Dr. Jim Yong Kim gave the following remarks before the World Bank Board of Directors in Washington, DC

Dr. Kim. It is an honor for me to be part of an open and merit-based election process. I've had the opportunity to listen to, and engage with most of you, and to visit a number of your governors since my nomination.

These interactions have underscored the reality that all countries share the goal of generating robust economic growth that is both inclusive and sustainable. We are bound together by our shared priority of creating jobs, especially for young people, and addressing inequality. All countries share concerns about new and unpredictable risks to the global economy that can reverse progress against poverty.

In helping to address these concerns, the Bank is an unparalleled resource for its members, not only for financing but also knowledge and convening power. These strengths were apparent in the Bank's timely response to the recent financial crisis. The Bank must remain an effective partner in strengthening the foundations and fairness of the global economy, and in ensuring that the benefits of growth are widely shared.

Among shareholders there exists a strong consensus about the Bank's future role. The Bank must maintain a sound financial structure that lends credibility and capacity to respond when called upon. Shareholders do not expect the World Bank to do everything, but they insist that it remain a preeminent platform for attracting and leveraging global knowledge and capital. They rightly admire World Bank staff and are committed to harnessing the talents of an increasingly diverse and decentralized team of talented professionals.

As a testament to their commitment to this institution, Governors recently recommitted to the Bank with a nearly one-third increase in capital to restore its risk-bearing capacity and ensure continued lending. Countries also supported a record, $49 billion replenishment of the International Development Association, which is particularly striking at a time of financial constraints. Together, these investments can support country-led efforts for achieving inclusive growth and poverty reduction.

Countries continue to call on the Bank for not only country-level financing for improvements in financial markets, infrastructure, agriculture, governance and other sectors, but also at the global level to help address shared challenges like gender equity, climate change, green growth, trade finance, job creation, and food security. They also want support for attracting more private investment and building competitive private sector environments.

The Bank's shareholders have demanded and embarked upon an ambitious modernization agenda to make the Bank a more open, accountable, and responsive partner. This effort has demonstrated significant progress so far on openness and transparency, on defining and delivering results, and on initial efforts to simplify and streamline operations. This is an agenda that must continue and become even more deeply embedded in the practices of this institution.

The World Bank has taken steps to realign voting power to increase the voice and responsibility of developing countries in the governance of this institution. The Bank is gearing up for the challenges of the future, which will increasingly call for greater South-South exchange and engagement. Providing greater voice and representation to the developing world is an imperative for the effectiveness and global legitimacy of the institution.

Our Shared Challenges

And yet, as I've spoken to executive directors and governors, I've also heard about several challenges pertaining to the Bank's future, and concerns regarding whether this latest round of reforms and reorientation is sufficient to enable the Bank to rise to meet the next set of challenges facing its members and clients.

Some countries, struggling with, or emerging from, conflict, want the Bank Group's help to bring stability and meet basic demands for jobs and security. No “fragile” country is on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, especially the goal of improving maternal health. These countries want an institution that is far more responsive than it is today, and capable of delivering the right financial and technical support at the right time.

Many of the Bank's IDA clients want help in building their own high-quality institutions. While they continue to seek concessional resources, they want an institution that doesn't seek to set their priorities for them and is faster and easier to work with.

Many small countries appear worried that high overhead costs will result in the Bank ceasing operations in their countries altogether. But demand in these countries for Bank services remains high. They need resources for forging greater regional integration and building resilience to shocks and disasters. They want a Bank that's lean enough to serve them in a cost-effective manner and capable of quickly assembling the best advice and ideas from around the world.

Middle-income countries have an increasing number of options for development financing, but continue to look to the Bank for critical support and expertise. In particular, they need a more flexible partner to help them address deficits in infrastructure and planning capacity. They seek greater innovation in financing mechanisms. They want a partner in reducing high unemployment levels and uneven growth that, in many cases, has left millions of people in poverty even as their countries' overall income levels rise. In turn, middle-income countries have a lot to offer the Bank and to other members based on their own development experiences.

High-income countries value the financial leverage and forum for knowledge exchange that the Bank Group offers. At a time of domestic fiscal constraints, they value the Bank's capacity to maximize impacts within a limited resource envelope. They need to demonstrate to their taxpayers the Bank's effectiveness and want the Bank to lead in finding solutions for a growing number of transnational challenges. They believe in the value of IDA and underscore the importance of finding ways to strengthen its long-term sustainability. They seek more innovative and cross-border partnerships.

A strong and common theme is that clients and shareholders, wherever they come from, value the Bank yet also expect much more from it. They want the Bank to take smarter and better-managed risks. They are committed to the mission and the mandate, but believe change is needed to make the Bank truly fit for its essential purpose.

Working Together for Change

If elected, I would bring new leadership to this great institution.

First, throughout my career, I have worked both within and outside institutions for reform and change. I haven't just managed large institutions; I have worked to change them and make them more effective in accomplishing their mission. As President of Dartmouth—a leading knowledge institution with a medical school, a business school, an engineering school, and about 4,500 employees—I managed an $820 million budget, oversaw a $3.5 billion endowment and made necessary cuts in the institution's budget at a time of reduced investment returns, while protecting the quality of both research and teaching. I understand the very difficult choices that confront institutions with declining or flat administrative budgets, and would work closely with the Board to ensure that we safeguard the Bank's sound financial model and considerable pool of talent, while ensuring the Bank can achieve its mandate.

My work on multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (TB) defied convention, building powerful alliances for progressive change. In 1994, working with Partners in Health, we found scores of people in the shanty-towns of Lima suffering from TB, and standard treatment was not working. My colleagues and I developed systems to get appropriate but difficult to procure drugs to South America, preventing drug-resistant strains of tuberculosis from spreading widely through families, communities and the world.

Second, my life's work has focused on investing in people to spur inclusive growth. I have devoted my career to providing the poorest communities with access to the technology, information, and resources of the developed world. At a time when skeptics argued that African countries were not ready for antiretroviral drugs, at the World Health Organization, I set a goal of getting three million people in developing countries on treatment for HIV—an ambitious target that was reached in 2007. By combating HIV/AIDS, our efforts contributed to stemming the tide of an epidemic that threatened to halt investment and growth on the African continent.

As an educator, today, I am deeply concerned about the high levels of unemployment and skill mismatches facing young people. Young men and women worldwide are vulnerable, underemployed or unemployed and feel disconnected from systems they feel no longer work well for them. They need opportunity, skills and access to capital. This is an urgent priority. As a grassroots development practitioner, I find it unacceptable that up to 358,000 women die each year in pregnancy and childbirth. This isn't just a medical failure; it is an infrastructure failure, borne of far too many communities' lack of roads, health clinics, effective supply chains, and communication networks. The World Bank must do more to strengthen rural infrastructure.

Third, I am a physician and an anthropologist committed to a strong, evidence-based approach to problem solving. To be effective, doctors must listen, evaluate the available evidence, assess options and alternatives, take action and listen more to refine their approach, if needed. I do not come to this election with a rigid or ideological approach. Rather, I come to it with a deep-seated commitment to evidence-and results-based solutions that must be country–led and scalable. As an anthropologist, I am trained to value local context, institutions and the interconnectedness of individuals and the broader economy in which they live. I know that solutions must be tailored to the local context and that we must listen to the aspirations of the people and countries that the World Bank serves.

A strong understanding of context will be critical to developing new ways to support transition countries, particularly in Middle East and North Africa, where many old assumptions have recently been challenged. A key test for the World Bank will be how it re-engages to help Arab transition economies achieve more inclusive growth.

Fourth, I have led a large, world-class knowledge institution. In this role, I have learned how to create an environment conducive to innovation and cooperation among a range of talented professionals.

Many believe the World Bank's role as a knowledge institution will grow in importance in the coming years, but the Bank must evolve in order to better share and deliver that knowledge to its clients. I am well-placed to steward this evolution.

Fifth, I am well-versed in developing new partnerships to address transnational challenges. My whole career has been spent working with a range of diverse actors to achieve solutions to cross-border problems such as tuberculosis and building strong communities in fragile states like Haiti. I would bring this same approach to the Bank, so it can play a more effective role in tackling global challenges. The Bank cannot address the issues of gender equality, climate change, conflict or food security by itself—it must work with others to achieve the outcomes we all seek. As I travel the world, I see a growing global consensus about the Bank's importance in partnering with the private sector, civil society, private foundations and other actors.

