The last three decades have seen an increase in studies on Cyropaedia, which is slowly recovering its historical importance.Footnote 1 These investigations have focussed on how we should understand Cyrus and his imperial project. In general, we can speak of a spectrum of positions that vary between understanding Cyrus as a wicked despotic tyrant and as a straightforward positive figure.Footnote 2 Since Xenophon praises Cyrus explicitly, negative interpretations are largely influenced by ‘ironic’ readings, as initiated by Leo Strauss.Footnote 3
While there have been scholars who have argued that Cyrus has a completely corrupt psychē,Footnote 4 others have offered mixed or ambivalent evaluations.Footnote 5 I propose an explanation for Cyrus’ psychology based on three natural desires (philotimía, philanthrōpía, philomátheia)Footnote 6 and two acquired virtues (sōphrosúnē and enkráteia). Cyrus’ political exceptionality lies in his psychological structure, which establishes a course of action where the pursuit of his desires necessarily leads to a political practice—the establishment of benevolent and stable rule. Cyrus’ aim is not altruistic or naïve, and his activity is marked by calculation and manipulation, but precisely these characteristics of his political practice bring well-being not only to himself but also to the society that he rules.
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RULERS
At the beginning of the Cyropaedia, Xenophon explains the reason for his work: Cyrus is the only example of a successful ruler he manages to find. Xenophon insists that we must look for Cyrus’ exceptional nature in the essential traits of his person, in his physical and psychological nature (1.2.2), as summarized in 1.2.1:Footnote 7
As to his nature, even now Cyrus is still described in word and song by the barbarians as having been most beautiful in form and most benevolent in soul, most eager to learn, and most ambitious, with the result that he endured every labor and faced every risk for the sake of being praised.
The somatic characteristics (the ability to withstand fatigue and dangers) respond to the psychological ones, which are presented as the fundamental basis of Cyrus’ nature. There are three superlative psychological features that indicate a particular orientation of the desiderative structure: generosity, altruism or love for humanity (philanthrōpía), ambition or love for honours or recognition (philotimía), and love for learning, knowledge or study (philomátheia). The exceptional disposition of Cyrus’ political nature is defined by a psychē shaped by these three powerful desires.Footnote 8 The relevance of this psychology for the character of the good ruler also appears in the Agesilaus. The performance that makes the Spartan king a figure worthy of praise has its cause in a virtuous psychological structure, marked by a proper desiderative predisposition of his psychē (Ages. 3.1.4–2.1).
The issue of a ruler's psychē is also developed in the Hiero. In the beginning, Simonides the poet proposes a differentiation between individuals according to their political role. Common citizens and rulers present two different kinds of life, two ways of processing pleasures and pains—primordial sensations that organize life. These sensations can be experienced by the body, by the psychē, or by both (Hier. 1.5). For example the displeasure of extreme cold is perceived by the body, while kind words are lived as pleasurable by the psychē, and a literal backstab of a friend is suffered by both the body and the psychē. This distinction between desires in the Hiero is important because of the philosophical context in which Xenophon writes. Aristippus claimed that there are only somatic pleasures (Diog. Laert. 2.86–8 = SSR Footnote 9 4.A.172), and this leads to abandon all political participation (Mem. 2.1.1–7). Xenophon introduces the distinction to assert that a ruler with a proper orientation of the soul could live a pleasant life according to his desires, achieving pleasures that, unlike Cyrenaic pleasures, are not only somatic but also psychological. From this differentiation, the dialogue presents a debate about who lives a life of greater pleasure, a common citizen (Hiero's posture) or the ruler (Simonides’ posture: Hier. 1.7–9).
Although at first the differentiation between these human types appears exclusively related to the individuals’ living conditions, it soon becomes evident that the social context organizes the demands and perceptions of desires and their satisfaction, effectively shaping the psychological structure.Footnote 10 Since the psychē is the basis and origin of ἐπιθυμήματα (Hier. 1.23), an important part of the psychological structure changes according to experiences that are different for rulers and for common citizens. There is, however, a desire or impulse which is more powerful in the rulers (and in those who aspire to rule), independently of their context: the desire for honour (7.1–3). This is a natural psychological trait of those who rule, and the pursuit of this supreme pleasure is the reason why a ruler undergoes all kinds of sorrows. It serves as a response and reformulation to the initial question asked by Simonides: ‘Why do many desire to rule?’ (1.9.2). In fact, this desire of the majority is based on a false image of ruling, which is presumed to be pleasant; after the exposition of Hiero, it is clear that there is nothing desirable in ruling, and philotimía seems to raise a new, tacit question: ‘Why should ruling be an object of desire to the ruler?’ (cf. 7.3–4).
