, 2021, Janet Woodcock, the Acting FDA Commissioner, requested an independent investigation into the agency’s approval process. Woodcock requested the investigation to restore public confidence in the FDA’s processes, despite her asserted confidence in the way the agency carries out its responsibilities.Footnote 136 Shortly afterward, in August 2021, the Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (“HHS OIG”) announced a review of the entire Accelerated Approval pathway. The investigation will assess implementation of the Accelerated Approval pathway on a much broader scale than just the Aduhelm decision. The HHS OIG will make recommendations based on examination of the approval process for a variety of drugs, including Aduhelm, in a report to be issued in 2023.
In addition to the HHS OIG investigation, the Congressional Committees on Oversight and Reform and Energy and Commerce announced investigations into Aduhelm’s approval process as well as into Biogen’s pricing and business strategies for the drug. In a letter to Biogen on July 12, 2021, the committees requested a vast number of documents related to the safety, efficacy and clinical benefit of the drug, the regulatory review process and approval, and any records from informal or formal meetings.Footnote 137 Then, on September 1, 2021, both committees requested more information from the FDA regarding the approval process. The committees stated in a letter to Woodcock that they were “concerned by apparent anomalies” in Aduhelm’s evaluation by the agency and “reports of unusual coordination between [the] FDA and Biogen throughout the approval process.”Footnote 138 Specifically, the committees requested more information related to the clinical data that supported the use of amyloid plaques as surrogate endpoints and the decision to overrule the advisory committee, among other issues.Footnote 139
C. Patients’ Access to Aduhelm
Some lauded Aduhelm’s approval as a great step forward for Alzheimer’s patients who could now access a drug that would directly impact the disease and ideally allow the development of future medications. Even after approval, however, accessing Aduhelm is not as simple as it sounds. The combination of Aduhelm’s exorbitantly high price and questions from prestigious institutions regarding clinical effectiveness has left patients struggling to gain access to the drug.
Biogen originally announced a list price of $56,000 per year for the drug, even though an independent analysis had calculated the fair price of Aduhelm as between $3,000 to $8,400 annually.Footnote 140 Even investors did not expect the list price to exceed $25,000.Footnote 141 Biogen justified this price as “substantiated by the value it is expected to bring.”Footnote 142 The company argued that the price was “responsible” because Alzheimer’s costs the United States about $600 billion each year in direct and indirect costs and affects millions of Americans.Footnote 143 Additionally, Biogen pledged not to increase the price for four years.Footnote 144 After months of bad press and criticism from physicians, patients, and policymakers, Biogen unexpectedly cut the price of Aduhelm nearly in half to $28,200.Footnote 145 Even with this unexpected price cut, many patients may still be unable to pay the high price. Ultimately, the price that patients will actually pay depends on their insurance.
1. Insurance Companies
The prohibitive cost of Aduhelm and its unusual approval process caused many insurance companies and hospital systems to conduct their own cost/benefit analyses of Aduhelm.Footnote 146 Although these reviews are standard, many institutions conducted deeper inquiries into clinical effectiveness once the FDA approval overruled the overwhelmingly negative advisory committee recommendation.Footnote 147 This institutional “holding pattern” added another barrier to patients’ ability to access the drug. After their own analyses confirmed the lack of demonstrated efficacy, many insurance companies have decided not to cover or to limit coverage severely.Footnote 148 Within a month of approval, six Blue Cross and Blue Shield affiliates in Florida, New York, Michigan, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania announced they would not cover Aduhelm because they considered it “investigational” or “experimental.”Footnote 149 James Chambers, an associate professor of medicine at the Tufts Medical Center Institute for Clinical Research and Health Policy Studies, who has spent seven years studying how private insurers decide to cover drugs, called the action “unprecedented.”Footnote 150 This decision leaves many patients uninsured even when their doctors prescribe Aduhelm.