Finally, my life experiences position me to serve as an effective bridge between different constituencies and their interests, helping to strengthen the multilateralism the World Bank embodies. I recognize that the interests of emerging economies, the United States, Europe and developing countries do not always converge. I was born in Korea, raised in the United States, and I've worked on several continents. I will bring a global orientation to my leadership, helping to build consensus to advance the mission of the World Bank.

If I were entrusted with the responsibility of leading this institution, you would find in me someone who asks hard questions about the status quo and is not afraid to challenge existing orthodoxies. You'd also find someone interested in listening—to the Board, to our clients, to staff both here and in the field and to stakeholders in the private sector and civil society. I'd bring rigor, objectivity, and a focus on data that help all of us define and achieve our shared vision of securing strong economic growth and delivering greater opportunity for the world's poor.

Let us lift our sights. Let us focus on the broader purpose of creating a world that bends towards greater justice, towards greater inclusion, and towards greater dignity for all, especially the poor and most vulnerable.

Thank you.

Secretary Hillary Clinton gave the following remarks in Brasilia, Brazil

Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, and it's a great pleasure to be here at this first high-level conference of the Open Government Partnership. And I want to commend and thank Brazil, in particular President Rousseff, for the leadership that they have given to this initiative.

As co-chair of the Open Government Partnership for the past year, Brazil and the United States have had a front-row seat to see how swiftly and enthusiastically the community of nations has come together. Fifty-five countries now belong, 47 of which joined in the past eight months alone. A quarter of the world's people now live in OGP countries, each of which has outlined concrete, credible steps that it will take to open the work of government so citizens are empowered, problems are solved, democracy is strengthened.

I particularly want to thank the Brazilian team. Minister Hage, thank you for your leadership, along with Under Secretary Maria Otero of the State Department. The two of you have worked very hard leading this process, and we are grateful. I want to thank my colleague and friend, the foreign minister of Brazil, and also welcome the other foreign ministers who are representing their country. And we are particularly pleased that the president of Tanzania and the prime minister of Georgia are here, and you will hear from them shortly.

I also want to recognize Minister Maude from the United Kingdom, which will serve as the next co-chair along with Brazil. And I'm confident that this partnership will continue to grow and flourish.

Let me also offer a special welcome to the hundreds of civil society organizations represented here. This is called the Open Government Partnership, but it is equally a partnership with civil society. The mission of OGP is one that civil society has long fought for, and therefore, we need civil society to have an equal stake and an equal voice, because without your advocacy and expertise, this enterprise simply cannot succeed.

When President Rousseff and President Obama launched the Open Government Partnership last fall on the margins of the United Nations General Assembly, six other founding governments and eight civil society organizations were present. At that time, President Obama made clear that the purpose of the Open Government Partnership was to advance specific initiatives to promote transparency, fight corruption, and energize civic engagement and to leverage new technologies so that we strengthen the foundation of freedom in our own countries while living up to ideals that can light the world.

In the 21^st century, the United States is convinced that one of the most significant divisions among nations will not be north/south, east/west, religious, or any other category so much as whether they are open or closed societies. We believe that countries with open governments, open economies, and open societies will increasingly flourish. They will become more prosperous, healthier, more secure, and more peaceful.

By contrast, those governments that hide from public view and dismiss the idea of openness and the aspirations of their people for greater freedom will find it increasingly difficult to maintain peace and security. Those countries that attempt to monopolize economic activity or make it so difficult for individuals to open their own businesses, they will find it increasingly hard to prosper. And those societies that believe they can be closed to change, to ideas, cultures, and beliefs that are different from theirs, will find quickly that in our internet world they will be left behind.

I know we don't need to make the case for openness to you. You're here. But what we have to do is make a convincing case that those of us who have joined up to the Open Government Partnership really mean what we say. It's not enough to assert that we are committed to openness. We have to deliver on the commitments that we have made.

Let me mention a few examples of how that is already occurring. Chile, Estonia, Israel, Italy, Jordan, Peru, Romania, Spain, and Tanzania are all creating websites to make public data available to citizens on everything from crime statistics to political party financing to local budgets and procurement.

Bulgaria, Croatia, and Tanzania are creating “citizens' budgets,” to explain in plain, accessible language how public resources are spent.

Ukraine, the Slovak Republic, Montenegro are introducing “e-petitions” on websites to make it easier for citizens to send their ideas and opinions directly to policymakers, and I want to commend the Slovak Republic and Montenegro for also introducing whistle-blowing protection laws to ensure that those who expose corruption are not punished or harmed.

Now other countries have also pledged to make the location and status of natural resources transparent, map the location of water access points, pass national anticorruption legislation, create innovation funds for development of technologies that support openness, strengthen protections for the media, create social networking websites on drug trafficking so citizens can anonymously and safely report suspicious activity.

These initiatives are designed to reduce corruption because we know corruption kills a country's potential. It drains resources. It protects dishonest leaders. It takes away people's drive to improve themselves or their communities. So the cure for corruption is openness, and by belonging to the Open Government Partnership, every country here is sending a message to their own people that we will stand for openness. And we're going to hold ourselves accountable. As this process moves forward, we're going to have to have report cards about whether we are living up to our own pledges of openness or not.

Now for our part, the United States is committed to 26 initiatives designed to increase public integrity, promote public participation, improve public services, and do a better job of managing public resources. We are joining the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative to bring more transparency to our oil, gas, and mining industries, and you'll hear more about this from my colleague, Secretary of the Interior Ken Salazar, later today.

Additionally, I announced in Busan, South Korea that we will join the International Aid Transparency Initiative. We've created websites where people can get clear information about government regulations and consumer information on products and services, and we've launched a website where citizens can send a petition directly to the White House. This adds up to a collection of far-reaching, practical, and, we believe, achievable ideas, and that's important. Because if ideas just remain theoretical, they are not much use to anyone, so we need to match our aspirations with our actions.

Now one theme running through these national action plans is technology, because in the digital age, we now have tools that previous generations of open government advocates couldn't even dream of. New technologies make it both possible and useful to do things that were once impractical or prohibitively expensive, like releasing enormous quantities of public data, or making national budgets easily available online. And of course, new connection technologies empower citizens to connect with one another and their leaders, as we have seen in this past year of the era of awakening.

I've seen how technology is transforming the way that we and other nations do diplomacy and development, and later today, I will be sending policy guidance to every U.S. Embassy worldwide on modernizing technology through diplomacy. We want to open up the State Department not only to U.S. citizens, but to people everywhere, because in keeping with the principles of open government and this partnership, we believe that when people are empowered to speak their minds and leaders are held to account for their actions, we all do better.

But of course, technology isn't some kind of magic wand. Ultimately, it is political will that determines whether or not we hold ourselves accountable. Corruption, closed doors, the consolidation of power, these are as old as human nature itself. The new tools of the digital age will not change human nature. Only we can do that. But through this partnership, we can advance progress together.

My country, like those represented here, were founded on noble ideals. President Lincoln memorably described our government as of the people, by the people, and for the people. And these words ring true as to what all of us believe government should be and should do. As we've seen in this past year, the remarkable events in North Africa and elsewhere have really opened that potential wider than ever, and I am personally so pleased that we have, as a member of the Open Government Partnership and represented here at this conference, representatives from the Government of Libya, a government that before this year could never have participated in an Open Government Partnership.

So we now have a chance to set a new global standard for good governance and to strengthen a global ethos of transparency and accountability. And there is no better partner to have started this effort and to be leading it than Brazil, and in particular, President Rousseff. Her commitment to openness, transparency, her fight against corruption is setting a global standard. So the United States is proud to be co-chairing with Brazil, and we intend to do all we can to help make the Open Government Partnership a leader in ensuring that the 21^st century is an era of openness, transparency, accountability, freedom, democracy, and results for people everywhere. Thank you.

Ambassador Susan Rice gave the following remarks at the UN Security Council

Ambassador Rice. I want to thank the Secretary-General for his participation and leadership on this issue, as well as my fellow Council members for today's discussion of an issue at the very top of our agenda and for their agreement to the presidential statement I will read shortly.

When it comes to the urgent nuclear threats we have discussed today, including nuclear terrorism, the Security Council must embrace its primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. As President Obama stated three years ago this month in Prague, the explosion of a single nuclear weapon would have catastrophic consequences for our global safety, our security, our society, our economy, and even our very survival.

We all share an interest in preventing and containing nuclear threats. During the Security Council's historic September 2009 Summit on non-proliferation and nuclear security, heads of state reaffirmed this shared interest by adopting a landmark resolution, resolution 1887, which resolved to “seek a safer world for all and to create the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.” Resolution 1887 was the Council's first comprehensive action on these issues since the mid-1990s.