Hence in Hiero, the psychological structure of the ruler has two desiderative levels: (a) a stable section, given by nature, marked by the desire for honours, which promotes the pursuit of ruling, and (b) a broad mutable section, altered by experience and dependent on the ability to control unnecessary desires. While (a) refers to a trait inherent to an individual and given by physis, (b) alludes to psychological characteristics modified by the accumulation of impressions. This last section is easily explained by the example of feasting (Hier. 1.17–19)—anyone who attends feasts everyday will not feel any special enjoyment when eating a good meal (and to achieve any enjoyment will have to have food that is more and more splendid), while someone ascetic in his alimentation will be amazed and satisfied by a banquet. The debate on rulers’ pleasures revolves around this last point, since Hiero says that it is the ruler's very lifestyle—negatively altering the experience of pleasures—that corrupts his psychē. In fact, Simonides’ overriding proposal in his ‘guide to political rule’ (9–11) is to establish a political course that supports development of the pleasures of level (b) and, more importantly, achieves the desire for honours of level (a) through the most authentic honour—genuine love from his subjects (11.15.2–4):Footnote 11
And if you do all these things, rest assured that you will be possessed of the fairest and most blessed possession in the world; for none will be jealous of your happiness.
Furthermore, the good ruler that Socrates presents in Mem. 2.1.1–7 (and that Aristippus, despite identifying this ruler as ‘foolish’, recognizes as the best possible ruler)Footnote 12 is marked by the way in which he manages his desires, that is, his psychological structure.
THE DESIRE TO RULE: PHILOTIMIA
One of the three superlative desires that characterize the nature of Cyrus’ extraordinary psychē forms, according to Hiero, the distinctive basis of rulers’ psychology: philotimía. In chapter 7 of this dialogue, Simonides accepts the long-suffering role of the ruler proposed by Hiero and puts forward philotimía—the extraordinary drive for a pleasure which is more divine than human and which differentiates rulers from other people—as a reason for pursuing rule despite all the troubles that come with it (7.3).
philotimía involves love not only for honours but also for approval (7.3.5–7). We are therefore faced with a desire concerned with form (gestures of reverence, performance of submission, etc.) and, fundamentally, with content: the philótimos finds pleasure in the authentic recognition of others. This makes it possible to draw a distinction between the desire for false honours (hence, false philotimía)—those honours which are delivered out of obligation—and the true honours which are the ambition of true philotimía (7.9):Footnote 13
For whenever men feel that some person is competent to be their benefactor, and come to regard him as the fountain of blessings, so that henceforward his praise is ever on their lips, every one of them looks on him as his peculiar blessing, they make way for him spontaneously and rise from their seats, through love and not through fear, crown him for his generosity and beneficence, and bring him freewill offerings, these same men, in my opinion, honour that person truly by such services, and he who is accounted worthy of them is honoured in every deed.
The philótimos ruler is virtuous through his own desire: honours are true only if they are freely given, and, therefore, achieving them requires exemplary behaviour marked by good social deeds. Although Xenophon does not speak explicitly of rulers without philotimía in the Hiero, we can consider them none the less. Since philotimía is the desire to rule in spite of its intrinsic difficulties, there are two possible cases of non-ambitious rulers: (a) naïve rulers, ignorant of the problems they will face and without desires that encourage their resolution (and thus the continuity of their rule), and (b) rulers with false philotimía, whose unjust desires lead to socially despised courses of action. In both cases the complex situation (ruling without a good desire) is eventually perceived, but it is impossible to abandon ruling itself: what has been done to obtain and maintain the power generates a resentment that makes it impossible for the ruler to return to the situation of vulnerability and defencelessness of the common citizen (7.11–12).
