Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 February 2005
Relativism is usually a derogatory word in philosophical bioethics in the West. If people make the mistake of trying to understand radically “different” points of view, an accusation of relativism is quickly forthcoming. But why should this be an accusation? My aim in this paper is to demonstrate that it should not.
Relativism is usually a derogatory word in philosophical bioethics in the West. If people make the mistake of trying to understand radically “different” points of view, an accusation of relativism is quickly forthcoming.1
This can be seen especially well in Macklin R. Against Relativism—Cultural Diversity and the Search for Ethical Universals in Medicine. New York: Oxford University Press; 1999. But the phenomenon is common, and can be seen in such diverse contributions as Beauchamp TL, Childress JF. Principles of Biomedical Ethics, 5th ed. New York: Oxford University Press; 2000; Singer P. Practical Ethics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1979; Gillon R. Philosophical Medical Ethics. Chichester: Wiley; 1985; Harris J. The Value of Life: An Introduction to Medical Ethics. London: Routledge; 1985; Pellegrino ED, Thomasma DC. For the Patient's Good: The Restoration of Beneficence in Health Care. New York: Oxford University Press; 1988; Maclean A. The Elimination of Morality: Reflections on Utilitarianism and Bioethics. London: Routledge; 1993; Rachels J. The Elements of Moral Philosophy, 2nd ed. New York: McGraw-Hill; 1993; Häyry M. Moral relativism and the philosophical criticism of other cultures. Science Studies 1992;5:53–56; and Häyry M. Liberal Utilitarianism and Applied Ethics. London and New York: Routledge; 1994.
My demonstration is simple, and it consists of filling in the empty boxes of Table 1. Once I have done this, it should be clear to anybody that “relativism” is a profoundly misused concept, and that if it is understood correctly, there is no shame in being a relativist in one's bioethical work.
A periodic table of “isms”
Let me start by explaining what I mean by the “isms” featured in Table 1.
The ethical norms and values that in fact guide our actions and moral thinking come from three closely related sources, and we can have roughly three attitudes concerning their validity, or prescriptive (normatively action-guiding) power.
The sources from which my norms and values are derived are
The same observation can, of course, be extended to other people, where their norms and values are derived from themselves, others, and objective, or extrahuman, sources.
Note that I am not offering these observations as topics for critical discussion; this is simply how things are. Everyone has their (or at least I have my) own life, thoughts, and characteristics, and these do guide, to some extent, human actions, whether they should do so or not. We also live with other people, and their habits and ideas have a guiding effect on our values, norms, and actions. (We call people of whom this is not true “psychopaths”—another derogatory word that I will not go into here.) And as for objective factors, we at least live in a physical world that we cannot fully control, and we must somehow accommodate its demands in our behavior, if not always in our attitudes, simply to survive.
The prescriptive power, or bindingness, or validity of these norms and values is a different matter, and we can, as I said, take three different attitudes toward any one of them. One possibility is to say that at least some of them are absolutely binding, and that it would be morally wrong not to abide by them. Another option is to say that all or some of them are relatively binding; that for certain specified people in certain specified contexts it would be wrong not to live by them. And yet another choice is to say that the validity or normative bindingness of some or all of these values and norms is nil; implying that we should either avoid complying with them or that it does not matter whether we do or not.
By crossing these two lists we end up with my original table, where the springs of norms and values provide the vertical dimension and the views regarding their validity the horizontal dimension. Let me describe the contents of the table one column at a time.
First, absolutism is the creed that states that some norms and values should be observed absolutely, or without exception. Because this view has been the traditional starting point of Western moral philosophy since Greek antiquity, many explanations and justifications have been presented for this requirement during the last 2400 years or so.
Starting from the “objective” version of this doctrine, Plato argued that there is, apart from this changing and observable world, an eternal world of ideas, which is, in fact, more real than the one we can see, hear, smell, and touch here. Moral norms and values reside in the world of ideas, and it is our task to seek knowledge concerning them and to observe them the best we can, rejecting, if necessary, the customs of our society, and our own transitory desires.2
Plato. The Republic. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books; [c. 360 BCE] 1955.
Aquinas T. Summa Theologica. In: Sancti Thomae Aquinas Opera Omnia. New York: Musurgia Publishers; 1948; Aquinas T. St. Thomas Aquinas on Politics and Ethics. Sigmund PE, transl. and ed. New York and London: WW Norton; 1988; Aquinas T. Saint Thomas Aquinas on Law, Morality, and Politics. Baumgarth WP, Regan RJ, eds. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company; 1988; Finnis J. Natural Law and Natural Rights. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1980; Finnis J. Fundamentals of Ethics. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1984.
Kant I. Grundlegung zur Metaphysic der Sitten (1785) and Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Tugendlehre (1797). In Kant I. Ethical Philosophy. 2nd ed. Ellington JW, transl. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company; 1994; Scheewind JB. The Invention of Autonomy: A History of Modern Moral Philosophy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; 1998.
Bentham J. An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. London and New York: Methuen; [1789] 1970.
Whether or not “absolute intersubjectivism” as a normative doctrine exists is a question in itself. In theory, it would mean that contractually assumed or traditionally shared social or communal values should rule absolutely. But the question is, why should people who have not actually made the contract, or people who are not members of the specified society or community, observe the designated norms and values?6
Cf. Hobbes T. Leviathan. Macpherson CB, ed. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books; [1651] 1985; Locke J. Two Treatises of Government. London: Dent; [1690] 1924; Rousseau JJ. Du Contrat Social. In: Rousseau JJ. The Social Contract and Discourses. Cole GDH, transl. Brumfitt JH, Hall JC, eds. London: JM Dent; [1762] 1986.