Building on the momentum of the 2009 summit, the Security Council and the world have made significant progress. In an historic first, the 2010 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference resulted in a Final Document that included a comprehensive Action Plan adopted by consensus on steps to strengthen all three “pillars” of the NPT. There is no denying that the NPT remains the cornerstone of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and the foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. As President Obama said in Seoul last month: “We've upheld the basic bargain of the NPT: countries with nuclear weapons, like the United States and Russia, will move toward disarmament; countries without nuclear weapons will not acquire them, and all countries will have access to peaceful nuclear energy.”

The International Atomic Energy Agency has continued to play an essential role in implementing safeguards and promoting the safe, secure, and peaceful use of nuclear energy. The combination of an NPT safeguards agreement and an Additional Protocol is widely recognized as the standard for strengthened IAEA safeguards. To date, 115 states, including the United States of America, have brought into force an Additional Protocol granting to the IAEA expanded rights of access to information and sites. We continue to seek partners in the effort to expand and accelerate IAEA activities to strengthen the agency's ability to detect and deter undeclared nuclear activities.

In 2011, this Council adopted resolution 1977, extending the mandate of the 1540 Committee for an unprecedented ten years. The 1540 Committee's work to help states prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction to non-state actors is a crucial part of the international non-proliferation regime. The United States fully supports 1540 implementation efforts and made a voluntary contribution of $3 million last year to promote this work.

Finally, the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit held in Washington, D.C. was followed up by a second summit last month. Over 50 heads of state met in Seoul and reaffirmed their commitment to combat nuclear terrorism and increase nuclear security. The actions and commitments undertaken by participating states are being translated into tangible steps to protect against nuclear terrorism.

The United States is also strengthening global non-proliferation and disarmament efforts. The 2010 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) outlined our approach for reducing the role of nuclear weapons and pursuing the goal of a world without such weapons. Through the posture review, we announced that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations. And we emphasized our collective interest in ensuring that the record of more than six decades of nuclear non-use continues forever.

The New START Treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, which entered into force on February 5, 2011, is being implemented successfully. This treaty illustrates yet again the United States' strong commitment to meeting its disarmament obligations. When the treaty is fully implemented, the deployed strategic nuclear forces of the United States and Russia will reach their lowest level since the 1950s. The rigorous provisions of the New START Treaty testify to the importance of transparency and effective verification in providing predictability and stability in international relations.

Continuing the process of P5 engagement established through the 2009 London and 2011 Paris P5 conferences, the United States will host a P5 conference in Washington later this year to continue discussions on verification, transparency, and confidence-building measures. The P5 process now underway expands the longstanding U.S.-Russia nuclear disarmament dialogue into an ongoing process of P5 engagement on issues related to nuclear disarmament, consistent with our obligations under Article VI of the NPT and our commitments under the 2010 NPT Action Plan.

The entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty is also an essential step toward a world without nuclear weapons, and the United States remains committed to working toward our ratification of the Treaty and its entry into force. We continue to maintain our voluntary moratorium on nuclear explosive testing, which went into effect two decades ago, and we call upon all states to refrain from nuclear explosive testing.

Despite these many multilateral and national efforts, much work remains to be done. We must continue strengthening global nuclear non-proliferation, disarmament, and security efforts. We cannot let our guard down. Certain countries continue to pursue nuclear-weapons capabilities in violation of Security Council resolutions and contrary to the clearly expressed will of the international community. The dangers we face and the price of complacency remain much too high. We cannot, for example, allow the NPT to be weakened by tolerating non-compliance with its requirements or violations of international safeguards agreements. The implications of any case of non-compliance, whether by North Korea or Iran, concern more than just the offending country and its neighbors. Every violation of the NPT has the potential, if left unchecked, to erode confidence in the global nuclear non-proliferation regime. We cannot and we will not let that happen.

Beginning negotiations on a fissile material cutoff treaty is the next logical step in nuclear arms control. It is thus a great disappointment that, due to one country, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to agree to move forward. The Conference should agree to commence negotiations without further delay.

We must also sharpen our commitment to nuclear safety and security. The terrible accident at the Fukushima plant last year was a reminder of our shared vulnerability as much of the world looks increasingly to nuclear power to fuel economic growth and development. The choice safely to develop and maintain nuclear power is and should remain a national one. However, we will continue strongly to support international efforts, led primarily by the IAEA, to facilitate better nuclear-safety training and cooperation and to improve accident-response capacities.

The United States believes that it has a moral responsibility to lead and act now, in cooperation with the members of this Council and the international community, to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons. Today's session and presidential statement mark a milestone on that path. As President Obama remarked in Seoul last month, “no one nation can do this alone.”

I thank you.

Ambassador Susan Rice gave the following remarks at the UN Security Council

Ambassador Rice. I want to begin by thanking the Secretary General for his important statement and for his participation in today's open event. I wish to thank Council colleagues as well for their thoughtful contributions to today's event and the preparations for it.

In our interconnected world, our system of collective security is only as strong as the weakest links in the chain. One of those weak links today is the poorly secured borders that are exploited for the illicit transfer of arms and drugs; of materials for nuclear, chemical and biological weapons; of terrorists and their funds; of conflict minerals; and even of human beings—a modern day form of slavery. Such illicit transfers across borders increasingly undermine the sovereignty and internal stability of member states and can threaten international peace and security. The dangers posed by these transfers are not limited to fragile or particularly vulnerable states. They affect us all.

The Security Council has often addressed these transfers individually, in specific regional contexts. For example, we have examined how illicit arms transfers have exacerbated instability in the Sahel and fueled longstanding conflict in Somalia and the Democratic Republic of Congo. We have seen how arms smuggling from Iran—in violation of UN sanctions—exacerbates conflict in the Middle East and supports terrorist groups worldwide. We have also discussed how drug trafficking has directly contributed to internal disorder in Guinea-Bissau.

These are just a few examples. The Security Council has been involved in the question of illicit trafficking and movement for a long time. But we have tended to look at each item trafficked in isolation of the common feature they share: the vulnerabilities at poorly secured borders that are too easily exploited by nefarious networks.

States already understand very well how important it is to control their borders and often ask for international assistance in doing so. States recognize their self interest in protecting their territory and people from these interrelated phenomena that threaten their sovereignty, corrode governing institutions and undermine internal security. States additionally have international obligations—including those derived from Chapter VII of the UN Charter, including UN sanctions—that require them to intercept or control contraband. There are already significant bilateral, multilateral and regional efforts underway to help states defend their borders, and these efforts should be supported and encouraged. But today we focus on the UN's operational capacity.

We believe that the United Nations system could improve its help to states to secure their borders and to put in place related intelligence and law enforcement cooperation, customs standards, and administrative and legal frameworks. This is why we have convened this debate today.

Many elements of the UN system—as well as national, regional and other multilateral organizations—are already doing excellent work to assist states to protect their borders and implement their relevant international obligations. In response to requests from member states, organizations as diverse as Interpol, UNODC, the World Customs Organization, UN peacekeeping missions, and the IAEA provide such assistance. Also doing this work are a number of Council-created bodies such as the 1540 Committee, the Counter-Terrorism Executive Directorate and our Sanctions Committees and their expert panels. The United States fully supports all these efforts. We are also committed to helping fund efforts by the UN's Counter Terrorism Implementation Task Force Working Group on Border Management to enhance international, regional and national policy and practice relating to border management in the context of countering terrorism.

These bodies are all doing important work, but because they are so narrowly focused on specific threats, they may be unaware of overlapping efforts or miss opportunities to pool knowledge and expertise. After all, these different bodies are often evaluating the same state institutions and legislative frameworks, providing similar technical advice, and appealing to the same pool of donors for assistance. Put simply, they are all working on different aspects of the same problem: how to help states that want it and need it to better secure and control the flow of illicit goods across their borders. Surely, there is scope to streamline and strengthen the UN's capacity to help states secure their borders, while realizing efficiencies in the process. The Security Council can make an important contribution to this effort, but it is vital that the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and other UN bodies continue to remain fully engaged as well. This complex, cross-cutting challenge cannot be tackled effectively by any single body alone. Many UN actors play a role in these capacity-building efforts, and it is logical that they work better together—as one UN system—to assist member states.