The previous description of philotimía corresponds to the political notions held by the philotimótatos Cyrus. The type of honours sought by him and the means to achieve them are consistent with the ‘political programmes’ recommended by Cambyses to Cyrus, who maintains the importance of giving the governed a good life (1.6.7–8), and by Cyrus to his children (8.7.7, 13). In this last section, in a more pragmatic way than that of the Hiero, the old king insists on how euergesía, and not violence, is the foundation for the recognition and fidelity of the ruled.
The exceptional nature of Cyrus appears already in his early years, to the point that his reputation reaches the court of his grandfather Astyages. After his arrival at Media, Cyrus’ philotimía manifests itself in his equestrian practice, something foreign to the Persian world (1.3.3). This childhood version of philotimía still does not represent a political development and remains in a personal sphere, but its form is already virtuous: Cyrus seeks the true honours that are obtained from effective practices (in this case, through the constant practice of horse-riding that will make him a competent horseman: 1.3.15), when he could have been satisfied with enjoying the courtly compliments derived from being the king's grandson.
With the passing of the years and the advent of adolescence, Cyrus’ philotimía acquires political (or, at least, proto-political) scopes—the desire for honours and the means to acquire them now operate on the large group of the prince's companions, who were educated in the royal palace, and also on their well-off parents (1.4.1). Cyrus is well received and recognized by this group thanks to a remarkable example of euergesía, with a great dedication of time and effort; for example he makes visits where he shows his affection, earns for them the king's favour, and obtains those things that they request. All of these practices (together with his repulse of the Assyrians’ attack, 1.4.18–24) accomplish his quest for honours and recognition: years later Cyrus leaves Astyages’ kingdom surrounded by a Median court which said goodbye to him with tears and gifts.
The proposal of Due,Footnote 14 that the first speech to the peers or homótimoi (1.5.12) represents philotimía, fits perfectly with the appearance of that expression at Hier. 7.3.4–5. In Cyropaedia, Cyrus says (1.5.12):
You rejoice more than all other men when you are praised. Those who long for praise necessarily undertake all toil and danger with pleasure because of this.
The words of the young prince to the Persian peers at the beginning of the military campaign contain the same spirit as those spoken by Simonides, especially if we bear in mind that the homótimoi are the Persian ruling class. As in the case of Hiero's rulers, the desire of approval or social recognition leads necessarily and pleasantly to the pursuit of an arduous, laboriousFootnote 15 course of action. The receipt of well-deserved praise after hard effort is a source of rejoicing for those marked by a virtuous psychological commitment.Footnote 16
philotimía in its superlative degree also has a pejorative appearance in the corpus Xenophonteum.Footnote 17 In Mem. 1.2.14, it is said that Alcibiades and Critias were the most philótimoi of the Athenians, which impelled them to seek to be the masters of politics of their city and pursue fame. The peculiarities of the specific context in which this is said makes it necessary to linger here, given our previous virtuous characterization of philotimía. We must point out the difference that exists in how philotimía develops in the interaction between equals, and how it develops in a hierarchical political framework. Xenophon describes the role of Alcibiades and Critias in the Athenian democracy of his time, a political system of relative equality. In Cyr. 3.3.10, philotimía also appears as a cause of rivalry and conflict on a horizontal social plane: the army in times of peace. Without conflicts that displace the search for honours onto an external object and, more importantly, without a clear verticality reproduced permanently, the desire to stand out and to be recognized becomes perverted and translates into confrontations. Identifying the positive power behind this philotimía, Cyrus performs a double movement: in addition to initiating the military campaign to displace rivalry over enemies, he organizes the army so that hierarchies are well established and there are no ambivalences or voids in the chain of command (Cyr. 3.3.11). This virtuous reconversion of corrupted philotimía is possible because of a context of clear hierarchy, and contrasts with the more horizontal Athenian democracy, where the perverted philotimía of Alcibiades and Critias develops unconstrained.Footnote 18
A second point is related to the distinction we have made between false philotimía and true philotimía. As we have pointed out, true philotimía contemplates not only the form of the honours received (as false philotimía does) but also the content, that is, that honours are authentic and freely given. The way to reach them is, as Cyrus’ words and actions show, through euergesía—exemplary behaviour focussed on performing good acts for the community. The attitude of Alcibiades and Critias, who do terrible damage to Athens (Mem. 1.2.12), is the reverse of Cyrus’. Unconcerned with good actions, Critias and Alcibiades are a living example of perverted, false philotimía: they desire only false, forced honours.
