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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 November 2004
Kiki Kennedy-Day's Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy is about an under-studied genre of philosophical literature—namely, books of definition in medieval Arabic philosophy. The work surveys three philosophers central to Arabic philosophy—al-Kindi, al-Farabi, and Ibn Sina—and their contributions to this genre. The book has philologists working with Arabic and students of Arabic philosophy as its primary audience. Since the work includes a translation of Ibn Sina's Book of Definitions, and given Ibn Sina's influence on the history of philosophy, it is also aimed at the historian of philosophy more broadly.
The work consists of two parts, which, although thematically linked, can be read independently. Part 1, “Definitions of the Philosophers,” has five chapters: (1) “What Is a Definition”; (2) “Al-Kindi: The First Arabic Book of Definitions”; (3) “Al-Farabi: The Emergence of Arabicized Greek Logic”; (4) “Ibn Sina: The Second Book of Definitions”; and (5) “Comparison of Vocabulary.” This part traces the fortunes of three definitions of key concepts—substance, cause, and matter—in the works on definitions from al-Kindi, al-Farabi, and Ibn Sina. Primarily, it treats how considerations of one's audience, the reception of new material, and the subsequent appropriation and assimilation of that material affected philosophical style and content. Part 2, “Ibn Sina's Book of Definitions,” has three chapters: (6) “The Socio-Political Milieu of Ibn Sina”; (7) “Translation: The Book of Definition”; and (8) “Commentary.” The work has one appendix with the Arabic of the three focal definitions; twenty-four pages of notes, seven pages of bibliography; and a three-page index.
Although the work makes some good points locally, globally it lacks an over-arching thesis. Indeed, if the thesis is “to analyze the growth and stabilization of a philosophical vocabulary in Arabic” (p. 3), as Kennedy-Day claims, then it is not clear how her test cases bear out this point.
More specifically, the author seems to be unfamiliar with the Aristotelian and Neo-Platonic Greek sources underlying the Arabic falsafa movement. Admittedly, she claims that her work is not a “source-hunt” (p. 12)—although she does exert considerable effort looking for non–Greek sources in Sufi, Kalām, Buddhist, and Chinese sources. Still, the absence of reference to obvious Greek texts leaves many of her discussions wanting. For instance, al-Kindi lists five definitions of substance. The last two involve substance's being susceptible to neither generation nor corruption, and substance's relation to our knowledge of particulars—both definitions that the author finds perplexing. In the pseudo–Aristotelian works The Book of Causes (an adaptation of Proclus's Elements of Theology) and The Theology of Aristotle (a redaction of books 4–6 of Plotinus's Enneads), both of which al-Kindi knew, the ancient authors treat intellectual substances and Platonic Forms in just the terms used by al-Kindi. Kennedy-Day makes no mention of these sources or the potential light they might throw on al-Kindi's definitions.
Kennedy-Day offers the first English translation of Ibn Sina's Book of Definitions. The text is technically difficult, requiring a solid grounding in the subjects considered—for example, metaphysics, physics, and psychology. Given the difficulty of the text's content, the translation for the most part is good. Still, some of the translations are somewhat confusing. For instance, Kennedy-Day translates Ibn Sina's definition of “cause” as “Cause. Every being (dhāt) which exists has existence from another essence (dhāt) in actuality. This being has existence in actuality and existence of this being in actuality is not from the existence of that one in actuality.” Two difficulties face this translation. First, if, as translated, “every being which exists has existence from another essence in actuality,” then, since y is the cause of x and y is also a being, y will have a cause z, but z is also a being and so needing a cause, and we find ourselves on the road to infinite regress. Second, if “every being which exists has existence from another essence in actuality,” then, if one thinks that God is a being, God would also have a cause. The author correctly disavows both implications in her comments, but based solely on the translation they are possible interpretations. The problem could be with the Arabic, but in fact it can be translated to avoid these pitfalls. Thus, I suggest the Arabic—al-

illatu kullu dhātin wujūdu dhātin ākhara bi-al-fi

li min wujūdi hādhā bi-al-fi

li wa-wujūdu hādhā bi-al-fi

li laysa min wujūdi dhālika bi-al-fi

l—be translated, “The cause is every determinate being from which the existence of some other determinate being in act is from the existence of the former in act, whereas the existence of the former in act is not from the existence of the latter in act.” The suggested translation avoids the confusions that Kennedy-Day's translation presents. Again, the author corrects the reading in her comments; however, since she does not provide an entry-by-entry commentary of all the definitions, one should use her translation with caution.
Despite deficiencies, Kennedy-Day's Books of Definition in Islamic Philosophy makes some good points about this genre of literature, and her translation of Ibn Sina's Book of Definitions expands the repertoire of Avicennan works available in English, a task that is much needed. Still, one might think twice before investing $75.00.