3.1. Legal Pluralism

Legal pluralism, which John Griffiths defines as “the presence in a social field of more than one legal order,”Footnote ²² is a dominant feature of most legal systems in Africa. As Muna Ndulo rightly observes, the national legal system of a typical African State is composed of the following: “African customary law […][,] religious laws (especially where there is a significant Muslim population); received law (common law or civil law depending on the colonial history); and legislation, both colonial (adopted from the colonial state) and post-independence legislation enacted by Parliament.”Footnote ²³ According to Berihun Gebeye, legal pluralism “is a device which connects and incorporates pre-colonial laws into colonial legal systems […] [and also] retains and transforms colonial laws into post-colonial legal systems.”Footnote ²⁴ Thus, in almost all, if not all, African countries, laws of the State coexist with customary laws.Footnote ²⁵ The Constitution of Ghana, for instance, states that the national laws shall comprise the constitution itself, “enactments made by or under the authority of the Parliament established by […] [the] Constitution,” other existing statutes (i.e., statutes passed during the colonial period), the common law, and customary law.Footnote ²⁶

Julie Davies and Dominic Dagbanja define customary law in general as “a set of established norms, practices, and usages derived from the lives of people.”Footnote ²⁷ This definition is consistent with that of Ndulo, who defines African customary law as “the indigenous law of the various ethnic groups of Africa.”Footnote ²⁸ This view is also shared by Samuel Obi, who defines customary law as a “rule (or body of rules) which the members of a given community recognise as binding on themselves.”Footnote ²⁹ George Kingsley Acquah explains that each country in Africa is made up of a number of ethnic communities, “each with its own deep-rooted customary practices and offences handed down from generation to generation.” He further states that some of the customary practices and offences are “related to the history of the founding fathers of the community, others to particular incidents in the lifetime of the people […] and others to the day to day life in the community.”Footnote ³⁰

In brief, African customary law “is the indigenous law of the various ethnic groups of Africa […] having its sources in the practices and customs of the people.”Footnote ³¹ It must be mentioned and emphasized that African customary laws, which are largely unwritten, are enforced by the courts if and when called upon to do so.Footnote ³² It is also noteworthy that, in many Anglophone African societies, courts typically apply or enforce customary law when the parties/litigants belong to the same ethnic group, and such law or custom is not repugnant to natural justice, equity, and good conscience.Footnote ³³ However, where the parties are not subject to the same personal law, the courts may apply the relevant rules of their (the parties) different systems of personal law.

It is also worthy of mention that, unlike the received common law and statutory law, customary law recognizes the existence of witchcraft and malevolent witches. Therefore, suspecting and/or accusing a person of being a witch or practicing witchcraft is not unlawful under customary law if the correct or proper procedures are followed. For example, in a typical indigenous African community, alleged victims of witchcraft, or people who feel that they are being bewitched by others, are required to approach the traditional leaders or elders of the community to lodge a formal complaint. The traditional leaders/elders then investigate the allegation, and if the claim is found to be valid, the suspects’ guilt or innocence is then established through divination or a trial by ordeal conducted by a traditional spiritualist (i.e., a fetish priest, medicine man, diviner, etc.). If the accused persons are found guilty, “appropriate” sanctions may be imposed on them, and if they are found to be innocent, the traditional leaders or elders mediate between the two parties to find an amicable solution.Footnote ³⁴ So, calling a person a witch in public without observing the required customary process and/or without any reasonable basis, may render such an allegation reckless and unacceptable.

3.2. The Tort of Defamation

The principles of defamation law and the boundaries of their application vary from country to country. However, since the legal systems in Anglophone African countries are based or modelled on the English legal system, attention is focused here largely on the English law of defamation, and only the basic elements of defamation are highlighted.

Freedom of speech or free speech is one of the most fundamental rights that democratic societies are required to safeguard.Footnote ³⁵ The danger, however, is that this right may easily be exercised in a way that damages the reputations of others if not well checked. This gives rise to the concept or law of defamation, which serves to protect reputation by reprimanding or imposing sanctions or damages on persons who maliciously injure the reputations of others. A reputation, as G.W. Paton rightly notes, is a person's “most highly prized treasure, hard to win and easy to lose. Only by strict rules of law can a reputation be adequately protected.”Footnote ³⁶ Defamation thus serves to draw a line between healthy free speech premised on goodwill and an injurious expression occasioned by malice.