We therefore welcome the Security Council's request to the Secretary-General to provide a diagnostic assessment of these efforts. The Security Council needs a birds-eye view of them across the UN system. The U.S. hopes the Secretary-General's report will also offer any proposals as appropriate for improvement. By helping member states to secure their borders, this Council can respond to and, we hope help, prevent these evolving threats to international peace and security. With this goal in mind, we look forward to revisiting this issue in six months and to taking effective action.

Thank you.

Deputy Assistant Secretary Mark Sobel gave the following remarks at the Woodrow Wilson Center

Deputy Assistant Secretary Sobel. I thank the Woodrow Wilson Center for the opportunity to share our thoughts on Mexico's G-20 agenda and the upcoming Summit.

Today, I would like to address two issues: first, a Treasury perspective on the financial agenda heading into Los Cabos; and second, with the Summit approaching, recent questions from some think tank and academic quarters about the G-20's relevance.

El Camino a Los Cabos

In the financial sphere, three topics will dominate the Los Cabos agenda—the global economy; reform of the international financial institutions (IFIs); and strengthening the international financial regulatory agenda.

Clearly, how to strengthen global economic growth will be the top priority. After some stalling in momentum in 2011 and serious financial stress late last year, the outlook has improved. But the recovery remains fragile, facing continued downside risks. Many advanced economies are still struggling to recoup output lost during the crisis. A healthy recovery requires faster growth and job creation, and a careful balance between growth and sustainable fiscal policy, central bank support and structural reform. Strong implementation of G-20 commitments is needed and we look forward to the Los Cabos Action Plan.

The U.S. economy continues to gather strength despite higher oil prices. U.S. growth has averaged about 2-1/2 percent since the recovery began, and the economy has added private sector jobs for 25 straight months, totaling 4.1 million jobs. The business sector's balance sheet is stronger. Household debt to income has come down significantly and U.S. financial sector debt has decreased. Reflecting early action on repair and reform, U.S. banks are strongly capitalized, improving confidence and facilitating an expansion in credit to the private sector.

While the economy is gradually firming, the financial crisis put our economy in a deep hole and it will take time to fully repair the damage. Unemployment remains high, the housing market remains weak, and growth is not as fast as we would like. The Administration has laid out a blueprint that proposes action to support growth in the short-term so as not to jeopardize the economic gains of the last three years.

Alongside measures to support growth, the President has also outlined a balanced approach to address our formidable long-term fiscal problem. Including legislation signed into law last year, this approach would reduce the deficit by more than $4 trillion over the next decade, cutting the deficit in half as a share of the economy and helping to put our nation's finances on a sustainable course.

Euro area fragility remains a key risk to our recovery and the global economy, as recent market volatility reminds us.

Europe's leaders have taken important action in recent months to strengthen their crisis response, reduce financial stress, and lay the foundations for greater stability. They have bolstered the firewall to guard against further emergency financing needs from euro area members; successfully extended large amounts of liquidity and implemented an accommodative monetary policy; and strengthened fiscal compacts. Euro-zone members are adopting tough reforms. The success of the next phase of the crisis response will hinge on Europe's willingness and ability to apply its tools and processes creatively, flexibly and aggressively to support countries as they implement reforms and stay ahead of markets, and to provide confidence to markets and the public that the political resolve is there to surmount the problems in the euro area and preserve a lasting monetary union.

This will require sustained efforts in the presence of many challenges. How will Europe balance fiscal austerity in some countries with the need to spur growth, avoiding counter-cyclical fiscal policy at the European level and a downward spiral of austerity? Will countries with fiscal space let automatic stabilizers work, supporting euro area growth? Will Europe create fiscal institutions to match the depth of monetary integration? Will Europe implement structural reforms essential for growth? Will efforts be intensified to strengthen supervision and regulation and support bank restructuring and recapitalization at the European level? How will Europe address its internal current account imbalances?

Oil prices also present a risk to global growth. Over the past few weeks, crude oil prices have fallen and global oil inventories are rising. But we must remain vigilant to the risks of supply disruptions and their economic impact.

Beyond the near-term challenges facing Leaders at Los Cabos, the G20 cannot lose sight of the need to put in place policies for a better-balanced global economy, pursuant to the Pittsburgh Summit Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth. Current account surpluses and deficits are down from pre-crisis levels, but much of the decline is cyclical and further action is needed to guard against unsustainable imbalances re-emerging.

As current account deficit countries such as the United States work to raise domestic savings, the global economy and job creation are being hindered by insufficient aggregate demand. We need to see stronger acceleration of growth in domestic demand in current account surplus economies, such as in Germany and in emerging Asia, supported by greater exchange rate flexibility in countries such as China.

Turning to the IFIs, further progress has been made this year with the conclusion of the recent agreement to mobilize an additional $430 billion in bilateral resources for the IMF. While these resources will be available to all IMF members, the additional funding will provide an important complement to Europe's recently-bolstered firewall if further emergency assistance is needed for euro area members.

At the recent G-20 ministerial, Ministers also focused on strengthening IMF surveillance. The key to strong surveillance is high-quality, thorough and transparent analysis, effectively integrating bilateral and multilateral activities and examining the full range of policies. But it is crucial to remember that the Fund was created against the backdrop of the beggar-thy-neighbor currency policies of the 1930s and that rigorous surveillance of exchange rate policies must remain at the core of the Fund's global mandate.

Important discussions will also take place for the rest of the year on how to bolster the relative economic weight of dynamic emerging markets, such as Mexico, in the IMF.

We also look forward to further progress on the international financial regulatory reform agenda. This successful agenda is now transitioning from design to implementation. This year in the G-20, we are emphasizing progress on:

Implementation of new capital rules, particularly on ensuring consistent definitions of capital and measurement of risk-weighted assets across jurisdictions;

Strengthening cross-border resolution regimes, ensuring that recovery and resolution plans are in place for globally systemic institutions;

Aligning rules and regulations on trading, clearing and reporting of standardized OTC derivative contracts;

Promoting international agreement on global margins on uncleared derivatives trades and creating a legal entity identifier system for financial contracts, a new global standard that will help us understand and monitor systemic risk.

Advancing progress on better understanding the risks posed by the “shadow banking” system where credit intermediation occurs outside the regulated banking system and providing recommendations to limit those risks, as necessary.

Is the G-20 Still Relevant?

While this substantial work is being undertaken, some analysts are raising questions—is there a G-Zero, is the G-20 still relevant, is the G-20 succeeding? In posing such questions, it is critical to stipulate the standard by which the G-20 is being assessed. Some lament the absence of global governance; some lament “national interests” being placed ahead of “global interests”; some might prefer a more concentrated international order.

The reality is that we live in a world of nation-states with economic weight now more widely dispersed, and a world of interdependencies and spillovers necessitating cooperation among nations. And there is, of course, complexity in greater numbers.

Still, when the G-20 came together in Washington and London, the world faced a deep crisis, common to all, that threatened to turn into a global depression. This was not just a crisis that major advanced economies alone could tackle. Facing severe global economic hardship, G-20 countries all had an interest in doing whatever it took to prevent a dangerous, synchronized global fall in economic activity.

With recovery, G-20 countries now face differing economic conditions, and policies need to be tailored to individual circumstances. Some countries are in surplus; others in deficit. Some have fiscal space; others do not. Some are concerned about overheating; others face output gaps.

The G-20's strategy to promote global rebalancing is embodied in the Pittsburgh Summit Framework for Strong, Sustainable and Balanced Growth. As I noted, this Framework emphasizes the roles and responsibilities of surplus and deficit countries. As we all know, the formulation of economic policy takes place against the backdrop of domestic realities. Nonetheless, the ongoing mutual assessment process built around the Framework has heightened policy-makers attention to the policies they must promote to foster greater balance in the global economy. It is a critical exercise in international “peer pressure”, reminding countries of the international ramifications of their domestic actions, and unlike G-7 multilateral surveillance exercises, it is being done at the Leaders' level.

At Pittsburgh, the G-20 was designated the premier forum for international economic and financial cooperation, transforming the G-7 oriented architecture of past decades. Other facets of the architecture were also modernized.

Through two rounds of quota reforms at the IMF over the last decade, strongly backed by the United States, dynamic emerging market economies are seeing their weights in the Fund increase substantially. At Pittsburgh, the United States led the effort to shift at least 5 percentage points in quota shares to dynamic emerging markets. At Seoul, the United States helped secure an agreement by which advanced European economies committed to decrease their IMF Board representation by two seats. There is now a clear international consensus that the weights of dynamic emerging markets in the Fund should continue to rise in the future.

