This book is both a philosophical commentary on the first book of Plato’s Republic and a sustained argument regarding the nature of justice throughout the whole dialogue.
As for the argument, W. opposes a standard interpretation that sees Book 1 as merely refuting inadequate positions. Rather, W. argues, it advances a position on justice. Moreover, any positions presented later in the dialogue should be read against this earlier account, and with scepticism. For instance, Book 1 develops the notion of justice as an outward-facing virtue. So, when readers get to Book 4 and see justice as an inward-facing virtue – as some kind of harmony within the city or soul –, they ought to ask themselves whether this new concept of justice-as-moderation conflicts with the earlier, more compelling notion. W. makes a similar argument with respect to the later argument about philosophers needing to be compelled to rule.
As for the commentary, W. provides a terrific close reading that is useful apart from its relevance to her argument. Indeed, it would be invaluable to have this sort of commentary on each book of the Republic. W. provides reconstructions of the book’s arguments, helpful philosophical distinctions, interpretations of literary features and abundant connections to secondary literature on each point. The results are illuminating – and impossible to ignore – for anyone wishing to understand and interpret Book 1. And, since the themes of Book 1 extend across the entire dialogue, W.’s book will be a valuable resource for anyone working on the Republic.
The book is composed of seven chapters and an index. Besides the introduction and conclusion, there is a chapter focusing on Cephalus, one on Polemarchus and three on Thrasymachus. Also noteworthy is how most chapters contain a final section entitled ‘anticipations’, where W. explains how the reading so far anticipates subsequent developments (e.g. how Thrasymachus introduces us to the tyrant, how Socrates introduces the question of a ruler being forced to act for the benefit of the ruled etc.).
The introduction (Chapter 1) defends Book 1 as essential to the Republic. W. puts a radical spin on the knotty question of the book’s role in the dialogue (as independent, integral, positive, propaedeutic, aporetic, inferior, wrongheaded, incomplete, unnecessary etc.). Contrary to a tradition – perhaps the main tradition – of interpreting Book 1 as surpassed by what follows, she argues that we should see that the positive conclusions from Book 1 are cues to reading the books that follow, cues to recognise and oppose later inconsistencies (justice as harmony, philosophers as rulers etc.). This chapter also stipulates W.’s methodology (for holistic interpretation, for treating the literary elements as integral to the work’s philosophy etc.), which she successfully executes in the remaining chapters; W. indeed demonstrates the interrelatedness of important ideas, and she combines clearheaded reconstructions of the arguments with imaginative and reasoned attention to drama.
Chapter 2 argues that the conversation with Cephalus reveals several positive aspects of justice (e.g. that rules are important, that justice should not be selfishly motivated, that justice is not just about following rules but also about ruling, and that rulers should care for those ruled). The chapter also provides a wealth of commentary on Cephalus and his relationships with Socrates and Polemarchus. Perhaps it is the result of an inevitable tension in any monograph-commentary, but W. does not show how all of her insights are pursued or relevant to her argument. Nevertheless, this feature is a great resource for those reading the book as a commentary.
Chapter 3 focuses on Polemarchus and introduces a distinction between two senses of justice at play throughout the Republic: lay justice (L-justice – following moral rules like Cephalus) and technē justice (T-justice – a sort of ruler’s expertise in doing justice, the concern of Polemarchus and Thrasymachus). W. uses this distinction to read the various arguments of Book 1 in innovative ways. Consider, for example, how the argument at 335b–336a is clarified: the T-just person never makes others L-unjust, but rather L-just. In subsequent chapters this distinction helps W. dissect Thrasymachus’ position about the actions of the ruler (T-justice) and the obedience of the ruled (L-justice). Whether one agrees with this distinction or not, there are certainly multiple senses of justice at play throughout the dialogue, and W.’s attempt illuminates something of the vexing ambiguity.
Chapters 4–6 deal with Thrasymachus. Arguments of note include that Socrates improves Thrasymachus, that Socrates’ argument about rulers benefiting the ruled is stronger than scholars recognise, that the vacillation between δικαιοσύνη and τὸ δίκαιον is a principled use of terminology, and that the art of wage-earning is stranger than it is usually thought to be. Also notable is W.’s provocative discussion of how it is possible to be a ‘good and decent man’ and not want to rule, since ruling just is helping others: we are meant to recognise Socrates as expressing a Thrasymachean position (although nobody else, including Glaucon, grasps this).
Finally, Chapter 7 ties together the main lines of argument, showing how readers are meant to recognise the conclusions of Book 1 as at odds with later developments. W.’s account is persuasive, though at points suggestive. This is perhaps more a criticism of any account that draws implicit evidence that is at odds with what Socrates appears to assert explicitly. But W.’s clearheaded and straightforward defence of her position will, regardless, improve the clarity of future discussions on this point.
A related criticism is that W. waits until this final chapter to make her most important arguments, and one might have liked to see them explicitly defended in the earlier chapters. For instance, the idea that justice is moderation is not really identified until the final chapter, and it is not until 6.3 that we get an explicit discussion of justice as ‘outward facing’. And when we do, it is unclear that the argument precludes alternative interpretations – for example, that the reason that Plato goes out of his way in Book 4 to distance himself from previously discussed concepts of justice is not that he wants readers to recognise the incongruity, but that he wants to advance what he considers a better view. Nevertheless, the final chapter’s treatment of these questions is innovative and revealing. The account is especially valuable for establishing and addressing what is sidelined or ignored by many other commentators: that Book 4’s account of justice looks like moderation (in definition, description, effects, extension etc.), that it is at odds with facets of Book 1’s discussion of justice and that it may not reappear in later books. As W. rightly argues, these questions should be more central to discussions of justice in the Republic than they have been.
Given the very recent publication of the ‘Cambridge Green and Yellow’ commentary on Republic 1 (D. Sansone, Plato: Republic. Book I [2023]), it is a good time to be doing work on Republic 1. It bears note that W. cannot have been expected to engage in this very recently published work. However, readers should be assured that the distinct purposes of these two volumes makes for surprisingly little overlap, and both commentaries are excellent resources in their own rights.