A defamatory statement has been defined as “a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society generally or to cause him to be shunned or avoided or to expose him to hatred, contempt or ridicule, or to disparage him in his office, profession, calling, trade or business.”Footnote ³⁷ A defamation suit is thus “a legal claim for injury to a person's reputation as the result of [a] false [statement or] speech that is either written (libel) or spoken (slander) to another.”Footnote ³⁸ Evidently, English defamation law prioritizes the protection of reputation.Footnote ³⁹ However, “a plaintiff cannot prevail in a libel or slander action based on an expressed or implied statement that is true or substantially true.”Footnote ⁴⁰ In other words, under the English law of defamation, the falsity of a defamatory statement is presumed; hence, it is a defence to prove that the statement is true whether or not it injures the claimant's reputation.Footnote ⁴¹ Failure on the part of defendants to prove the veracity of a disparaging statement thus renders them liable. In Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd., for instance, the United Kingdom's House of Lords made the following pronouncement:

Besides, slanderous statements or words must generally cause actual damage for liability to be imposed on the defendant. It must be clarified, though, that there are a few permitted classes of defamation in which slander is actionable without proof of special damage. It must also be noted that alleged disparaging statements or words uttered or published exclusively to the claimant and not to a third party cannot result in liability under English common law.

Unlike the English law of defamation, some legal systems, such as Roman law, protect not only the reputation but also the dignity of individuals. Under such systems, the truth of a defamatory statement by itself, although a factor that may lessen liability or mitigate damages, is no defense. It is a defense only if the defendant can show that the defamatory statement was not only true but was also made for the public benefit.Footnote ⁴³ The protection of individual feelings or dignity is a feature that Roman law shares with African customary law.Footnote ⁴⁴ Thus, under African customary law, the tort of defamation (particularly slander) serves two main functions: the protection of reputation or character and the protection of dignity. Under the English common law, defamatory statements that injure reputation necessarily injure dignity indirectly. Consequently, a person's dignity is often upheld by protecting them from defamatory statements that injure their reputation.Footnote ⁴⁵

However, abusive or insulting statements hurled at individuals may compromise their dignity without necessarily injuring their reputation. But the English common law generally fails to grant such persons a cause of action against their vituperators “since in the eyes of the law, [right-thinking members of society who hear] […] such statements should recognise that, when uttered in the heat of anger, they should not be taken seriously.”Footnote ⁴⁶ Again, a truthful disparaging statement may nonetheless debase an individual's personal dignity, yet the English common law generally offers the aggrieved party no cause of action against his/her defamer. However, in most African indigenous communities, certain insults and vulgar abuse that debase the dignity of others are vehemently frowned upon.Footnote ⁴⁷ In fact, “[w]ords imputing witchcraft, adultery, immoral conduct, crime,” and similar words that impair a person's dignity may be actionable under customary law,Footnote ⁴⁸ depending on the circumstances. It must be reiterated that African customary law largely takes the position that the truthfulness of a statement that impairs someone's dignity may not necessarily amount to a defense. Thus, the fact that a disparaging or defamatory statement made about a person is true, does not necessarily negate liability if the statement damages the person's dignity.

Since the colonial period, the courts in Anglophone Africa have, on several occasions, been invited to address whether mere insults or name-calling, including witchcraft imputation, could or should amount to defamation and, if so, under what circumstances. The next section explores the Anglophone African courts’ attitudes towards witchcraft-related defamation claims, highlighting the various arguments provided by the courts in Ghana, Namibia, South Africa, Botswana, and Tanzania for allowing or dismissing witchcraft-related defamation claims brought before them since the 1970s.

It should be noted here that many African courts’ judgments do not have numbered paragraphs. Hence, pinpointing a specific paragraph, even where a direct quote is utilized, has generally not been possible. Some of the cases and judgments discussed in this article were retrieved from the online law portals or databases of various credible legal information bodies or institutes, such as the African Legal Information Institute, which convenes a network of over fifteen legal information institutes in English-speaking Africa. These online databases usually include otherwise unpublished cases.