What separates the desire for true honours from the desire for false ones? Where is the psychological difference between Cyrus and Critias or Alcibiades? Xenophon himself answers this question, identifying the main virtue that Socrates should have taught to his companions (Mem. 1.2.17–19): in sōphrosúnē and enkráteia lies the power to guide the desires correctly, maintaining virtuous philotimía.
THE VIRTUES THAT CAN BE LEARNED: SŌPHROSUNĒ AND ENKRATEIA
In the Hiero, Xenophon differentiates between a stable section of psychological structure that is given by nature, and another section that is mutable and alterable by experience. If Socrates could have taught sōphrosúnē to Critias and Alcibiades (Mem. 1.2.17), these psychological virtues are part of that section of the psychē that can be modified and trained. Indeed, the notion that only through intense and persistent exercise is it possible to maintain the good condition of the psychē appears in Mem. 1.2.19–23 and 2.1.29–33 as well as in Cyr. 7.7.75. This is consistent with the characterization of Cyrus: although the prince's enkratic character is emphasized throughout the Cyropaedia, it is not listed among the natural features of his psychē in 1.2.1 but as one of those virtues achieved through training. In this way, sōphrosúnē and enkráteia appear in the narration of the formation of the prince and, specifically, in the description of Persian education.
It has been argued that sōphrosúnē ‘appears in Xenophon as a perfect synonym of enkrateia’.Footnote 19 Both concepts are the condition for the realization of good deeds and, therefore, appear as the centre of human virtue,Footnote 20 as the Armenian prince Tigranes says (Cyr. 3.1.16, regarding sōphrosúnē) and as Socrates says to Euthydemus (Mem. 4.5.2, regarding enkráteia). In the Xenophontic corpus these two concepts appear differentiated, yet their close relationship is undeniable.
Their origin as sources of all good actions makes sōphrosúnē and enkráteia capital virtues for political life, and especially for rulers, whose individual behaviour has repercussions throughout society.Footnote 21 This is demonstrated in the discussion between Socrates and Aristippus on how to educate the ruler so that he has the correct psychological structure. It is established there that the ruler must have the enkratic ability to set aside the satisfaction of his own pleasures to pursue the satisfaction of the common good (Mem. 2.1.1–6). The desires that the ruler must be able to relegate are especially somatic (food and drink, 2.1.2; rest and sexual appetites, 2.1.3), which may well be attributed to the context of the debate with Cyrenaic philosophy.Footnote 22 However, it is legitimate to ask about the desire for honours—is it necessary to postpone that desire as well? As we have seen, what is necessary is to exercise philotimía with sōphrosúnē and enkráteia, to eliminate the desire for false honours.Footnote 23 These false desires are the ones that should be put aside by exercising self-control. What guides the natural condition of philotimía (that is, whether an individual will direct his desire to true honours or false honours) lies in education and permanent training in sōphrosúnē and enkráteia. With sōphrosúnē and enkráteia, philotimía is the cause of euergesía. Agesilaus’ self-control illustrates this (Ages. 5.1–5): his ability to give away his own food to honour his guests (5.1), his abstinence from sleep when necessary (5.2), and all his hard work along with his soldiers (5.3) obtain admiration and recognition from the Spartan king.Footnote 24
Cyrus is the best example of the impact of sōphrosúnē and enkráteia in the good ruler, to the point that, when organizing the Persian empire, his own self-control functions as a moral guide that teaches the court to reject reprehensible acts and promote good deeds (Cyr. 8.30–3). The gestation of this virtue in Cyrus is (as Socrates proposes to Aristippus) caused by his education. The exhaustive formation of Persian children is based in part on the teaching of sōphrosúnē and enkráteia (1.2.8; cf. 8.8.15). The education of the Persian homótimoi is a permanent exercise, not restricted to a rigid curriculum but covering every aspect of life.Footnote 25 In this way, learning is carried out through exemplary models (teachers and elders) and unfolds in all everyday areas (such as meals and dinners). So strong is the concern for these virtues that Cyaxares mentions how Persians stand out above all peoples in this respect (4.1.14).
