If scientists really are ‘standing on the shoulders of giants’, then this captivating volume shows that they also spend a significant amount of time dwarfing anyone who they suspect brings science into disrepute. In 1950 a Russian-born scholar who had migrated to the US, Immanuel Velikovsky, controversially argued in his newly published monograph that major catastrophes recalled in ancient documents were actually the result of a comet hitting the Earth's atmosphere – and that the celestial body became the planet Venus after the clash. Since Worlds in Collision contained a number of claims going against the received scientific wisdom, its publication made respected astronomers and other illustrious experts wary and anxious. Their reaction to the controversial work was swift and effective. They threatened to boycott Macmillan, the volume's scientific publisher, and this persuaded its managers to stop selling the book. Rights were promptly handed over to the non-scientific publishing house Doubleday to prevent further protests. So if Velikovsky ever hoped to stand on the giants’ shoulders with his (precarious) conjectures, in less than six months American scientists threw him off balance.
The boycott was somewhat to be expected, though. Velikovsky had arrived at theorizing Earth catastrophes through a syncretistic approach that had led him to study Zionism at first, then enquire about Freud and psychoanalysis, and finally dissert on physical and astronomical phenomena. He was thus criticized for having no prior scientific knowledge or training. The Russian-born scholar fought back with a number of arguments, claimed to be primarily a historian, and sought recognition as any other scientist would have by presenting new evidence. His altercation with prominent astronomers thus highlighted how, during the early Cold War years, the US scientific movement confronted the problem of internal and public scrutiny of novel scientific works. Velikovsky may well have been wrong or even deliberately circular in his reasoning. But many, especially in the wake of McCarthyism, understood that he still had a right to his opinions rather than deserving what resembled scientific censorship.
Exploring the previously untapped Velikovsky correspondence, Gordin thus looks at the reception of his published work and the many conflicts with renowned experts that his theory produced. Along the way, the volume elucidates a number of other disciplines labelled pseudosciences that received a similar treatment, including Lysenkoism and flood geology. Gordin shows that Velikovsky never abandoned the hope of convincing his adversaries, and sought to ally with prestigious scientists, including the celebrated Albert Einstein. He also distanced himself from a variety of theories propounded by fringe groups openly challenging the scientific establishment. Velikovsky worried especially about William Reich's controversial teaching on orgones and proposals to blend his theory with Reich's assumptions on using sex as a way to liberate universal energy.
The case study is intriguing and wittingly analysed. But, more importantly, Gordin uses it to probe our understanding of what makes science different from pseudoscience and it is certainly this treatment that deserves attention as it offers a novel interpretation of a problem, that of demarcation, that has preoccupied historians and philosophers of science alike for some time. The Velikovsky affair shows that we should be sceptical of any internal, logic criteria à la Karl Popper. But Gordin also illustrates the limits of explaining pseudoscience as emerging from defeat in the context of a historically situated scientific debate (as in Steve Shapin's treatment of the history of phrenology). This is because Velikovsky's theory was born pseudo and American scientists did not wait for falsification (or another logic device) to judge it, they just demonized it.
So in order to explain pseudoscience, Gordin innovatively uses the notion of mimicry. Pseudo-sciences are not thrown out a priori and they do not disappear when scientists decided to prove them wrong. Pseudosciences live on for some time because they mimic science ‘proper’. The case of Velikovsky, a scholar indicted by scientists but committed to using their methods, suggests that the argument is convincing. And Gordin goes further to argue that pseudoscience should not necessarily be considered some invasive pathogen corrupting science, but just the result of the very process of demarcation that scientists routinely adopt. He does interestingly conclude that its emergence is a sign of health for the whole scientific movement. Few would disagree. But will the scientists themselves finally sit and offer a nod of approval?