4.1. Ghana (West Africa)

In Ghana, as in other Anglophone African countries, whereas common law recognizes both slander and libel, customary law acknowledges only slander.Footnote ⁴⁹ It appears that, until the 1960s, most defamation claims bordering on mere insults/vituperations or name-calling failed because the courts largely applied the English common law principles/standards, which did not offer a remedy for such conduct. However, in 1963, the Ghana High Court's decision in Wankyiwaa v. Wereduwaa (a case heard by five different courts between 1959 and 1963)Footnote ⁵⁰ changed the landscape of the tort of defamation—specifically slander—in Ghana.

This case concerned two women in a neighborhood who were openly hostile to each other. The defendant told the plaintiff in public, during angry exchanges, that her “vagina stinks.” The plaintiff sued for slander in the local court, which awarded damages in her (the plaintiff's) favor. However, this decision was overturned by the District Court to which the defendant appealed. The plaintiff then challenged the District Court's decision in the Magistrate Court which, intriguingly, set aside the District Court's judgment and reinstated the local court's. The defendant also appealed this ruling to the Circuit Court. Dramatically, the Circuit Court reversed the Magistrate Court's judgment. Displeased with the Circuit Court's judgment, the plaintiff appealed to the Ghana High Court, which ruled in her favor—overturning the Circuit Court's ruling and restoring the Magistrate Court's.

Evidently, the major difficulty that the lower courts faced in this case was determining the appropriate or applicable law. Thus, the law each court applied, and how each interpreted the chosen legal system's principles, determined the outcome. In considering the Circuit Court's judgment, the Ghana High Court noted that the circuit judge failed to consider “which law was properly applicable to the matter in question.” Apaloo J., who would later become the Chief Justice of Ghana, stated: “I feel no doubt whatsoever that this matter ought to be determined by customary law.”Footnote ⁵¹ He went on to make the following interesting pronouncement:

The court was conscious of the fact that customary law vehemently discourages any act, whether by word or deed, that impairs one's dignity and is likely to bring about a disturbance of the peace within the community. The principles enunciated in Wankyiwaa were affirmed by the Court of Appeal in Attiase v. Abobbtey, where the defendant was sued for calling the plaintiff a “prostitute.”Footnote ⁵³ Wankyiwaa and Attiase recognized that customary law best reflects the community values of a people, and in the Ghanaian context, there is stigma and impairment of dignity attached to certain insults or name-calling. Therefore, aggrieved parties or claimants deserve a remedy for the affronts to their dignity.

These two cases demonstrate that the scope of customary law on defamation is broader than that of the received common law—the latter protects reputation only, but the former protects reputation and injured feelings or dignity. It is apparent that the superior courts’ decisions in the two cases clarified the scope of the tort of slander under Ghanaian customary law and somehow offered persons accused of witchcraft the needed confidence to bring legal actions against their accusers in the courts of law (or State/national courts).

One of the few reported high-profile, witchcraft-related defamation cases decided by the courts in Ghana is Abotchie v. Nuumo. In that case, the defendant uttered the following words to the plaintiff's sibling: “Tell your sister [meaning the plaintiff] that the reason why I do not speak to her is that she is a witch and she leads a gang of witches to come and eat me up.”Footnote ⁵⁴ Upon receiving the unkind message, the accused witch sued her accuser for defamation. At trial, the defendant admitted uttering the words imputing witchcraft to the plaintiff and insisted that her claim was true. She requested that the judge allow witchdoctors or fetish priests to testify as to the truth of her witchcraft claim. But the judge declined the request on the grounds that “the traditional mode or method of proving witchcraft which the defendant intends to adopt or follow has not gained any recognition in the courts of law.”Footnote ⁵⁵ The defendant was found liable and ordered to appease the claimant. Citing celebrated authorities, such as John Mensah Sarbah and Joseph Boakye Danquah, Abban J. stressed that, under customary law, words imputing witchcraft as in the instant case “are actionable and it is not necessary for the plaintiff in such a case to prove any special damage.”Footnote ⁵⁶

In Afriyie v. Dansowah, where the defendant accused the plaintiff of being a malevolent witch and practicing witchcraft, the court justified why it is necessary to impose damages on people who recklessly accuse others of being witches. It reasoned that witchcraft is believed to be hereditary among some groups; therefore, to call a person a witch is to imply that members of their family also possess malevolent powers capable of causing irreversible harm. For this reason, words imputing witchcraft is a civil wrong and actionable per se.Footnote ⁵⁷ This view reflects that of Sarbah, who opines that what makes witchcraft imputation “a serious offence is that witchcraft is considered hereditary, and to call a person […] [a] wizard, witch, implies that every member of such person's family is possessed of an evil spirit capable of doing infinite mischief, and the less one has dealings with any of them the better.”Footnote ⁵⁸