The Financial Stability Forum was transformed into the Financial Stability Board, with all G-20 members joining. Standard setting bodies such as the Basel Committee also expanded to include the G-20. With key emerging markets joining the FSB, the scope of international financial regulatory standards now encompasses the globe.

The international financial regulatory agenda has made major strides. G-20 Leaders and Finance Ministers, working through the FSB, have helped shape the reform agenda and timelines, while respecting the independence of standard setting bodies. In past years, the G20 agreed on the broad principles and objectives for international financial regulatory reform—such as raising the quantity and quality of capital, increasing the transparency of OTC derivatives markets, extending the perimeter of regulation. Already, this agenda is well in train, as evidenced by agreements such as Basel III.

While current FSB work is not headline grabbing, efforts to align nitty gritty regulatory policies are ongoing and advancing, precisely because the G20 early on agreed to put in place high quality standards in an internationally consistent manner and avoid a race to the bottom. There can be no doubt—the global financial system is now more resilient and less dangerous.

Conclusion

The financial agenda at the heart of the G-20 is substantial and meaty. While the climate for advancing this agenda now is different and more complex than in 2008-2009, G-20 cooperation continues to progress.

It would not be realistic to expect that participation in any “G” grouping would trump national interests. Nor would it be realistic to think the G-20 would displace other channels for cooperation, such as informal G-7 discussions, BRIC gatherings, U.S.-China bilateral discussions and the like. Still, the G-20 led financial architecture continues to evolve, helping facilitate rebalancing, better aligning the voice of dynamic countries with their growing weight in the world economy, and strengthening financial regulatory reform.

There is critical work to be done in Los Cabos and over the remainder of the Mexican Presidency. Mexico is successfully managing and advancing the reform agenda and this is testimony to the excellence of its officials.

Adelante a Los Cabos.

Deputy Administrator Donald Steinberg gave the following remarks before the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission

Deputy Administrator Steinberg. Thank you, I welcome the opportunity to participate in today's hearing, which is shining a spotlight on the disturbing trend toward growing restrictions on the space for civil society institution in a number of countries and the physical threats against citizens stepping forward to demand change in their societies.

In 1990, I served as foreign policy adviser to House Majority leader Richard Gephardt, and had the honor to travel with Mr. Gephardt, as well as Tom and Annette Lantos to Budapest, Prague, Warsaw, and Berlin within days of the fall of the Berlin Wall.

This trip afforded the unique privilege to see the changes through the eyes of Tom and Annette, who were true regional heroes.

In Prague, we sat down in a beer hall with Ivan Havel and other leaders of the Civic Forum. Tom's first question to the leaders was—when did they plan to turn their group into a political party and take over government?

Havel and his colleagues seemed baffled. Over the next hour, they explained that their goal wasn't to step into the shoes of the authoritarians. Rather, it was about diffusing power throughout society—to lawyers, journalists, labor unions, religious leaders, business people, artists, ethnic groups, and, yes, playwrights. It was all about creating space for citizens to run their own lives.

I often think of this experience in my current job. On recent trips, I've had the opportunity to sit down with Afro-Colombians and indigenous people in Colombia; independent media and human rights lawyers in Georgia; displaced persons in South Sudan; disabled people and LGBT advocates in Vietnam; and women and youth activists, only steps away from Tahrir Square in Egypt.

Each participant's perspective mirror the comments made in that Prague beer hall: these heroes demanded a role in shaping the lives of their nations, their compatriots and themselves.

But now we face a disturbing paradox—at a time of exploding social media and open communications, many governments are seeking to further close space for civil society through draconian restrictions.

My colleagues, Assistant Secretary Posner and Special Adviser Tillemann, have outlined for you the most disturbing situations, addressing primarily the human rights and political aspects. I want to focus on the development aspects.

From three decades of work in this arena, I've learned several lessons.

First, development simply works better and is more sustainable when it draws on the full richness of civil society, involving them as planners, implementers and beneficiaries. No government has a monopoly on good ideas, financial or human resources, ground truth or moral authority. In these environments, civil society is often the eyes, the ears and the conscience of their nation.

Civil society plays a vital role as a watchdog against governmental abuse, corruption and inefficiency—working to hold officials accountable.

Civil society knows that development means more that high rates of per capita growth. It means a sustainable improvement in socio-economic standards, growing educational opportunities, improved health, better housing and other social conditions. Egypt, for example, experience 6-10 percent growth for much of the Mubarak reign, but the lack of inclusion and equity led to misdistribution of income and wealth, arrogance and corruption, white elephant infrastructure projects and lack of jobs, particularly for the youth.

At USAID, we've addressed these concerns in four key ways.

First, we're working to create and enforce international norms, working hand-in-hand with our own civil society institutions, including Interaction, associations of contractors, human rights groups, women's associations and other partners. At the Busan Development Forum last year, for example, the United States pressed hard and successfully for inclusion of strong language affirming the rights and importance of civil society. Specifically, the document states that civil society organizations play a vital role in enabling people to claim their rights, to shape development policies and new partnerships, and to oversee their implementation. Each signatory agreed to enable civil society to play its role as independent development actors, ensuring an enabling environment that maximizes their contributions to development.

We achieved similar normative statements in the Community of Democracies, the Open Government Partnership, within the UN General Assembly and other international forums.

But it is telling that many of the governments that signed the Busan outcome document—and even those who led its drafting exercise—are the very countries seeking to restrict civil society.

Thus, we are also demanding that governments include civil society in formulating development strategies and goals, in implementing these programs, as well as in monitoring, evaluating and demanding accountability. This is especially true in implementing rural development and food security efforts under the President's Feed the Future initiative; child survival efforts under the Global Health Initiative; remediation and adaptation efforts under the Climate Change initiative; and humanitarian relief efforts.

For example, we now have a requirement that each project proposal include a gender impact statement stating how the project will impact women.

Third, we are working directly to create civil society institutions. A growing percentage of our assistance is going through reputable, transparent NGOs.

We are helping to build these groups. In the Philippines, for example, we set up incubators for 120 NGOs in human rights, environmental, and development space, providing training to create reliable financial, human resource, monitoring and evaluation systems. In Cambodia, we have empowered 315 civil society groups to advocate for more space, as part of our global “Legal Enabling Environment Program.”

Similarly, last year at Afhad University in Khartoum, I was pleased to announce a new program to empower civil society women to participate in peace processes, which include providing training, stipends and physical protection, because we know that one of the most dangerous professions in the world is a women peace builder.

Finally, like our colleagues throughout government, we advocate for these groups in meetings with host governments by speaking out against abuses, providing financial support for those subjected to abuse, and, when appropriate, wrapping the American flag as a protective shield around advocates who want this protection. The simple act of meeting with a senior American official—or a member of Congress, for that matter—can provide life-saving protection.

There is no higher purpose for the use of American power than to provide a stern reminder to those who seek to shut down civil society that they are indeed on the wrong side of history.

Secretary Leon Panetta gave the following remarks before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

Secretary Panetta. Chairman Kerry, Senator Lugar, distinguished members. I want to thank you for the opportunity to be the first Secretary of Defense to testify in support of United States accession to the Law of the Sea Convention.

I have been involved in ocean issues most of my career and I strongly believe that accession to this treaty is absolutely essential not only to our economic interests and our diplomatic interests but I'm here to say that it's extremely important to our national security interests as well.

I join a lot of the military voices of the past and present that have spoken so strongly in support of this treaty. The fundamental point is clear: if the United States is to assert its historical role as a global maritime power, and we have, without question, the strongest Navy in the world, but if we're going to continue to assert our role as a maritime power, it's essential that we accede to this important Convention.

Being here with Secretary Clinton and Chairman Dempsey—their presence alone is a testament to the conviction of our diplomatic and military leadership that this Convention is absolutely essential to strengthening our position around the world.

Let me outline some of the critical arguments with regards to U.S. national security and why it's time to move forward with this issue.

First of all, as the world's strongest preeminent maritime power, we are a country with one of the longest coastlines and largest extended continental shelves in the world, we have more to gain from approving the Convention than almost any other country. There are 161 countries that have approved. We are the only industrial power that has failed to do that, and as a result, we don't have a seat at the table.

If we are sitting at this international table of nations, we can defend our interests, we can defend our claims, we can lead the discussion in trying to influence those treaty bodies that develop and interpret the Law of the Sea. We are not there. And as a result, they're the ones who are developing the interpretation of this very important treaty.

In that way, we would ensure that our rights are not whittled away by the excessive claims and erroneous interpretations of others. It would give us the power and authority to support and promote the peaceful resolution of disputes within a rules-based order.