Rawls J. A Theory of Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1972.
MacIntyre A. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. London: Duckworth; 1981; MacIntyre A. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? London: Duckworth; 1988; MacIntyre A. Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press; 1990.
The “subjective” version says that my norms and values ought to rule absolutely over all other values, including those derived from universal reason, God, and community ideals. This is certainly a possible program, but it is not clear that it has ever been philosophically defended. The character of Callicles in one of Plato's dialogues defends a view that comes close to this docrtine. He argues, in the dialogue, that strong individuals are entitled to do whatever they like, regardless of legal or social norms by which the weak try to slow them down.9
Plato. Gorgias. Waterfield R, transl. Oxford: Oxford University Press; [c. 380 BCE] 1998.
Second, relativism is the doctrine that says that the validity of norms and values is always related to some changing, or diverse, phenomenon or viewpoint. It does not say that all norms and values should be rejected, although it is opposed to the idea of absolute rules and principles.
The relativization of manners, customs, and laws in Western moral philosophy started in the 18th century with challenges against an immutable notion of reason as the basis of (objective) historical progress. Adam Smith argued, following many of his contemporaries, that human history is basically economic history, and that changes in the production and distribution of goods and services, rather than changes in the way people think about them, are the prime mover of legislation and political developments.10
Smith A. The Wealth of Nations. Skinner A, ed. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books; [1776] 1982.
Hegel GWF. Lectures on the History of Philosophy. Haldane ES, Simson FH, transl. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press; [1833–1836] 1995.
Marx K. Karl Marx: Selected Writings. MacLellan D, ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press; 2000.
During the 20th century, relativism was extended more directly to (intersubjective) societies. At the turn and in the first half of the century, social anthropologists shocked Westerners by giving vivid descriptions of the alien manners of some other cultures.13
Westermarck E. The History of Human Marriage. New York: Macmillan; 1891; Westermarck E. The Origin and Development of Moral Ideas, 2 vols. London: Macmillan; 1906–1908; Mead M. Coming of Age in Samoa: A Psychological Study of Primitive Youth for Western Civilization. New York: Morrow; [1928] 1988; Mead M. Growing Up in New Guinea: A Comparative Study of Primitive Education. New York: Morrow; [1931] 1976; Mead M. Sex and Temperament in Three Primitive Societies. New York: Morrow; [1935] 1988.
United Nations. Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 1948. Cf. Häyry M. Another look at dignity. Cambridge Quarterly of Healthcare Ethics 2004;14:7–14.
The subjective variation of relativism reminds us that every individual (and, metaphorically speaking, every culture and nation) has her or his or its own viewpoint.15
Westermarck E. Ethical Relativity. London: Kegan Paul; 1932. Cf. Herder JG. Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit. Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag; [1784] 1989.
Nozick R. Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974; Narveson J. The Libertarian Idea. Philadelphia: Temple University Press; 1988; Gauthier D. Morals by Agreement. Oxford: Clarendon Press; 1986.
Third, nihilism does say that some, or all, norms and values are invalid, and to be rejected. The motivation for this rejection in different forms of nihilism varies from intellectual irritation to moral concern. There are also two main “deontic” strands of the creed; one stating that we are allowed to disregard certain values, and the other insisting that we must do so.17
I use the term “deontic” here in the sense defined by von Wright GH. Deontic logic. Mind 1951;60:1–15.
When nihilistic ideas are applied to objectivist moral theories, there are two possible conclusions. If we say that people are permitted to ignore, for instance, the main Kantian or Benthamite rules (which are predominantly altruistic), then we automatically advocate some sort of egoism.18
Rand A. The Virtue of Selfishness: A New Concept of Egoism. New York: New American Library; 1961; Wilson EO. Sociobiology: The New Synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press; 1975.
Nietzsche F. On the Genealogy of Morality: A Polemic. Clark M, Swense A, transl. Indianapolis: Hackett; [1887] 1998; Ayer AJ. Language, Truth and Logic. London: Victor Gollancz; 1936; Stevenson CL. Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press; 1944.
The requirement to reject subjective and intersubjective norms and values is usually a part of traditional forms of absolute objectivism. This means that as regards human (individual- or community-based) values, then, Plato, Aquinas, Kant, and Bentham can all be seen as nihilists. Perhaps this is an excessively weird way to use the concept, but the fact is that they do deny the validity of some values. From the viewpoint of existentialism, this also means that the named dignitaries encouraged people to live “inauthentically,” or in “bad faith.”20
Sartre J-P. Being and Nothingness: A Phenomenological Essay on Ontology. Barnes HE, transl. New York: Simon & Schuster; [1943] 1993; de Beauvoir S. The Second Sex. Parshley HM, transl. London: Vintage Books; [1949] 1989.
I have now filled in the blanks of Table 1. Table 2 shows the completed form.
The periodic table of ethical “isms”
Let me now recap my findings against the information contained in Table 2.
First, what, in the light of my observations, is relativism? Very briefly, it seems to be the doctrine that (from the bottom up in the center column of Table 2)
Secondly, what is relativism not? Well, it is not mindless political or communal loyalty, and it is not absolute egoism—these notions seem to be invented by the competing schools of thought. Nor is it nihilistic—it does not deny the validity of all norms and values. (It does reject some, but so do all moral theories.)
And finally, what would the alternative to relativism be? If the alternative is absolute objectivism, then what is required is a giant jump, or a leap of faith, into one particular view of human nature and morality. And because this view can, for me, only be mine, the alternative to relativism is … well, absolute egoism. This is not too encouraging, and hence I think that relativism is, after all, not such a bad idea.
The periodic table of ethical “isms”