Even though previous judicial decisions suggest that the legal framework applicable to witchcraft-related defamation claims in Ghana is customary law, there have been instances where judges addressing such cases there have struggled to decide which of the two sources of law (common law or customary law) is applicable to resolving the matter. One good example is found in Afful v. Okyere and Another.Footnote ⁵⁹ This case concerned a senior nutrition officer with the Ministry of Health who, without provocation, was accused by her male co-tenants of being a witch and killing two of the first defendant's children by witchcraft. The woman sued for defamation in the Ghana High Court, but the trial judge dismissed the claim after erroneously applying the received common law principles. The plaintiff appealed on the grounds that “the trial judge had (a) erroneously interpreted the evidence on the record; and (b) confused the common law principles on defamation with that of customary law.”Footnote ⁶⁰ Allowing the appeal, the appellate court made the following important statement:

The judge further explained that, as the parties lived within a small community where all the folks knew each other, it was evident that the plaintiff had suffered impaired dignity and considerable injury to her reputation from being labelled a witch who had killed two children through witchcraft.Footnote ⁶² The plaintiff was accordingly awarded damages.

4.2. Namibia (Southwest Africa)

The Namibian courts do not rely solely on, or make explicit reference to, customary law in determining defamation claims arising from witchcraft imputations. Instead, they apply the so-called “objective” or “(un)reasonable person” test—a common law principle. Thus, for a witchcraft-related defamation claim to succeed, the statement complained of must not only serve to damage the claimant's good name or dignity; it must also be “objectively unreasonable.”Footnote ⁶³ One instructive witchcraft-related defamation case heard in the Namibian courts was Claudia Mbura v. Gotlob Katjiri and Another.Footnote ⁶⁴ The plaintiff in that case was a successful businesswoman based in Windhoek, Namibia's capital city, and the first and second defendants were her stepfather and uterine sister (i.e., defendant's biological daughter), respectively.

The facts of the Mbura case are these: In 2013, the plaintiff's maternal half brother (the first defendant's biological son) died in Windhoek. There were rumors in the village that the plaintiff had used witchcraft to kill her half brother who had lived with her in the city prior to his demise. The plaintiff assisted financially in the preparation of the funeral and arranged for the transportation of his remains from Windhoek to their hometown for interment. The cortege from Windhoek included the plaintiff's vehicle, which was in front, followed by the hearse carrying the deceased's remains, and then another vehicle carrying some members of the bereaved family. The defendants were not part of the group that went to collect the deceased's body from Windhoek; they remained at home, waiting for the arrival of the corpse. The defendants, who were expecting the hearse to be in front, became upset when the cortege arrived in the village, and they realized that the plaintiff's vehicle was leading the procession and not the hearse—something they deemed a taboo and an abomination. This, in their view, was unmistakable proof that the plaintiff had a hand in the death of the deceased. The first defendant then made the following statement concerning the plaintiff in the presence of a multitude of sympathisers who had gathered at the funeral grounds or the family home:

Following this episode, some of the family members and locals at the funeral venue refused to assist in off-loading food from the plaintiff's car, suspecting that the food had been infested with witchcraft. The second defendant, for instance, made the following statement: “You are a killer (witch). You can go to court if you want. In any event, with all your witchcraft, who is going to eat the food you brought?”Footnote ⁶⁶

This case was tried twice before two different judges, as the defendants were able to justify why they could not attend the first trial in which they had been found liable in absentia and requested a fresh trial in the interest of justice and fairness. Even though the defendants flatly denied ever uttering the statements attributed to them during the second trial, the court found them liable and ordered them to pay 70,000 Namibian Dollars (approximately US$4,700) as damages for the defamatory statements.