In August 2021, the Department of Veterans Affairs (“VA”) decided not to cover Aduhelm broadly in the first nationwide decision on the medication.Footnote 151 The VA recommended against the drug’s use in its update to the national formulary for prescription medicine.Footnote 152 VA providers can request coverage, but the policy grants an exception only for “highly selected patients” at hospitals equipped with the “experience and tools to appropriately diagnose individuals and monitor for possible side effects.”Footnote 153
Other government health programs also might not cover Aduhelm because of the higher price, limited efficacy data, and lack of diversity of the participants in the original clinical trial. Medicaid must cover nearly all FDA-approved prescription drugs, so it must initially cover Aduhelm.Footnote 154 On the other hand, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (“CMS”) can independently determine whether to cover the drug. This coverage decision could have enormous impact on the financial viability of government health care programs.
If CMS decides to cover the drug, one analyst contends that 80% of Medicare beneficiaries could be eligible to take the drug due to the broad label.Footnote 155 Prior to the price cut, one researcher estimated that if even one million Medicare beneficiaries receive Aduhelm, Medicare could spend $57 billion on the product for only one year.Footnote 156 This would far surpass spending on all other Part B-covered drugs combined.Footnote 157 It is unlikely that the drug will cost Medicare as much as originally predicted before the price drop, but even at the new price, Aduhelm is still expensive and could have a significant impact on the government health care program budgets.
On the other hand, if CMS decides not to cover or to severely limit the use of Aduhelm, then state Medicaid budgets would be stretched.Footnote 158 Because Medicaid must cover all drugs approved by the FDA, Medicaid will need to pay most of the drug cost for any dually-enrolled patients without any cost sharing with the federal Medicare budget. Therefore, this decision would severely drain states’ Medicaid budgets. Two state Medicaid directors implored the Biden Administration to ensure CMS covered Aduhelm so Medicaid spending would not dramatically increase.Footnote 159 According to the National Association of State Medicaid Directors, state and federal Medicaid spending could increase by $2.6 billion (about 250% nationally on average) and some states could see spending rise as much as 500%.Footnote 160 If this does happen, experts expect state Medicaid programs to institute limitations on Aduhelm use to protect Medicaid budgets.Footnote 161 This introduces a host of other problems such as what limitations are acceptable given that the FDA has approved the drug.Footnote 162
On January 11, 2022, CMS published a draft decision proposing that Medicare would only cover monoclonal antibody treatment (like Aduhelm) for certain patients participating in clinical trials.Footnote 163 While this decision would affect a whole class of drugs, it is garnering attention because of its impact on Aduhelm reimbursement. As discussed above, the decision will have a significant impact on Medicaid government budgets. This decision also restricts patients’ access to treatment based solely on geographic lines.Footnote 164 Aduhelm must be infused and thus cannot be administered at home. Additionally, larger medical centers primarily located in cities are traditionally the only institutions capable of coordinating large clinical trials like the one required for Aduhelm. Thus, large swaths of the country may not be able to access Aduhelm unless they are willing to travel significant distances for treatment.
The decision sparked a range of reactions during the comment period. Some researchers applaud the decision and argue an additional clinical trial is the “best incentive to… [ensure Aduhelm] even works in women and people of color.”Footnote 165 Patient advocacy groups, however, have slammed this decision saying “this is not a tolerable situation. [The] FDA was charged with this decision, they made the decision, CMS should honor it.”Footnote 166 Republican lawmakers criticized the decision in a February 8, 2022 letter to CMS, contending the “FDA is responsible for protecting the public health…” and that the decision “without a reasonable policy and explanation will send mixed signals about the respective agencies’ role and sow greater confusion.”Footnote 167
Biogen was also critical of the decision and submitted a counterproposal on February 10, 2022, through the comment process on the preliminary decision.Footnote 168 Biogen argued the “current draft proposal fails to consider [the] FDA’s analysis;” instead, they suggested a plan to collect extra data to assuage Medicare’s safety and efficacy concerns through real-world evidence.Footnote 169 Biogen proposed setting up a registry to collect data on Alzheimer’s patients and launching a research network to allow more comprehensive data analyses on Alzheimer patients.Footnote 170 This registry would facilitate comparisons between patients taking Aduhelm and those that are not. Biogen also proposed using Medicare claims’ data to track patient outcomes.Footnote 171 For this to be successful, the drug would need to be more widely available than the preliminary decision would allow.Footnote 172 The comment also implies they might challenge Medicare’s decision as arbitrary and capricious unless the decision is modified.Footnote 173
