In the end, I agree with Way that our books are in large part complementary, each making some important contributions that are not addressed in the other (for example, my notion of regime cycles and Way’s notion of pluralism by default), and in some cases simply agreeing (as on the importance of linkage and leverage vis-à-vis the West).

Where we diverge mainly concerns which factors we consider most fundamental as drivers of regime dynamics. Way sees regime organization and identity divides as most basic (even “structural”). My book, on the other hand, sees regime organization as much more contingent and often endogenous to patterns of expectations that complicate or facilitate coordination among power networks in a given country. Even a state as robustly organized as East Germany can collapse as easily as the next when expectations shift for exogenous reasons. And, in line with a large body of constructivist theory, I also find that identity divides are readily subject to manipulation and suppression through the mechanisms of patronal politics (as with the case of highly divided Kazakhstan that I mentioned in my original review). My book instead singles out certain formal institutions (constitutions, term limits, elections) and regime popularity as among the most predictable shapers of expectations. Way, however, concludes that such factors can be so readily changed by the leaders of robustly organized regimes that they are primarily epiphenomenal. He quite fairly cites the frequent cases of patronal presidents pushing through changes to their own constitutions and suppressing criticism that could make them less popular.

The fact is, as I do discuss in my book, that the causal relationships involved in regime dynamics are highly complex, with both positive and negative feedback loops and multiple moderating and mediating variables that make it very hard to sort out what is most important. My approach has been to argue that the factors I emphasize have a surprisingly high degree of predictive power even if we take into account, for example, that public opinion and formal constitutions can be influenced by patronal presidents and do reflect preexisting power balances to some degree. That is, factors like constitutions, term limits, and public opinion that shape expectations can be manipulated, but not infinitely, and the part that is not manipulated turns out to afford us great leverage in anticipating regime dynamics, including not only where but also relatively precisely when patronal networks are likely to be ousted from power.

Ultimately, these issues are to be decided by future research. To be sure, neither of us claims our research is exhaustive or conclusive, and there are many paths ahead for investigation. Surely bringing in cases from outside the post-Soviet world will be fruitful. Furthermore, neither of our books employs quantitative methods, another way to sort out competing claims. My hope is that—at a minimum—these books together demonstrate the utility of understanding many countries’ regimes on their own terms, building theory that does not necessarily start from standard concepts of “democracy,” “transition,” or even “autocracy” and instead proceeds from a logic that seems familiar to the locals themselves.