Anthony Billingsley selects an interesting and timely subject in this work: the nature of political succession in the Arab world. At present, a generational change of leadership has taken place in numerous Arab countries, including Jordan, Morocco, and Syria, while there are impending questions about how succession will take place in numerous other countries, including Egypt, Libya, and Yemen. Understanding the processes that underlie succession has important policy implications and informs our understanding of the nature of Arab political systems.
Billingsley primarily focuses on three factors he considers to have the greatest effect on this process: tribal loyalty, Islamic tradition, and constitutions. Highlighting the importance of tribal identity in the region and detailing traditional practices of tribal succession, he argues that the presence or absence of these practices has a significant impact on the perceived legitimacy of any succession in the Arab world. Billingsley then suggests that the role of Islamic identity at times competes with the concept of hereditary succession because of the notion in the Islamic tradition that a ruler should be just. In his view, constitutions have grown in importance in the modern era as a means to ameliorate these tensions by legitimizing the existing ruler's candidate for succession, most often his eldest son. In fact, this process of using constitutions or largely equivalent documents to increase regime legitimacy is now ubiquitous in both monarchical states and republics, indicating a greater role for the rule of law in the process of succession.
While Billingsley's thesis is theoretically interesting, his evidence falls short in many important respects. The most important of these shortfalls is the case selection for his dependent variable: succession. In every case he examines, a dynastic succession has occurred—or, he predicts, will occur—which means that there is no variation on the dependent variable. As a result, Billingsley's search for independent variables leads him to two other concepts prominent in all Arab countries: tribalism and Islam. The congruence of these three concepts leads him to argue that the combined effect of tribal identity and Islam within the Arab world has produced the uniform outcome of dynastic succession throughout Arab countries.
While Billingsley relies on the presence of tribalism and Islamic identity to prove his thesis, he ignores cases outside the Arab world in which these two variables exist but dynastic succession has not occurred, such as in parts of Central Asia or Africa. Accordingly, his argument seems to suggest that there is something unique to Arab political culture that produces dynastic succession. Yet countries such as Tunisia and Algeria are clearly at odds with his basic theory, and therefore he should have addressed these cases clearly and directly. Billingsley instead argues briefly that the Tunisian case was largely similar to a hereditary transition and that Algeria has not had a ruler in power long enough to make it comparable. Given the overarching nature of the political culture argument in his book, however, neither explanation is particularly convincing, and additional attention should have been given to these two cases.
Moreover, the reasoning behind Billingsley's decision to examine eight cases in which succession is dynastic is not fully clear. The main concern is that this choice results in a sample of successions that is limited to the last ten to fifteen years, combined with, in multiple cases, what he predicts will be the result of future successions—including the now unlikely cases of Egypt and Yemen—and ignores variation in types of succession that took place in the decades prior to this cutoff. After all, until the death of Hafez al-Asad in 2000, dynastic succession was not the norm in republican systems. A more detailed account of these additional cases of succession would have been useful for informing his theory.
A second concern relates to the uniformity of the key independent variables: tribalism and Islamic tradition. Billingsley attempts to illustrate that these elements deeply permeate society by tracing them back more than 1,400 years, but their influence is not constant across the Arab world. The nature and importance of tribalism in political organization varies from the Gulf to the Levant and from Egypt to the Maghrib. Moreover, the dominant schools and interpretations of Islam similarly vary, from more conservative interpretations in much of the Gulf to more liberal versions in parts of North Africa, for example. Given these variations in the nature and strength of these two factors, it would be surprising if they produced such uniformity in outcomes across the Arab world. A more nuanced treatment of these two independent variables is therefore necessary.
A third concern relates to Billingsley's conclusion that the legitimacy of existing regimes is increased by their adherence to traditional forms of hereditary succession. He argues that legitimacy can be defined as the endurance of the system and that this endurance is related to hereditary succession conforming to Arab political culture. Yet evidence from public opinion polls demonstrates low satisfaction with existing regimes and a high stated desire for democracy (Arab Barometer, 2006–7), suggesting that many Arab publics do not believe these regimes to be highly legitimate. This point is strongly confirmed by recent protests (subsequent to the book's publication) across the Arab world, in which one of the primary demands, most notably in Egypt and Yemen, has been not only that the president step down, but also that he not be succeeded by his son. Rather than increasing regime legitimacy among Arab publics, hereditary succession appears to decrease regime legitimacy because it has come to symbolize the cronyism and corruption inherent to many of these governments.
Many of Billingsley's arguments would be greatly strengthened by evidence from existing opinion polls from the Arab world. In fact, evidence from these polls reveals that Billingsley at times misses important variation throughout the region or even inaccurately characterizes Arab public opinion. He claims, for example, that Arabs desire stability above all else, which explains why there is no demand for reform (p. 79). Yet public opinion data from the World Values Survey (2000, v140; see www.worldvaluessurvey.org) clearly demonstrate that many if not most citizens do in fact desire reform. Inclusion of public opinion data would also significantly strengthen his claim that constitutions are playing a more important role as aging leaders seek to legitimize hereditary succession. Although few if any polls ask directly about the legitimacy of Arab constitutions, polls asking respondents about their knowledge of the constitution do exist in some Arab countries (such as polls done by the Center for Strategic Studies at the University of Jordan).
Overall, the two chapters describing the eight case studies provide good summaries of political developments surrounding succession in these countries up to the date of publication. The chapters are concisely written and provide important details from media sources and local analysts that could serve as resources for thinking about particular developments within each country. The book represents a useful contribution for scholars and others tracking these issues. It contains a helpful comparison between how succession has played out in monarchical and republican systems and a review of existing literature on the influence of tribal and Islamic identity throughout the region. As an academic work, however, this book's research design and failure to use appropriate data to substantiate a number of its claims, in addition to evidence brought to light from the recent wave of protests across the Arab world, serve to limit its theoretical contribution to the field.