On April 7, 2022, CMS announced Medicare will only cover Aduhelm for patients participating in clinical trial.Footnote 174 Although the final coverage decision is similar to the preliminary decision, there are several important differences. First, Medicare no longer requires patients to be treated at hospital-based clinics as initially proposed.Footnote 175 However, because the drug must be infused, geographic division will remain an issue. Second, CMS will not automatically apply the same restrictions as the Aduhelm decision to new drugs in the drug class.Footnote 176 If future drugs must demonstrate clinical benefit for patients through the traditional approval program (rather than Accelerated Approval like Aduhelm), then CMS will provide enhanced access and coverage for the drug.Footnote 177 For future drugs in this class, this change is extremely important because it means Medicare may cover medicine for a broader group of patients in the future, including in real care settings.Footnote 178
After the announcement, many people praised the decision while others criticized it. In an opinion piece, several doctors praised the decision, arguing that Medicare’s coverage decisions require medication to be safe and effective, but “Aduhelm fails on both counts.”Footnote 179 On the opposite side of the spectrum, a spokeswoman for a leading pharmaceutical industry group called PhRMA argued that the recent CMS decision “… has further complicated matters by taking the unprecedented step of applying different standards for coverage of medicines depending on the FDA approval pathway taken, undermining the scientific assessment by experts at [the] FDA.”Footnote 180 George Vradenburg, founder of advocacy group USAgainstAlzheimer’s, succinctly said “[a]ccelerated approval, as we know it, is gone.”Footnote 181 Even though CMS has made its final decision on coverage, the debate surrounding Aduhelm will continue.
2. Hospital Systems and Individual Doctors
Hospital systems have had similar concerns about the FDA’s process and are conducting their own analyses. Like the analyses of insurance companies, these reviews are standardized and usually relatively routine following agency approval. Several major medical centers have announced, however, that they will not administer the drug despite the FDA’s favorable action.Footnote 182 In July 2021, New York’s Mount Sinai Health System announced it would not administer Aduhelm.Footnote 183 Woodcock’s own letter calling for an investigation into the relationship between Biogen and the FDA drove the decision. Dr. Gandy, director of Mount Sinai Center for Cognitive Health, stated the hospital will not consider administering Aduhelm until and unless an HHS OIG investigation “affirms the integrity of the FDA Biogen relationship” and the FDA’s decision to approve Aduhelm.Footnote 184
Even if a patient were able to find the money and a hospital willing to administer the drug, many individual physicians doubt its clinical efficacy and plan to refuse to prescribe Aduhelm. A study performed at the end of June revealed that eighty-seven percent of doctors polled disagreed or strongly disagreed with the FDA’s decision to approve the drug.Footnote 185 A majority (sixty-eight percent of neurologists and seventy-nine percent of primary care doctors) said they did not plan to prescribe the drug.Footnote 186 These doubts have played out in real life; Aduhelm’s third quarter sales were significantly below expectations.Footnote 187 Between the June approval and the beginning of September, only 100 patients actually received Aduhelm.Footnote 188 Biogen projects the product to bring in only minimal revenue through the rest of the year.Footnote 189 Despite this slow start, Wall Street analysts have projected about $1 billion in Aduhelm sales for 2022.Footnote 190 These projections, however, operate under the assumption that CMS will cover the drug, which as discussed, is still an open question.
D. Future Drug Approvals
The FDA’s decision has the potential to re-shape the Alzheimer’s drug approval landscape. Many drugs over the last eighteen years have targeted beta-amyloid in hopes of treating Alzheimer’s.Footnote 191 While many of these products did not remove plaques at a level similar to Aduhelm, some may be comparable. After the decision, many drug companies re-evaluated their timelines for submitting drugs for FDA approval.Footnote 192 Eli Lilly, another major pharmaceutical company, has a drug called donaemab that removes amyloid plaques and has improved cognition in a smaller study.Footnote 193 Originally, Eli Lilly planned to wait for results from a larger study, but after the FDA’s favorable decision on Aduhelm, the company decided to submit for Accelerated Approval.Footnote 194 Additionally, Biogen and Eisai intend to submit a second Alzheimer’s drug called lecanemab for approval through the Accelerated pathway.Footnote 195 Like Aduhelm, this drug reduced levels of amyloid plaques but failed to achieve the study’s primary goal of improving Alzheimer’s symptoms after 12 months.Footnote 196 Other drugs’ manufacturers will undoubtedly try for approval through the lower Accelerated Approval standard.