Second, we would secure our navigational freedoms and global access for military and commercial ships, aircraft, and undersea fiber optic cables.

Treaty law remains the firmest legal foundation upon which to base our global presence, as the Secretary has pointed out, and it's true on, above, and below the seas. By joining the Convention, we would help lock-in rules that are favorable to our freedom of navigation and our global mobility.

Third, accession would help secure a truly massive increase in our country's resource and economic jurisdiction, not only to 200 nautical miles off our coasts, but to a broad extended continental shelf beyond that zone adding almost another third to our nation in terms of jurisdiction.

Fourth, accession would ensure our ability to reap the benefits—again, as the Secretary has pointed out—of the opening of the Arctic. Joining the Convention would maximize international recognition and acceptance of our substantial extended continental shelf claims in the Arctic, and—as again the Secretary pointed out—we are the only Arctic nation that is not a party to this Convention.

More importantly from our navigation and military point of view, accession would also secure our freedom of navigation and our over-flight rights throughout the Arctic, and it would strengthen the freedom of navigation arguments with respect to the Northern Sea Route and Northwest Passage.

And finally, let me say that we at the Defense Department have gone through an effort to develop a defense strategy not only for now but into the future as well. It emphasizes the strategically vital arc that extends from the Western Pacific and East Asia into the Indian Ocean region and South Asia on to the Middle East. By not acceding, we potentially undercut our credibility in a number of Asia-focused multilateral venues that involve that arc I just defined—we're pushing, for example, for a rules-based order in the region and the peaceful resolution of maritime and territorial disputes in the South China Sea, the Strait of Hormuz and elsewhere.

How can we argue that other nations must abide by international rules when we haven't joined the very treaty that codifies those rules? We would also help strengthen worldwide transit passage rights under international law and isolate Iran as one of the few remaining non-parties to the Convention.

These are the key reasons from a national security point of view for accession—reasons that are critical to our sovereignty, critical to our national security. Again, as the Secretary pointed out, I understand the arguments that have been made on the other side, but at the same time, I don't understand the logic of those arguments.

The myth that somehow this would surrender U.S. sovereignty, nothing could be further from the truth. Not since we acquired the lands of the American West and Alaska have we had such an opportunity to expand U.S. sovereignty. The estimated extended continental shelf is said to encompass at least 385,000 square miles of seabed. As the Secretary pointed out, it's one and half times the size of Texas that would be added to our sovereignty, that would be added to our jurisdiction.

Some claim that joining the Convention will restrict our military's operations and activities, or limit our ability to collect intelligence in territorial seas. Nothing could be further from the truth.

The Convention in no way harms our intelligence collection activities; in no way does it constrain our military operations. On the contrary, U.S. accession to the Convention secures our freedom of navigation and over-flight rights as bedrock treaty law.

Some allege that the Convention would subject us to the jurisdiction of international courts—and that this represents a surrendering of our sovereignty.

Once again, this is not the case. The Convention provides that a party may declare it does not accept any dispute resolution procedures for disputes concerning military activities; we would do the same—as so many other nations have chosen likewise to do. Moreover, it would be up to the U.S. to decide precisely what constitutes a military activity—not others.

Others argue that our maritime interdiction operations will be constrained. And again, this is simply not the case.

The U.S. and our partners routinely conduct a range of interdiction operations based on UN Security Council Resolutions on treaties, port state control measures and the inherent right of self-defense. The U.S. would be able to continue conducting the full range of maritime interdiction operations.

In short, the Law of the Sea Convention provides the stable, recognized legal regime that we need in order to conduct our global operations today, and in the future.

Frankly, this is not even a close call—the Law of the Sea Convention is supported, as pointed out by the Secretary, by major U.S. industries, by the Chamber of Commerce, by our energy, shipbuilding, shipping, and communications companies, by fishing interests, and by environmental organizations—along with past and present Republican and Democratic administrations, strong bipartisan majorities of this committee, and the entire national security leadership.

By finally acceding to the Convention, we help make our nation more secure and more prosperous for generations to come. America is the strongest power in the world. We have the strongest Navy. And make no mistake, we have the ability to defend our interests anytime, anywhere. But we are strong precisely because we play by the rules.

For too long, the United States has failed to act on this treaty. For too long, we have undermined our moral and diplomatic authority to fight for our rights and our maritime interests.

For too long, we have allowed our inability to act to impair our national security. The time is now, for this Senate to do what others have failed to do: join the Law of the Sea Convention.

Thank you.

Assistant Secretary Michael Posner gave the following remarks in Washington, DC

Assistant Secretary Posner. Thank you, Madam Secretary. I wanted to say a few words about the report—reports and what's new this year. Then I'll be happy to take your questions.

As the Secretary noted, 2011 was a year of dramatic changes with historic change led by citizens across the Middle East, North Africa, Burma and elsewhere. These reports document a number of situations where human rights continue to be violated, including in Iran, North Korea, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Eritrea, Sudan, and Syria. And there continue to be a range of human rights challenges in places like Russia, China, Pakistan, and other nations where the U.S. has important policy interests. In too many countries, egregious human rights violations continue, including torture, arbitrary detention, denial of due process of law, disappearance, and extrajudicial killings, all of which we document in detail.

These reports cover other disturbing trends in 2011. First, in a number of countries, we see flawed elections, restrictions on physical and internet freedom, media censorship, attempts to restrict the activities of civil society groups. Such restrictions stymie the efforts of citizens to change their own societies peacefully from within, which the Secretary has spoken so eloquently about.

We also report on continued, and in some cases, increasing persecution of many religious groups, including the Ahmadis, the Baha'i, Tibetan Buddhists, Jews, and Christians. The reports have a separate section documenting anti-Semitic acts. We document discrimination against other groups, including racial and ethnic minorities, people with disabilities, women, and the LGBT community, which continue to face criminalization and violence in many countries.

But there are also a number of encouraging developments in 2011 starting with the Burmese leadership, which the Secretary has mentioned. Much more needs to be done, including releasing all remaining political prisoners, working to end violence against ethnic minorities, but we will continue to encourage that government to keep making progress on those issues in the coming year.

We also saw positive developments around the world in 2011 in Zambia, where they held free elections that were credible and orderly, in Tunisia, where they held free elections for a constituent assembly, a body that's now rewriting the constitution. In Colombia, the government continues to strive to improve justice in human rights cases. Progress towards human rights is neither linear nor guaranteed, but we're pleased to note these important landmarks.

Now, let me just say a couple of words about the report themselves. Since the 1970s, this is has grown into a mammoth undertaking. This year we have 199 reports covering every country and a number of territories. They reflect the work of literally hundreds of people here and around the world who collect information and edit, review, and fact check to make sure that these reports are accurate and objective.

I want to extend my heartfelt thanks to all the people who've worked so hard to make these reports the gold standard for human rights reporting and fidelity to the truth. I want to especially thank Stephen Eisenbraun, who's our commander in chief and chief editor, and he's done an outstanding job over the last six years in putting these reports together.

Last year, the report was viewed by more than a million people. As the Secretary noted, consistent with her leadership on 21st century statecraft, this year's we've taken a number of steps to make the reports more concise, more accessible to a broader spectrum of readers, and easier to search. This year's reports are more—shorter and more focused, and each country section now has an executive summary. We've used the latest technology to make the reports fully searchable as well as searchable across countries by topic. The public can share these reports on social media, and so they can have their own conversations about human rights. So I invite you to explore the reports online and to look at our website, a year old now, which is humanrights.gov.

Now, let me take any questions, please.

Q. Two things. One, could you assess for us the respect for human rights, particularly in those countries in the Middle East where authoritarian regimes were toppled last year? So specifically, I would include Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Could you also comment broadly on your assessment of Bahrain's implementation of the BICI report?

And finally, I couldn't find it in the report, although I had little time to read through it, and I may have missed it, but I didn't see a reference to how the Libyan authorities handled the death of Colonel Qadhafi. And if I missed it, that's fine. But could you give us your assessment? I think at the time, Toria described it as an opportunity for the Libyan authorities to do a thorough investigation. How do you think the new Libyan authorities handled his death, any subsequent investigation, holding anyone accountable for what some people might regard as an extrajudicial killing?

Assistant Secretary Posner. Yeah. Okay. Let me take the first question, which really is a broad overview of changes in the Arab Awakening, in particular with regard to Egypt Tunisia, and Libya. I think it's—first thing to say is that we recognize that change in any society that's been stuck is going to be a process. It's not a linear process. And so in each of those countries, we see both fundamental change in terms of leadership, but also a range of challenges that remain.

