Anzali delineates the historical forces and intellectual developments which led to the emergence of ʿirfan, a term, which he leaves untranslated in order to offer an accurate and multifaceted meaning of it throughout the course of his book, and its relationship to Sufism from the 17th to the 20th century. Anzali argued that by the end of the 19th century, ʿirfan became fully independent of Sufism. A group of modern Iranian intellectuals and ʿulamaʾ who continued to resist the Sufism of the medieval khanaqahs and tekkes, found ʿirfan a suitable entity for expressing their esoteric spiritual leanings.
Anzali's interest in tracing the semantic and social genealogy of ʿirfan is intimately tied to modern political struggles surrounding Sufism in Iran. He sees his study as an attempt to “give a voice to the subaltern Sufis of Iran” (p. 8). Indeed, Anzali attempts to lay claim to Sufism as a unique marker of Iranian identity, and as a form of resistance to proponents of state-sponsored ʿirfan who try to marginalize and oppress Sufis (page 8).
Shah Muhammad Darabi and Qutb al-Din Nayrizi who came from Shiraz, Anzali argues, abandoned some of the “Sufi-Sunni” elements, and promoted ʿirfan (p. 125). Anzali concluded that ʿirfan was the outcome of the “independence” of the “Shiʿi discursive tradition” from Sunnism (p. 128). As such, ʿirfan reveals the “authenticity” of a distinct “Shiʿi mystical discourse vis-à-vis the traditional Sufi-Sunni one” (p. 116). This argument faces some challenges. Sufi traditions have multifaceted Sunni and Shiʿi features. Moreover, a number of Safavid ʿulamaʾ and philosophers continued to engage with Sufi Sunni ideas, especially those of Ibn ʿArabi and al-Ghazali (while arguing that these thinkers died as Shiʿa). So, where would this form of adaptation and intervention fit in the picture painted by Anzali?
The term ʿirfan, Anzali insightfully writes, defined a uniquely Shiʿa spirituality, an “authentic” one, which can be differentiated from a Sunni one. He argues that Darabi, by setting up a Shiʿa–Sunni dichotomy, aimed to promote a localized form of Sufism that fits better with a premodern Shiʿa state, with all its tensions and contradictions. Anzali does not separate his own argument from Darabi's claims. He does not seem to test whether Darabi's discourse about ʿirfan's “authenticity” and suitability for Shiʿa believers is in fact solely driven by the need to create a non-Sunni entity. Thus, we are left with the view that Sufism is exclusively Sunni.
During the late medieval period, Sufi masters were increasingly emphasizing outward conformity to the shariʿa. Sufi scholars extensively debated features of samaʿ (audition) and wajd (passion), among others, as their adab works clearly show. The jurists in turn directed attacks against a host of Sufi concepts and practices, but such attacks did not lead to a decline in organized Sufism. Why then did organized Sufism experience a decisive setback in Iran during the 17th century? Anzali provides a partial answer to this question by arguing that organized Sufism (during the 17th century) was largely the outcome of aggressive anti-Sunni policies. But if one were to look closely at Ottoman approaches to Sufism, one would find there too Sufism received distinct elaborations and ameliorations. Ottoman Sunni jurists and theologians integrated certain Sufi notions and activities, but they also rejected many others. By the early 17th century, many Halveti shaykhs were cautiously preaching in Ottoman mosques, and emphasizing observances demanded by the jurists. The Halvetis and other Sunni orders also experienced the intense backlash of the Kadizadelis tied partly to a competition for power. If we explain the marginalization of Sufi orders in Safavid Iran as the outcome of an anti-Sunni policy, we still need to explain why certain Sunni orders declined under Sunni rulers, and Shiʿi orders under Shiʿi rulers. In my view, despite the importance of Ottoman–Safavid struggles in shaping the socioreligious order, the internal structural tensions between Shiʿa and Sufi rituals and conceptions are more pertinent to the formulation of ʿirfan, than a “rejection” of Sunnism. Both Nayrizi and Darabi refer to the tensions between a pir-centered (Sufi master–centered) basis of knowledge and an Imam-centered one. There is no reason to believe that this fundamental tension is less important than distancing oneself from Sunnism.
The thesis that Sufism was not feared by the jurists and philosophers for itself, but for its profound links to Sunnism, can be destabilized in a number of places. When Mulla Sadra depicted many Sufi practitioners as “false Sufis” in his infamous work Kasr Asnam al-Jahiliyya (The Breaking of the Idols of Ignorance), he did not mention the “Sunnis,” but focused instead on promoting a new presentation of Sufism from within a Shiʿa tradition. Al-Hurr al-ʿAmili, the well-known akhbari jurist, too did not make the argument that Sufism was Sunni. To the contrary, he cited Sunni scholars who stood firmly against antinomian Sufi principles like hulul (incarnation of God in the body) and ittihad (unity with God). He argued that Shiʿa and Sunni jurists have stood united against Sufi transgressive utterances and practices.
Anzali's emphasis on the similarities between the jurists and philosophers in their dismissal of Sufism is well-argued. But the two groups are more internally diverse than his analysis permits. Moreover, it is problematic to treat “the ahl al-hadith movement … pioneered by scholars of hadith such as Ibn Hanbal and later Ibn Taymiyya, and the Akhbari School of legal thought that emerged during the Safavid era” all as puritan discourses (p. 64). Ibn Hazm was a Zahiri and a Sufi, so it is unclear whether Anzali would consider him a puritan or not. At the same time, akhbari positions are not sufficiently differentiated or explained as when Nayrizi, a Sufi master (Dhahabiyya), was depicted as an “Akhbari-leaning scholar” (p. 146).
These comments notwithstanding, Anzali has consulted an array of previously unexamined Sufi-ʿirfani, polemical, and doctrinal works, and provided us with a thought-provoking assessment of the emergence of ʿirfan in Iran.
