The looming shadow of the United States is ever present in this interesting collection of essays on Cuba's relations with Latin America. As a Cuban contributor, Carlos Oliva Campos, points out, revolutionary Cuba's relations with its Latin American neighbours must be understood as ‘triangular’, because Washington plays a critical role. The United States instigated Cuba's expulsion from the hemispheric community in 1962, discouraged Latin America from resuming normal diplomatic and commercial ties even after OAS sanctions were lifted in 1975, and still today opposes Cuban participation in regional fora such as the Summit of the Americas. Of the five chapters in this book (aside from the introduction and conclusion), two focus on US policy: Luis Fernando Ayerbe examines how US foreign policy think tanks view US interests in Latin America, and Esteban Morales Domínguez assesses Barack Obama's policy toward the region in general and Cuba in particular.
Yet as this volume shows, the irony lies in the way US policy intended to isolate Cuba from its neighbours has instead isolated the United States. Cuba has normal relations with every other country in the hemisphere, none of which supports the US embargo or the strategy of trying to foster regime change through economic denial. Every time a US president or secretary of state attends a regional meeting, he or she must listen to a pantheon of Latin leaders criticising US policy towards Cuba and arguing for change. Washington's deafness to these appeals has led Latin Americans to form new regional organisations that exclude the United States.
To be sure, the sclerosis of US policy toward Cuba is more an irritant than a malignancy in Washington's bilateral relations with the rest of Latin America. All Latin American governments have important national interests at stake in their relations with the United States, interests they are unwilling to sacrifice on behalf of Havana. But what has undeniably changed over the past half-century is Latin America's willingness to comply with Washington's demands. As Latin American politics have become more democratic, governments in the region have tended to respond more to domestic constituents and their own national interests than to directives from Washington. This and economic development and diversification in the hemisphere are the underlying structural factors that have led to the decline of the hegemony the United States once enjoyed in the region.
The rise of the ‘New Left’ in Latin America underscores that loss of hegemony. In this volume Michael risman provides a detailed examination of Cuba's relationship with Venezuela and the Alianza Bolivariana para los Pueblos de Nuestra América (Bolivarian Alliance, ALBA). As Erisman points out, this is Cuba's most important hemispheric relationship because the exchange of Cuban medical services for Venezuelan oil is essential to the Cuban economy. ALBA may aspire to provide a twenty-first-century socialist alternative to Washington's neoliberal vision of hemispheric free trade, but it has failed to attract any of Latin America's other economic powerhouses. Besides Venezuela, its members are all poor countries being subsidised by the proceeds from Venezuelan oil. It is hard to imagine it surviving Hugo Chávez if his successor is a conservative.
That eventuality may pose the greatest proximate threat to Cuba. As Gary Prevost acknowledges in the conclusion, Cuba's ‘most important challenge’ is restructuring its internal economy. Cheap Venezuelan oil gives Cuba the margin of safety it needs to undertake major reforms. Would a new government in Venezuela turn off the tap? Would Washington push for that, in the hope that destabilising the Cuban economy would in turn destabilise the regime? All the contributors who comment on President Obama's Cuba policy agree that despite his campaign promise to replace the failed policy of the past with a new policy of engagement, nothing fundamental has changed. They offer varying explanations for the gap between Obama's rhetoric and his actions. Ayerbe concludes that even ‘moderate’ policy elites, represented by the Brookings Institution and the Center for American Progress, still regard US hemispheric hegemony as permanent. Jaime Preciado Coronado and Pablo Uc argue that US policy is stalemated by a combination of ‘defense and intelligence sectors’ in the government and the political clout of the Cuban-American community in Miami. Esteban Morales argues that Obama ‘is not really in control’ and ‘is best viewed as a manager of a company who is carrying out decisions that are made by powerful elites’ (pp. 162–3). Prevost concludes by arguing that US policy-makers see Cuban economic reforms as the harbinger of economic collapse, ‘a view that is deeply held’ by those responsible for policy toward Cuba (p. 173).
Each of these arguments provides a piece of the puzzle, but none is adequate on its own. Preciado and Uc are right that the Obama White House is attentive to the political reverberations that a change in Cuba policy would have in Florida for the 2012 election, and that there are conservative elements in the professional foreign policy bureaucracy (though less concentrated in the defence and intelligence community than they imagine) who would resist any policy change. Morales' argument is too conspiratorial in tone, but every president is constrained by institutional forces, chief among them existing law (in the Cuban case, the Helms-Burton Act) and the separation of powers – since 2010, there has been an obstructionist Republican majority in the House of Representatives, with Ileana Ros-Lehtinen (R-FL) as chair of the Committee on Foreign Affairs. US presidents do not make policy just as they please.
Is policy change still being delayed by the vain hope that tightening the economic screws just a little more will finally bring about the long-anticipated collapse of the Cuban government? That hope has been the dream of Washington hardliners ever since 1960, when President Dwight D. Eisenhower cut Cuba's quota for sugar sales to the United States. But only a few retrograde Republicans still believe it. Even the Cuban American National Foundation (CANF), once in the forefront of advocating tougher economic sanctions, now sees engagement as a more sensible approach. Nor are most liberals and moderates so deluded as to think that Washington still exercises hemispheric hegemony.
The sad truth is that US policy toward Cuba has not changed because there are no pressing reasons for a president – any president – to pay the price of changing it. Cuba no longer poses any serious threat to US interests, despite conservative hysterics about Havana's relations with Iran and China, so it can safely be ignored. To change policy truly would entail political costs in Florida (albeit diminishing as the Cuban-American community becomes more heterogeneous, but costs still greater than zero), and opportunity costs in Washington as Cuba displaces more urgent issues on the president's agenda. Doing nothing is easier and virtually cost-free.
In the closing sentence of the book, Prevost argues that if Cuban leaders successfully reform the economy and manage the succession to a new generation, ‘policymakers in Washington will have little choice but to adopt a pragmatic position of engagement with the Cuban government’ (p. 174). I wish I agreed with him. But the more likely outcome is that future US policy-makers will behave as their predecessors have done through 11 administrations, holding on to a policy that long ago proved fruitless because they lack the imperative or political courage to change it.