As the Secretary noted in Egypt, we now have today—yesterday and today presidential elections, which seem to be going—lots of people voting. The process seems open. But we remain to see what happens going forward. There's likely to be a next round and then a transition over the summer. There are a range of challenges that are still to be faced—writing a constitution, figuring out the relationship with the parliament. So we are—we're in a journey here, and I think our recognition is there's lots to be done, but we stand with the Egyptian Government and people as they move forward in that journey.

Tunisia, I think there is certainly a sense, as I said in my opening comment, that there's been a good deal of progress certainly in building the infrastructure, including the moving forward with a constitutional process that will set the framework for what needs to be done going forward. And Libya, huge agenda coming out of 42 years where essentially all institutions were destroyed, beginning to develop some stability, still a transitional government, hopefully in the coming months, an election, and the beginning of a process of regularizing the process of governing.

On the—your last question relating to the Qadhafi killing, the government, I think, has such a big agenda right now. I don't think it's reasonable to expect that they're going to be dealing with every aspect of that. They still have thousands of people in detention, many militias that still need to be brought into line. I actually plan to visit there shortly and will look into all of these issues.

And in Bahrain, finally, as we said several weeks ago, we have an important security relationship with Bahrain. It's in our national security interest to continue and maintain that relationship. But we've been very clear, very explicit—the Secretary was in her meeting with the crown prince—that there are a range of very serious human rights problems. There is an increased polarization in the society. We are eager for there to be a process that is a serious negotiation or dialogue that brings people together. But there are a range of issues on prisoners still in detention, accountability, police practices, so we continue to push it.

Q. Did the Libyans ever really investigate Qadhafi's killing, to your knowledge?

Assistant Secretary Posner. I'm not going to—I'll answer that better, I think, when I go there and have some of those conversations.

Q. Just kind of more broadly on Bahrain and other countries, I mean, Amnesty International coincidentally came out with a report—its own annual human rights report—and said that while you have been a leader in human rights, it's kind of—you're not always that principled when it comes to economic and national security priorities. Sometimes that is taking a front seat, particularly on Bahrain. And also, on Syria, where you haven't exercised the sufficient pressure on Russia and China because of other issues in the relationship to go along with more robust action at the United Nations Security Council. Could you respond to that—

Assistant Secretary Posner. Sure.

Q.—and talk about—a little bit in general about the balance that you're trying to strike between economic and national security priorities and American values of human rights?

Assistant Secretary Posner. Sure. So in the broader sense, President Obama has talked about, and Secretary Clinton, principled engagement. We engage in the world and we recognize that there are a range of interests. We have security interests, as you say, economic interests, political, diplomatic. But human rights is an essential part of what we do across the board. And so it is always going to be part of the discussion. Secretary has been great, and I've been part of many discussions with her with strategic, economic allies where these issues are raised with a clear voice.

We raised them in Bahrain. To cite the two examples you've raised, we raised these issues in Bahrain recognizing that that society is at a turning point. It's at a critical juncture where there's actually been a greater polarization and more street violence. We're concerned about that. We're concerned about it because we know that it's in Bahrain's long-term interests and the interests of the Bahraini people that there be a coming together and a serious addressing of the human rights issues there as part of a broader path to reconciliation. We're not shy about that, and we raised it consistently.

And in Syria, I would say we have been as focused and as active as any government in trying to get more—a more unified international response with the Russians, with the Chinese, with others at the Security Council. And we have a multifaceted response. We pushed for the monitors to be in place—the Annan plan. That's clearly not enough and it's frustrating. We've pushed at the G-8 for there to be a plan for transition. We're part of the Friends of Syria trying to build up and strengthen the opposition. We've been absolutely clear for months that Assad must go. And we've pushed for sanctions and we've enacted sanctions and gotten others to do it. It is a very tough challenge, but it's not for lack of commitment or lack of clarity about what we're trying to accomplish or how we're going about it.

Q. Thank you. I'd like to ask about China and the case of Chen Guangcheng. I wonder, first of all, how concerned are you about his network of friends who helped him escape? And then secondly, more broadly, I wonder, the way you resolve this case with the Chinese, whether you see that as a defining moment and new approach to dealing with these issues with China? Or are they so angry with you that they're never going to do this again and deal with you in that sort of way?

Assistant Secretary Posner. Well, let me say, first of all, about Chen Guangcheng's family and friends, we are closely monitoring what's happening with his immediate family—his brother, his nephew, the lawyers who have undertaken to represent his nephew, others who assisted him. We have and will, as I'm doing today, raise these cases and our concerns with the Chinese Government, both publicly and privately. We'll continue to do that. We'll continue to have contact with Mr. Chen and get his input.

So there are—these are things, as there are many human rights issues in China that we're paying attention to. As we've said previously, in the last several years, there's been a closing of space for human rights lawyers and activists in China. Those are things of concern. We're concerned about other cases like Gao Zhisheng, Liu Xiaobo. Those are cases we'll continue to raise.

In terms of the relationship, we had, obviously, a dramatic few days—you were there—during the Strategic and Economic Dialogue. What was striking to me is that we had a very successful meeting while a human rights issue was being played out. I think the relationship is now so important to both countries that we have found a way, and we will find a way, to talk about our economic, political, strategic interests. And human rights is going to be very much a part of those discussions.

Q. My name is Tara McKelvey and I write for Newsweek and The Daily Beast, and I have a question about Egypt. You talk about the elections as being open, and I'm wondering if you're concerned about the fact that there are going to be fewer monitors or it'll be harder to monitor those elections?

Assistant Secretary Posner. Well, let me say first of all that the election process is ongoing, and so at this stage we wait and watch, as Egyptians are doing, to see the final outcome, how the votes are counted, what happens in what is likely to be a second round, and what happens in what we hope will be a successful transition to a new civilian government in July.

We also recognize that this is an evolutionary process. There are some witnesses or observers there; not everywhere. But it is—from the initial accounts, lots of people are voting. The process seems to be moving forward. But there's a big agenda beyond the elections, and as Secretary Clinton has said often, a sustainable democracy requires a vibrant civil society, a free press, strong legal institutions, et cetera. So we have—there's a lot to be done, and this is going to be led by Egyptians. This is what the Egyptian people want. They want a stake in their own future, they want economic opportunity, and they want a stake in the political future of their country.

Q. Is anything else more about Colombia in this report—positive aspects or negative aspects, for example?

Assistant Secretary Posner. Well, the Santos government has undertaken a number of things that we regard as being in the right direction in terms of addressing some of the longstanding human rights cases. As you know, Colombia has faced decades of political violence. Trying to make the transition in a way that both addresses accountability issues in a reasonable way and also moves forward in reconciliation is a challenge. But I think the attorney general's office there and others have been very mindful of the need to strengthen the judicial system, to move forward in a way affirmatively to build institutions that will protect all Colombian people. And we are with them in trying to address those issues in an important strategic dialogue we have with them and in other ways that we can be helpful.

Q. Thanks. I wanted to ask you to highlight in Iran what you feel is different in 2011 versus previous years, and particularly compared with the Green Movement's start in 2009.

And I'd also like to ask you about Eritrea. Am I right in reading this as if Eritrea is really the bottom of the barrel here? Are they the 199^th on this list who you've been reviewing?

Assistant Secretary Posner. Well, first—

Q. Well, who is if they're not?

Assistant Secretary Posner. First of all in Iran, sadly, 2011 was a continuation of many negative trends: intolerance of dissent, particularly a crackdown on demonstrators in February; free speech restricted; internet freedom restricted; political participation severely circumscribed; unfair trials, amputations, floggings; lots of death penalty, including some this year, many held in secret. So it's a very grim picture. And I want to in particular single out the case of the seven Baha'i leaders who were sentenced to 20 years in prison. The sentence was reinstated last year. They're now—in May, they marked four years of a 20-year sentence for basically practicing their religion. It is a human rights situation that is very disturbing, and we'll continue to call it out.

Eritrea likewise is a situation where there are a range of very serious problems. It's a government that restricts any kind of dissent or openness. I wouldn't—we don't rank countries. Unfortunately, there are a number of countries that have consistent gross human rights violations. They would certainly be on that list.

Q. I'm wondering about Afghanistan. The report calls the situation of women, quote, “marginally improved,” but it also calls the gains tenuous. I'm wondering, looking forward, are you concerned about 2014 and what happens when we transition?