The Aduhelm decision is also affecting non-Alzheimer’s drug approvals. Kesselheim, the advisory committee member who resigned in protest, worried that the Aduhelm approval decision sets a “dangerous precedent” for future drug approval for both Alzheimer’s and other types of diseases.Footnote 197 He argued the decision stood “even more broadly for the idea that a company can turn around and at the last minute seek [Accelerated Approval] when their primary clinical endpoints in their trials don’t reach the level needed for FDA approval.”Footnote 198
Kesselheim’s concern is beginning to manifest itself. Amyotrophic lateral sclerosis (“ALS”) patient advocacy groups have recently criticized the FDA for holding ALS drugs to a higher standard than the one used to approve Aduhelm.Footnote 199 Several months later, the FDA reversed course, allowing Amylyx to submit clinical data for a recent ALS treatment after it had originally requested additional data from the same clinical investigation.Footnote 200 This reversal came after heavy criticism for using different standards for ALS and Alzheimer’s drugs and heavy lobbying from patient advocacy groups.Footnote 201 Amylyx will still be responsible for conducting the final phase of its clinical trial, but the approval is no longer contingent on those results. This may be just the tip of the iceberg as drug companies realize that the FDA might be open to approving a broader range of drugs with the lowered Accelerated Approval standard.
After the preliminary CMS decision, many people worried about its impact on future drugs using similar technology and science if the preliminary decision holds. George Vradenburg, the founder of the advocacy group USAgainstAlzheimer’s, said “all of the other companies have to start over” because the evidence required under Accelerated Approval is different than the data sought by CMS.Footnote 202 For instance, Accelerated Approval allows the use of surrogate markers to indicate effectiveness, but CMS is now asking for randomized clinical trials. As a result, “Accelerated Approval is off the table for this class of drugs… .[t]his is going to chill the hell out of the whole pipeline of Alzheimer’s drugs.”Footnote 203 Previously, Eli Lilly has urged CMS to evaluate each product based on its own clinical trials so that “limitations placed on the first FDA-approved therapies [do] not automatically apply to future therapies.”Footnote 204 Although the final CMS decision opened a pathway for future drugs to be covered despite the initial Aduhelm coverage decision, it still requires drug manufacturers to use the traditional approval pathway rather than accelerated approval.Footnote 205 Because the final CMS coverage decision was made so recently, the full repercussions of the decision, especially on drug manufacturer’s use of the Accelerated Approval pathway going forward, are still uncertain. One thing, however, is clear: the decision has created confusion and chaos that hurts patients and pharmaceutical companies alike.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS: RESTORE TRUST IN THE PROCESS
The Aduhelm decision highlights how quickly controversy and disagreement surrounding a drug can undermine public trust in the FDA approval process. This distrust coincides with the biggest public health crisis in one hundred years. For everyone’s health (especially during the COVID-19 pandemic), the FDA needs to inspire confidence that its drug approvals are based on safety and efficacy and not on conflicts of interest or other reasons unrelated to patient health.
The FDA should follow its own policies to ensure that the public has faith in its processes. Officials cannot violate agency policies and engage in off-the-book meetings with pharmaceutical companies or other entities they are meant to regulate without endangering suspicion. Secret meetings give rise to the perception of corruption. Agency officials should ensure that they maintain arms-length relationships with the entities they regulate. While these relationships may be hard to maintain,Footnote 206 compliance with FDA policies helps mitigate concerns about improper dealings.
