American Property is an exciting overview of the history of property law in the United States. Banner does a fantastic job explaining how ideas of property and property law changed over the centuries, and how American law diverged from its British antecedents. Complex legal theory is rendered very intelligible for the nonspecialist. By the end, I felt that I had been walked through the greatest hits of a law-school class on property and how these ideas came about. Historiographically, his most important contribution might be that our sense that “intangible property” only began to matter in the twentieth century with mass media is wildly off-base (71). Much of the early part of the book concerns intangible forms of property like “labor, public office, and all the incorporeal hereditaments,” and these convincingly show that modern property law should not be seen as a shift from tangible to intangible, but from property as a natural right to property as a social right (71).
Banner successfully documents the shift from thinking of property as a right over a thing to thinking about property as a “bundle of rights” defined not as a relationship between an owner and a thing but as a relationship between people (45). Classical economists believed that property preceded the state and was in fact a consequence of labor. By the early twentieth century, this view had fallen under critique, as anthropologists began to see in the still extant hunter-gatherers that property originated with the tribe, not the individual. Property did not precede the state, even when the state was a tribal leader. Banner points to the law professor Wesley Hohfeld as the codifier in the 1910s of the view that property “exists, not between a person and a thing, but between persons only, between the owner and the rest of human society” (102). The bundle of rights came from us, not from labor or nature.
The second major idea in American Property is that property is not an object but a “bundle of rights” over an object. Legal scholars today subscribe to an idea of property formulated by the English law professor John Austin in the 1830s that “property was not a thing a person owned; rather, property was the assemblage of rights a person had over a thing” (57). Property in this view was a “bundle of rights” over a thing, like land, not the thing itself. While property could be thought of as either harmed or not harmed, American courts held that the state was not liable for damages to property unless it were “taken or not taken.” In Eaton v. Boston, Concord, and Montreal Railroad (1872), the New Hampshire Supreme Court used the argument of the bundle of rights to side with Ezra Eaton, a New Hampshire farmer across whose land the railroad had been built. Eaton argued that while the railroad had not taken the land, it had reduced his rights with regard to it. The Court agreed that to take property it was not necessary to have “a complete ouster” since property was “only the rights of the owner in relation to it” (Eaton v. Boston, Concord, and Montreal Railroad). In the aftermath of this decision, the government's ability to regulate any aspect of property was called into question, as reducing the bundle of rights without compensation was seen as a violation of the due-process clause of the 14th amendment. By the 1890s, the Supreme Court “found itself regularly reviewing the balance sheets of railroads to determine whether allowed rates were high enough to escape censure of property without due process” (69). Property had become continuous rather than discrete. By making property a continuum of value, rather than a binary of value, courts and policymakers would be far more wary of impinging on property owners. The bundle of rights, then, was grounded in law, not in nature. If property was not a natural right, then it could be abridged and regulated. So while bundles of rights defended capitalist property in one way, they also undermined the sacrosanct right to that property in another. While Banner illustrates this contradiction, he does not explicitly make this point, which I found to be pivotal in thinking about this transition.
While the book points towards the larger context surrounding property, it does not engage with the causal or consequential nature of that context. Banner acknowledges that “thinking of property as a bundle of rights would help make [industrial capitalism] safer”; he does not, at the same time, show the effects of this new thinking on the economic relations of the 1890s (70). The struggle of labor and capital in the nineteenth century is acknowledged, while in the twentieth century the language surrounds the “poor,” in essence recapitulating the conventional narrative from producers to consumers. The chapter on the “new property” – by which was developed in the 1960s a theory that government payments, especially for the economically marginal, were a form of property – was intriguing, but ultimately turned out to be not that important. Banner writes that “in the end the new property was simply not as powerful a tool as its proponents hoped” (237), which makes me wonder why we discuss it at all other than as a curious case in the past.
In many ways, American Property privileges the obscure over the commonplace. While this shift in legal thinking about property is well done, the consequences for actual control over property in American society are less well explained. Banner's causation seems to emerge from either American republican ideology or crude social forces, or, most frequently, it is treated as superfluous. The book's weakness really lies in explaining why these ideas changed and, moreover, how these ideas shifted practices of property. Moreover, he does not explicitly assert causes behind these changes. More disappointing is a lack of analysis of the consequences of these new legal frameworks for ownership. I found myself wanting to know more about the boring aspects of property. How did all these new ways of thinking about property change how people owned houses or cars? While sound ownership is important for entertainment lawyers, home ownership is important for everything. I confess a bias towards the banal, but if I want to read a book about property, I want to know how property in the main has functioned, not peculiar aspects on the margin. Much of the book is devoted to clever topics, like fame, spectrum, news or sound, that provide stimulating thought experiments that push the boundaries of what we think property is. For those interested in the intersection of cultural work and the law, these chapters would, no doubt, be extremely helpful. Chapters on human organs are fantastic at clarifying legal arguments by taking examples to the extreme, but for understanding the everyday they are not as useful.
Property fascinates historians as a question of social and economic power, not as legal theory. The bundle of rights, in his view, defended the new industrialists, even though they were not responsible for its intellectual origins. By focussing on intellectual questions that concern lawyers, the broad middle of American property relations has gone unexamined. But it is, of course, unfair to judge a book by what it does not do. American Property stands as an eminently readable account of the development of American property law, doing an exemplary job of clarifying complex legal theory. For legal and intellectual historians, American Property is required reading.
