This book surveys and analyzes how the political psychology of six of the seven most recent Israeli Prime Ministers made them more or less likely to opt for peace. Each leader's approach is measured across five dimensions: ideology, time horizon, cognitive flexibility, risk propensity, and emotional intelligence. The book provides a wonderful portrait of the psychological and ideological make-up of each of the prime ministers and an excellent mapping of the development in their attitudes and policies. It is written in a very clear and structured manner and it is based on an extremely impressive array of sources in English and Hebrew, including a large number of interviews with key people. There are many biographies of these leaders and several academic works that seek to elucidate their worldviews, nonetheless Aronoff has produced the best succinct portrayal of each leader's approach.
Overall, Aronoff reached the following conclusions. First, in terms of ideology, a shift toward peace is facilitated by the absence or weakness of an ideological commitment to “the whole Land of Israel,” a tendency to perceive the world and the Palestinians as permanently hostile, and a belief that security is possible without peace. Second, an optimistic time horizon worked against leaders’ shifting toward peace because it prevents the belief that policy has failed or that change is urgent—this was the case with Yitzhak Shamir and Benjamin Netanyahu in the 1990s, and Ariel Sharon before he became prime minister. In contrast, leaders such as Yitzhak Rabin and Ehud Barak, who felt that time was working against Israel, shifted toward peace. Third, a propensity for taking risks made leaders such as Barak and Peres more likely to seek to make peace, while those who are risk adverse such as Netanyahu are less likely to do so. Fourth, emotional intelligence is important. Here it is argued that Barak's lack of this attribute was especially significant in contributing to the breakdown of the Oslo process in 2000. Fifth, a flexible cognitive system is deemed to have been important in that it means that leaders are more likely to listen to conflicting viewpoints and to reassess their policies. This is said to have contributed to Barak and Sharon's shifts toward peace, while inhibiting Netanyahu. While this is a very good book, I have three issues with it. First, Aronoff presents Netanyahu and Shamir as essentially having the same ideology. Yet Shamir was totally opposed for ideological reasons to territorial concessions in “the land of Israel,” although he was privately willing to consider territorial concessions from the Golan Heights. Second, in the early 1990s Netanyahu suggested privately that Shamir announce a willingness to withdraw from Gaza. Moreover, since becoming prime minister in 2009 Netanyahu has spoken publicly of his concern regarding demographic trends and the threat of a binational state while demonstrating a willingness to accept the principle of Palestinian statehood based on the 1967 borders (although he has continued to reject the division of Jerusalem). Aronoff argues this is merely a result of Netanyahu's sensitivity to Israeli public opinion and his desire to remain in power. In contrast, I think it is part and parcel of a more general ideological shift of the center-right in Israel, which has abandoned territorial maximalism without necessarily buying in to the dovish vision of peace offered by Peres and Yossi Beilin. After all, many former Likud stalwarts, including Zippi Livni, Dan Meridor, and Ehud Olmert abandoned their ideological commitment to the “whole land of Israel” because of demography and the need to protect Israel's future as a Jewish and democratic state.
In addition, while the book provides a first-rate mapping of the approaches of the prime ministers, some of the analysis regarding the importance of various psychological factors in affecting policy is less convincing. For example, Barak's lack of emotional intelligence is identified as a significant factor contributing to the failure of the Oslo process by damaging trust between himself and Arafat. However, as the author admits, Rabin also lacked emotional intelligence and did not lose his deep suspicion of Arafat until well after the signing of the initial Oslo Accords in 1993.
Third, the book seeks to emphasize the role of a changing image of the enemy in generating a positive shift toward compromise. However, unilateral disengagement—advocated at various times by Prime Ministers Barak, Sharon, and Olmert—was driven in part by the belief that the enemy remained the enemy, and that since time is working against Israel, it needed to withdraw even in the absence of ending the conflict in a formal peace treaty. Moreover, regarding the “image of the enemy,” while the book discusses the view that Arafat was not a real partner for peace, it seems to lean toward the opposing view. This issue is critical, because if Arafat was not a partner, then the book explains only shifts in a willingness to compromise, not shifts toward peace—as is stated in the book's subtitle. After all it takes two sides to make peace, and in this regard, perhaps the best biography of Arafat, by Barry Rubin, argues persuasively that Barak and much of the center-left in Israel were correct to feel cheated by the PLO leader. Moreover, the question of Palestinian intentions remains open given Abbas’ rejection of Olmert's offer in 2008 and his refusal to support Obama's framework for a peace agreement in 2014. Nonetheless, this book should be compulsory reading for anyone seriously interested in how key Israeli decision-makers think about the peace process.
