I appreciate the effort of Jeff D. Colgan to grapple with the material presented in my study of the formative years of US policy in Palestine and Israel given his interest in oil policy. However, the analysis of the origin of the US–Israel oil connection is not designed as a warning to oil companies or as a preface to oil nationalizations in the Arab world, which sometimes appears to be Colgan's prime concern in his review. The analysis offered in Dying to Forget: Oil, Power, Palestine and the Foundations of US Policy in the Middle East is about the transformation of Palestine at a time that coincided with the decolonization struggles across North Africa and the Middle East in which US officials recognized the importance of Palestine and its potential through the period including and following Israel's emergence.
At the core of Colgan's review is his rejection of the evidence I provide that contrary to conventional accounts, US support for partition and the future state of Israel did not undermine US oil interests in the Arab world, and that as early as 1948 calculations of power led US officials to recognize Israel's potential in US regional strategy.
Colgan identifies three claims which he contests. In the first he argues that “Gendzier's conclusion that there was never an ‘oil versus Israel’ choice is misleading.” What Colgan finds unacceptable is my claim that “the choice facing policymakers was not oil versus Israel but rather oil and Israel. In the years that followed, it was oil and Israel versus reform and revolution in the Arab world” (p. xviii).
Far from ignoring that there was, in fact, an “oil versus Israel” option, I offer ample evidence to demonstrate that US officials, including the Joint Chiefs of Staff, were initially opposed to support for Zionist objectives, the partition of Palestine, and the establishment of a Jewish state, as it “would prejudice United States strategic interests in the Near and Middle East,” to the extent that “United States influence in the area would be curtailed to that which could be maintained by military force” (p. 275).
But that position changed. Again, as I demonstrate on the basis of US sources confirmed by Israeli sources, the prospect of US withdrawal of its support for partition led the Jewish Agency to mobilize its efforts to persuade US officials to reconsider their views of the Arab reaction, notably that of its oil producers. They did so by emphasizing the degree of dependence of these producers on US oil companies, thus challenging the feared claim of loss of contracts due to Arab oil regimes’ power. In addition, as Colgan recognizes, the Jewish Agency representative “Eliahu Epstein lobbied to convince Max Ball, a key official in charge of the Oil and Gas Division of the Department of the Interior, to accept the future state of Israel as consistent with the interests of the United States.” What Colgan omits is the evidence of the wide reach of the relationship between Epstein and Ball and its influence, given Ball's extensive contacts throughout the policymaking bureaucracy.
Colgan additionally ignores the evidence that “the period following Israel's emergence proved to be one of expansion, not contraction, for the US oil industry.” Indeed, as US sources predicted, “that the oil companies are in a position to recover lost ground in the Near East sooner than US Government or other private interests” (p. 293). Moreover, after 1948, US–Saudi relations were strengthened and the premier US oil conglomerate operating in the Saudi Kingdom, ARAMCO, successfully pursued access to offshore rights in the Gulf (p. 295). These developments did not prevent an Arab blockade in 1949, but neither did the blockade prevent Israel from making “agreements with AIOC, Shell, Socony Vacuum and Standard Oil of New Jersey,” as Israeli historian Uri Bialer has written (p. 296).
Colgan's second rebuttal concerns my argument with respect to Israel and its strategic value for the United States, as perceived by US officials as early as 1948. Colgan concedes there is “some truth” in the position “that US officials, after 1948, rethought Israel's ‘strategic potential’ for the protection of American oil interests” given its military superiority over its Arab neighbors. As he remarks, “in the event of a major war in the Middle East, especially against the Soviet Union, the United States might have wanted Israel to serve as a military base.”
But he counters this with the claim that “this does not mean, as Gendzier implies, that US policy was oriented toward ‘Israel and oil’ in some symbiotic way.” Colgan returns to the view that “US support for Israel eventually became a major obstacle for its oil industry, ultimately leading in the 1970s to a wave of Arab countries deciding to nationalize their oil sectors.” Colgan offers no explanation of his linkage of the events of 1948 and those of the late 1970s. He offers no analysis of the conditions leading to Arab demands for sovereignty over its resources, the connection between such demands and the decoloniziation struggles taking place across North Africa and the Middle East, and Israel's role in US policy in the 1970s, which had little in common with what it was in 1948.
Colgan's third criticism involves his rejection of my analysis of the factors leading the United States to change its policy toward Israel from one of criticism of Israel's responsibility for the situation of Palestinian refugees and insistence on Israeli repatriation of refugees, to the deferral to Israel on this and related questions. Thus, Colgan rejects
a third claim that oil interests were what caused US administrations after 1948 to defer to Israel on its policies regarding the repatriation of Palestinian refugees, territorial boundaries, and Jerusalem. This claim is not proven. Mere correlation (of oil interests and deferral to Israel) does not prove causation. There could have been other factors that caused deferral to Israel in the wake of its independence. It is at least possible that the Israel lobby within the United States shaped policy significantly, and would have done so independently of American's oil interests.
Colgan's case would have been better served by reference to my discussion of the presidential campaign of 1948 and its influence on the move of the White House to order US officials to adopt a more compliant policy toward Israel (p. 320). This move did not contradict the deliberations that were in process in other circles, including the military. Colgan gives no indication of the evidence provided in Part Vl (pp. 303–24) that documents the deliberations of leading figures in US civil and military positions favoring a politics of deferral. Officials at the highest levels who had been confirmed supporters of the view that the resolution of the Palestinian refugee problem was the prerequisite to the Israeli–Palestinian conflict, determined that deferral to Israel was in US interests for reasons they clearly enumerated. Those reasons favored Israel's military capacity and its superiority over the military of Arab states which had effectively altered the regional balance of power. From their perspective, US officials considered the above sufficient reason to rethink Israel's potential in future US strategy. That strategy involved the maintenance of a favorable status quo in the region in order to contain the forces of reform and subvert those of revolution, a policy inseparable from the protection of broader US interests including those of US oil companies.