After a life marked by sōphrosúnē and enkráteia, Cyrus dedicates his final moments to advising his sons and heirs. His words start from his own experience and, therefore, are also an evaluation of his own political career. When Cyrus describes to his son Tanaoxares the future life of his brother Cambyses, who will occupy the throne, sōphrosúnē and enkráteia appear tacitly. This characterization of Cyrus’ rule in Cyr. 8.7.13 summarizes what is stated in Mem. 2.1.1–6: the ruler must set aside his own pleasures in pursuit of the common good. This idea about the ruler's task is similar, in turn, to the task that Cyrus holds in the conversation with his father Cambyses early in his life (Cyr. 1.6.8).
TO PERSUADE WITH GENEROSITY: PHILANTHRŌPIA
In the same way that, in the Hiero, philotimía appears as a human desire akin to that of the gods (Hier. 7.4), philanthrōpía is also a characteristic of the gods (Mem. 4.3.6).Footnote 26 It is not, however, exclusive to them.Footnote 27 This concept, which in Xenophon means ‘showing affection, being kind, beneficent and generous’,Footnote 28 is attributed both to Socrates (Mem. 1.2.60) and to Xenophon's model rulers Agesilaus and Cyrus.
Socrates’ philánthrōpοs character is shown by his generosity and the lack of interest in obtaining economic benefit from his disciples, attitudes which make the Athenian philosopher renowned (Mem. 1.2.61). These positive consequences of a psychology marked by philanthrōpía make it an essential virtue for the good ruler, as Simonides knows: when the people find someone competent and generous who can give them a good life, they recognize this man as their political leader (Hier. 8.9). This political capacity also makes philanthrōpía a desideratum for the ruler for dealing with otherwise unconquerable rivals, as is shown by Agesilaus: his humanitarian attitudes and his good dealings with enemies achieved the submission of citadels impossible to take by force (Ages. 1.22).
The first moment when we see Cyrus’ philanthrōpía is during his youth at the court of Media: the young prince's successful efforts to achieve the affection of his noble companions and of their parents (Cyr. 1.4.1). These actions have their origin in philotimía and philanthrōpía, in an interaction between virtues that achieves the ‘true honours’ of the Hiero (7.9). If true philotimía (that is, philotimía guided by sōphrosúnē and enkráteia) desires recognition and approval from euergesía, it is necessarily a psychological character that encourages generosity and good deeds, and this psychological trait is precisely philanthrōpía.
The next mention of philanthrōpía in the Cyropaedia refers directly to the friendships developed in Media obtained by Cyrus’ benevolence: thanks to his past generosity Cyrus manages to gather volunteers for the continuation of his successful campaign, which will itself be a source of honours and recognition (Cyr. 4.2.10). This consequence can also be observed in Agesilaus’ case: the generosity that opens the doors of impregnable citadels also brings the honour of taking that fortress. Also, the Spartan king's compassionate attitude towards his enemies will be the same as that of Cyrus when he invades Armenia (2.4.32, 3.1.3). That merciful behaviour toward the defeated enemy is a clear signal of philanthrōpía (7.5.73): since taking possession of bodies and people defeated in combat is, strictly speaking, an act of justice, not doing so is a great feat of benevolence, as well as a useful act.
philanthrōpía recurs in two episodes in the last book of the Cyropaedia, when Xenophon describes the debates around the organization of the Persian empire. In its first appearance, Xenophon addresses the problem of the empire's security or stability (ἀσφάλεια). Cyrus has realized that, with his enemies defeated, there is no external enemy that can attack the polity which he has organized. On the contrary, the danger comes from his own powerful commanders who may harbour the idea that they would be competent rulers (8.1.45–6). Cyrus evaluates the correct course of action. To dissolve their armies and deprive them of their command would damage the military power of the Empire, while being openly suspicious would lead to a civil war (8.1.47). The answer lies in philanthrōpía—this is the means of securing strong bonds of friendship with Cyrus himself, which in turn prevents the emergence of powerful links between potential contenders that would lead to dangerous coalitions between intriguers (8.1.48–8.2.1).Footnote 29 The potential of philanthrōpía is indeed a powerful one (8.2.1):
In the first place, he continually made his benevolence of soul every bit as visible as he could, for he believed that just as it is not easy to love those who seem to hate you, or to be well disposed toward those who are ill disposed toward you, so also those known as loving and as being well disposed could not be hated by those who held that they were loved.