Drawing on its earlier ruling in Lothar Bednarek and Others v. Mine Hannam and Another,Footnote ⁶⁷ the court stated in the Mbura case that the question as to whether the defendants’ statements were defamatory must be determined objectively, and the standard/test to be employed is that “of a reasonable person of sober tastes and sensibilities, neither given to easy excitability nor too docile.”Footnote ⁶⁸ Clarifying this position, the court stated:

Applying this principle, the court expressed no doubt that to call a person a witch who uses witchcraft “to kill people is per se defamatory and serves to impugn that person's dignity and […] lower him or her in the estimation of right-thinking members of the society.”Footnote ⁷⁰ Justifying and accentuating why the court said witchcraft imputation would be regarded as defamatory to a reasonable person of sober tastes and sensibilities, the court stated that “in many African traditional societies […] the belief in witchcraft […] continues to rear its ugly head from time to time and normally heralds grave consequences for one ‘diagnosed’ or ‘smelt’ out as a witchcraft practitioner.”Footnote ⁷¹ Thus, an accusation capable of provoking the persecution or lynching of the accused can never be deemed reasonable by a reasonable person.

The principles enunciated in Mbura were adopted and wholly applied in Herman Amukete v. Ester Iiyagaya (which bears a striking similarity to Mbura).Footnote ⁷² In the Amukete case, at the funeral of a relative, a school principal had been accused of being a witch in the presence of some of his relatives and other members of the community. He sued for defamation and was awarded 70,000 Namibian Dollars (US$4,700). Justifying its decision, the court reiterated that “[b]elief in witchcraft is still widespread in many African communities and [a reckless witchcraft accusation] brings about [a] breakdown in relations in those communities be it amongst family members, neighbours or members of the community.”Footnote ⁷³

In David Kashululu v. Joolokeni Nakale, Footnote ⁷⁴ where a police officer sued a schoolteacher for having accused him of witchcraft, the court stuck to its principles on witchcraft-related defamation that it had articulated in the Mbura and Amukete cases. The facts of Kashululu are these: The plaintiff (a traffic police officer) attempted to issue the defendant (a secondary school teacher) a traffic offence ticket for a dangerous overtaking that endangered the lives of other drivers or people, but the latter failed to cooperate, leading to a squabble. The teacher, who supposedly called the officer a witch during the encounter, also accused him (the officer) of physically assaulting her and accordingly opened a criminal case against him. However, the Prosecutor-General dropped the criminal case for lack of evidence. The officer then issued a summons for defamation against the teacher based on a false witchcraft imputation, among other accusations. The court was satisfied that the plaintiff had “proved on a balance of probabilities that defendant defamed him” and accordingly awarded 80,000 Namibian Dollars (approximately US$5,370) as damages. Cheda J. made the following pronouncement: “It is injurious for him [the plaintiff] to be referred to as a witch. […] [F]or plaintiff as a Police Officer to be associated with the underworld and engaging in metaphysical practices is, in my view, injurious to his dignitas. Defendant must therefore clean plaintiff's name.”Footnote ⁷⁵

4.3. South Africa and Botswana (Southern Africa)

In southern Africa, the legal systems are founded upon Roman-Dutch law even though significant aspects of the law are English in character.Footnote ⁷⁶ The actio iniuriarum, a significant feature of Roman-Dutch law, protects three main interests: fama (reputation), dignitas (dignity), and corpus (physical or personal integrity). These interests or rights have been referred to as “absolute or primordial rights and are thus inalienable.”Footnote ⁷⁷ The protection of fama and dignitas under Roman-Dutch law is comparable to the African customary tort of slander. Thus, although mere insults, name-calling, or vulgar abuse are not defamatory under the English common law in that they do not affect the reputation of the person to whom they are applied, such words or conduct may be actionable as an injuria to the plaintiff's dignitas under Roman-Dutch law.Footnote ⁷⁸ Courts in almost all southern African countries, including South Africa and Botswana, take the position that the tort of defamation serves to protect not only reputation but also dignity, and that witchcraft imputation amounts to the impairment of dignity.

4.4. Tanzania (East Africa)

The Tanzanian courts recognize the applicability of both customary law and common law principles in addressing defamation claims resulting from witchcraft imputations. However, in Hassani v. Kithuku and Chali, which appears to be the leading case in Tanzania on witchcraft-related defamation claims, the Tanzania High Court primarily applied common law principles.Footnote ⁹⁷ In that case, the court determined that words that are likely to expose people to hatred, ridicule, or contempt, or are calculated to negatively impact their social standing in the communities to which they belong, are defamatory. The court further indicated that, given the catastrophic consequences that witchcraft accusations tend to have on the accused, and the chaos and insecurity they cause in the community, statements recklessly imputing witchcraft to others are actionable per se.