Assistant Secretary Posner. We are concerned, and Afghan women and women's leaders are also greatly concerned. Women are critical actors in the reconciliation and reintegration process. They need to be not marginal to the political process. They need to be fully engaged and their rights fully respected. And we are very mindful, and having spent a lot of time with women's leaders there, I can tell you that there is a big—a tall agenda in terms of integrating women into the political process and making sure that women and girls' rights are protected going forward. We are very mindful of the challenge.

At the same time, there is a vital and vibrant civil society there. They're more engaged. And so I think it's in our interest to figure out how we can help them advance the agenda, amplify their voices, so that they can be more effective in the coming years.

Q. Thank you, ma'am. If I may go back to China, sir, this report, of course, we stand here and sit here every year. There are millions of people in China who are seeking freedom and democracy, especially those who are being persecuted in the name of religion; they cannot practice any kind of religion there. And also monks and Buddhist and finally, as far as Tibetans are concerned, they are still crying. And when Secretary said that you are not alone, we are with you, they are still asking the United States that—when will you be with us?

And finally, as far as Pakistan is concerned, journalists and extrajudicial killings and women and girls are under attack in Pakistan.

Assistant Secretary Posner. On China, I would say this: There are a—there's a long agenda, a big agenda on human rights. We deal with it in different ways. Last month, Harold Koh, the legal advisor here, and I participated in a legal experts discussion where we discussed a range of issues, including the independence of the courts, independence of lawyers, detention issues, and the like. We were part of—I was part of the Strategic and Economic Dialogue, and this summer we will have a human rights dialogue where we raise these issues.

So these issues come up in many different contexts with me and with other U.S. Government officials. We're very mindful of the situation of religious minorities—the Tibetans. We're very concerned about the self-immolations. We're concerned about the situation of the Uighurs in Xinjiang and elsewhere.

We are going to raise these issues as well as the individual cases, some of which I have mentioned. We're going to continue to raise our concerns about labor issues and about a range of other things that matter to Chinese people. These are issues that they are now increasingly debating within their own society. Again, we're going to amplify their voices and we're going to try to be reinforcing of that.

On Pakistan, I would say you've mentioned the extrajudicial killings, which is certainly one of the things the report singles out. We're very concerned about the violence in Baluchistan. We're concerned about the effects of those who've challenged some of the laws like the blasphemy law. Asia Bibi's case continues to be a cause of great concern. We have a big agenda. It's a tough discussion, but we're going to keep having it.

Q. Just one on Mexico? Please.

Q. In the opening, her introduction, the Secretary says that U.S. Government is watching and holding accountable governments who don't perform in human rights lists. In your report on Mexico, you said that security forces, especially the army and the Mexican navy, are not fulfilling their performance of human rights. And the Merida Initiative funds 50 percent. It's conditioned to the performance of human rights of the Mexican military forces. I just wonder if what you said in your report is going to be applied on the policy on the Merida Initiative, because the Mexican society is complaining a lot on the Calderon administration. So far are being more than 50,000 people dead in five and a half years. So what is your response to this situation, especially on the Merida Initiative?

Assistant Secretary Posner. Well—yeah, just two points on that: One, as you say, Mexico is a country where there's been endemic violence, much of it related to the drug trade and the government's efforts to curtail that. An aspect—obviously, that government has the, not only the right, but the obligation to try to protect its own citizens. There are a number of reports—and we document them in this report—of abuses by or violations by the Mexican military. We've had discussions. I've been down there several times meeting with Mexican Government, including Mexican military leaders, about how to improve accountability for those violations.

The longer term effort has to be to build a police structure and a criminal justice structure that deals with these cases outside of the military. President Calderon understands that and so does everybody else. But we are very attentive to these issues. We're both working closely with the Mexican Government, but also consulting broadly with Mexican human rights activists and others who are—who share our concerns.

Secretary Hillary Clinton gave the following remarks in Istanbul, Turkey

Ambassador Susan Rice gave the following remarks in New York

Ambassador Rice. Thank you Mr. President. And thank you to the Secretary-General, Under Secretary-General Amos, Assistant Secretary-General Simonovic, and ICRC Director Spoerri for your statements. I also want to commend the thousands of United Nations peacekeepers, observers, humanitarian and human rights workers for their dedication to protecting civilians in harm's way, despite great challenges and risk.

Mr. President, protecting civilians is a fundamental responsibility of the international community and a priority for the United States. Too many situations still cry out for stronger action. We must redouble our efforts to prevent and confront abuses of civilians.

Today, I'd like to stress three priorities for the United States: ensuring safety and access for humanitarian workers; advancing accountability; and strengthening UN capacity.

The United States is appalled by the numbers of reports of efforts to intimidate, obstruct and harm humanitarian workers. This must stop and, as stated in Resolution 1894, we must “take appropriate steps in response to deliberate attacks against humanitarian personnel.”

Second, the United States strongly rejects impunity and supports efforts to hold accountable violators of international humanitarian and human rights law. The conviction of Charles Taylor by the Special Court for Sierra Leone, and the International Criminal Court's judgment against Thomas Lubanga from the Democratic Republic of the Congo represent milestones for international justice. There has also been steady progress in bringing to justice those responsible for mass atrocities in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda. But many perpetrators remain at large, including the key architects of genocide in Darfur, moreover, justice has not yet been rendered for the Walikale rapes nearly two years ago.

We support efforts to expose and document human rights abuses and have cosponsored resolutions throughout the UN system stressing the need for accountability. We agree with the Secretary General that the Security Council has not spoken out enough about the failure to prevent attacks on journalists, as called for in Resolution 1738.

Third, the United States remains firmly committed to working with the international community and the United Nations to protect civilians. Over the past year, the United States has conducted a comprehensive review of our own structures and capabilities in order to develop better tools and processes to prevent atrocities. The recently released U.S. policy directive supports efforts by the Secretariat and UN field missions to review existing capabilities, identify gaps, and improve information-sharing and training.

Mr. President, the Secretary General has encouraged all relevant UN entities to brief the Council on protection of civilians, which is something we strongly support. In particular, we would welcome a briefing to the Security Council on implementation of Resolution 1894 and an annual briefing on the capacity of current UN-mandated peacekeeping and special political missions with respect to their efforts to protect civilians, particularly to identify lessons learned and resources gaps. Additionally, we would ask that all relevant UN entities, in future reports to the Council, include information on the threats and vulnerabilities facing the population as well as their strategies to mitigate them.

The Security Council has proven that it can act to protect civilians under threat. The perennial question remains—when will it? Last year, this Council and the broader international community took a principled stand, saving untold lives in Libya. As the Secretary-General said in his report, the Council's response to the situation in Libya was decisive. The Council first referred the situation to the International Criminal Court in Resolution 1970, and when Qadhafi's regime remained defiant, we adopted without opposition Resolution 1973, which contained a strong civilian protection mandate well understood by all members of this Council to authorize the use of force to prevent brutal actions by the Qadhafi regime against the Libyan people. These actions have given Libyans a well-deserved chance to chart a future where their sovereignty, dignity and human rights are respected.

By contrast, the situation in Syria represents a colossal failure by the Security Council to protect civilians. For over a year, this Council has not been willing to protect the Syrian people from the brutal actions of their government. During our last debate on this topic in November, the High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated the death toll from months of violence at 3,500. It has at least tripled since. The regime's relentless campaign of violence against its own people has grown ever more reprehensible and ever more dangerous to international peace and security. The recent suspension of operations by the UN Supervision Mission in Syria is a testament to the gravity of the situation. It is a shame that this Council continues to stand by rather than to stand up. We must take meaningful steps, including by imposing binding sanctions under Chapter VII, to pressure the Syrian regime to comply with the Joint Special Envoy's six-point plan; and work towards a political transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people.

In Sudan, the Government in Khartoum continues to fail to protect civilians by bombing civilian areas and impeding the delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance. The United States strongly condemns the violations of international law and human rights abuses in Darfur and the Two Areas. We and many others have repeatedly called on the Government of Sudan to end its indiscriminate aerial bombardments and provide immediate and unrestricted humanitarian access in Southern Kordofan and Blue Nile states. Sudan must also guarantee unrestricted humanitarian access to all of Darfur.

In conclusion, since the Council's November 2010 Presidential Statement on the Protection of Civilians, we have witnessed robust international action to protect civilians, including in Cote D'Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of Congo and of course Libya as I've already mentioned, but also the failure to help those in dire need. The United States remains committed to the protection of civilians and will continue working with this Council and our international partners towards that end.

Secretary Leon Panetta gave the following remarks in Washington, DC