The political, social and economic history of the Hellenistic world has been the subject of much more scholarly research in recent years compared with the amount of attention it received prior to the later twentieth century. One particular area of study which still remains comparatively neglected, however, is the history of Hellenistic naval warfare. This is not to say that no recent work has been done on the topic: the recent Cambridge History of Greek and Roman Warfare (2007), for example, includes a discussion of naval warfare during the Hellenistic period. However, it is fair to say that most modern discussions still take as their starting-point the seminal work of Tarn, Hellenistic Military and Naval Developments (1930), as well as the more recent works of Casson on seafaring and naval warfare in the ancient world. M.'s new monograph, therefore, is a welcome addition to the field for this reason alone.

One of M.'s principal objectives is to challenge the prevailing view of Hellenistic naval warfare which has been in place since the days of Tarn. According to this interpretation, the development of much larger warships, one of the hallmarks of the Hellenistic era, was brought about by a move in predominant tactics from ramming to the grappling and boarding of enemy vessels. The much larger decks of the Hellenistic ‘super-galleys’ provided ample room for the marines and artillery which were essential in such battles. As M. points out, however, the continued use of rams during the Hellenistic period, clear from both contemporary literary and archaeological evidence, suggests that ramming tactics did not fall out of favour as much as commonly believed (pp. 4–6).

In M.'s view, the origin of larger Hellenistic warships, namely the ship classes known as ‘fours’ and ‘fives’, can, in part, be traced back to the Peloponnesian War, in particular the final battle between the Athenian and Syracusan fleets in 413 b.c.e. Such aspects as the frontal ramming employed by the Syracusans (made possible by their heavier, reinforced prows), the use of artillery and even the location of the battle within a harbour were all precedents for later Hellenistic naval warfare (pp. 17–23). The decisive victory achieved by the Syracusans on this occasion encouraged them to experiment further with heavier rams and vessels in their fleet. Another important factor in this development, according to M., may have been the subsequent campaigns of Dionysius I against the Carthaginians, in which the siege of coastal cities held by the latter played a prominent role. It is no coincidence, seemingly, that Diodorus dates the introduction of both catapults and ‘fives’ to the reign of Dionysius: the catapults, of course, were instrumental in assaults upon the walls of these settlements, while the heavier vessels of Dionysius' fleet appear to have given him the edge in the fighting to secure their harbours (pp. 23–30). As M. notes, the relevant ancient sources do not provide as much detail as might be desired on such developments, but the proposed introduction of heavier vessels as an essential component of coastal siege warfare does correspond to their attested use in many later conflicts.

Throughout his study, M. makes use of not only literary sources, but important archaeological and artistic evidence as well. In Chapter 2, for example, M. provides a detailed discussion of archaeological relics such as the Athlit ram and the preserved ram sockets from Octavian's victory monument at Actium. Based on his reconstruction of such evidence, M. argues that the rams of vessels larger than ‘fours’ (such as the example found near Athlit) were specifically designed to distribute the shock of impact along their hulls as much as possible, making them ideal for head-on ramming, not only of enemy ships but of harbour defences as well. (pp. 66–8). The importance of overcoming the latter to the success of a coastal siege is amply demonstrated, inter alia, by Alexander's capture of Tyre in 332 b.c.e. (pp. 85–100).

The ‘big ship phenomenon’ reached its height in the later Hellenistic period, inspired, in part, by the massive vessels constructed in the course of Demetrius Poliorcetes' military career, which, allegedly, included ships as large as ‘fifteens’ and ‘sixteens’ built for his final campaign (pp. 111–28). The manual on siege warfare written by Philo of Byzantium, dated between the 240s and 220s, not only illustrates the importance of navies as part of a co-ordinated siege strategy against coastal cities in contemporary warfare, but also, in M.'s view, overturns some of the commonly-held assumptions about the use of larger vessels in the Hellenistic period: there is no mention in Philo's account, for example, of the use of large artillery mounted on such ships to smash through the decks of enemy vessels in order to kill or incapacitate their rowers (pp. 129–42). In addition, M. challenges the long-held assumption on the part of modern scholars that Hellenistic navies clearly preferred boarding as opposed to ramming tactics. In M.'s view, the apparent prevalence of boarding tactics in surviving accounts of Hellenistic naval battles is due as much to the ancient authors' lack of interest in the actions of socially inferior rowers as to the supposed absence of ramming tactics in such clashes (pp. 162–70).

The culmination of the ‘big ship phenomenon’ occurred in the mid-third century b.c.e. with the fleets of the Ptolemies, in particular the massive ‘forty’ built by Ptolemy IV. As M. notes, the sheer size and bulk of such vessels probably made them unsuitable for combat on the open sea: the same qualities, conversely, made them suitable to ram through harbour defences, or to act as platforms for large siege artillery (pp. 181–8). Such massive vessels, however, were ultimately untenable. The expense involved in their deployment included not only the costs of the large vessels themselves, but also the substantial number of ships necessary to support them, likened by M. to a modern carrier task-force. By the end of the third century b.c.e., the waning power and wealth of the Hellenistic states made such expenditures impossible (pp. 205–7). The Romans, after their defeat of Antiochus III, found the construction of larger vessels to be unnecessary, both because their rivals in the eastern Mediterranean no longer possessed such warships, and because the Romans themselves did not have a pronounced tradition of naval siege warfare (pp. 225–32). In M.'s view, the battle of Actium, which came to be viewed in an overly simplified fashion by posterity as the victory of Octavian's lighter vessels over the heavier ships of Antony, spelled the end, once and for all, of any inclination the Romans may have had to resurrect the massive warships of the Hellenistic era (pp. 232–44).

M.'s reconstruction of the ‘big ship phenomenon’ has much to commend it. Although some of his conclusions are of necessity conjectural, due to the relative lack of evidence for certain aspects of Hellenistic naval warfare, M. none the less makes skilful use of a broad range of sources to support his arguments, which are further elucidated by numerous charts, figures and appendices. M. supports his conclusions with detailed discussions of both the relevant literary sources, such as the surviving accounts of major naval battles in the Hellenistic period, and important archaeological evidence, such as the Athlit ram. In linking the increased size of warships to contemporary developments in siege-craft, M. has written an important book, for the study of not only Hellenistic navies, but Hellenistic warfare in general.