The plaintiff in the instant case was a frail elderly man who was highly respected in the community and who previously invited all manner of people to celebrate Maulid (a religious festivity celebrated among Muslims) in his house each year. The first defendant was a well-known medicine man who claimed to possess supernatural powers that enabled him to detect witches and to dismantle their witchcraft potency, and the second defendant was the first defendant's assistant. The facts of the case are these: The first defendant, accompanied by his assistant, had been moving from village to village on the invitations of some local residents to smell out “witches.” The two defendants went to the plaintiff's house, accompanied by a big crowd (comprising males and females, young and old) whose members were chanting/singing war songs and carrying a coffin-like object. The first defendant sprinkled urine, collected from young female members of the chanting crowd, in every corner of the plaintiff's house ostensibly for “neutralising purposes.” The first defendant then announced to the crowd that the plaintiff was a wizard and that

The key issues that the court had to consider in this case were: (1) whether the defendants, jointly or severally, uttered the words complained of; (2) whether the said words were defamatory of the plaintiff; (3) whether they were actionable per se if found to be defamatory; and (4) whether the parties were entitled to any relief.

Even though the defendants did not challenge the plaintiff's version of events, the court found that the first defendant uttered the said words alone. In relation to the second issue, the judge, who referred to the event as “a somewhat disgusting and absolutely nauseating episode that befell the plaintiff at his own house,”Footnote ⁹⁹ made the following pronouncement:

The court further explained that under the common law, a plaintiff in an action for slander must prove special damage. However, there are four exceptional cases where slander is actionable per se—namely, (1) where the words impute to the victims the commission of a criminal offence punishable by imprisonment; (2) where the words impute to them a contagious or infectious disease; (3) where they are spoken of them as professionals or businessperson[s]; and (4) where they impute unchastity or adultery to female victims. Applying these common law principles, the judge reasoned as follows:

The first defendant was accordingly found liable for defamation and ordered to pay 25,000 Tanzanian Shillings to the defendant as damages.

However, in Nyabagaya Mtani v. Nyakanyi Kabera, the Tanzania High Court suggested that customary law principles alone may be applied in resolving witchcraft-related defamation claims.Footnote ¹⁰² In the Mtani case, the defendant, when passing by the plaintiff's house, called her a malevolent witch who had caused the death of her child. At the time the said defamatory words were uttered, there was no one else present except these two women. The plaintiff, who felt bitter about the defendant's statement, convened a meeting of elders and complained to them. To clear herself or prove that she was not a witch, she travelled hundreds of kilometres from her village to Ukara Island to see a well-known “powerful” witchdoctor who certified that she was “clean” or not a witch. She returned and filed a lawsuit against her accuser in the Primary Court, claiming damages, including two cows and 3,080 Shillings (being the cost of her journey to Ukara Island). The Primary Court ruled in her favor and ordered the defendant to pay two cows and 3,080 Shillings plus costs. The defendant appealed to the District Court and won part of the appeal. The District Court set aside the award relating to the two cows but affirmed the 3,080 Shillings award. Dissatisfied with this decision, the defendant again appealed to the High Court.

The High Court concluded that “[w]itchcraft is something known to local people from time immemorial. If somebody imputed witchcraft to another whom people knew was not a witch, the imputer would be told to compensate the latter […] [under the] customary law tort of defamation.”Footnote ¹⁰³ However, the court allowed the appeal and set aside the award of 3,080 Shillings on the grounds that the defendant's claims that the plaintiff was a witch were uttered when no one else was present, apart from the two of them, and no one else heard what was said. The plaintiff “on her own initiative called a meeting and repeated what the appellant had told her.” This, in the court's view, “did not amount to publication by the appellant.”Footnote ¹⁰⁴ This decision is controversial because even though the court made direct reference to customary law, it surprisingly applied common law principles. The plaintiff’s decision to report the defendant’s groundless witchcraft accusation to the elders was legitimate under customary law. Besides, as aforementioned, customary law frowns upon hurting or injuring people's feelings by vituperation or name-calling. This seemingly suggests that a witchcraft imputation deemed to have hurt or injured one's feelings is actionable irrespective of whether a third party heard the slanderous words or not. In the instant case, the defendant did not deny that the alleged defamatory words were uttered; therefore, the claim would have perhaps succeeded if only customary law principles had been applied.