Henry Sidgwick (1838–1900) – classicist, moralist, educator – is surely one of the most oft-cited but little-read philosophers of the nineteenth century. Possibly he is best known to readers of this journal as a star in the intellectual firmament of late Victorian Cambridge. Others will recall a tree-lined avenue and a site opposite Newnham College, where the History Faculty now resides. It is only on closer inspection that we discover Sidgwick the sage, a bearded figure of almost tribal masculinity, who helped establish that women's college. But this is but the first of many discoveries, for in Sidgwick we find a remarkable combination of talents. From his arrival in Cambridge, coinciding with the advent of the new triposes in Moral and Natural Sciences, Sidgwick spent forty-five years weaving philosophy into the curricular fabric of the university. Undoubtedly, for better or worse, he was an ‘eminent Victorian’. His major intellectual achievement, The Methods of Ethics (1874), is still remembered, in the words of John Rawls, as ‘the first truly academic work of moral philosophy’.
All this is surely enough to engage any biographer. But Sidgwick was much more. And this monumental study (over eight hundred pages) by Bart Schultz – a consolidation of works published on Sidgwick since the 1990s – is the first fully to give the man his due. Schultz has undertaken an awesome task, fraught with difficulties. Sidgwick's writings, never easy to read, are often difficult to follow. Those who can, trace in him a line of practical utilitarianism, beginning with Bentham and J. S. Mill. As Knightbridge Professor from 1883, Sidgwick's influence was widely felt. If intellectually conservative, he had a liberalizing influence on others – and his ideals of intellectual candour permeated Bloomsbury (the circle, not the square). He may have lacked large numbers of undergraduates, in contrast to his Oxford contemporary T. H. Green, but his service on countless committees, contributing directly to the academic modernization of Cambridge – previously a ‘fount of the higher ignorance’ (p. 23) – shows all the hallmarks of a modern academic reformer.
Yet, as Sidgwick put it, his goal was higher than this – and nothing less than to shed light on ‘the deepest problems of human life’ (p. 510). The deepest of these were set in the form of questions: how to act, whether to believe and, in believing, what to believe. In attempting to decide such matters for himself, Sidgwick was torn with philosophical doubts, expressed in such familiar dichotomies as Hellenism versus Christianity, marriage versus celibacy, Benthamism versus socialism, reason versus faith. However, as Schultz demonstrates – in eight gargantuan chapters and seventy pages of endnotes – such easy binaries fail to do Sidgwick justice. Throughout one finds in him, as Schultz almost puts it, a neat Millian experiment: a ‘traditionalist, who paved the way for reform’, and a philosopher, wrestling with the contradictions of his age. His recourse – in life, as in theory – was to the practical.
For Sidgwick, like many of his donnish contemporaries, the practice of reason eventually trumped faith, sometimes with damaging consequences. Just as Leslie Stephen decided he could not live with the Thirty-Nine Articles, and resigned his college fellowship in 1867, so Sidgwick did in 1869. Like Stephen, Sidgwick sought other sanctions for morality, and found them in philosophy, rather than in history. But it was, above all, the quest that counted, and this would take him to the outer realms of economics, gender politics and parapsychology. Embracing the spirit of science as he saw it, Sidgwick became a founder of the Metaphysical Society, the Synthetic Society and the Society for Psychical Research, all in the belief that empirical study would eventually answer the ‘central questions’ of life (and afterlife).
Of course, such questions begged others – whether, for example, right conduct and a progressive society were necessary consequences of social evolution. Sidgwick's early mid-Victorian individualism eventually found itself at odds with the guiding spirits of late Victorian collectivism. Yet perhaps to journey was more important than to arrive, and in tracing that journey Schultz takes us a long way. Much space is given to Sidgwick's membership in the ‘Apostles’, and to his friendship (platonic or otherwise) with John Addington Symonds. Regrettably, we are told little about his work for the Moral Sciences Tripos. And while much is said of spiritualism, Sidgwick's links with scientists are more hinted at than explored. Still, we are left with a major monument to an eminent Victorian. Sidgwick's ‘cloudy presence’ casts few rays on present discontents. But if we look deeply enough, we may see in his influence glimmers of things to come.
As other reviewers have noted, Schultz is unsympathetic to Sidgwick's favourable views of empire, and deplores his views of race, which were not extreme for their day. Ironically, they formed the backdrop to a prophetic moment in 1908 – when, eight years after Sidgwick's death, A. J. Balfour, his admiring student and brother-in-law, devoted that year's Sidgwick Memorial Lecture to the theme of ‘Decadence’. Not long out of government, and soon to return, Balfour warned his audience against the ‘deep discouragement’ he feared would overtake the West when, owing to poor leadership, ‘learning languishes, enterprise slackens and vigour ebbs away’ (p. 657). Fears of an emerging Asia persuaded Teddy Roosevelt to propose an ‘Anglo-Saxon Confederation’, in which the United States and Britain would confront the future together. It remains for our generation to ask how it was that later incumbents of the White House and Whitehall – notably lacking Sidgwick's moral prudence – would seize upon the same idea, and pursue it to the point of folly.
