Once a new military innovation debuts, how does it spread throughout the international system? How do states respond to the innovation? And what are the consequences of these responses for international security? In The Diffusion of Military Power, Michael Horowitz shifts our focus away from military innovation itself and toward the ways in which states respond. This change in focus is important because, as Horowitz articulates, it is state response to innovation that is of greatest consequence for international security.
Horowitz focuses on major military innovations, defined as “major changes in the conduct of warfare, relevant to leading military organizations, designed to increase the efficiency with which capabilities are converted to power” (p. 22). Once an innovation debuts, states can choose from a variety of internal and external responses. Internal responses include adopting the innovation, adopting it partially, or countering through development of a different technology or organizational practice. External responses include moving toward neutrality or developing alliances with the state that debuted the innovation.
The author's adoption-capacity theory posits that two main factors determine a state's response to a new innovation, as well as how the innovation diffuses throughout the international system: financial intensity and organizational capital. Financial intensity “refers to the particular resource mobilization requirements involved in attempting to adopt a major military innovation” (pp. 30–31). For example, the more an innovation is oriented toward the military and the higher per-unit cost, the higher the financial intensity required for adoption. Organizational capital “represents a virtual stockpile of change assets needed to respond to changes in the character of warfare” (p. 33). The organizational capital of a military organization is defined by its age, willingness to experiment with new technologies and operational practices, and breadth of its primary task; organizations that are younger are willing to experiment, and have a broader critical task and organizational capital.
To investigate these arguments empirically, Horowitz examines four innovations: carrier warfare, nuclear weapons, battlefleet warfare, and suicide terrorism. In the case of carrier warfare, adoption-capacity theory helps explain why so few states adopted this innovation at the end of World War II. Since the financial intensity and organizational capital required for adoption were high, wealth and willingness to experiment with naval innovations allowed the United States and Imperial Japan to be the first movers during the interwar period, joined later only by Great Britain after World War II. Instead of adopting, most states chose to bandwagon with the United States and Great Britain or to counter the innovation by developing submarines and/or antiship missiles (e.g., the Soviet Union and China).
As with carrier warfare, the financial intensity required to adopt nuclear weapons when this innovation debuted was high. However, since no radical military changes were required, the organizational capital required to adopt was low. Adoption-capacity theory thus helps explain the large number of wealthy states that initially adopted nuclear weapons, followed by states that overcame the financial requirements by investing in a nuclear weapons program over time. Horowitz's statistical results support this argument and offer interesting findings. For example, industrial capacity and time after innovation debut did not influence whether a state developed a nuclear weapons program but did increase the likelihood of acquisition. States allied with nuclear-armed states were also less likely to develop their own bomb, which explains why states like South Korea developed a nuclear program only to abandon it and bandwagon with the United States.
In the case of battlefleet warfare, adoption-capacity theory helps explain how the medium-level financial and organizational requirements to adopt this innovation led to a higher rate of diffusion than for carrier warfare, with states pursuing both adoption and alternative response strategies. While Great Britain's navy was relatively old, the debut of the Dreadnought cemented the country's lead as a major naval power in the early 20th century. This advantage was short-lived, however, as Germany's ability to invest and adapt allowed it to catch up quickly. In contrast, while France had the financial and organizational ability to adopt, the absence of a stable naval bureaucratic structure meant that it primarily bandwagonged with Great Britain, only temporarily slowing its decline as a naval power.
In the case of suicide terrorism and its diffusion in recent decades, while the financial intensity required to adopt this innovation is low, the organizational capital needed is high. In the same way that older military organizations face bureaucratic hurdles in adopting new innovations, terrorist groups that had already developed an expertise in another type of attack could not transition easily to suicide terrorism when this strategy debuted. Horowitz' statistical evidence shows that as the organizational age of a terrorist group increases, the likelihood of adopting suicide terrorism decreases. His discussion of suicide terrorism also shows how adoption-capacity theory can explain the ways in which innovations diffuse through both direct links (e.g., between Hezbollah and the Tamil Tigers and Al Qaeda) and indirect links (e.g., between Al Qaeda and other groups that later acquired operational knowledge of this tactic). In contrast, terrorist groups that did not adopt suicide terrorism, such as the Provisional Irish Republican Army, tended to have fewer or no ties to groups employing this innovation.
While the author's theoretical arguments and empirical evidence for states' responses to innovations and how those innovations spread are compelling, less convincing are the arguments and evidence regarding how state responses and innovation diffusion influence international security. Horowitz argues that since a state's military power is determined, in part, by its ability to adopt major military innovations, adoption-capacity theory can explain when and why power transitions occur. This argument, while intriguing, could be strengthened in two key ways. First, the author could have considered how states' responses to innovation play out when the innovation overlaps with other innovations occurring in the same time period (e.g., carrier warfare and nuclear weapons). Indeed, many innovations seem to occur alongside others (see Table 2.4). Second, he could have looked at regional and minor powers for additional empirical evidence. For example, as Horowitz notes, although India had only one aircraft carrier, this single resource offered a significant advantage in its war with Pakistan in 1971. Moreover, a large regional power transition could have occurred had either India or Pakistan been unable to develop nuclear weapons.
More generally, adoption-capacity theory might be improved through a more precise consideration of the ways that military innovations influence conflict. While it makes sense that most military innovations can increase the geographic range in which adopting states can fight, it is not clear how adoption would lead to more frequent and intense international conflicts. For example, Horowitz argues that time periods that encompass major military innovations “are more likely to have more militarized interstate disputes (MIDs) and wars on a systemwide level” (p. 52). Yet, since innovations occurred during all of the past two centuries, it is difficult to evaluate his claim without comparison with time periods when no innovations occurred.
Despite these shortcomings, The Diffusion of Military Power contains a theoretically coherent and highly compelling explanation for the spread of military power that moves our focus beyond specific innovations to the response of states when innovations emerge. Horowitz's mix of qualitative and quantitative methods produces an engaging and readable book that will interest both scholars and practitioners who want to understand how military innovations have spread throughout history and how future innovations are likely to spread.