At a dinner with his most faithful friends, Cyrus is approached by the noble elder Gobryas, deserter of the Assyrian army. Gobryas is truly amazed by Cyrus’ generosity (8.4.7–8):
‘Cyrus, I held before that you most surpassed human beings in being the most skilled general. Now I swear by the gods that you seem to me to surpass them more by your benevolence than by your generalship.’
‘Yes, by Zeus’, said Cyrus. ‘And I display the works of benevolence with much more pleasure than those of generalship.’
‘Why?’ said Gobryas.
‘Because one must display the one by harming human beings, the other by benefiting them.’
The importance of philanthrōpía that Gobryas notices and which Cyrus explains is the benefit that it brings to the ruled. The capabilities and consequences of war are not denied but placed in the background: if he could choose, Cyrus would prefer to do good rather than harm. This brief intervention explains the dynamics between generosity and fear that mark Cyrus’ political career, described in the proemium (1.1.5), in the dialogue between Cambyses and Cyrus (1.6.2–46), and in Cyrus’ last words to his sons (8.7.7–13). In those passages there are exhortations to benefit friends and to harm enemies that show the reach, and the limits, of philanthrōpía: anyone who truly cannot be convinced by the generosity is an enemy and therefore must be annihilated.
TO RULE WITH KNOWLEDGE: PHILOMATHEIA
As a child, Cyrus speaks constantly, to the point that Xenophon calls him ‘very talkative’; his permanent questioning and seeking for the causes results from his philomathēs personality (1.4.3). philomátheia implies curiosity, the recognition of personal limits, the need to consult those who already have knowledge and, in general, dialogue, exchange of opinions, and ‘the ability to excel in contest of learning and to pick up lessons quickly’.Footnote 30 The importance of noticing one's own ignorance and, therefore, the need to seek advice from those who have knowledge is a characteristic that Cambyses sees in his son (1.6.43). Even after having demonstrated his enormous capacity to conquer and rule, Cyrus continues to ask his subordinates to teach him what he does not know, as shown in the discussion about how a beautiful parade should be performed (8.3.2). In this sense, philomátheia not only encourages Cyrus to be open to words but also prompts him to involve himself with those who show knowledge and the ability to transmit it—characteristics which Cyrus praises in Chrysantas during an intimate meeting with Cyrus’ closest commanders (8.4.11).
The desire for knowledge and the enjoyment of knowledge are fundamental characteristics of the philosopher (Oec. 16.9). For Socrates (and for Xenophon in Cyr. 1.2.1), this enjoyment and the desire to learn are found in the psychē and are specially linked with the passion for acquiring knowledge useful for the good management of cities and men (Mem. 4.1.2).Footnote 31 This knowledge leads to the ability to confer eudaimonía on others, whether individuals or societies, and also makes the ruled more obedient (Cyr. 1.6.22). In other words, the political power of philosophy lies in a philomátheia oriented towards a formal knowledge with positive practical consequences for the society.Footnote 32 This effective, practical aspect of philomátheia also has a creative aspect. This is directly presented in Cambyses’ pieces of advice to Cyrus on how to face enemies: it is necessary not to confine oneself to established knowledge but also to invent, to create (Cyr. 1.6.38). This interaction between knowledge acquisition and the conception of new practices is a central characteristic of Cyrus’ ascent to and consolidation of power, observable in his interest in learning how to ride (1.3.3, 1.3.15), the creation of a Persian cavalry corps (4.3.4), the expansion of the army on the basis of arming homótimoi (2.1.9), his supervision of the invention of new tactics (2.3.17–20), and the creation of the infamous scythed chariots (6.1.28).
