This volume deserves credit for many aspects, and especially for its stress on methodology. A collection of nineteen papers presented at a conference in Brasilia in 2011, this work explicitly reflects on theoretical assumptions by pointing out the advantages of diverse multidisciplinary approaches. Expectations do not fall short: far more than a volume on Pythagorean doctrines, the book constitutes a clear and methodologically focused attempt to discuss how to access Pythagoreanism in its different forms, and according to what premises. This characteristic allows the volume to look at Pythagoreanism by concurrently monitoring its historical and historiographical constructions in their evolution. The organisation of the sections (historiography; Pythagoras and early Pythagorean traditions; fifth- and fourth-century Pythagoreanism; reception by Plato, Aristotle and the Early Academy; Hellenistic and late-antique traditions; Pythagorean heritage in Renaissance and modern times) discloses an arrangement that is more than chronological. Additionally, the structure raises themes such as reception and historiography, topics that expose the immense, complex entanglement that is Pythagoreanism. Indeed, it is very difficult to speak of Pythagoreanism without considering the impact of reception and late testimonies. Accordingly, the organisation of the chapters attempts to unravel this issue by acknowledging the function these sources perform and distinguishing different traditions of Pythagoreanism. Here I shall discuss in brief selected contributions. By appealing to three main theoretical frameworks, namely historicist, sceptical and contextualist, my intention is to exemplify how the volume further stimulates ongoing methodological debates.
Cornelli's paper, ‘Pythagoreanism as an Historical Category: Historical and Methodological Notes’, elucidates the historicist approach. Cornelli presents a historical review of previous leading studies on Pythagoreanism. His proposal to consider Pythagoreanism as a ‘unique historiographical category’ (p. 36), beyond reminding us of our role as modern historiographers in dialogue with and confronting the ancients, opens the path for further thoughts. First, Cornelli's meta-historical approach helps to elucidate the content of other contributions, such as those of C. Riedweg, J. Thom, M. Mota, A. Bernabé and F. Casadesús, by exposing the sorts of objectives and approaches they adopt. Second, the combined diachronic-synchronic dimension of inquiry encourages vertical and horizontal explorations of Pythagoreanism. On the one side, it works as a criterion to identify scholarly lineages and traditions, while on the other side it reminds scholars to be methodologically self-reflective. There are important consequences involved. First, faith in a unique Pythagorean tradition is questioned, while at the same time the possibility of speaking of a pluralistic Pythagorean identity is advanced. Hence, Cornelli brings Pythagoreanism into relation with modern approaches to Platonism. As pointed out by M. Bonazzi (Il Platonismo [2015], pp. 36–7), many difficulties arise when one attempts to investigate Platonism as a singular and organic phenomenon: instead, it is more productive to recognise the existence of a plurality of Platonisms that might be interrelated and connected, but are, first and foremost, products of their own objectives and times. Much work for modern scholars of Pythagoreanism remains to be done, and Cornelli's demands seem to be very reasonable.
A paradigmatic example of the sceptical approach is L. Zhmud's paper, ‘Pythagorean Number Doctrine in the Academy’. Zhmud questions W. Burkert's distinction between two different branches of interpretation of Pythagoreanism, Aristotelian and Academic, and argues that the Aristotelian presentation of the Pythagorean number doctrine would not be understandable without Academic and Platonic teachings. The Pythagorean number doctrine as presented by Aristotle, then, would describe nothing but a ‘centaur’, ‘assembled partly from data of the Pythagorean tradition, and partly from Aristotelian notions of what Plato's predecessors must have looked like’ (p. 335). Aristotelian construction or not, it must be recognised that Pythagorean number theory, in its metaphysical developments, is one of most lasting and lively contributions to the life of later Pythagoreanism and Platonism. Zhmud's neat scepticism asks for more work to be done on Speusippus’ and Xenocrates’ doctrines, and on their relation with Pythagoreanism. As paradoxical as it might seem, one can still think of a Pythagorean identity for such doctrines, as they were appropriated in later times. Even by assuming that no archetype can be found for ancient Pythagoreanism, would this make the developments of the number theory less ‘Pythagorean’? Similar questions could be raised in reference to L. Brisson's paper, which casts doubts on the standard view of Archytas solving the problem of the duplication of the cube. What significance can be drawn from the inclusion of such an event in the history of Platonism? Can this be considered, to some extent, a symptomatic reflection of ‘Pythagorean’ pluralism in its overlapping with Platonism?
The contextualising approach illustrated by Bonazzi's paper shares methodological concerns with those of L. Rossetti, McKirahan, C. Huffman, B. Bossi, F. Santoro, G. Casertano and A. Laks. Bonazzi warns us against the risk of a homogeneous conception of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha and encourages, instead, the analysis of distinct but coherent clusters. The examination of pseudo-Archytas’ On Principles and On the Whole System, and of pseudo-Timaeus’ On the Nature of the World and of the Soul, in relation to the testimonia of Eudorus, leads Bonazzi to identify the decisive role of the Pythagorean pseudepigrapha in the history of Platonism. The paper is stimulating and leaves space for other questions, especially linked to the theme of legitimation. Post-Academic Pythagoreanism is in fact frequently considered either as an ennobling and backdating ruse to cover Platonic and Aristotelian doctrines with an ancient patina, or as a loose compendium of concepts that are customarily connected to Pythagoreanism. The consequence is that post-Academic Pythagoreanism becomes an empty label that dramatically overlaps with Platonism. Is there any space to be found for a new iteration of Pythagoreanism after Plato, or should we just consider it as neutralised in substance by the Platonists’ appropriations? This question, implicit in D. O'Meara's paper as well, demands a reconsideration of Pythagorean identity after Plato. Indeed, Pythagoreanism needs to be released, when necessary, from ancient doctrines. In this way, its shifts and changes can be tracked and understood as consistent with diverse needs and objectives of different eras. Otherwise, the risk is to deny to Pythagoreanism a place in the history of philosophy and to reduce its legacy to a merely formal evocation. Bonazzi succeeds in restoring the originality of the pseudepigrapha by showing their pertinence within the contemporary debate and by finding a contextualised place for them in the history of Platonism. Nevertheless, the question concerning the possibility of also identifying a Pythagorean collocation remains unanswered.
Correspondingly, T. Robinson's and E. Fernandez's papers show how later Pythagoreanisms were constructed. Though the papers, as they touch on the theme of later reception, hardly fit the standard frameworks of Pythagorean scholarship, they both manage to show how modern evocations of Pythagoreanism held philosophical purchase. Indeed, the papers demonstrate that ancient material can still provide a fresh and original insight into scientific and philosophical modern theories.
The volume is to be highly recommended, especially as it demonstrates a rich and multifaceted variety of approaches for reflecting on Pythagoreanism. By satisfactorily accounting for the status quaestionis of Pythagorean studies in the present day, the papers also encourage further detailed analyses of the topics treated. Indeed, instead of providing dogmatic and definitive answers, the collection presents Pythagoreanism as an open field of inquiry and points out many uncovered paths for scholars to follow. It is this possibility of broadening our scope and methodological questions that inspires and stimulates the reader to see Pythagoreanism as inexhaustible. If the goal was to show new and accessible approaches, to challenge simple assumptions, to give justice to Pythagorean contributions in the face of the oversaturation of Platonic and Aristotelian scholarship, it has been wholly fulfilled.