In addition, one of the best ways to restore trust in the FDA approval process, apart from following the agency’s own articulated policies, is for the FDA to rely upon (and follow) recommendations of scientific expert advisors, particularly when no experts vote for approval, like in the Aduhelm decision. The FDA already has the advisory committees to integrate scientists’ opinions into approval decisions. Much of the Aduhelm controversy stemmed from the FDA’s decision to overrule the advisory committee’s negative recommendation and approve the drug through an abbreviated pathway that the committee did not even consider. The FDA should not lightly disregard the advisory committee’s expertise in evaluating drugs.Footnote 207 Currently, Congress requires the use of advisory committees for any new chemical entities, but it should amend the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act to require the advisory committee’s evaluation of every potential approval pathway as well. This way, if the FDA begins to consider a new approval pathway after the advisory committee meets, as it did with Aduhelm’s approval, then the agency must reconvene the advisory committee for a second decision.
Even though the FDA typically follows the advisory committee’s recommendations, a recent study found that the agency will reject the advisory committee’s findings about twenty-two percent of the time.Footnote 208 The only significant factor in predicting contradictory decisions is a lack of consensus in the advisory committee’s recommendation vote. Of these contradictory decisions, the FDA makes a more restrictive decision (i.e., advisory committee recommends approval, but the agency nonetheless rejects approval) about seventy-five percent of the time.Footnote 209 Based on this data, the FDA’s decision to approve Aduhelm and overrule the advisory committee is exceedingly rare.
Ultimately, the decision to approve a drug should rest on the scientific data rather than extraneous factors, absent compelling policy objections. The public is more likely to trust the approval process when decisions are transparent and supported by clinical evidence.Footnote 210 Even when a drug may be intended for a large unmet need (like Alzheimer’s), approval does nothing to help people unless the product works. Aduhelm has shown the far-reaching implications of approving drugs when the public does not trust the process or efficacy of the medication. The advisory committee recommendation should be compulsory when all scientific committee members fail to vote for approval of the medication. Following the advisory committee’s recommendations in these situations will preserve the FDA’s reputation as a neutral drug evaluator, which in turn will help the agency avoid similar controversies.
The advisory committee is not entirely unbiased, and its members can suffer from conflicts of interest when they have ties to the pharmaceutical industry. However, recent reforms have helped curtail the effect of these ethical issues. The Federal Advisory Committee Act makes it a criminal offense for anyone to participate in an approval decision in which they have a financial interest.Footnote 211 Additionally, the FDA has issued guidance on evaluating advisory committee members for clear conflicts of interest as well as draft guidance for the appearance of conflicts of interest.Footnote 212 The FDA may issue an exception to allow an advisory committee member to participate when a conflict of interest exists. In the rare situations when this does occur, the FDA evaluates whether “the Government’s interest in the member’s participation outweighs the [appearance of the conflict of interest].”Footnote 213 No reform will ameliorate this issue perfectly because many advisory committee members are selected due to their expertise working with relevant drugs and pharmaceutical companies. Ultimately, however, most of the Aduhelm controversy stems from the FDA’s decision to ignore the advisory committee’s recommendation even though the scientists on the committee are highly trained and experts in the field. If a unanimous advisory committee’s negative recommendation becomes compulsory for the FDA’s approval decision, the danger of factors besides science affecting the approval decision decrease.
While this solution is not perfect, this change would ensure that drugs could only be approved if drug companies convinced at least one scientist on the committee that the drug is safe and effective and should be released onto the market. This maintains the FDA’s regulatory flexibility to approve drugs when the advisory committee lacks consensus, especially when compelling policy arguments may play an important factor in the FDA’s decision for or against the medication’s approval.
VII. CONCLUSION
During this dangerous time for public health, the public and important health care system participants, such as insurance companies, hospitals, and doctors, must have full faith in the integrity of the FDA approval process. The best way to infuse integrity and legitimacy into this process is to ensure that, when a group of scientists conclusively decide that a drug should not be approved, the recommendation is followed. A recommendation that lacks any approval votes should be enough to prove that the medication is not ready for approval on the open market regardless of other policy considerations or unmet need. The overriding lesson from the Aduhelm controversy is that the public needs to trust the FDA to follow scientific evidence and not ignore experts in the field before approving new medication.
