Generally, books that claim to tell secrets are not worth reading. This one, too, has many strikes against it. The author is obviously a groupie for the cause he describes; innocently, he writes such howlers as Osama bin Laden's survival of the explosion of a Scud missile that landed within twenty meters and of diesel fuel freezing in Tora Bora. Furthermore, much of the book is hearsay, reported uncritically; the author repeats and contradicts himself; all figures in the book are patent fantasy. His token disavowals of enthusiasm for killing Westerners elicit compassion for his poor literary skills and anger at his chutzpah. Nevertheless, the book is worth reading because the author is “a participant observer” who gives the reader precious insight into some of the conversations among top terrorists. Through his text as well as through its omissions, Atwan gives a very sympathetic account of how terrorists perceive what they are doing.
Atwan, the editor of the London-based Arabic newspaper Al Quds al Arabi, a megaphone for anti-Westernism, begins with a rapturous account of his 1996 visit to bin Laden's mountain headquarters. He presents us with a saint: wise, serene, kind, and gentle, with his beloved Kalashnikov, living sparely and according to the Koran so that he may be generous with others. As he tells us of this spoiled rich kid who made good, he shows, perhaps unintentionally, bin Laden first instructed by one teacher, Abdullah Azzam, then being won over by another, Ayman al Zawahiri, who accused his rival of being too soft. As a result of his switch, Azzam and his two sons were murdered. We learn that “There is little basis, however [he does not tell us how little], for the suggestion that bin Laden authorized Azzam's murder” (75).
The author tries hard to depict bin Laden as a powerful man. But he achieves the opposite. Without evidence, he credits the fantastic claim that bin Laden was responsible for shooting down the U.S. Blackhawk helicopter in Somalia in 1993. But he cannot produce even a substantial claim that he or his people made any substantial military contributions to driving the Soviets from Afghanistan. Hence, when he reports that the Saudi royal family “disregarded” bin Laden's “remarkable prescience” and potency—ridiculed his offer to stop Saddam Hussein's threatened invasion of Saudi Arabia in 1990 with “Afghan Arabs”—thereby humiliating him and turning him into a terrorist, the reader grasps something important about the man and about the author. The book's account of bin Laden's relationship with the Taliban gives the same impression: bin Laden had been flown to Afghanistan in 1996 (by a Russian pilot) because Saudi and U.S. pressure had made Sudan inhospitable. He committed money and men to the Pushtun Taliban's war against the Tadjik Northern Alliance for no ideological reason, but simply to pay his keep to the party that controlled most of Afghanistan.
The book's account of bin Laden's role in September 11 is of the same kind. Citing only Osama's expression of joy at the Twin Towers' collapse and a 1998 remark that he was going to do something big to the United States, the author assumes that bin Laden “did it.” He gives no hint of how. But he names Abu Zubaydah (131), not bin Laden, as the man who had “masterminded the September 11 attacks.” Of course, one Kalid Sheik Mohammed confessed in U.S. custody to being the mastermind and claimed that bin Laden supervised him. However, confessing is as easy as imputing. Our only solid evidence is that individuals other than bin Laden acted in specific ways that were connected to September 11. One cannot help but conclude that, whatever role bin Laden may or may not have had in September 11, it could not have made the difference between the events happening or not happening. Despite its best efforts, this book would not help a prosecutor convict bin Laden of anything. In sum, the author succeeds in making the case that bin Laden is a significant symbol of Jihad. Unwittingly, he also makes just as strong a case that bin Laden is a weak, vain, rich man manipulated by individuals and forces he barely understands.
The book's most gripping part is its passionate, sympathetic explanation of suicide bombing. Suicide bombers are manufactured by the Arab world's schools, media, Mosques, and social institutions. The author's own London newspaper is part of that production machinery. From early ages, children are taught the double glory of killing an average of fifteen persons per suicide and of enjoying guaranteed paradise. Then, as they prepare, they are held in ever-tightening discipline. The funeral videos they make are designed to shame them out of any last minute reticence. Furthermore, they know that if they do not carry out their mission, they will be pariahs rather than heroes. Forthrightly, the author cites texts from the Koran that condemn suicide—plainly. But just as forthrightly, he says that political necessity makes it all right. The reader may notice that politicized religion is not about God's commandments.
Dishonestly, the author writes that “there is little if any financial compensation” (112) for the families of suicide bombers. In fact, the “organization the attacker was part of” (110) supplies what amounts to an endowment for the family—not just food for the wake. Similarly, he dismisses the promise of seventy-two virgins in paradise as motivation by pointing out that Islam allows four wives. He neglects to mention that in the Arab world, wives go to those who can afford them. Sheiks who use suicide bombers as weapons have more than their share of women on earth; lesser men can hope to have them only in heaven.
The book's other most interesting part shows how terrorists use the internet. The author glories in the fact that elementary security measures—giving members of a group the same email account and the same password—allow them to communicate without ever actually sending any emails. He applauds as well the marvels of modern encryption, which can thwart the world's best code breakers, as well as in the capacity to hide messages in pornography.
The book's references to the Iraq War reveals its tight political focus: of course, the Americans in Iraq are trampling on Islam itself and murdering “the people.” But one does not have to read too closely to see whom it considers people. Iraq's Kurds and Shi'ites (some 80% of all Iraqis) are on the wrong side. These villainous people (except for Moqtqada al Sadr) are objectively on the Americans' side and just like them. In short, this is not just a terrorist tirade; it is specifically a Sunni terrorist tirade.
For this reviewer, the book's attempt to play on the political correctness of its Western readers was its most disgusting ploy. Having glorified murder, it tells us that “Claiming to protect the population from ‘terror’ the Bush and Blair governments have effectively chipped away at their civil liberties” (87). Chutzpah.