THE INTERACTION BETWEEN VIRTUES
The interaction between the three virtues by nature (philotimía, philanthrōpía and philomátheia) and the set of virtues by learning (sōphrosúnē and enkráteia) marks Cyrus’ psychology, which is the origin of his political career. This relationship, schematically, could be represented as follows:
sōphrosúnē & enkráteia { (→) philotimía ↔ (philomátheia) ↔ philanthrōpía}
sōphrosúnē and enkráteia, virtues learned through education, guarantee the good behaviour of the whole system, but they have a more direct impact on philotimía, since they orientate that desire towards the search for true honour. The ambition for true honour contributes the passion necessary for the pursuit of the euergesía proper to philanthrōpía. In turn, philomátheia allows the gathering of knowledge necessary both for the performance of good deeds that arise from philanthrōpía and for the techniques necessary to obtain honours. This psychological scheme of three closely related natural desires and a guiding virtue allows us to solve the problem of priorities between Cyrus’ impulses.Footnote 33
The particular balance that occurs in Cyrus’ psychē is the origin of its exceptionality and helps to explain features that have concerned some scholars. Faced with positions that highlight Cyrus’ self-interest,Footnote 34 Danzig has responded that self-interest and philanthrōpía are not mutually exclusive traits, and is correctly pointing out that ‘selfless behaviour is not a standard to be found in Xenophon, so it would be wrong to criticize Cyrus for lack of it’.Footnote 35 Moreover, the psychological scheme we have presented shows that self-interest is necessary for a political project that aims to improve the life of the society ruled. There are two reasons for this. The most obvious is that philanthrōpía—the force that leads to good deeds—is a personal desiderative impulse, proper to the psychē of an individual and not an external imposition. The second reason is that the strong and constant pursuit of the common good can be achieved only through an exhausting degree of political effort, as Hiero and Aristippus insist. The incentive necessary to undertake this task lies in the ambition for true honour––that is, honours that have their origin in a philanthropic impulse.
CONCLUSION
Cyrus rules and dies happy (8.7.26–8). During his reign, thanks to his philanthrōpía, he discouraged any potential rival from wanting to take his place (8.1.45–8). We must understand, then, that Simonides’ ‘guide to political rule’ has achieved its results, since Cyrus achieves the goal that the poet proposes to Hiero—Cyrus has ruled by doing good to his friends so that his enemies cannot face him, and therefore has had the best of rewards, to be happy without being envied (Hier. 11.15).
Cyrus’ good deeds, marked by his philanthrōpía, have achieved for him solid and compact support, both from the people as well as from his soldiers and his commanders, even those who once might have wished to take his place. The effective functioning of Cyrus’ psychological structure is consistent with the pursuit of eudaimonía as described by Gray: ‘[t]he motive for the leader to foster this eudaimonia to followers is the pursuit of his own eudaimonia because he must use them for success … Because Xenophon's rulers are dependent on followers to flourish, they have a vested interest in giving them eudaimonia, because this means the capacities that will best assist in furthering the leader's success.’Footnote 36 Cyrus’ psychē is marked by this virtuous interaction between the pursuit of individual and of social eudaimonía, also proposed by Simonides in the search for a good and happy ruler.
Nobody envies Cyrus. As the Socratic ruler of Mem. 2.1.1–6, Cyrus lives without any of what other men understand as pleasures, to the point of being called by Chrysantas a ‘cold king’ (Cyr. 8.4.22). But, despite what Chrysantas thinks (or Aristippus in the Memorabilia), Cyrus’ extraordinary psychē allows him to make this postponement of pleasures a virtuous characteristic in regard of his own eudaimonía: having sōphrosúnē and enkráteia and being simultaneously philanthrōpótatos, philomathéstatos and philotimótatos configure a psychē where self-interest and social interest converge. More eudaimonía for the ruled society means, in turn, more eudaimonía for Cyrus.
It has been said that Xenophon praises Cyrus ‘because he “forgets” every political good higher than stability’.Footnote 37 Indeed, Cyrus is praised for this very reason. But, as we have seen, for Xenophon stability can only be the consequence of a benevolent rule that favours the common good. Cyrus highlights this in the last moments of his life: a ruler can have stability only through faithful followers, and they can be won only through generosity (8.7.13). For a ruler to be as beneficent as Cyrus is, he must possess the complex psychological structure that we have analysed. It is almost what Johnson has pointed out: an ‘inhuman mixture of continence and greed’.Footnote 38 It is indeed an extraordinary mixture but not an impossible one. The complex mixture, Cyrus’ psychē, is not inhuman––after all, Cyrus needs time to learn, makes mistakes and dies––but it is rare. It is so uncommon that Xenophon finds only in Cyrus’ psychē the unlikely coincidence of a correct predisposition by nature and a good education. It is so unusual that after his death the polity which he has built goes into decline. The fundamental lesson that Xenophon teaches in the Cyropaedia is how exceptional the psychological conditions are which permit a stable (and therefore good) ruler: contrary to any romantic views, we have to take account of the limits that society and human nature impose on politics.
